# World War II Buffs: WWII Strategy? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [March 9, 2022, 3:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720 "2022-03-09T03:28:15Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![JohnnyEcks](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/johnnyecks/32/18197_2.png) [@JohnnyEcks](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JohnnyEcks)\ **Post date:** [March 16, 2022, 6:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/81 "2022-03-16T18:26:46Z")
It’s been a while since I read Shattered Sword, but a large part of his argument rested on ship design, standard operating procedures, and training records. As I recall, he made a very good case that given the amount of time it took to recover, rearm, and refuel the planes, it simply wasn’t possible for them to be ready for another attack. There are only so many trained men and so much equipment and space available, and it was physically impossible for them to ready the planes any quicker. In addition, Fuchida’s account of the Pearl Harbor attack is also riddled with inaccuracies, probably to hide the inefficiency of various air groups. He seems to have been very comfortable altering facts to meet his preferences. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [March 16, 2022, 6:39pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/82 "2022-03-16T18:39:39Z")
> [@Jinx](#): > > In WWII, why didn’t the Allies bomb the heck out of the German railroads (by air) from the start? I’m no historian, but it seems to me the railroads were clearly the lifeline for Nazi Army. Furthermore, why didn’t the Allies go for air superiority over the Nazis before engaging in the Battle of the Bulge, etc? 1. Railroads are very hard to bomb. They are narrow, and difficult to destroy unless you hit them directly. WWII bombers were of dubious accuracy from high altitude during the day and at night could hit nothing smaller than a city. The Allies built a lot of bombers, but Europe is a big place, so they had to be selective in what they bombed. The British did not have effective precision bombing capabilities and ended up choosing to burn and blow up cities on a large scale, while the USAAF decided on different targets to crush the German economy like oil and industrial production. The Allies certainly did go after railyards to some extent and once they achieved air supremacy their fighter bombers would regularly destroy trains. My grandfather destroyed several trains in his Tempest V, and was subsequently shot down by another. (He survived.) 1. The Allies did have air superiority by the time the Battle of the Bulge happened. Tactical air support was not generally possible when weather was bad but when it was good the Allies owned the air. The Germans had a joke that went “If you see white planes they’re American. If you see black planes they’re British. If you see no planes, it’s the Luftwaffe!” ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 16, 2022, 6:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/83 "2022-03-16T18:42:52Z")
> [@griffin1977](#): > > So I have no feelings about which version is true, but I’m curious about this (though not enough to, you know, read their paper 🙂 ) What is there in the ship documentation that gives them so much confidence in this conclusion? The [linked PDF](https://digital-commons.usnwc.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1601&context=nwc-review) is 12 pages , which means that you likely have spent more time arguing the point than reading the evidence. 🙂 This is not something they did lightly and they documented their evidence very well. Fukuda lied about a number of things concerning the war, and Parshall and Tully spent years gathering the evidence showing that he had indeed lied. As Parshall says: > [@](#): > > Sadly, however, this article has less to do with beer than with the use of personal accounts in the study of naval history, since it is doubtful that any one person has had a more deleterious long-term impact on the study of the Pacific War than Mitsuo Fuchida. Because of his misstatements, the American study of the Japanese side of such battles as Pearl Harbor and Midway (particularly the latter) was probably set back by decades. His untruths also demonstrate the tremendous power of self-serving ideas that may be wrong, but subtly support national self-images, particularly when carried forward by the mass media. This is a theme I will explore. I hope it will be instructive to other historians. Among other things, after the two authors had become convinced that Fukuda was lying, Parshall (or perhaps both of them, I don’t recall if he said “we” or “I”) had a chance to discuss this with Japanese historians, and they said they had known for decades that Fuchida was lying. > [@](#): > > During the course of the morning’s operations the Japanese carriers came under attack no fewer than five times by nine separate groups of American aircraft. Not surprisingly, Japanese flight decks were quite busy with combat air patrol (CAP) requirements. These activities, as well as the interspersed American attacks, made it nearly impossible for the reserve strike force to be readied on the Japanese flight decks—a process that took around forty-five minutes.13 It was not until the publication of Shattered Sword that all these factors were brought together. In the course of our research, Tully and I were able to use the Japanese air group records for the carriers