Would military geniuses of the past do well today?

[RickJay]

@JoelUpchurch

I wonder how any general, even one from the WWII would fare today? I remember watching the D-Day Landings in Saving Private Ryan and I kept thinking that if a modern general sent troops into machine gun fire like that, he would be court mar tailed so fast his head would spin. There is little use for cannon-fodder in a modern western army.

You were seeing a recreation of one of the few parts of the Normandy landings that went wrong, which is why they set it there; a movie that started on Utah Beach, where only token resistance was offered, would have had no point.

Omaha Beach was not typical of the operation as a whole. Only Juno saw remotely equivalent resistance, and it was cleared away faster than at Omaha. The landings at Utah, Sword and Gold went relatively smoothly.

Given the complexity of the operation and the skill and tenacity of the opposition, D-Day went pretty well. You’d be damned hard pressed to pull off an operation that good against equivalent opposition today.

The planning of D-day was as good as it could possibly have been given the circumstances. The generals involved knew their shit and would adapt quickly to warfare today.

[mac_bolan00]

I kept thinking that if a modern general sent troops into machine gun fire like that, he would be court mar tailed so fast his head would spin. There is little use for cannon-fodder in a modern western army.

i wouldn’t be too sure of that. no armed force in the world i know has ruled out suicide missions as possible options. and even at the troop level, one could decide to risk it all just to accomplish one’s goal.

in fact, several spec warriors now are trained to take on a force several times bigger than them since they have, in addition to higher firepower per-man, communications, designators, and other gizmos that can direct heavy fire on their opponents. having this luxury is fine but if you think of it, anything can happen in a war. and if your heavy support somehow stalls, your 10-man SEAL team will find itself up against 200 meanies and all they have are their personal small arms.

[Kobal2]

@Sailboat

Eh. Rommel was instrumental in adapting the 88 for anti-tank use, and Panzerfausts were heavily deployed among the German infantry he commanded along the Atlantic Wall. He also warned the German high command that Allied airpower was going to make movement on the roads all but impossible, and that it would destroy his tanks if they had to move long distances. I think he already understood both these points you’ve made, and would be not at all surprised by modern refinements.

I think there’s a difference between recognizing the power of gunpowder as a concept, and being ready to face a thousand AK-47s tomorrow. And that’s really the level the field has changed in those past 60 years. The Panzerfaust might as well have been a cartoon bomb tied to a stick.

[mac_bolan00]

i see no hindrance in fast technological changes. fighting in WW2 was completely different from WW1. in fact, new weapons and methods of fighting came out just as the second war broke out. with that, WW1 veterans weren’t forced into retirement. they learned new methods, improved on their technology, or copied the enemy’s. pure and simple.

i mentioned in one thread that small arms accounted for only around 5% of all wartime casualties. that rule still holds. today, more than ever, that 5% is the crucial 5%. some things won’t change.

[Kobal2]

But they had the benefit of growing with them, learning their trade while these technological changes came about and training with them long before the war started. Not quite so with a teleported, time travelling Rommel or Alexander dropped in the cupola of an M1A1.

[JoelUpchurch]

@mac_bolan00

i wouldn’t be too sure of that. no armed force in the world i know has ruled out suicide missions as possible options. and even at the troop level, one could decide to risk it all just to accomplish one’s goal.

in fact, several spec warriors now are trained to take on a force several times bigger than them since they have, in addition to higher firepower per-man, communications, designators, and other gizmos that can direct heavy fire on their opponents. having this luxury is fine but if you think of it, anything can happen in a war. and if your heavy support somehow stalls, your 10-man SEAL team will find itself up against 200 meanies and all they have are their personal small arms.

Their will always be high-risk military missions, but the people who conduct those missions are highly trained specialists, not cannon-fodder. Notice I also said western armies. Their was a lot of mass charges by untrained troops during the Iran-Iraq war. The mission to capture Bin Laden was definitely high risk mission and could have easily gone very badly, but it hardly a forlorn hope.

The total number of allied soldiers killed during D-Day is roughly equal to the number of coalition soldiers killed in 10 years in Afghanistan.

