My brain (like the rest of me) is in interactive pattern with its inputs and surroundings. It acts upon things even as it is being acted upon, so there’s no linear causal direction, although we often simplify our models to treat causality as flowing in a certain direction, much as we often navigate by pretending we’re on a stationary two-dimensional plane.
I go by the most obvious conclusion; that the reason I feel like I’m making a choice is because I am in fact making a choice. The mental process I feel I’m making is something that’s actually happening.
I have eggs and oatmeal in my kitchen. When I got up this morning, I could have had either one for breakfast. I decided to eat oatmeal.
But I feel I could have chosen to eat eggs. And the reason I feel that making a choice was possible is because it was possible.
You acknowledge that you feel like you are making choices. But you say this is an illusion. That everything we do is actually predetermined and our feeling that we are making a choice is mistaken.
Use Occam’s Razor. The simplest explanation is that the reason you experience the feeling that you’re making a choice is because you are making a choice. There’s no reason to postulate an illusionary cloak of free will that’s shielding the reality of determinism.
Occam’s Razor says to go to the physics we know. And as far as we know, physical law is deterministic or random, depending on the circumstances. There’s no room for a supernatural homunculus to provide an extra influence on our decisions.
And even if there were, the homunculus would still abide by its own laws of physics. It’s hard to imagine that those would not also be either deterministic or random.
Both experience and our scientific understanding of the brain tells us that our consciousness is lied to at just about every level. That the feeling of free will is also a lie should not be a surprise.
This sounds a little too much like the brain in a jar argument to me.
Why assume that the feeling of making choices is an illusion rather than the more direct conclusion that we are feeling something real?
And where does this illusion come from? At what point in the evolution of the human mind did we collectively develop the delusion that we were making choices? And being as we feel like mental effort is being spent on decision making, what is the evolutionary advantage we gained?
If all we’re really doing is going through life carrying out predetermined actions, why don’t our minds reflect that reality?
Anybody claiming that the argument from selection is sound is making this claim. Because the argument starts from the fact that the illusion of free will implies behavior conferring a reproductive advantage, and then inverts that to say that we have the illusion of free will because of this reproductive advantage. That, of course, as pointed out several times now, is trivially fallacious. The only way to make it sound would be if the illusion of free will were the only way to get this reproductive advantage, thus allowing one to run the implication in the other direction. As that’s not the case, the argument doesn’t work.
But it means that relying on fresh water isn’t the only evolutionarily sound strategy. Which is all I’m saying.
So your argument that free will does make a difference in function/behavior is wrong.
Sure, but again, the argument from selection is that we have the illusion of free will because it confers an adaptive advantage.
You’re confusing the headache with the feeling of having a headache. For the latter, the fact that you do, in fact, have a headache is its most simple explanation.
I don’t need to prove it, I simply need for there to be the possibility. Because then, again, the implication for the argument from selection can’t be run in the other direction. And it is certainly possible to have all the same behaviors without feeling one is responsible for them. There might be such people among us, but if their behavior is thoroughly the same to yours, you wouldn’t notice. And neither would evolution.
I honestly don’t get why you think that I’m somehow arguing that we can’t have the illusion of free will. We clearly can. But you can’t argue that it’s due to some reproductive fitness advantage without somehow arguing that no other internal mental state could give the same advantage.
And as pointed out to @Babale , assuming that to be a fact is just assuming your conclusion. We could have the sense of being free because we are, in fact, free, in which case the illusion of free will would not have evolved.
It leads to the disjunct ‘feathers or fur’. It can’t (all else being equal, which I of course well know they aren’t in practise) then choose between them, because (as was stipulated) there is no fitness differential between them for it to act on. That choice is then, for instance, due to random genetic drift.
Take my coin-tossing game above. If you win the million in either case, it’s just nonsensical to say that you won the million because it came up heads—as whether it came up heads or tails makes no difference to you winning the million. Likewise, feathers or fur (again, in this hypothetical) makes no difference regarding differential selection, so it makes no sense to say one was selected over the other. The function both (as stipulated) equally well fulfill was selected for.
No, of course not. I’m a thoroughgoing materialist. But this isn’t, in the end, really about evolution; it’s about a logically flawed argument. I’m just trying to use stark examples to expose its flawed structure—to no avail, apparently. These examples all just boil down to, if there is no differential fitness advantage between some set of traits, evolution can’t select one over the other. It’s that simple.
I’m saying what I’ve said, that nobody has ever seen anything cause anything else. We see things happening in constant conjunction, but from that, causation doesn’t follow without some additional hypotheses. That’s a very old point due to David Hume.
