Plans are one thing. Belief that war was coming is another.
And yet, we were still caught off guard, when reinforcements did exist and could have been moved. It’s like the entire Pearl harbor incident. The signs were there, but nobody really took them that seriously.
In Eagle against the Sun, author Ronald Spector makes the case that the US high command were aware that the Philippines could not be held against a Japanese attack before the war started - too difficult to supply - but for political reasons were incapable of abandoning it.
Allegedly MacArthur did not share this view, but he wildly over-estimated the combat effectiveness of the Philipine forces, which in many cases lacked basic training and supplies and were in no way a match for battle-hardened Japanese troops.
On a side note - what is MacArthur’s current reputation as a general? Spector appears pretty scathing on this.
In theory sure. For 1st Armored, formation had completed by August '41. But their first three “deployments” were all to various army exercises. So in many ways they were still training. In December they were ordered to deploy overseas. It took them 5 months from the order to start packing until they arrived in the UK. And even then they spent another five months training before the Torch landings. The 2nd was about the same.
So even if they had deployed immediately upon completing their formation they couldn’t have been in the Philippines by December. And if they were they wouldn’t have been fully combat trained.
Up and down. He was both really capable and capable of being really obnoxious. He wasn’t bad, though often over-rated (the man was a master of public relations) and is often considered to be dubious reliability.
The word implies practical and moral failure on the part of the agent
performing the act of abandonment, hence its use in this case is imporper.
What has always amazed me-most of the US Army and British Army commanders in the Far East had correctly forecast what places the Japanese would pick to invade. In the PI, McArthur’s own staff officers pretty much knew what would happen-but the Japanese caught most of the USAAF on the ground.
Similarly, the (British) general Percival (Singapore) correctly predicted that the Japanese would land at Khota Brau-yet he never deployed his forces in a way to oppose the landings.
President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to leave.
This is my problem with MacArthur. He was basically the king of the Philippines for years, he had substantial military resources at hand, plenty of time to get ready and some indication that trouble might just be on the horizon. Yet, Mac was caught completely off guard. As a military commander he failed terribly IMO. He truly was a master of PR though.
The war was on from the day Japan attacked, whether it was Pearl Harbor or the smallest island the Philippines. The US was well on its way to war by late '41.
I think a lot of this can be attributed to straight out racism. The Western commanders could not conceive of the Japanese troops being effective against Western armies. This despite recent examples of Japanese effectiveness in China. In a similar vein there was a belief that Japanese couild not be good pilots, because they somehow lacked an innate sense of balance. So while both MacArthur and Percival anticipated the likely landing places it didn’t really matter as they assumed the Japanese break when they came up against Western troops.
Here are some quotes from the war warning the Navy sent out Nov 28th.
“Japanese future action unpredictable but hostile action possible at any moment.”
“Prior to hostile Japanese action you are directed to undertake such reconnaissance and other measures as you deem necessary…”
“Should hostilities occur you will carry out the tasks assigned in Rainbow Five so far as they pertain to Japan.”
“Undertake no offensive action until Japan has committed an overt act.”
“Be prepared to carry out tasks assigned in WPL46 so far as they apply to Japan in case hostilities occur.”
Sure looks the Navy thought war was coming.
Here is the summary of Japanese Naval movements in the December 1st fortnightly navy report that was sent to all naval commands.
"Deployment of naval forces to the southward has indicated clearly that extensive preparations are underway for hostilities. At the same time troop transports and freighters are pouring continually down from Japan and northern China coast ports headed south, apparently for French Indo-China and Formosan ports. Present movements to the south appear to be carried out by small individual units, but the organization of an extensive task force, now definitely indicated, will probably take sharper form in the next few days. To date this task force, under the command of the Commander in Chief Second Fleet, appears to be subdivided into two major task groups, one gradually concentrating off the Southeast Asiatic coast, the other in the Mandates. Each constitutes a strong striking force of heavy and light cruisers, units of the Combined Air Force, destroyer and submarine squadrons. Although one division of battleships also may be assigned, the major capital ship strength remains in home waters, as well as the greatest portion of the carriers.
The equipment being carried south is a vast assortment, including landing boats in considerable numbers. Activity in the Mandates, under naval control, consists not only of large reinforcements of personnel, aircraft, munitions but also of construction material with yard workmen, engineers, etc."
Again it sure looks like they could see invasion forces being prepared. And the Philippines would have to be considered one of the likely targets.
What reinforcements could have been provided to the Philippines that weren’t already sent? In Dec '41 we had what? 13 fully mobilized army divisions (10 infantry, 2 Armored, 1 Cavalry). Nearly a quarter of the active ground strength was already in the Pacific. Sure we had another 23 (plus two marine divisions) forming, but they weren’t ready yet. I don’t think that the problem was that people weren’t taking it seriously. It think the problem was it just took too much time. You just can’t go from 7 divisions (in '39) to 96 (in '43) overnight.
Hold up, I think we’re talking about two separate things. First, despite reasonable warnings, the U.S. held back from actively ramping up ground forces for years until it was too late. Second, despite having no other plausible threats at the time, did not deploy everything available even then to the Phillipines. Japan had been demonstrating aggressiveness for years, but wasn’t taken seriously as a threat. I suspect McArthur would have preferred to have relatively green troops over none, especially given that the Japanese troops he wound up facing weren’t exactly veterans themselves.