[Dissonance]

@RickJay

The planning of D-day was as good as it could possibly have been given the circumstances. The generals involved knew their shit and would adapt quickly to warfare today.

Quite so considering most of the NATO leadership for the next 40 or 50 years had cut their chops in WW2. All of the SACEURs up to 1992 had combat experience in WW2 or Korea, all of the Commanders of the British Army of the Rhine until 1983 had combat experience in WW2, etc.

@JoelUpchurch

The total number of allied soldiers killed during D-Day is roughly equal to the number of coalition soldiers killed in 10 years in Afghanistan.

And the total American deaths in 8 years in Vietnam were approximately 24 times the American dead on D-Day. Neither is a particularly meaningful figure considering how vastly different these wars are from WW2.

[JoelUpchurch]

@Dissonance

And the total American deaths in 8 years in Vietnam were approximately 24 times the American dead on D-Day. Neither is a particularly meaningful figure considering how vastly different these wars are from WW2.

I don’t think that actually refutes my point. Vietnam was fought by general that were WWII vets and in some cases by the same generals like Curtis LeMay. They also used a draftee army that died in droves. There was some development of Special Forces, but it was pretty primitive compared to the modern military.

[bump]

One thing to consider, is that in WWII, the Axis and Allies had rough technological and training parity, meaning that everyone had all the same stuff and modern versions. Same thing in Korea, more or less.

Vietnam, Afghanistan, Gulf War I and II and the Iraq insurgency were either all insurgencies, or where they were force-on-force, they were highly asymmetrical (i.e. our training/technology was really superior to theirs), hence the casualty differential.

If say… the USMC was to try an opposed beach landing vs. the British, French, Russians, etc… it would be drastically more bloody than the insurgencies because it wouldn’t be so asymmetrical. It would be Iwo Jima-esque, I’d think.

The other thing to remember is that for the most part, a lot of the technological whiz-bang stuff we’ve put into place since WWII was to basically fight the same kind of war better. That’s why we were caught somewhat flat-footed after the initial war in 2003, and why we rolled Saddam’s army so thoroughly in 1991.

[Dissonance]

@JoelUpchurch

I don’t think that actually refutes my point. Vietnam was fought by general that were WWII vets and in some cases by the same generals like Curtis LeMay. They also used a draftee army that died in droves. There was some development of Special Forces, but it was pretty primitive compared to the modern military.

They didn’t die “in droves,” 58,000 over an 8 year period isn’t a very high rate of attrition at all, especially when you consider the official Vietnamese government numbers are 1,100,000 dead amongst the NVA and the VC. I would be amazed if Taliban combat deaths have been 5% of that figure, which would make the kill ratios approximately equal. As for being primitive, did you note that the SACEUR in 1992 was a WW2 combat veteran? In other words during that war we had with Iraq in 1991 where they were completely steamrolled using petty much the same hardware being used today? The entire US Army tank fleet in Desert Storm was M1A1s, for example.

[JoelUpchurch]

@Dissonance

They didn’t die “in droves,” 58,000 over an 8 year period isn’t a very high rate of attrition at all, especially when you consider the official Vietnamese government numbers are 1,100,000 dead amongst the NVA and the VC. I would be amazed if Taliban combat deaths have been 5% of that figure, which would make the kill ratios approximately equal. As for being primitive, did you note that the SACEUR in 1992 was a WW2 combat veteran? In other words during that war we had with Iraq in 1991 where they were completely steamrolled using petty much the same hardware being used today? The entire US Army tank fleet in Desert Storm was M1A1s, for example.

I notice you are leaving out the 200-300 thousand South Vietnamese soldiers that died in your comparison.

The interesting aspect of the Afghan War is evolution of assassination as a standard tool of warfare. This was used occasionally, like the ambush for Admiral Yamamoto during WWII, but identifying Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and routinely targeting them for drone strikes is a new and effective tools of warfare.