Sure, whatever suits your preconceptions.
Option A] is excluded by the argument from selection, as it alleges that it’s the illusion of free will that has a reproductive advantage. Option B],1. is excluded by the hypothetical that all of your actions remain the same. That there ought to be some difference in cost is again something I don’t know how even to assess. It might just as well be less costly: after all, we don’t have to sustain some elaborate machinery that comes up with rationalizations and reasons for our actions. There’s some mechanism that generates my choice for, say, jam instead of peanut butter on toast. Why simulate all that ‘could have done otherwise’-stuff? Why not just make me aware of that mechanism?
But the argument from selection doesn’t come with additional qualifiers. It’s just, the illusion of free will is adaptive, that’s why we have it. But those same reproductive benefits could be garnered another way. You can, of course, preemptively exclude that, by saying we were in a situation where only the illusion of free will was in the genetic cards, so to speak. But then you also lose the argument from selection, since the argument is intended to explain why we have the illusion of free will; but in that case, it’s just because you stipulate that we couldn’t have evolved anything else, so completely devoid of information.
Not every trait an organism has is adaptive.
But there’s no sound argument that free will is ‘not even wrong’ in that sense.
Exactly. To selection pressure, organisms are black boxes, and mental traits are effective only in so far as they cause a fitness differential in the phenotype, that is, by proxy. The illusion of free will doesn’t do so.
Again, this just misconstrues the examples I gave. It’s readily obvious that, at a given point in a species’ evolutionary history, for instance, feathers are the only sound evolutionary strategy to fulfill a given function. But if you argue that from the point where the illusion of free will was the only evolutionarily sound strategy, the illusion of free will was the only evolutionarily sound strategy, then you’ve just made a vacuous statement when the aim was to explain why we evolved free will—meaning, why that particular mental trait was chosen among alternatives. Thus, we must first assume that there are, in fact, alternatives. And if there are, then we find that those could’ve done just as good a job as the illusion of free will.
No. I’m just saying that for an argument to explain why a given choice was made, there must have been different choices on the table. If there weren’t, I don’t need the argument.
And at this point, that you try to saddle me with a belief that adaptation implies necessity despite my repeated clarifications is either a massive lapse of reading comprehension on your part or just deliberate misrepresentation of my position.
I’ve never assumed, not implied, that anywhere.
The justification for this is that natural selection acts only on the phenotype, so distinctions that don’t make a difference for the phenotype don’t make a difference for reproductive fitness.
Sure. And (as I explained to you) since that causal chain doesn’t go in the other direction, changes at any point before the functionally relevant will not be subject to direct selection pressure, if they make no relevant difference in the phenotype. The problem is that the argument from selection attempts to invert the causal chain, but since it’s not a one-to-one correspondence (i.e. lacks a necessary connection), that’s just fallacious in general.
But in order to have an argument as to why one of several options was chosen, we must start at a point where there are options on the table, otherwise, there is no choice to explain and we’ve just assumed our conclusion. Suppose that feathers (taking here ‘feathers’ solely as a means to conserve bodily heat) never had evolved, by pure chance. Then suppose that somebody makes an argument that all animals must have fur, because of the reproductive advantages this brings. This argument, I hope you’ll agree, is wrong. If, however, you start from a point where there was some proto-feathers already developed, then yes, you’ll evolve feathers (and yes, feathers will be adaptive in this case). But you’ve also already eliminated the choice you’ve intended to explain!
Or take the hypothetical case where we act the way we do because we feel a compulsion to do so. We could have the exact same discussion there, where you’d be arguing that we do have that compulsion because it’s adaptive, and I’d be pointing out that no, an illusion of free will would buy us the same evolutionary real estate. You can’t be right in both cases!
Now, it might be that for some reason, the path to evolving an illusory sense of free will from the first cell who ever thought it’d be a good idea to snuggle up to others of its kind, or wherever you’d want to start, was easier than to evolve a sense of compulsory action, or just an awareness of the underlying deterministic machinery that makes decisions happen. It might be thanks to some correlation with some other mechanism giving a fitness advantage, or thanks to how brains work, or whatever. But I, at least, don’t know that’s the case (and, you know, I strongly doubt you or anybody else does). Given our current knowledge, it seems most reasonable to suppose that at that point, all options were on the table. But then, the argument from selection simply does no work towards explaining why the illusory-free-will option was chosen.
[ my bold ]
No! You keep repeating this over and over again. It’s complete nonsense.