to show that the Japanese had been recovering CAP fighters aboard Akagi a mere fifteen minutes before it was bombed.14 Recovering aircraft meant that its flight deck had to be empty aft, which in turn meant that there was no reserve strike force spotted. The official Japanese war history on the battle, Senshi So-sho, explicitly states that at the time of the American attack there were no attack aircraft on the Japanese flight decks, only combat air patrol fighters. Indeed, the Zero fighter whizzing off Akagi’s flight deck in Fuchida’s dramatic passage can be shown in Akagi’s own air group records to have been a CAP fighter, sent aloft to foil the ongoing American air attacks. We even know the pilot’s name.15 > > Thus, Fuchida’s entire rendition of the climax of the most important naval battle in American history was a lie. The Japanese were nowhere near ready to counterattack at this time. The truly stunning thing about this, however, is that it essentially paralyzed the American study of this pivotal battle for the better part of fifty years. Fuchida’s tale was in English, while the operational records that belied it were in handwritten Japanese stored on microfilms. Japanese carrier could not spot planes on the flight deck while simultaneously recovering other aircraft. The CAP records show time of the launching and recovery of the fighters during the morning and show conclusively that there wasn’t enough time for the large group of aircraft to be spotted. They demonstrate the length of time that takes and such. As was mentioned by @gnarator they also have photographic evidence that the decks did not have the supposed strikeforce. The evidence is conclusive. ---
**Author:** ![txtumbleweed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/278dde/32.png) [@txtumbleweed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/txtumbleweed)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 2:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/84 "2022-03-17T02:59:28Z")
> [@griffin1977](#): > > So I have no feelings about which version is true, but I’m curious about this (though not enough to, you know, read their paper 🙂 ) What is there in the ship documentation that gives them so much confidence in this conclusion? @TokyoBayer has an excellent post, just a few more supporting details. The air group records from the Japanese carriers survived the battle. You can see an example of one of these _kodochoshos_ from _Akagi_ here: [http://www.combinedfleet.com/fuchida/images/AkagiKodo\_060442\_1.jpg](http://www.combinedfleet.com/fuchida/images/AkagiKodo_060442_1.jpg) (caution, [combinedfleet.com](http://combinedfleet.com) is a great place to lose an entire day) These are the records for each flight of aircraft with everything from take off/landing times to the weapons loadout. Using these, Parshall and Tully were able to reconstruct the timeline of carrier ops for the Japanese at Midway. This showed conclusively that no Japanese aircraft could have been on the flight deck at the time of the 1020 US attack. A second supporting point for the fact that the Japanese flight decks were empty was the delay in in the launch of _Hiryu’s_ counterstrike. Had the aircraft been on the deck and launching almost simultaneously with the US attacks as Fuchida claims, _Hiryu’s_ strike should have been outbound on the heels of the US aircraft fleeiing for home. As it was, _Hiryu_ didn’t launch until almost 1100, some 30 minutes after the US strikes ended. The 30 minutes it would normally to take to get aircraft up from the hanger, warm-up engines, and then launch aircraft. ---
**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 4:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/85 "2022-03-17T04:02:02Z")
The details of whether the planes were on the deck or below deck seems a bit of a nitpick. The larger question to me is did the Japanese, in their rush to re-arm and refuel planes, skimp on safety procedures? Were the Japanese carriers wrecked because they just really sucked at damage control and, while it was business as usual for them, a few bombs was all it took to wreck them? Or, were the Japanese lax about usual safety procedures in all the rush and, when the bombs hit, those bombs found carriers unusually vulnerable to such attacks? ---
**Author:** ![OttoDaFe](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ottodafe/32/356_2.png) [@OttoDaFe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OttoDaFe)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 7:09am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/86 "2022-03-17T07:09:16Z")
One major problem on the _Akagi_ and _Kaga_ is that they were trying to repurpose their B5N (“Kate”) squadrons. They had initially been armed with torpedoes in case USN fleet units were encountered, but when it was decided that a second Midway attack was necessary they had to be changed over to level bombers. This involved not only removing the torpedoes, but changing the mounting brackets because the level bombs had a different shape. In addition, the torpedoes that were removed couldn’t be struck below to the magazines while the level bombs were being brought up. The discovery that the USN was present, and later that there was a US carrier in the area, only added to the confusion. So I suppose one could say they were “lax about usual safety procedures,” but unlike the British at Jutland it was a matter of trying to do too many things at once. As far as damage control was concerned, they certainly did suck compared to the USN. And their ships were designed with an emphasis on offensive capability, often at the expense of survivability. ---
