# Would you give up free will for world peace? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [September 28, 2023, 1:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800 "2023-09-28T01:17:18Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 21
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 8:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/401 "2023-10-12T08:11:38Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > The length of your last post though, shows you really mean it: you have the strong conviction that “feeling of free will” must be treated differently to all other biological traits, and all the other examples of A-\>B that we’ve discussed, and must necessarily be a unique solution. I have of course been persistently arguing the exact opposite, that the purported explanation of the feeling of free will by the reproductive benefit it confers ought to be treated exactly the same as any other explanation. But there seems to be little point in continuing this if you will not even read my explanations in order to persist in your misunderstandings. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 9:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/402 "2023-10-12T09:48:47Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I have of course been persistently arguing the exact opposite, that the purported explanation of the feeling of free will by the reproductive benefit it confers ought to be treated exactly the same as any other explanation. (Indeed, my argument is really just that in _any_ explanation, it must be the case that the explanans entails the explanandum, as otherwise the explanans being true doesn’t give us any reason to believe that the explanandum is true, as well—it might or might not be. But then, we obviously haven’t explained _why_ the explanandum is true. And this just fails to be the case for the feeling of free will being supposedly explained by the selective benefit. To dismiss this as me requiring some special treatment for this case is such a gross misreading of what I’ve been writing that I struggle to see how it could reasonably come about.) ---
**Author:** ![eburacum45](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/eburacum45/32/8690_2.png) [@eburacum45](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/eburacum45)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 9:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/403 "2023-10-12T09:56:37Z")
I think I can see what HMHW is driving at; either free will is an illusion, which has presumably evolved biologically, or it is a real phenomenon, and we really do have free will. Or perhaps there are other options I can’t imagine (due to my own intrinsic limitations). But I’m still stuck on what **true-free-will** would mean in practice. Earlier in the thread we discussed two main options; choices which are made as a result of events in the past, leading to a causal relationship and a choice which is determined by those events and certainly not free. The other option was that choices might be made as a result of ‘contracausal’ effects, effects that have noting to do with past events and just happen at random somehow. It seems to me that neither of those definitions fulfil the characteristics of free will as a real phenomenon, as opposed to an illusion. I’ve been wracking my brains to try to imagine what true-free-will would look like. Even if there is a separate, non-material spirit or **ethereal entity** which makes decisions independently of our own deterministic, mechanistic brains, that ethereal entity would surely make decisions based on its own experiences and on its own intrinsic nature - that would be just another form of determinism, just resulting from the effects of a different set of events. One way to ensure that our choices are not solely a result of events which have happened in the past is to allow true **prescience**. If we could get information from the future as well as the past we might be able to use it to make better decisions; imagine if we already knew the results of some or all of our actions, or the answers to some or all of our questions. Hans Moravec has investigated this possibility in [some of his speculative papers](https://philpapers.org/rec/MORTTA-2); this advanced information might help us to make better decisions, but I suspect it would turn out to be just as deterministic as the other kinds of causality. Or maybe true-free-will occurs as the result of a miracle, or a series of miracles, which are performed by some remote **god-like entity** or impersonal panuniversal emergent entity that has decided to allow us to choose ‘freely’ between a range of options at various points in the timeline. This ‘god’ might even actualise a range of possible futures, and we poor mortals might be gifted the chance to ‘navigate’ through these choices at will. But each option we take would seem (to us limited mortals) to be the only possible choice, so we would then labour under an **illusion of determinism** , the exact opposite of the illusion of free will. Ultimately I suspect that the concept of true-free-will arises from theological considerations, since true-free-will allows us limited mortals to make good and bad choices, and this gives an excuse for the concept of sin and punishment. If everything that happens is considered to be the result of the actions of an omnibenevolent god, then all the bad, harmful, ‘evil’ things that happen are also the result of Her actions, and that would mean that She is not omnibenevolent. So we must be somehow to blame for our own evil. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 10:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/404 "2023-10-12T10:10:39Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Indeed, my argument is really just that in _any_ explanation, it must be the case that the explanans entails the explanandum, as otherwise the explanans being true doesn’t give us any reason to believe that the explanandum is true, as well—it might or might not be. Except that you haven’t, when it comes to things like beer being the reason Mijin is drunk, or a cricket ball being the reason the window is broken, you do not demand that those explanations be inferable from the conclusion (i.e. that broken glass logical entails a cricket ball, and not a stone) Uniquely only for this one biological trait, logic works backwards. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 10:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/405 "2023-10-12T10:17:16Z")
> [@eburacum45](#): > > I’ve been wracking my brains to try to imagine what true-free-will would look like. Exactly. The answer is that the concept has never made sense, it’s never been fully defined. It just dates from a time where we had no clue at all about how mind and matter could be related. So it felt like our decisions appeared from nowhere. Now that we know something of neurology, and can make intelligent machines, we’re left asking what we even mean by free will, and the answer is: who knows? We should really start over with a completely different framing of intention, but can’t because: 1. This has been filed as a grand philosophical debate for so long, the one opinion that’s not allowed is: **Both** the statements “we have free will” and “we don’t have free will” are undefined, because “free will” is ill-defined. 2. Modern apologetics relies upon the idea that free will solves issues like the problem of evil. It doesn’t of course. But that’s a reason it gets propped up as a meaningful concept. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 10:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/406 "2023-10-12T10:41:01Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Except that you haven’t, when it comes to things like beer being the reason Mijin is drunk, or a cricket ball being the reason the window is broken, you do not demand that those explanations be inferable from the conclusion (i.e. that broken glass logical entails a cricket ball, and not a stone) > > Uniquely only for this one biological trait, logic works backwards. No. Honestly, how do you get this from what I’ve written? I’ve been at great pains to point out that nothing is inferred from any conclusion, treating all of the cases offered in exact parallel. The only thing I’m saying is that something being an explanation necessitates it actually explain the thing to be explained. I.e. that if the explaining thing holds, so must the explained thing, otherwise the explaining thing holding gives us no reason to conclude the explained thing, and hence, no reason why the explained thing holds true—i.e. we simply have no explanation. That is: to explain that @Mijin is drunk, having drunk (that amount of) beer must entail being drunk. To explain that the window is broken, being hit by a cricket ball must entail the window breaking. To explain Socrates being mortal, being human must entail being mortal. To explain humans having the feeling of free will, having the survival benefit must entail having the feeling of free will. This is exactly and absolutely the same in all cases. Explanans → explanandum, otherwise there’s no explanation. I don’t understand where you come to believe that requiring exactly the same in every case is somehow ‘backwards logic’ when applied to the argument from selection. All the elements bear the same relation in all the described cases, as shown explicitly by the diagrams above. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 12, 2023, 3:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/407 "2023-10-12T15:29:11Z")
> [@eburacum45](#): > > Earlier in the thread we discussed two main options; choices which are made as a result of events in the past, leading to a causal relationship and a choice which is determined by those events and certainly not free. The other option was that choices might be made as a result of ‘contracausal’ effects, effects that have noting to do with past events and just happen at random somehow. That somewhat depends on how you want to cash out the notion of ‘chance’. The sort of implicit assumption in these threads is a kind of prescriptive reading: wherever the deterministic laws of the universe leave an opening for randomness, the universe flips a coin, and decides the next step ‘for you’, forcing you along. Then, chance doesn’t give any more of an opening to free will than deterministic evolution does. But that’s not the only possible way to interpret this. Another option is to instead move to a descriptive, ‘Humean’ sort of reading: the laws of the universe just give a concise description of what happens, but they aren’t what _makes_ things happen. (After all, how would they do that?) Any not totally random universe has a description in terms of some deterministic algorithm plus a random input—essentially, the maximally compressed version of the data together with the algorithm to unpack it. Thus, its evolution seems lawlike for some, and perhaps most, of the time, with interspersed random events. But these random events then aren’t points where the universe flips a coin for you; rather, they’re simply points where the laws don’t fully describe what happens next—where the future course is open. Consider chess, as an analogy: the laws don’t uniquely determine the next move; the player chooses one among several possibilities. One could write down some probability distribution for the next move, but that doesn’t mean that the next move just ‘happens’ by some random process; rather, it’s due to the player’s choice. Of course, that only kicks the can down the road: how does the player’s choice work? We have the same dilemma, just iterated. So the proposal I raised all these many posts ago is: just keep iterating, and when you’re done, you’ll have a self-determined decision neither due to chance nor determined by external factors. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > take a device capable of traversing infinitely many states in finite time, like [Thomson’s lamp](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Thomson%27s_lamp). Then, use it as the basis of a recursive computation of your future actions: in order to decide whether you do x or y, you need to first decide whether you want to do x or y. Then iterate infinitely (this is to overcome [Schopenhauer’s regress](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/On_the_Freedom_of_the_Will), the only real problem for free will)… The result is clearly not deterministic: just as with Thomson’s lamp, the initial conditions don’t imply the outcome. It’s also clearly not random: there’s a simple mechanism by which it comes about. Furthermore, it’s also not determined by anything but that mechanism. This makes free will a kind of supertask, but so is super-Turing computation generally thought to be, and there plausibly are examples of that in the real world (in fact, true randomness generation is one, so if your ontology admits that, then it seems to also have the resources for free will of the above type—which of course doesn’t mean it actually exists). This is admittedly kind of an exotic suggestion, but arguably not logically inconsistent. Whether such a thing is possible in the real world is, of course, another matter altogether (although as noted, any world containing true randomness should admit processes equivalent to those needed here); and even if it’s possible, there’s still a question of whether human minds actually make use of such a mechanism. My guess is that whenever we bump up against these sorts of ‘infinitary’ notions, what we’re really dealing with is an inability of symbolic reasoning (i.e. finite manipulations on finite strings of symbols) to fully capture the phenomena present in the world, and if we could leapfrog these limitations, things like this would seem much more commonplace. But we can’t, and so lots of people take these limits of theory to accurately track the limits of the world. However, that’s a much more involved topic. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 11:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/408 "2023-10-18T11:31:35Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > That is: to explain that @Mijin is drunk, having drunk (that amount of) beer must entail being drunk. To explain that the window is broken, being hit by a cricket ball must entail the window breaking. To explain Socrates being mortal, being human must entail being mortal. To explain humans having the feeling of free will, having the survival benefit must entail having the feeling of free will. > > This is exactly and absolutely the same in all cases. And it is. That’s _my_ position. The thing I am disagreeing with, is what you’ve been arguing for the last 120 posts, that the feeling of free will must _uniquely_ be the _only_ thing that provides this survival benefit. A selection of quotes: > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > The argument from selection aims to _explain why_ we have the illusion of free will, by pointing out that it gives a selection benefit. If there are other mental states giving the same benefit, the argument fails. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > I’m saying that if vision and echolocation have the same adaptive benefit, natural selection can’t distinguish between them, and thus, if we end up with vision, it’s fallacious to say we did so because of the adaptive benefit it provides. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > But that doesn’t do jack for the explanation of why we have that trait, if there are other (mutually exclusive, as @Riemann pointed out, so the example isn’t great) traits that yield the same reproductive benefit. But this uniqueness requirement is absolutely **false**. Mijin could be drunk because he drank _vodka_. A _sonic boom_ could explain why the window broke. Socrates could be the name of a _dog_, because they are also mortal. And, yes, natural selection can result in a trait that has the same, or even _less_ benefit that another trait. The only requirement for a trait to be selected is that the trait is better than the _status quo_. There is no uniqueness of explanation requirement, that’s not rational. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Honestly, how do you get this from what I’ve written? You’ve also been exasperated that @Riemann and @Babale were not “getting it”. Once again, respectfully, just accept that maybe your reasoning on this is not sound. Remember, I don’t even disagree very much with your overall conclusion, I am just saying your argument to arrive there simply doesn’t work. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 11:56am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/409 "2023-10-18T11:56:37Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > To explain humans having the feeling of free will, having the survival benefit must entail having the feeling of free will. (missed edit window) I said I agreed with this statement because I misread this as: having the feeling of free will must entail a survival benefit. That would be looking from the perspective of cause → effect, and would be reasoning correctly as in all the other examples. OTOH, reasoning from the effect (survival benefit) to a cause (feeling of free will) is the fallacy of affirming the consequent. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 1:06pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/410 "2023-10-18T13:06:20Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > The thing I am disagreeing with, is what you’ve been arguing for the last 120 posts, that the feeling of free will must _uniquely_ be the _only_ thing that provides this survival benefit. As it must, in each of these cases. You keep confusing explanans and explanandum: to explain what is to be explained, the explanans must uniquely entail the explanandum. For instance, if the window is cracked, and the proposed explanation is that a cricket ball broke it through impact, then it must be the case that impacting the window in this way breaks it; otherwise, this impact could occur without the window being broken, and hence, would not tell us why it is broken. Likewise, Socrates’ mortality is explained by his humanity only if being human entails being mortal; if there were some immortal humans, then being human just isn’t a sufficient reason to be mortal. Now, there could, of course, be other explanations: Socrates could be someone’s dog, in which case his being mortal would be explained by his dogness. That is, there are multiple explanantia for any explanandum, but any given explanans must uniquely entail the explanandum—it can’t be the case that the explanans obtains without the explanandum doing so, too. That’s just what is meant by something explaining something else: that given the first thing, we know the second must be the case. This is all I require for the feeling of free will. The explanandum (having this feeling) must uniquely result from the explanans (having the survival benefit). That it does _not_ means that the latter fails to explain the former—just in the same way that the possibility of immortal humans would mean that Socrates being human fails to explain his mortality. > [@Mijin](#): > > Mijin could be drunk because he drank _vodka_. A _sonic boom_ could explain why the window broke. Socrates could be the name of a _dog_, because they are also mortal. Here, now, you turn things around: yes, the explanandum could obtain due to a different explanans. Multiple explanantia can lead to the same explanandum. Likewise, the feeling of free will could be explained by us actually having free will. But this doesn’t change the fact that any single explanans must lead uniquely to the explanandum! The direction ‘explanandum → explanans’ can (and generally will be) one-to-many, but the direction ‘explanans → explanandum’ must be unique. Otherwise, the question ‘Why explanandum?’ simply isn’t answered by pointing to the explanans. So the point I’m making is just that in the case of the argument from selection, this implication fails—the explanans may be the case, without the explanandum being so. You then give examples where the explanandum is the case without a given explanans being so—where the window is shattered by a sonic boom, or Socrates is mortal because he is a dog. But this is simply the wrong way round! It doesn’t impinge on the point I’m making at all. Or in short, I’m saying that explanans → explanandum, and you’re saying, no, because explanandum does not → explanans. But that just doesn’t follow. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 1:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/411 "2023-10-18T13:27:13Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > Mijin could be drunk because he drank _vodka_. A _sonic boom_ could explain why the window broke. Socrates could be the name of a _dog_, because they are also mortal. Or to put the point differently: rather than giving examples of different explanations for Socrates being mortal, you would have to give an example of the same reason yielding different outcomes, while nevertheless being a good explanation for one particular outcome—i.e. how Socrates being mortal could be explained by him being a jellyfish, even though some jellyfish are immortal. Obviously, that can’t work, because then, the same reason could be put forward as an explanation for Socrates’ _immortality_. Likewise, the proposed explanation for having the feeling of free will by having the reproductive benefit could just as well explain the _lack_ of such a feeling. ---
**Author:** ![Mijin](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/mijin/32/9369_2.png) [@Mijin](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Mijin)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 2:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/412 "2023-10-18T14:23:12Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Here, now, you turn things around: yes, the explanandum could obtain due to a different explanans. Multiple explanantia can lead to the same explanandum. Likewise, the feeling of free will could be explained by us actually having free will. No, _you_ are turning the logic around, as demonstrated in the three quotes of yours that I put in my last post. No-one else is having a problem with this. Not me, not @Babale, not @Riemann. If **P → Q** , then we can say if P, then Q _by definition_. What we _can’t_ say, is if Q then necessarily P, which is your argument, your whole basis for rejecting the hypothesis that the feeling of free will could have a survival benefit. Any number of mental or physical traits could have a survival benefit, that’s irrelevant and your argument is flawed. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 2:42pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/413 "2023-10-18T14:42:54Z")
> [@Mijin](#): > > No, _you_ are turning the logic around, as demonstrated in the three quotes of yours that I put in my last post. In all of those quotes, I am saying that if explanans, then explanandum. You’re trying to argue against that by saying that there could be multiple explanantia, given an explanandum (Socrates could be mortal because he is a dog or a human). That’s simply the wrong way round. > [@Mijin](#): > > What we _can’t_ say, is if Q then necessarily P, which is your argument, It isn’t. Again, there could be multiple possible explanations for having a feeling of free will. Actually having free will is one, interference by some trickster god is another. In each of these cases, we have that given the explanans, the explanandum follows necessarily. That isn’t the case for the proposed explanation via the selection benefit. Hence, it doesn’t work as an explanation. There is absolutely no affirmation of the consequent. > [@Mijin](#): > > rejecting the hypothesis that the feeling of free will could have a survival benefit. That is _not_ a hypothesis I’m rejecting. What I am rejecting is the argument that _because_ of this survival benefit, we have the feeling of free will. In doing so, I am in fact accepting, at least for the sake of argument, that this feeling (or rather, the behavior produced by having it) does have a survival advantage. ---
**Author:** ![Riemann](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/riemann/32/3133_2.png) [@Riemann](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Riemann)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 4:23pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/414 "2023-10-18T16:23:52Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > That is _not_ a hypothesis I’m rejecting. What I am rejecting is the argument that _because_ of this survival benefit, we have the feeling of free will. In doing so, I am in fact accepting, at least for the sake of argument, that this feeling (or rather, the behavior produced by having it) does have a survival advantage. @Mijin, I stepped away from this because it is so frustrating, and it’s hard to believe that @Half_Man_Half_Wit is still persisting with this. But let me give it one more try. The disconnect here is that @Half_Man_Half_Wit is so heavily invested in refuting what he calls the “argument from selection” that he simply won’t accept that nobody was ever making this “argument”. Eveyone else is left scratching their heads about why he keeps erecting a straw man and then knocking it down. It becomes very confusing because in this persistent need to erect the straw man it sometimes appears that he arguing _for_ the obviously flawed logical argument - when in fact he is just setting it up to knock it down again. The adaptive hypothesis simply postulates that there may be a fitness advantage to the trait “sense of free will”. It is a hypothesis, not a logical argument. It may, of course, be phrased as something like > “we have a sense of free will BECAUSE it has a fitness advantage” The “because” here is obviously just referring to the ordinary process of natural selection _if_ the hypothesis is true - that the trait arose by random mutation, then went to fixation in the human population _because_ it had some fitness advantage relative to the ancestral state where the trait was absent. @Half_Man_Half_Wit has misinterpreted the “because” in that phrasing as somebody making a logical argument that a proposed fitness advantage implies the _necessary_ existence of the trait. He is determined to “refute” this “argument from selection”, and has apparently become so invested in the refutation that he cannot now accept that he misinterpreted the meaning of “because” in this context. Nobody anywhere was ever making this flawed logical argument. Not in this thread, not in any of the links he posted. The fact that one of the links he posted used the specific phrase “argument from selection” is irrelevant. If you examine the article, they were clearly only using “because” in the sense I have described to refer to the ordinary process of natural selection _if_ the hypothesis is true and a fitness advantage exists. > HMHW: I reject the “argument from selection”. The fact that finding food is a fitness benefit does not necessarily imply that we must have eyes. > > Everyone else: Nobody is making that “argument”. There is just a hypothesis that eyes might help you find food, that eyes might be better than no eyes. > > HMHW: I accept that hypothesis as plausible, but I reject the “argument from selection”. The fact that finding food is a fitness benefit does not necessarily imply that we must have eyes. > > Everyone else: Nobody is making that “argument”. There is just a hypothesis that eyes might help you find food, that eyes might be better than no eyes. > > HMHW: I accept that hypothesis as plausible, but I reject the “argument from selection”. The fact that finding food is a fitness benefit does not necessarily imply that we must have eyes. etc. _ad nauseam_ ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 5:16pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/415 "2023-10-18T17:16:05Z")
> [@Riemann](#): > > The disconnect here is that @Half_Man_Half_Wit is so heavily