Exactly the same flawless logic as : when I ride the bus, it cannot be for the purpose of getting to the store, because I could have driven a car to the store. But what if I don’t have a car, and it’s too far to walk.
First of all, I have been very clear that I do not have a strong view that the illusion of free will is adaptive. I am pushing back only against your spurious claim that it cannot be adaptive.
Anyway, what are you claiming is an “opposite conclusion” here? It seems to me that my conclusion would be exactly the same. In both cases we observe a subjective mental state. In one species a feeling of free will, in the other hypothetical species a a feeling of compulsion. My view would be exactly the same for both species. Clearly any subjective mental state can influence behavior, so in each species it is possible that their subjective mental states are adaptive.
I’m not ignoring the context, I’m pointing out we don’t know the context. Maybe we were locked into a basin of attraction that leads to the evolution of an illusion of free will from the very first amoeba on; but maybe we were locked into a basin leading to a feeling of irresistible compulsion regarding all our actions, and only the intervention of alien genetic engineering got us to where we are. But assuming we were on the first trajectory just assumes the argument’s conclusion from the outset: it tells us nothing about why an option was chosen if we stipulate there was no other choice from the beginning.
If we stipulate there was choice, on the other hand, the argument simply fails, because the choice could not have been made on the basis of differential selection.
Again, you know more than me. I don’t know such an illusion has evolved. For one, the feeling of freedom might not be an illusion. For another, it might be, but just due to the whims of the programmer whose simulation we inhabit. And so on.
Again, if I stipulate from the outset that taking the bus was the only option available, then the argument isn’t going to tell us anything about why that option was chosen, since there was no choice in the first place, an we just put our desired outcome in at ground level.
So if we were members of a species that felt a compulsion for their actions, you’d argue that we couldn’t feel differently, because of natural selection. And if we’re members of a species that feels an illusion of freedom, you argue that we couldn’t be otherwise due to natural selection. Do I have that right?
That’s because you seem to be afraid of using logic.
You’ve never explained how it could not be. Which isn’t your fault - there’s no coherent explanation possible.
If it makes things easier for you, then from now on unless one of my posts specifically says that I am arguing from the perspective of presuming that we are living in a simulation or a world artificially created by a deity or any other counterfactual, that I am operating from a materialist framework.
I concede that it might be true that we live in a simulation that was constructed to obey materialistic rules, or that we could live in a world where a deity micromanages every particle interaction while hiding His presence completely. But since either of those scenarios are indistinguishable from a materialist framework from within the simulation, I feel free to ignore these possibilities 99% of the time.
If you ever find some evidence that refutes the materialist worldview, let me know.
But it does mean that you can’t say that being large is adaptive. But that is what the argument from selection claims: that we have the illusion of freedom because it is adaptive. And for that to be true, there need to be no small mice, so to speak.
Being large and being small are both adaptive (to different lifestyles - and as it turns out, there are no herds of mice roaming across the Serengeti and no elephants in the cupboard at work).
Forgive me for finding a “mechanism” that is really a thought experiment that relies on infinities to create an apparent paradox unconvincing as an explanation for… a phenomenon that isn’t observed.
Finally! Yes, that’s exactly right. So, it makes no sense to say that elephants are large because being large is adaptive. Likewise, it makes no sense to say that we have the illusion of freedom because it is adaptive. Hence, the argument from selection fails.
If anybody could point to some set of circumstances in which that illusion was adaptive, then we’d have an argument. But nobody can. And just claiming that we might be in such a circumstance is vacuous, as it just assumes the desired conclusion.
This is not an explicit mechanism, unless you can show that a Thompson’s Lamp exists in the real world and is the method by which we make decisions.
Free will cannot exist in a materialist framework in the sense that anything you choose to do is determined by a combination of things that are all causally connected. You can make a choice (depending on how we define “you” and “choice”) but you could not have chosen differently unless your past or your internal state had been different.
Again, when your reasoning has led you to the preposterous conclusion that large size in elephants cannot be adaptive, perhaps that should give you pause?