**Author:** ![ASL\_v2.0](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/asl_v2.0/32/3525_2.png) [@ASL\_v2.0](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/ASL_v2.0)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 7:18am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/87 "2022-03-17T07:18:56Z")
> [@griffin1977](#): > > Random personal anecdote about this. My grandfather had a good friend on board the Hood, he was absolutely clear (after a drink or two) that all the officers knew there were design flaws that meant they would not likely survive an artillery duel with a German battleship. Design flaws, or simply the sober realization that _Hood_, a battlecruiser launched in 1918, was bound to be at a disadvantage if set against a generic “German battleship.” Keeping in mind that whereas the other WWII-era navies had battleships and/or battlecruisers still in service from WWI and interwar years of the 1920s and early 1930s, the Germans were by necessity limited to a handful of relatively new capital ships. So someone serving in an older ship like _Hood_ would have to know for certain that if they _did_ end up going toe-to-toe with a “German battleship” that could really only mean one of the two _Bismarck_ class ships or maybe–depending on how generous they were with the term “battleship”–the two ships of the _Scharnhorst_ class. While _Bismarck_’s dispatch of _Hood_ was perhaps swifter than expected, and of course it was not a single ship-on-ship duel, it’s hardly surprising that officers serving in _Hood_ would have had serious doubts about their ships ability to go up against either of the two ships of the _Bismarck_ class, being launched twenty years apart. So while I’m not saying _Hood_ didn’t have design flaws, I would simply highlight that to the extent your grandfather’s “good friend” story might well be substantially true, it’s not necessarily on account of “design flaws” that the officers in questions may have had misgivings. Because, again, there’s “design flaws,” and then there’s age and advances over time. ---
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 4:07pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/88 "2022-03-17T16:07:18Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > The USAAF did not run out of incendiaries, but were running out of targets. Knowing atomic bombs were coming on line, about a half-dozen cities – including Hiroshima and Nagasaki – were [left untouched](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki#Choice_of_targets) so an assessment of the bombs’ effectiveness could be made. > The target selection was subject to the following criteria: > > - The target was larger than 3 mi (4.8 km) in diameter and was an important target in \> a large city. > - The [blast wave](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blast_wave) would create effective damage. > - The target was unlikely to be attacked by August 1945.[[76]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Atomic_bombings_of_Hiroshima_and_Nagasaki#cite_note-targetcommittee-76) ---
**Author:** ![gnarator](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gnarator/32/8266_2.png) [@gnarator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gnarator)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 5:10pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/89 "2022-03-17T17:10:42Z")
> [@ASL\_v2.0](#): > > So while I’m not saying _Hood_ didn’t have design flaws, I would simply highlight that to the extent your grandfather’s “good friend” story might well be substantially true, it’s not necessarily on account of “design flaws” that the officers in questions may have had misgivings. Because, again, there’s “design flaws,” and then there’s age and advances over time. There’s a kernel of truth to the design flaw idea. The _Hood’s_ design predated the Battle of Jutland, where RN battle cruisers fared poorly, so she was modified during her construction to add more armor. Even so, there were some deficiencies in the design. The rest of the ships in her class were canceled, with the RN deciding to start over with a clean slate (those ships were canceled due to the Washington Naval Treaty). The \*Hood \* had several refittings and modifications over her service life. Advances in naval gunnery were to lead to another rebuild in 1941, but the outbreak of war kept her in service without any upgrades. Drachinifel [makes the case](https://youtu.be/CLPeC7LRqIY) that it was essentially a lucky shot. ---
**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 6:13pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/90 "2022-03-17T18:13:14Z")
> [@gnarator](#): > > The _Hood’s_ design predated the Battle of Jutland, where RN battle cruisers fared poorly… My understanding was the Royal Navy ships at Jutland faring poorly was due to demands on the crew to be very fast at reloading weapons. As a result, crews got in the habit of skipping safety procedures and things like ammo and propellant were left exposed in the various spaces so they could be quickly sent to the guns when a reload was needed. As a result, a hit in the right spot would detonate that stuff lying about and bye-bye ship. It’s not the ship design that was bad. It was the training/culture aboard those ships. ---