invested in refuting what he calls the “argument from selection” that he simply won’t accept that nobody was ever making this “argument”. I’m not heavily invested in anything. I would’ve let things stand as they were when I originally brought up the argument as something that’s obviously wrong, but common, in the hope of not having to get sidetracked (and look how that turned out). But yeah, as long as people keep attacking my reasoning as basically being that of a spittle-flecked troglodyte, I am going to carry on trying to explain myself. > [@Riemann](#): > > Eveyone else is left scratching their heads about why he keeps erecting a straw man and then knocking it down No, people keep trying to tell me that I’m childishly wrong. I generally take it that means they disagree with me. Hence, I keep trying to explain, in various different ways, although so far with little success. > [@Riemann](#): > > @Half_Man_Half_Wit has misinterpreted the “because” in that phrasing as somebody making a logical argument that a proposed fitness advantage implies the _necessary_ existence of the trait. I interpret that ‘because’ in the same way as I interpret it in ‘we have the feeling of free will because we do have free will’, or ‘Socrates is mortal because he is human’. My original point was merely that those who believe in free will have a ready explanation for why we should _feel as if_ we have free will—because that feeling is just accurate. This puts an explanatory burden on the ‘no free will’-position: if we don’t have any, why do we feel like we do? And to meet that burden, a commonly-made argument is _because of_ the adaptive benefit this confers. And that’s the argument I’ve been discussing. It might be clear, to you, that this is a fallacious argument. But it’s certainly not clear to everyone, nor even everyone in this thread. If so, then it’s also clear to you that the ‘free will yay’ side, whatever their other issues might be, has a leg up regarding the explanation of the feeling of free will as compared to the ‘free will nay’-side. And if _that’s_ the case, I wonder why you ever engaged me and tried to oppose my arguments at all, if you agree with my position. > [@Riemann](#): > > Everyone else: Nobody is making that “argument”. There is just a hypothesis that eyes might help you find food, that eyes might be better than no eyes. Which, of course, exactly _is_ that argument you claim nobody is making. There is no comparable argument that having the feeling of free will could be better than not having the feeling of free will: because the behavior in both cases can plausibly be the same, while the behavior in the ‘eyes’ vs. ‘no eyes’-cases _can’t_. There is a valid argument from selection for eyes (or for a visual sense, at least), there’s just none for the feeling of free will. You can’t behave the same way without such a sense as with it; you can behave the same way without the feeling of free will, as with it. ---
**Author:** ![Riemann](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/riemann/32/3133_2.png) [@Riemann](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Riemann)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 5:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/416 "2023-10-18T17:41:09Z")
> [@Riemann](#): > > There is just a hypothesis that eyes might help you find food, that eyes might be better than no eyes. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > Which, of course, exactly _is_ that argument you claim nobody is making. There is no comparable argument that having the feeling of free will could be better than not having the feeling of free will: because the behavior in both cases can plausibly be the same, while the behavior in the ‘eyes’ vs. ‘no eyes’-cases _can’t_. There is a **hypothesis** that “sense of free will” leads to **different** behavior from “no sense of free will”, in precisely the same way as the hypothesis that “eyes” leads to different behavior from “no eyes”. That is the entirety of the **hypothesis**. You have said quite clearly that you accept this **hypothesis** as plausible. To say that “the behavior in both cases can plausibly be the same” is simply **rejecting the hypothesis** out of hand. It is not rejecting any **argument** , because this **hypothesis** does not entail any logical argument. You claim that a hypothesis that “eyes” being better than “no eyes” is qualitatively different from a hypothesis that “sense of free will” is better than “no sense of free will”. It is not. They are precisely analogous. The plausibility of the “eyes” adaptive hypothesis depends upon understand the use of vision, the plausibility of the “sense of free will” adaptive hypothesis depends upon understanding how our brains work. Neither hypothesis differs in plausibility through abstract logical argument. Anyway, I’m done here, I’m not getting dragged back into this. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 5:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/417 "2023-10-18T17:53:18Z")