[Sailboat]

@Little_Nemo

But I feel temperament alone isn’t enough to make a great commander. A great commander needs to know instinctively what his forces and the enemy forces are capable of doing and that can only be gained through experience. A general has to know how far arrows will fly in this type of weather and how many horses will shy off at the last second of a cavalry charge. He has to know how close a near miss from an artillery shell will disable to tank and whether an infantry battalion can conceal itself from a helicopter flying overhead. He needs to know a thousand little things like these and he needs to know them at a subconscious level so he can look at a complex shifting situation and decide in seconds whether or not something will work. And I don’t feel you can readily transfer that kind of knowledge across the centuries. If Hannibal and Rommel had swapped places it would have taken each of them years to catch up to where they other had been.

Well, when you look at biographies of the great generals, one thing that stands out is their hunger to know all these little details. The really successful ones tend to be keen observers, avid students of tactical details, and voracious consumers of intelligence. In earlier areas, an obsession with maps and/or direct personal eyeballs on the terrain is also characteristic.

It might have taken them a while to get up to speed, but my money is on their doing so as fast as anyone alive. Part if the reason they were great generals is specifically because they absorbed this kind of stuff like sponges.

[Spiny_Norman]

@Alessan

Take it from me, modern tactical leadership is riot control, too. A commander has to coordinate infantry, armor, artillery and air support while receiving dozens of different, often contradiatory reports every minute and dealing with the pleas and demands of hundreds of coordinates. 75% of military success consists of remaining calm in the eye of the storm - and that’s something that hasn’t changed since ancient times.

Ironically, that probably would have challenged some of the old-school commanders more than a little. At Trafalgar, Nelson issued his orders to his captains the day before the battle and basically was reduced to flag signals from that point on. The battle was essentially won by the superior fighting capabilities of the British Navy backed by a few hundred years of tradition, not by the Admiral making split-second decisions as the tactical picture changed.

Although unlikely, for all we know, the modern-day commander’s information load could have completely unraveled a man like Nelson.

[Sailboat]

@Little_Nemo

Napoleon would have had no problems figuring out Civil War era artillery. It was virtually the same equipment he was used to.

Hell, the most common type of cannon on both sides was called “the Napoleon,” although for a different member of the family (Nappy III).

@Sitnam

For instance a 16 year old Black Ops playing kid would be able to utilize drones better than Shaka.

I’d bet good money that Shaka would make mincemeat out of a 16-year-old, Black-Ops-playing kid. Not with drones perhaps, but he’d find a way.

Bruce Catton commented on US Grant’s tendency to “take immediate and devastating advantage” of any mistakes made by his opponents, and most of the greats were like that. Somehow or other, I think that the 16-year-old would be in the middle of typing “LOL looser!” when a dozen iklwas pierced his body.

In case anyone reading this thread might find it interesting reading, here’s the Straight Dope’s own Greatest Military Leader Elimination Game thread.

[Dissonance]

@JoelUpchurch

I notice you are leaving out the 200-300 thousand South Vietnamese soldiers that died in your comparison.

And I noticed that you’d not counted any of the Afghans from the Northern Coalition and the post-Taliban government who have died in this 10 year war, choosing only to count coalition casualties, hence I left out ARVN dead in the comparison.

The interesting aspect of the Afghan War is evolution of assassination as a standard tool of warfare. This was used occasionally, like the ambush for Admiral Yamamoto during WWII, but identifying Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders and routinely targeting them for drone strikes is a new and effective tools of warfare.

Yes, killing the enemy leadership is an entirely new development and tool in warfare. That’s why on the eve of Desert Storm, bolding mine

Schwarzkopf described Saddam’s forces. They’re not 10 feet tall, he said, but they are a very tough opponent. The Iraqis are not good in the offensive role, he said. Their chief weakness is a very centralized command system; the officers at all levels wait for the next order. “In the military, we say, `If you cut off the head, the body won’t function.'”

This was not by any stretch a remotely new concept in warfare in 1991.

[mac_bolan00]

belisarius’ “field denial” is not likely to change in 10,000 years, even in inter-galactic warfare.

[Little_Nemo]

Here’s an example of a general knowing the details and using it to win a battle.