Suppose in a given species, the ancestral state lacks mental state X (subjective feeling of free will) and mental state Y (feeling of compulsion). It feels nothing in particular.
If a mutation arises in the genome that encodes mental state X which fosters better decision-making granting superior fitness, natural section will favor it. The mental state IS the phenotype. The mental state IS the behavior.
You cannot arbitrarily decouple anywhere in the causal chain between the DNA that encodes the structure of the brain and whatever ultimately puts more food in your stomach or gets you a better mate. EVERYTHING in that causal chain is the behavior, EVERYTHING in that causal chain is the phenotype that is subject to selection. A mental state IS behavior. Everything in the causal chain downstream of DNA is the adaptive behavioral phenotype.
You cannot just say “what if mental state Y (feeling of compulsion) also arose by mutation and produced the same behavior”? The mental state IS the behavior. So mental state Y is a DIFFERENT behavior. The entire point is to propose that there is a causal connection between mental state X and you ultimately getting more food in your stomach or a better mate. The hypothesis is that mental state X is BETTER than the ancestral state and BETTER than mental state Y. So it is favored by natural selection, it is an adaptive behavior.
And the hypothetical existence of Z (another DIFFERENT phenotype) that might confer some DIFFERENT reproductive advantage is equally irrelevant. Natural selection only compares phenotypes that actually exist in the species’ actual environment. There is no such thing as absolute fitness, natural selection does not throw darts at a dartboard of all conceivable phentotypes in all conceivable species in all conceivable environments across all conceivable universe and only select the absolute best one. There is only RELATIVE fitness in the species under consideration in the environment under consideration.
It is simple logic. The argument is of the form ‘if A, then B’—if (illusion of free will), then (reproductive advantage). It tries to invert the direction of implication, inferring A from B. That’s only sound—strictly only sound—if there is no other way than A to yield B. Evolution doesn’t enter into it at this stage. Anything else is just affirming the consequent.
I agree entirely! It is exactly in such a case that the argument is unsound, because the same reproductive advantage would’ve been had by a mutation producing the state Y instead. Take my above example of getting a million dollars: it’s simply not the case that you got the million because the coin came up heads, if you’d also gotten it if it had come up tails. Because which way the coin lands is completely immaterial for the outcome!
Even during the bad old days of behaviorism, where there would’ve at least been some to take this seriously, this would’ve been a massively contentious assertion. These days, just blandly asserting something like that is pretty much without credibility.
No, Y would be exactly as good, from a fitness point of view, because again, what the mental state is just isn’t relevant for selection—as long as your behavior is the same, there simply is no differential fitness for natural selection to act on.
I think you need to read my post more carefully. Mental state Y is a different behavioral phenotype that does NOT confer the same reproductive advantage.
If you think that there is no possible causal connection between the configuration of your neurons and whether you end up with more food in your stomach, I can’t help you.
There must be a causal connection all the way from DNA to whatever gets more food in your stomach, and (from the perspective of natural selection) that entire causal chain is the phenotype. That causal chain obviously goes via the brain. If you don’t want to call the entire chain “behavior”, that’s just semantics. Just call it a phenotype. But this complete causal chain must exist, or natural selection does not operate. Natural selection operates on heritable phenotypes.
It seems @thorny_locust was correct. The problem here seems to be that you don’t believe in causation, so of course you don’t believe in evolution by natural selection at all.
This is patently rodiculous. No traits at all give you advantages that couldn’t be given to you by some other adaptation instead. By your logic NOTHING evolves due to a reproductive fitness advantage. Not fur, not locomotion, respiration… nothing.
Right, we could. What would it mean for us to, “in fact, be free”, assuming we don’t discard causality?
Absolutely nothing. Freedom is an incoherent concept in the context of causality.
I see three explanations.
- the could-have-done-otherwise stuff is key to our decision making or planning abilities
- the could-have-done-otherwise stuff is a side effect of anothed ability
- the could-have-done-otherwise stuff was designed by an intelligent being to fuck with you
Then you’re just changing the setup, because the way I intended the compulsion to work, it would yield the same benefit. And if you’re now saying that it doesn’t, well, then you’re just assuming that there’s nothing else that yields that benefit, to conclude that there’s nothing else to yield that benefit.
None of that is related to anything I’ve said, and honestly, I can’t see how you can plausibly misunderstand so badly. All I’m saying is that I might both make me a salad while having the mental state ‘yummy, I really like salad’ and ‘blech, I hate salad, but I should eat healthier’. In both cases, there is a clear causal connection between my brain state and the resulting behavior, but the resulting behavior does not uniquely determine the brain state. As whether I eat the salad instead of the high-cholesterol burger is what determines whether I check out early from congestive heart disease, it’s there that selection acts, not at the point of my subjective feelings regarding salads.