> [@Riemann](#): > > That is the entirety of the **hypothesis**. You have said quite clearly that you accept this **hypothesis** as plausible. No, I’ve said that I accept the hypothesis that the _behavior_ produced by the feeling of free will carries an adaptive benefit. I have also quite clearly said that I _reject_ the hypothesis that this behavior is only achievable via a feeling of free will, giving numerous examples of cases where a creature without this sense would show the same behavior. There seems to be no reason to accept any hypothesis that the feeling of free will would produce a fitness benefit over the lack of such a feeling. > [@Riemann](#): > > To say that “the behavior in both cases can plausibly be the same” is simply **rejecting the hypothesis** out of hand It’s not a rejection out of hand, I’ve given several examples where it’s false, and see no reason why these examples shouldn’t be relevant. > [@Riemann](#): > > You claim that a hypothesis that “eyes” being better than “no eyes” is qualitatively different from a hypothesis that “sense of free will” is better than “no sense of free will”. It is not. They are precisely analogous. Sure it is. You can’t show the same behavior with and without eyes; but there are easily conceivable cases of showing the same behavior with and without the feeling of free will. > [@Riemann](#): > > Anyway, I’m done here, I’m not getting dragged back into this. Nobody is dragging you anywhere. ---
**Author:** ![Riemann](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/riemann/32/3133_2.png) [@Riemann](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Riemann)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 6:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/418 "2023-10-18T18:00:44Z")
> [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > You can’t show the same behavior with and without eyes Sure I can, if you live in a cave where there is no light. The plausibility of the adaptive hypothesis for eyes might be _obvious_ (we don’t live in caves and the way we use vision is obviously beneficial), but it does require reference to our use of vision, to physics and neuroscience. No logically circular “argument from selection” step is involved. > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > there are easily conceivable cases of showing the same behavior with and without the feeling of free will You are welcome to imagine such cases. But imagining them is not grounds to simply **reject the hypothesis** out of hand. You are not pointing out some logical flaw in an “argument from selection”, because the **hypothesis** does not entail any such logic. Just as the adaptive hypothesis for eyes requires reference to the use of vision, any discussion of the plausibility of the adaptive hypothesis that “sense of free will” is better than “no sense of free will” must refer to neuroscience, to the way our brains work. We could have been _having_ that interesting discussion rather than wasting hundreds of posts on your misunderstanding of the word “because” in the context of natural selection. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 18, 2023, 8:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/419 "2023-10-18T20:20:30Z")
> [@Riemann](#): > > Sure I can, if you live in a cave where there is no light. In which case it would be unexplained why we have eyes. Which is, well, my point. > [@Riemann](#): > > No logically circular “argument from selection” step is involved. The argument isn’t circular, it’s clearly valid, just not always sound, because it’s premises can fail to be true. If it is possible to have the benefit without having the feeling of free will, then that premise is just false. > [@Riemann](#): > > But imagining them is not grounds to simply **reject the hypothesis** out of hand. They certainly are grounds for not accepting it, which of course isn’t a rejection out of hand, but for good reasons. If you come to me with the hypothesis that all middle-aged blond cobblers named Steven have at least size 8 feet, the fact that I don’t see any problem with there being one with size 7 feet is good grounds not to accept that hypothesis. > [@Riemann](#): > > We could have been _having_ that interesting discussion rather than wasting hundreds of posts on your misunderstanding of the word “because” in the context of natural selection. We could’ve been having all kinds of discussions, but for some reason you saw fit to keep defending an argument you’re simultaneously claiming not to make. ---
**Author:** ![Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/half_man_half_wit/32/21766_2.png) [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Half_Man_Half_Wit)\ **Post date:** [October 19, 2023, 7:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800/420 "2023-10-19T07:51:49Z")
> [@Riemann](#): > > > [@Half\_Man\_Half\_Wit](#): > > > > You can’t show the same behavior with and without eyes > > Sure I can, if you live in a cave where there is no light. Actually, it occurs to me that this might serve as a good illustration of what I’m saying. If, in some dark cave, you find a population of creatures with perfectly functioning eyes, at the very least, you’d be surprised—there’s no reason for them to have vision, it doesn’t confer any additional survival benefit they couldn’t obtain without it (let’s for the moment assume that eyes also don’t incur any additional fitness cost, which probably isn’t true). So pointing to selection as the reason for them having eyes simply isn’t explanatory. Now, finding such creatures in a well-lit space, you’d be perfectly justified in making an argument from selection: eyes are clearly beneficial, and _because_ of that, they have them. We’re in the same boat with the feeling of free will. If it’s true that the same reproductive benefit could be obtained without it—which so far nobody has made a case against—then that we have it is just as surprising as the existence of eyes in a dark cave, i.e. not explained by a survival benefit. And that’s all I’m saying, really. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800.md?page=20) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/would-you-give-up-free-will-for-world-peace/990800.md?page=22)