**Author:** ![Capn\_Carl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/838e76/32.png) [@Capn\_Carl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Capn_Carl)\ **Post date:** [March 17, 2022, 11:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/91 "2022-03-17T23:40:54Z")
The problem is that gasoline is extremely flammable. The USN ships had better firefighting equipment by 1944, but in 1942, if you hit an American or Japanese carrier while it had fueled aircraft aboard ( _Wasp, Akagi_ , etc.), it was screwed. If you hit it while the gas was secured ( _Yorktown, Shokaku, Hornet_ ), it could take a lot of damage and stay afloat (although _Lexington_ didn’t). Even with 1944-level damage control, _Franklin_ was nearly lost to a flight deck/hangar fire, caused by a bomb that would have done much less damage, had there been no fueled aircraft nearby. ---
**Author:** ![gnarator](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/gnarator/32/8266_2.png) [@gnarator](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/gnarator)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 12:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/92 "2022-03-18T00:57:39Z")
Jellicoe’s official report blamed thin turret armor for the loss of three battle cruisers–each of the British battle cruisers was penetrated through a turret roof and her magazines ignited by flash fires passing through the turret and shell-handling rooms. The German battle cruisers had thicker turret armor and more deck armor, so _Hood’s_ design was modified to giver her 5,000 tons more armor. The poor cordite handling no doubt was the real cause, but both Beatty and Jellicoe blamed thin armor. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 12:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/93 "2022-03-18T12:33:47Z")
> [@Whack-a-Mole](#): > > The details of whether the planes were on the deck or below deck seems a bit of a nitpick. This completely misses the significance of the elementary but fundamental principle of carrier navigation. Carrier planes cannot take off from the hangers below deck. Simply not possible. The false claim was that the strike force was spotted on the four IJN carriers and that the order to launch had been given. Given that strikes from _Hiryu_, the one Japanese carrier that survived the initial deadly US assault, knocked out one of the three USN carriers, it can be assumed that a combined attack from all four carriers would done substantially more damage. But for those five minutes! Had Fuchida’s account been true, and had they been able to launch the planes five minutes earlier, then the course of the war would have been changed. It was one of the greatest “what if” stories of the war, and seemingly the most plausible. But it wasn’t true and Fuchida’s account was simply that of a bullshit artist. (Of course, it wouldn’t have changed the outcome of the war, anyway.) > [@Whack-a-Mole](#): > > Were the Japanese carriers wrecked because they just really sucked at damage control and, while it was business as usual for them, a few bombs was all it took to wreck them? Or, were the Japanese lax about usual safety procedures in all the rush and, when the bombs hit, those bombs found carriers unusually vulnerable to such attacks? This is one of those cases where the answer to an “or” question is “yeah.” As noted by @OttoDaFe, Japanese damage control lagged that of the US. It was also early in the war and everyone got better as time went along, although the Japanese never got as good as the USN. Carriers were floating bombs. They had substantial quantities of bombs. planes, and AV gas stored in close quarters. As @DesertDog notes, AV gas was highly flammable, while the ship’s fuel oil was not as much. Ships also contained a lot of flammable material, including furniture, the flight deck, bedding, paperwork, etc. Japanese carriers had wood floors in the crew quarters. Gas explosions were also serious issues. _Princeton_ (CVL-23), a light carrier, was lost in 1944 after being hit by a single 450 kg GP bomb. > [@](#): > > At 0938 a single enemy plane scored a bomb hit about 15 feet off the centerline to port at frame 98 on the flight deck. The bomb passed through the flight deck, went through a torpedo plane on the hangar deck, pierced the hangar and main decks, and detonated in B-204-2L on the second deck or between the main and second decks. The resulting structural damage was relatively minor. The fire started by the gas from the plane eventually got out of control and they were forced to abandon ship and scuttle it. This was in 1944, after damage control procedures have been improved over the start of the war. The point is that sometimes it only took one (un)lucky hit. However, there were other attacks where the crews were able to control the fires. For the four IJN flattops, _Kaga_ was hit by five bombs, four of which were placed along the length of _Kaga_’s upper hanger. It was gone. _Soryu_ was hit by three bombs in the upper hanger and possible up to 1/3 of the crew may have been dead by the time the last of the dive bombers completed it’s attack. _Akagi_ was hit by only one hit, but that landed in a location which also doomed the ship, right on top of a Kate bomber, fully fueled and loaded with a torpedo, with another 17 around. It’s possible that had the damage-control teams been able to react swiftly and appropriately, the Adm. Nagumo’s flagship but that would have been difficult, and within minutes the flames were getting out of hand. _Hiryu_ was hit by four 1000-lb bombs and although the damage control teams actually battled well, the damage was too great. ---
