# World War II Buffs: WWII Strategy? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [March 9, 2022, 3:28am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720 "2022-03-09T03:28:15Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 10\ **Page:** 6
**Author:** ![OttoDaFe](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ottodafe/32/356_2.png) [@OttoDaFe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OttoDaFe)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 9:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/101 "2022-03-18T21:47:14Z")
Well, if the dive bombers had struck at 02:00 when the mechanics and armorers were still in their bunks, the carriers would have been much more likely to survive. Okay, seriously: the fact that the hangar decks were crammed\* with fully fueled and armed (at least in the case of the level/torpedo bombers) aircraft magnified the damage done by a bomb manyfold. Also, the fueling system was unsecured so breaks in the line resulted in avgas pouring out onto the deck. Such conditions would not have been present outside of a battle, so being hit then wouldn’t have done nearly as much damage. \* One of the more interesting illustrations in _Shattered Sword_ is a diagram of a typical IJN hangar deck. It looked something like a Tetris game, and I got the impression that even an accidental fire with no associated bomb damage would have been difficult to reach. ---
**Author:** ![Capn\_Carl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/838e76/32.png) [@Capn\_Carl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Capn_Carl)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 10:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/102 "2022-03-18T22:32:19Z")
There’s a convenient example that answers your question. The _Shokaku_ was badly damaged by multiple hits from dive bombers, on 2 separate occasions. The resulting fires were controlled, and the ship returned safely, because there were no fueled aircraft present when bombed. ---
**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\ **Post date:** [March 18, 2022, 10:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/103 "2022-03-18T22:55:42Z")
> [@OttoDaFe](#): > > - One of the more interesting illustrations in _Shattered Sword_ is a diagram of a typical IJN hangar deck. It looked something like a Tetris game, and I got the impression that even an accidental fire with no associated bomb damage would have been difficult to reach. I am always amazed that these ships could carry as many planes as they did not to mention move them around and arm them and whatnot. No matter what carrier it is. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2022, 12:04pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/104 "2022-03-20T12:04:30Z")
> [@DesertDog](#): > > One of the things Drach mentioned in an episode on damage control last year was that while both the IJN and USN had specially trained teams, any American sailor could handle a fire hose or do basic dewatering while Japanese, not so much. Drach is one of my favorites! Very informative. One of the fascinating aspects of studying the war is trying to understand the decision making process and the cultural biases which are involved. Japan had recognized it was in an inferior position concerning the US, and had developed quite the plan for how to defeat the USN, despite having fewer battleships. They were completely offensively oriented to the detriment of their defensive abilities. Other aspects of the differences between the two countries’ attitudes was that the US teams would actually lay down on the deck during an attack to reduce the risk of getting hurt or killed. That would not be acceptable on Japanese ships. > [@OttoDaFe](#): > > Also, the fueling system was unsecured so breaks in the line resulted in avgas pouring out onto the deck. That came [as a lesson](https://www.usni.org/magazines/naval-history-magazine/2019/december/fighting-survival) out of the loss of _Lexington_ at Coral Sea. > [@](#): > > The _Yorktown_ ’s acting executive officer, Commander Irving D. Wiltsie, later reported one reason the carrier had escaped more extensive damage: Shortly before the dive bombers had attacked, “all gasoline in the topside gasoline lines was pumped back down to the gasoline tanks. . . . [A] CO2 purging system for the topside gasoline lines and a CO2 blanket for the gasoline tank compartments” prevented a serious conflagration. Machinist Oscar W. Myers, the air fuel officer, had developed the carbon-dioxide purging system to expel vapors.14 This lesson had been learned from the loss of the USS _Lexington_ (CV-2) at Coral Sea. Both sides did learn lessons from the war, but it seems the US was more systematic about gathering information, analyzing and implementing changes than Japan. It’s not that Japan never made changes, but not as systematic as America. [Sloppy damage control](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_aircraft_carrier_Shinano#Attacked) on _Shinano_ caused Japan’s largest carrier to get sunk just after being commissioned and before it was completely fitted out. While they had an inexperienced, they should have known by November, 1944 that this should be automatic. Of course, poor damage control contributed to the loss of several of the BB at Pearl Harbor. > [@Whack-a-Mole](#): > > What I was mainly curious about was whether the American dive bombers happened upon the Japanese carriers when those carriers were particularly vulnerable or if it didn’t matter at all? A lack of personal interest does not trivialize the significance of the event to history. If one were to hang around the alt-history forums then it would be a given that _Akagi_ was lost simply because of Japanese clownish attempts at damage control, but that seems to be more wishful thinking in terms that it gives another “what if.” It’s true that she was only hit by one 450-kg bombs, but it was in a particularly vulnerable location. Of the two other near misses, the one near the stern may have also caused critical damage, specifically damage from it preventing the aft magazine from being flooded. ---