U.S. diplomatic stances indicate that at the highest reaches of government, people expected Japan to back down instead of make war, and actively made plans on that belief. In fact, when lookling at the armed forces, it’s also clear that they were planning for war with Germany - wise, but not the same as preparing for war with Japan.
In fact, had the fleet been moved to defend the Phillipines, the entire history of the U.S. in the Pacific weould have wound up completely different. The short verison is that they had a significant force there, but one they knew or should have known would be insufficient if war loomed, and were unwilling to take adequate steps to defend.
Anyone know how many of the filipino forces were children and teenagers? When America was at war with the Philippines there were defectors on the American side who went Native because they refused to shoot 13 year olds.
What do you mean different? Moving the entire US fleet to the PI pre-12/7/41
would have been insane.
On 12/7/41 the US Pacitic Fleet was outnumbered by Japan in every category
of fighting ship from destroyer on up. The US Army and the USAAF did not match
up any better, either.
Furthermore the US mainland, hence supply, was several 1000 miles further
away than Hawaii, and there were no fortified US bases in the gap.
Furthermore putting everything in the PI would have left the central Pacific
and even the US West coast defenceless.
We made plenty of mistakes pre-12/7/41, but headquartering the Pacific Fleet
in Hawaii was not one of them.
Fair enough smiling bandit, we may be. And I do understand you points.
I think it may be worth pointing some time references on things. If you are talking about say 1940, I would agree with just about everything you said. In 1940 I don’t think anyone really saw war with Japan as a likely outcome. But by the summer of '41 everyone seems to have viewed it as almost an inevitability.
Unfortunately by then it was too late. The US couldn’t ship enough men and material to the Philippines in time. McArthur had 100,000 men, mostly Philippine. But most of them were more than green, most of them had never even fired a weapon. That was a problem the US had stateside as well. There was a real lack of rifles for basic training in '41, and the Philippine units had lower priority.
And you are right. Germany took priority ever since the “dog memo.” But even then the assumptions was that war would take place with each. The Rainbow-5 plan called for a focus on Germany with a defensive posture in the Pacific, not no war at all in the Pacific.
And I don’t think moving the Pacific fleet to Manila would have been feasible. The facilities were significantly below those at Pearl or the West Coast. It had no major repair facilities (there was only one dry dock), no significant fuel bunkers, etc. And while these could have been built I don’t see how they could be done in '41. And placing the fleet in Manila would have left it very vulnerable to the Japanese land based craft. As it was half of the Asiatic fleet was destroyed before Corrigidor surrendered. I’m not sure how the Arizona would fair better in Manila than it did in Pearl. If the fleet were in the Philippines the Japanese could have their decisive battle there, and sunk even more of the US fleet than they did historically.
I agree with both previous posts, hence the problem - that the Phillipines simply could not have been held. Yet politically they could not be abandoned to the Japanese.
Politically, they weren’t even to be U.S. Territory for long. This had a huge impact on the war. The States had already decided to let the Phillipines go as an independant power, and the Phillipinos believed this would happen (it did, a little behind schedule due to the war).
Thus, when the Japanese invaded, the native people didn’t see it as a “change of boss” but as a clear change from a growing independant nation to a slave state, which is pretty much accurate. And they fought alongside Aerican soldiers.
Thus, politically, it wasn’t simply that they couldn’t be “abandoned.” They were effectively allies and even brothers in arms. I can’t disagree with your statement, but I think the reality goes even farther. The U.S. would have burned Japan to the ground before letting them dominate the Phillipines. And then we actually did it.
Well yes, agreed - but this merely highlights the strategic dilemma: that most likely (indeed, almost certainly) in a war with Japan, the Japanese would take the Phillipines, and any US forces there would be killed or captured. The US was not yet geared up for war sufficiently to outright defeat the likely Japanese invasion, at the height of Japan’s rampage through SE Asia. Further reinforcements to the Phillipines would most likely have simply led to further losses. Yet for the reasons you cite, the US was committed to having forces there.
Militarily the sensible thing may have been for the US to allow the Japanese to garrison the Phillipines while the US built up overwhelming force to return and crush them (a review of comparative industrial capacities, as Admiral Yamamoto well knew, proved that Japan was doomed to eventual defeat if the US chose to fight - leaving aside such unknowns as the Atom Bomb). But politically, it was impossible for the US to pursue this course. The US could never simply abandon its allies to the very doubtful mercies of the Japanese Empire without a fight.
I would certainly argue that better generalship. equipment, and earlier training could have tipped the balance. Allied forces (well, not the Allies at that time, but whatever) outnumbered the enemy and were on their home ground. Yes, they lacked the naval power in place to respond fully. And would be cut off. That doesn’t mean a defense was completely impractical. Japanese forces frequently met with defeat and used poor tactics.
I was trying to be kind of MacArthur above, but I’m not convinced he did much of use in the campaign.
Interestingly, the Philippines do not feel that way about the Americans. Other than some early unpleasantness, the Americans were pretty good at running things over there. The Philippine-American was was over fairly quickly, except the Moros.
From the Philippine histories I’ve read, the US compares favorably with the Spanish, as they did a lot of infrastructure improvements, and did set them on pace to eventual independence. Things had changed a lot from McKinley’s white-mans burden attitude at the turn of the century.
The Japanese occupation? I have never EVER heard a Filipino say anything positive about that experience. The Japanese would’ve chuckled at the American atrocities in the above cited war: Amateurs! 
This is true except in the Philippine-American war there were some horrible atrocities.
Pretty much anything imaginable “compares favorably to Spanish rule” though.