**Author:** ![Limmin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/f04885/32.png) [@Limmin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Limmin)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 1:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/94 "2022-03-18T13:56:26Z")
Fukuda = Fuchida? And is this the same guy who led the Pearl Harbor aerial assault? This thread has a lot of new (to me) and interesting stuff. ---
**Author:** ![JohnnyEcks](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/johnnyecks/32/18197_2.png) [@JohnnyEcks](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JohnnyEcks)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 2:21pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/95 "2022-03-18T14:21:29Z")
The very same. Alan Zimm’s book, “Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat,Myths, Deceptions” explains that he was in charge of the after action report and photo analysis, and makes a very good case that he lied extensively, mostly to credit dive bombers with kills that they did not earn. I highly recommend it- it really dismantles the myth of hyper competent Japanese military. In reality, Pearl Harbor was a high stakes gamble that very easily could have gone the other way. They never even made a contingency plan for if the fleet was detected before the attack! ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 3:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/96 "2022-03-18T15:26:43Z")
> [@Limmin](#): > > Fukuda = Fuchida? And is this the same guy who led the Pearl Harbor aerial assault? > > This thread has a lot of new (to me) and interesting stuff. Yeah, sorry. It should be [Fuchida](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida). > [@](#): > > Fuchida was an important figure in the early portion of the Pacific War, and his written accounts, translated into English and published in the U.S., were highly influential.[[28]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-29) However, the veracity of Fuchida’s statements on a variety of topics has been subsequently called into question. This process began in Japan in 1971, with the publication of the Japanese official war history volume on the [Battle of Midway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway), which explicitly contradicted Fuchida’s version of events.[[29]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTESenshi_Sosho1971372%E2%80%93378-30) In 2001, historians H.P. Willmott and Haruo Tohmatsu in their _Pearl Harbor_ , dismissed Fuchida’s rendition of having demanded a third-wave against Pearl Harbor’s fuel tanks as “blatant and shameless self-advertisement” regarding “an episode which never took place.”[[30]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-31) These criticisms were repeated by historian Jonathan Parshall[[31]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEParshall2010-32) and Mark Stille’s _Tora! Tora! Tora! Pearl Harbor 1941_ .[[32]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-33) Alan Zimm’s 2011 _Attack on Pearl Harbor: Strategy, Combat, Myths, Deceptions_ , reinforced and enlarged these earlier criticisms[[33]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEZimm,_pp._301-308-34) and added new charges, including Fuchida having fabricated a battle damage assessment that was presented to Emperor [Hirohito](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hirohito).[[34]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEZimm,_pp._255-258;_361-365-35) Zimm subsequently accused Fuchida of lying about important decisions and signals he made as strike leader immediately prior to the attack, while blaming others for his own errors.[[35]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEZimm_2016,_pp._19-22.-36) With respect to the [Battle of Midway](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Midway), Fuchida’s account of the readiness of the Japanese counterstrike aircraft during the American dive-bomber attack has been disputed by historians Parshall and Anthony Tully in their 2005 work _[Shattered Sword](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shattered_Sword:_The_Untold_Story_of_the_Battle_of_Midway)_ ,[[36]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEParshallTully2005437%E2%80%93442-37) as well as Dallas Isom’s _Midway Inquest_ ,[[37]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-38) Craig Symonds _The Battle of Midway_ .,[[38]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-39) and Evan Mawdsley,[[39]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-40) with Mawdsley noting “Parshall and Tully compellingly contradict Fuchida.”[[40]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-41) Parshall also disputed Fuchida’s uncorroborated claims of attendance on the battleship [USS _Missouri_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/USS_Missouri_(BB-63)) during the [Japanese surrender ceremony](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Surrender_of_Japan) in 1945,[[31]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEParshall2010-32) these criticisms being later amplified by Zimm.[[41]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mitsuo_Fuchida#cite_note-FOOTNOTEZimm,_pp._260-263.