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2022, 4:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/105 "2022-03-20T16:24:15Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Japan had recognized it was in an inferior position concerning the US, and had developed quite the plan for how to defeat the USN, despite having fewer battleships. They were completely offensively oriented to the detriment of their defensive abilities. It was part in parcel of their national character, the first strike to deliver a stunning blow to your enemy rendering him unable or unwilling to carry on. In the final film of [_Samurai Trilogy_](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samurai_Trilogy), based loosely on the story of the legendary Miyamoto Musashi, there’s a long, long scene where he’s rowed to an island to meet and fight his mortal enemy, Sasaki. On stepping ashore the fight commences and two minutes later Musashi is victorious but mourns “the greatest swordsman” he’d ever faced. I watched it with a friend who knew Japanese history much better than I and when I commented, “That was quick,” he said, “That was to give the audience a payoff,” – the historical sword fight was done in about ten seconds. ---
**Author:** ![Whack-a-Mole](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/whack-a-mole/32/141_2.png) [@Whack-a-Mole](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Whack-a-Mole)\ **Post date:** [March 20, 2022, 5:15pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/106 "2022-03-20T17:15:51Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > A lack of personal interest does not trivialize the significance of the event to history. I do not know what this means. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 21, 2022, 12:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/107 "2022-03-21T12:26:32Z")
> [@Capn\_Carl](#): > > There’s a convenient example that answers your question. The _Shokaku_ was badly damaged by multiple hits from dive bombers, on 2 separate occasions. The resulting fires were controlled, and the ship returned safely, because there were no fueled aircraft present when bombed. And of course [she was sunk](http://www.combinedfleet.com/shoksink.htm) in the Battle of of the Philippine Sea, when she was first hit by four torpedoes, one of which hit the avgas storage. > [@](#): > > _Shokaku_ had just recovered planes and was fueling others when the torpedoes struck; thus highly volatile av-gas was flowing through pipes in the vicinity of the impacts. Nothing could have been as catastrophic in timing. As many as nine aircraft were in the hangar, and the hangar was turned into chaos by the shocks. Gas spewed from ruptured aircraft tanks and caught fire, and ammunition on hoists began to explode, turning the hangar into a blast furnace. Exploding bombs and aircraft fuel tanks added to the conflagration and cut down men trying to fight the fire, so that pieces of “dismembered bodies lay everywhere about the deck”. > > With boiler rooms on the starboard side flooding quickly, the _Shokaku_ at once lost speed, fell out of formation, and began to list rapidly to starboard. Reacting quickly, Captain Matsubara ordered port spaces counterflooded to correct the list. This was done, but too well, as damage control efforts overcompensated, and _Shokaku_ flopped over into an opposite heel to port! [It should be noted that the magnitude of counterflooding necessary to accomplish this reverse heel to port most likely would have involved flooding of port-side machinery spaces, further complicating _Shokaku’s_ power situation.] At the same time the carrier was beginning to trim noticeably by the bow, for one of the torpedoes there had opened a large hole. [Our analysis revealed just such a hit and raised the distinct possibility that the bow was rent clean through, which could explain the marked head trim reported throughout]. The upshot was that before noon the _Shokaku_ had become unnavigable and gone dead in the water, fires raging. Eventually, a (Japanese) aerial bomb on the hangar deck forward exploded and set off a gas vapor explosion, followed by four other massive explosions and sunk within minutes. Torpedoes hit below the waterline, where the AV gas was stored, and usually bombs exploded in the hangers above the waterline. ---
**Author:** ![Capn\_Carl](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/c/838e76/32.png) [@Capn\_Carl](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Capn_Carl)\ **Post date:** [March 22, 2022, 2:02am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/108 "2022-03-22T02:02:18Z")
The loss of _Shokaku_ is similar to that of _Wasp_: torpedo hits, ruptured gas mains, followed by uncontrollable fires in the hangar, where planes were being refueled. ---
**Author:** ![JRDelirious](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jrdelirious/32/9531_2.png) [@JRDelirious](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JRDelirious)\ **Post date:** [March 22, 2022, 2:27am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/109 "2022-03-22T02:27:56Z")
> [@Whack-a-Mole](#): > > It’s not the ship design that was bad. It was the training/culture aboard those ships. > [@gnarator](#): > > The poor cordite handling no doubt was the real cause, but both Beatty and Jellicoe blamed thin armor. So, in effect saying, “why yes, sir, you’re right, there seems to _be_ something bloody wrong with our ships…” rather than point to procedure and training which would have meant someone in the chain of command was doing their job wrong. ---
**Author:** ![OttoDaFe](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ottodafe/32/356_2.png) [@OttoDaFe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OttoDaFe)\ **Post date:** [March 22, 2022, 6:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720/110 "2022-03-22T06:38:04Z")
My — perhaps faulty — recollection is that procedures and training were being deliberately ignored. Since the British optical fire controls were inferior to the Germans’ they tried to compensate by increasing their rate of fire; this led not only to storing cordite in the turrets, but to propping the flash doors (designed to prevent a turret explosion from traveling down the ammunition hoist to the shell handling rooms and magazines) open. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/world-war-ii-buffs-wwii-strategy/960720.md?page=5)