Elephants are large because being large is adaptive to their lifestyle. Mice are small because being small is adaptive to their lifestyle. Our sense of free will is an adaptation to our lifestyle (or at least, our ancestors’ lifestyle).
First if all, the phenomenon is at least as reasonably inferred as causation is. Second, as (of course, and without any effect) already pointed out above, it’s the same as what’s needed to produce genuine randomness, so there’s no cause for believing in the latter, but not in free will.
As noted, the powers of this mechanism are exactly those that are needed for the production of genuine randomness. If you think that’s possible, you should not have an troubles with free will, save for those brought on by ideology.
Whether that’s actually used in the production of our decisions, I don’t know, of course. Neither do I know that we have free will. In fact, when I look at most of my decisions, they don’t seem all that free to me.
If the mechanism I gave above is sound, it can. And other ways have been proposed.
I’m honestly at a loss as to what it is you’re not getting. If both large and small sizes are possible without fitness loss, then plainly, large size is not adaptive. Sure, it might be you’re in a situation where there is only the pathway to large size open; but to suppose we were already on that path is (again, again and again) to assume one’s conclusion.
Yes, yes and yes.
And this I once again simply don’t know. The same lifestyle would be possible with a feeling of compulsion, or unconnectedness to one’s choices. You’re claiming you know that such a feeling wasn’t in the cards. I don’t know that, but even if it’s true, then the argument from selection doesn’t tell us why we have a feeling of subjective freedom, the stipulation that from the point of origin of our ancestors the only direction was to evolve towards such a feeling does.
Every trait that every species has evolved through adaptation.
Sometimes traits are vestigial, but it doesn’t seem like our illusion of free will is something that was useful to chimps that we just haven’t lost yet. I guess you never know.
Other times traits are not directly selected but arise as a side effect of something else. A number of us have said that it is possible that this is the case - that the illusion of free will serves no purpose, but something else does, and this illusion is either a prerequisite or a side effect of this other thing.
Finally, some traits are directly selected, and it is possible that our sense of freedom is providing some crucial function in decision making. [The fact that some other species without this illusion could have come up with a different adaptation is not evidence that this is impossible].
It is true that some traits are none of the above, they are simply the result of genetic drift in a trait where little selective pressure is applied. This is theoretically possible. However, based on ournunderstanding of evolution, this is very unlikely. Complex structures do not arise as a result of genetic drift because it is exceedingly unlikely for all the necessary adaptations to emerge together unless evolutionary pressure is directing the process.
When did you last see something causing something else? Never, of course. Yet, you have no problem with the notion of causation, even though, if followed through, it leads to the same issues as free will, papered over only by your unwillingness to open the black box in this case.
As you note yourself, that’s false. The problem is that it lands you among the following options: either you stipulate that there is only one basin of attraction we could have landed in, that yields us having the illusion of freedom. This might well be the case, but is clearly not something we could know. Consequently, this means we smuggle the conclusion in at the outset: hence, the argument is fallacious.
Or there were several possible basins of attraction yielding equivalent behavior, differing only in our internal stance towards our actions. Then, selection couldn’t favor one over the other, and the result has to be due to random chance.
Or, of course, our impression of having choice might just be due to having choice. The simplest option here is obvious.
The current sense of free will I have makes sense causally. My emotions, the things my senses tell me, and my memory of past experiences all add up to make decisions, and I experience this process as consciousness. I have “free will” in the sense that I can choose to do whatever I want; I don’t have real control over this process, in the sense that @Riemann calls contracausal free will, because every factor that could influence my decisions is determined causally.
If my consciousness is some kind of data integration and planning tool, it makes perfect sense to say it is adaptive for my ancestors’ lifestyle.
Your scenario on the other hand posits a consciousness that is capable of feeling as if it could make decisions - in other words it is a data analysis and planning tool - but somehow it has evolved fully formed without being plugged into the only place where it could possibly be useful.
Only if we toss causality out. Which is a fine thing to do over a couple joints when you really want to flex your philosophy muscles but is rarely useful otherwise.
Yawn. Just because causality is epistemically impossible to truly observe does not mean it does not exist. Now pass the joint.