Well, if the dive bombers had struck at 02:00 when the mechanics and armorers were still in their bunks, the carriers would have been much more likely to survive.
Okay, seriously: the fact that the hangar decks were crammed* with fully fueled and armed (at least in the case of the level/torpedo bombers) aircraft magnified the damage done by a bomb manyfold. Also, the fueling system was unsecured so breaks in the line resulted in avgas pouring out onto the deck. Such conditions would not have been present outside of a battle, so being hit then wouldn’t have done nearly as much damage.
* One of the more interesting illustrations in Shattered Sword is a diagram of a typical IJN hangar deck. It looked something like a Tetris game, and I got the impression that even an accidental fire with no associated bomb damage would have been difficult to reach.
There’s a convenient example that answers your question. The Shokaku was badly damaged by multiple hits from dive bombers, on 2 separate occasions. The resulting fires were controlled, and the ship returned safely, because there were no fueled aircraft present when bombed.
I am always amazed that these ships could carry as many planes as they did not to mention move them around and arm them and whatnot. No matter what carrier it is.
One of the fascinating aspects of studying the war is trying to understand the decision making process and the cultural biases which are involved. Japan had recognized it was in an inferior position concerning the US, and had developed quite the plan for how to defeat the USN, despite having fewer battleships. They were completely offensively oriented to the detriment of their defensive abilities.
Other aspects of the differences between the two countries’ attitudes was that the US teams would actually lay down on the deck during an attack to reduce the risk of getting hurt or killed. That would not be acceptable on Japanese ships.
That came as a lesson out of the loss of Lexington at Coral Sea.
Both sides did learn lessons from the war, but it seems the US was more systematic about gathering information, analyzing and implementing changes than Japan.
It’s not that Japan never made changes, but not as systematic as America. Sloppy damage control on Shinano caused Japan’s largest carrier to get sunk just after being commissioned and before it was completely fitted out.
While they had an inexperienced, they should have known by November, 1944 that this should be automatic.
Of course, poor damage control contributed to the loss of several of the BB at Pearl Harbor.
A lack of personal interest does not trivialize the significance of the event to history.
If one were to hang around the alt-history forums then it would be a given that Akagi was lost simply because of Japanese clownish attempts at damage control, but that seems to be more wishful thinking in terms that it gives another “what if.”
It’s true that she was only hit by one 450-kg bombs, but it was in a particularly vulnerable location. Of the two other near misses, the one near the stern may have also caused critical damage, specifically damage from it preventing the aft magazine from being flooded.
It was part in parcel of their national character, the first strike to deliver a stunning blow to your enemy rendering him unable or unwilling to carry on. In the final film of Samurai Trilogy, based loosely on the story of the legendary Miyamoto Musashi, there’s a long, long scene where he’s rowed to an island to meet and fight his mortal enemy, Sasaki. On stepping ashore the fight commences and two minutes later Musashi is victorious but mourns “the greatest swordsman” he’d ever faced.
I watched it with a friend who knew Japanese history much better than I and when I commented, “That was quick,” he said, “That was to give the audience a payoff,” – the historical sword fight was done in about ten seconds.
And of course she was sunk in the Battle of of the Philippine Sea, when she was first hit by four torpedoes, one of which hit the avgas storage.
Eventually, a (Japanese) aerial bomb on the hangar deck forward exploded and set off a gas vapor explosion, followed by four other massive explosions and sunk within minutes.
Torpedoes hit below the waterline, where the AV gas was stored, and usually bombs exploded in the hangers above the waterline.
The loss of Shokaku is similar to that of Wasp: torpedo hits, ruptured gas mains, followed by uncontrollable fires in the hangar, where planes were being refueled.
So, in effect saying, “why yes, sir, you’re right, there seems to be something bloody wrong with our ships…” rather than point to procedure and training which would have meant someone in the chain of command was doing their job wrong.
My — perhaps faulty — recollection is that procedures and training were being deliberately ignored. Since the British optical fire controls were inferior to the Germans’ they tried to compensate by increasing their rate of fire; this led not only to storing cordite in the turrets, but to propping the flash doors (designed to prevent a turret explosion from traveling down the ammunition hoist to the shell handling rooms and magazines) open.