You can tell yourself whatever story you like, of course, but that has nothing to do with anything I’ve posted.
That doesn’t follow from anything I’ve said. Of course, for instance, for a scaly organism, evolving feathers is advantageous. But this simply just doesn’t support an argument of the form of the argument from selection. Take @Riemann 's hypothetical:
As I said above, I don’t disagree with anything about it. It’s in fact exactly the point I was making with the million-dollar game, which (curiously enough) nobody decided to comment upon. If that is the case, and Y provides exactly the same fitness benefit as X, then that fitness benefit is not due to X arising in the same sense you didn’t get the million dollars because the coin came up heads—whether the coin comes up heads or tails is irrelevant to the outcome, and likewise, whether the mental state X or Y arises.
Of course, you could then posit that we’re in a situation where Y is, for whatever reason, less adaptive—it has a higher metabolic cost, for instance. Then X would preferentially arise, or at least the X-derived phenotype would outcompete the Y-derived one in the long run. But then, you’ve also just assumed your conclusion: yes, if you assume X is the only way to obtain the fitness benefit, then X is the only way to obtain the fitness benefit. Big deal!
But in a situation where there is a genuine option (i.e. in the only situation where you’d need the argument form selection), the natural selection doesn’t determine either any more than the coin throw’s outcome determines whether you get the million bucks.
It would mean that we could, in any given situation, have acted differently.
Or it could’ve just arisen randomly. Or it’s a prerequisite for another ability. Or… But this is a fool’s game, adding ad-hoc hypotheses to a failed argument. It does the opposite of making it more plausible.
The idea that a phenotype is adaptive is a hypothesis, not an assumption.
And OF COURSE the hypothesis is that the phenotype is BETTER than at least SOME other phenotypes. The hypothesis only requires that this mental state is a better phenotype than other mutually exclusive mental states that are present or likely to arise by mutation in the species.
But your absolute “assuming that there’s nothing else that yields that benefit” is incoherent. The benefit IS the mental state phenotype. The hypothesis is that the mental state “sense of free will” is an adaptive phenotype because there is a causal connection between that neuron configuration and getting more food in your stomach. Again, the entire causal chain starting at DNA and running through the brain is the phenotype subject to selection. Of course nothing else yields EXACTLY this benefit, because something that is different is different.
Other phenotypes may entail DIFFERENT benefits, which also end up with you getting more food in your stomach. Unless those other phenotypes are mutually exclusive with this one and arise in the same species, so what?
In a causal universe, that’s nonsensical. Even if you introduce true randomness, causality+true randomness=a creature that acts normally sometimes and completely at random at other times, IE something suffering from bouts of temporary insanity - certainly not our subjective experience of free will. Unless you are willing to discard causality, you cannot have free will.
As you correctly point out, no one has ever seen causality in action. But no one has ever seen free will in action, either - not in a way that they’d be able to distinguish from the illusion of free will. So we have two incompatible concepts - free will and causality - and both are epistemically impossible to observe.
One thing we could do in response is declare that it is impossible for us to know which is true. And maybe it is impossible for us to truly know. I don’t argue there, but it’s impossible to trully know anything - some even call “I think therefore I am” into question.
But at the end of the day, science is about building the best model of the world that we can. Good scientists recognize that their model, by definition, will always be incomplete. So they build the best model they can (typically the simplest possible model that works with all observations) and use that until they get more information.
That’s the framework I work in. Why? Well, I’d say because unlike every other framework in history, it reliably proves itself. The fact that we are communicating through the internet right now is proof of that. When I apply that framework to problemsolving, it works.
Causality is the basis for almost every scientific theory we have. These scientific theories have enormous explanatory power. We cannot observe causality, but we can see endless modeled interactions that play put exactly as predicted by models that assume causality. That’s not a way to directly observe causality, but it is something.
Meanwhile free will has very little explanatory power. It explains only one thing - why we have a sense of free will - and not very well, since it literally doesn’t track with experimental evidence from neurological and psychological trials.
This is why, despite the fact that both free will and causality would be epistemically unobservable even if they existed, I am very comfortable with saying that the evidence for causality is far stronger than the evidence for free will.
The same goes for evidence about evolution. You say, for example, that we cannot know whether our sense of free will evolved due to selective pressure or due to random genetic drift. And again, it’s true that we do not know this with 100% certainty. AND YET, we draw conclusions.