-42) Reading about him, I found an interview with the Christian magazine _[Guideposts](https://www.guideposts.org/inspiration/inspiring-stories/stories-of-hope/pearl-harbor-finding-forgiveness-for-mitsuo-fuchida)_ which says: > [@](#): > > Then one day in June 1942 he was on the deck of the aircraft carrier Akagi off a small island called Midway when American planes swooped from the sky. Several bombs hit the ship; there were fires and explosions. > > One explosion left Fuchida with two shattered legs. From the Japanese light cruiser that rescued him he watched as his ship was scuttled and three other carriers sank. The Battle of Midway was Japan’s first defeat of the war. While it’s true that he was indeed injured from a bomb blast while on _Akagi_ and then was taken along with Adm. Nagumo to the light cruiser _Nagara_, it didn’t stick around to watch the carriers sink. Nagumo actually lead the charge to attempt to close in with the US carriers and engage a surface action and left some destroyers to tend to the three burning carriers while _Hiryo_ initially was able to go along with the force lead by Nagumo. _Soryu_ and _Kaga_ were scuttled around 1915. _Akagi_ _Nagara_ was a long distance away. _Akagi_ wasn’t actually scutted until 0520 the next morning when _Nagara_ carrying the now disgraced Nagumo along with Fuchida were retreating to the west. _Hiryu_ was also scuttled by torpedo about that time, but didn’t actually sink until around 0910. The final survivors were adrift for 14 days until rescued by some Americans. Obviously, Fuchida did not witness this, so this was just another lie. Going back to: > [@griffin1977](#): > > But surely given a disagreement between a first person account (from both sides IIRC, aren’t there accounts from the US pilots of large numbers of planes ready to take off, as they completed their bombing runs?) of what happened, and what someone wrote on some form to satisfy the Japanese naval bureaucracy (presumably a while after the battle) with no particular strong reason to ensure it was an exactly accurate minute-by-minute account of the battle, you would choose to trust the first person account more? As has been shown before, the records were actually made accurately, in the battle and not some form to fulfill Navy bureaucracy. There is no reason to believe a bullshit artist whose claims can be proven to be impossible. > [@JohnnyEcks](#): > > I highly recommend it- it really dismantles the myth of hyper competent Japanese military. In reality, Pearl Harbor was a high stakes gamble that very easily could have gone the other way. They never even made a contingency plan for if the fleet was detected before the attack! Ditto the recommendation. A lot of popularly known “facts” about the war are incorrect or not as cut and dried as is thought, and it’s interesting to dive into those. ---
**Author:** ![griffin1977](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/977dab/32.png) [@griffin1977](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/griffin1977)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 3:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/97 "2022-03-18T15:40:07Z")
> [@gnarator](#): > > Jellicoe’s official report blamed thin turret armor for the loss of three battle cruisers–each of the British battle cruisers was penetrated through a turret roof and her magazines ignited by flash fires IIRC it was specifically this that my grandfather’s friend related to him (that all the officers on board knew a single direct hit on a turret would be the end of it), I assume my grandfather was not the only one to hear this so that could have influenced the version of events in the official report. ---
**Author:** ![Limmin](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/f04885/32.png) [@Limmin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Limmin)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 4:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/98 "2022-03-18T16:06:12Z")
Outstanding. Thanks! ---
**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 7:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/99 "2022-03-18T19:05:25Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > This completely misses the significance of the elementary but fundamental principle of carrier navigation. Carrier planes cannot take off from the hangers below deck. Simply not possible. What I was mainly curious about was whether the American dive bombers happened upon the Japanese carriers when those carriers were particularly vulnerable or if it didn’t matter at all? Whether the planes could have dropped three bombs on a Japanese carrier at absolutely any time, in any conditions, and the carrier would have suffered the same fate. ---
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 9:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/100 "2022-03-18T21:14:03Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > The point is that sometimes it only took one (un)lucky hit. However, there were other attacks where the crews were able to control the fires. One of the things Drach mentioned in an episode on damage control last year was that while both the IJN and USN had specially trained teams, any American sailor could handle a fire hose or do basic dewatering while Japanese, not so much. More than one IJN ship was lost when the DC team was in the wrong compartment at the wrong time and wiped out while a USN ship may well have survived a similar hit because of that training. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720.md?page=4) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720.md?page=6)