During the First Punic War, the Carthaginians used elephants in battle. The Romans did not.

Elephants are big and hard to kill and they can cause a lot of damage when they charge. If you’re a soldier with a sword or a spear you do not want to be holding a line against an elephant.

On the other hand, elephants don’t have a personal stake in the outcome of the battle. They don’t really care if their side wins or loses. And they don’t like be stabbed or slashed. So all things considered, an elephant would just as soon not fight. But the guy riding the elephant is able to convince the elephant to attack.

And so the battles would go. The Carthaginians would sent a bunch of elephants charging at the Romans and the Romans would try not to get crushed while driving the elephants off. After the elephant charge was done, the main Carthaginian army would attack. The Romans, already reeling from the elephant attack, would often lose.

Up until the Battle of Zama. At Zama, the Roman General, Scipio, tried something different. When the Carthaginian general, Hannibal, set his elephants charging at the Roman line, Scipio gave the order and all of the Roman soldiers stepped aside and created clear paths through the Roman army. The elephants were of course supposed to charge at the soldiers but when they saw these open paths, they ran for them instead. The riders tried to get them to attack but the elephants just charged through the army on the open paths without killing anyone and ran out the other side. The Roman soldiers then stepped back into formation and went on to win the battle.

It was a risky maneuver. The elephants might have charged the soldiers like they were supposed to and were in the habit of doing. Worse yet, they might have started down the open paths but then been brought under control by their riders. If that had happened, the effect would have been devastating. Rather than attacking the front of the Roman line, the elephants would now be attacking in the middle of the Romans and would have caused much greater casualties than they usually did. And the soldiers at the front of the line would have been caught between raging elephants behind their backs and Carthaginian soldiers to their front. There would probably have been a panic and complete rout.

But it worked completely. And it was not something Scipio could have learned. He didn’t have any elephants of his own. The Carthaginians, who had elephants, had never thought of this idea (and Hannibal was no dummy). Scipio had just observed elephants in previous battles and seen how they acted and how their riders acted. He then used his experience to create a plan.

[Dissonance]

@Little_Nemo

And so the battles would go. The Carthaginians would sent a bunch of elephants charging at the Romans and the Romans would try not to get crushed while driving the elephants off. After the elephant charge was done, the main Carthaginian army would attack. The Romans, already reeling from the elephant attack, would often lose.

You might be overestimating the role played by elephants by Carthage, at least as far as Hannibal is concerned. Elephants scarcely played a role if any at all in his repeated utterly annihilating defeats of the Roman field armies in Italy. Allegedly only 37 elephants made it with him across the Alps, and they weren’t a factor at all in Trebia, Lake Trasimene and Cannae where he didn’t simply defeat the Romans; he completely destroyed them all three times.

[straight_man]

[ETA: this is in response to Post #75, about “cutting the head off the snake”.] Not to mention how the US declared the beginning of Iraq War II by sending unannounced cruise missiles to kill Saddam Hussein. Of course, that’s more or less contemporary (though it certainly isn’t the GWOT.) On a lower level, Nelson himself probably died because a sharpshooter picked him out by his uniform; Isaac Brock was probably shot intentionally; etc. On a higher level, well, assassinations certainly aren’t a new phenomenon — it’s just that assassins didn’t used to be military personnel.

[JoelUpchurch]

@Dissonance

Yes, killing the enemy leadership is an entirely new development and tool in warfare. That’s why on the eve of Desert Storm, bolding mine This was not by any stretch a remotely new concept in warfare in 1991.

The first Iraq War was about attacking command and control facilities, not about killing the individual generals. The technology simply didn’t exist to do that. Back then we could attack buildings and other static targets, but actually attacking individual leaders was very difficult. During the 1st war, if military leaders actually got killed during a attack, then that was gravy, but the important part was to reduce their ability to communicate with their troops.

Of course, we have used snipers to target officers since WWII, but now we have the capability to attack the Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders without putting any of our soldiers at risk. This is a qualitative change to the nature of warfare, where drone pilots that often never leave the United States, will decide a battle.