Take Parasaurolophus.
Why did this guy have that big crest on his head? (It’s actually a highly modified nasal bone). The answer is, we don’t know. There are a lot of theories. Some think the crest was for identifying other Parasaurs (as opposed to other similar hadrosaurs who lived in the same area). Others theorize that they used their horn as a resonating chamber to make loud honks to attract mates.
Not all theories are good ones. We continue to test the crest and how it connected to the Parasaur’s nasal passages to determine whether it actually could use it to honk, for example. We concluded it wasn’t used for combat by studying its shape and size, and subjecting models to different levels of stress. We even tested whether it could have used its crest to store and squirt chemically combustible fluids, like a bombardier beetle.
Will we ever know exactly what a Parasaurolophus crest was like? No - but with every fossil find and scientific paper, we come closer.
You know what nobody proposes about Parasaurolophus crests? That they arose entirely at random and had no impact on the fitness of the animal.
Is it possible that this is the real reason? Or that the real reason is that the devil thought it would look cool when he was planting fossils in the ground to lead us astray from God? Or that Parasaurolophus didn’t actually have a crest and by pure luck every fossil of Parasaurolophus crania we find happens to be in association with a very crest-like rock?
Yes, all of those scenarios are possible. Despite that, I sti feel confident saying “Parasaurolophus’ derived crest evolved to be that way as a result of selection pressure”. Hell, despite the fact that I have no idea what it was for, I will say that I am certain that it was an adaptive trait. I think @Riemann would likely agree.
And I feel just as confident saying that about a derived and costly trait like our cognition.
To say that all mental states lead to the same outcome is not “clear causation in all cases”. It is the definition of the absence of causation - or at least of any difference in causation, where difference is what’s relevant.
There must be a causal connection from DNA to mental state to whether food gets in your mouth for natural selection to operate. Your contention seems to be that mental states cannot be causal.
No. Again, if that’s the case, you’re just affirming the consequent.
But there’s not. Evolution can’t distinguish between me eating salad because I like it, and eating it because I want to eat healthier. What matters is just that I eat it.
Really, try and understand the coin throw example. If I throw a coin, and you get a million dollars each way, then it’s meaningless to say that the coin landing heads made you get a million dollars. Likewise, if there’s mental states X and Y, and each of them confers the same benefit, it’s meaningless to say that X was selected for its benefit.
I’ve provided an explicit example of how it works in this thread, several times now.
The notion of causality is exactly as problematic as that of free will, you’re just willing to accept it as a black box. But just think about how the causal chain of events comes about. Either it originates in something non-caused, or it goes on to infinity. In the latter case, we already have an infinite regress. In the former, we must give some account of how something could come about without being caused. Randomness is an option. To have randomness, you need computational power equivalent to solving the Halting Problem, which is the sort of power you get if you have a machine that can traverse infinitely many cycles in finite time. This is also what you need for genuine could-have-done-otherwise free will.
That’s true for everything. Maybe you’re just a brain in a vat?
No. Causality plays no role in science. Constant, lawful regularities do. As Bertrand Russel put it so aptly more than 100 years ago:
The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers, is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm.
That’s not what I’m saying, but there seems little use in repeating myself again.
Jesus. I have nowhere said that. Stop putting words in my mouth. That some mental states yield the same outcome doesn’t imply that all do.
The hypothesis is that mental states X and Y do NOT confer the same benefit, because they are causal.
Where does “But there’s not” come from here? Is it supposed to be a consequence of your next sentence? If so, you really don’t understand how evolution works, or perhaps you imagine that we don’t. Evolution does not CREATE causal connections between things.
If you think the hypothesis is that evolution CREATED a causal link between “sense of free will” and getting food in your mouth, you misunderstood it. The hypothesis is that this phenotype, like all phenotypes, arose by random mutation - with downstream causation that gets more food in your mouth already present.
There may of course be a deeper sense in which evolution might be said to have “enabled” this causal link, to the extent that the prexisting brain architecture surely evolved through natural selection, and the causal connection between “sense of free will” and getting food in your mouth flows through that brain
Only if you assume that both X and Y are possible to reach from an initial state.
No, you haven’t. You provided a thought experiment that showed that a hypothetical construct that can experience infinite possibolities at once cpuld generate randomness. That’s not the same thing, at all.
Yes, and I explained my reasons for doing so in my post.
Just because genuine randomness may be possible somewhere in the universe does not mean it is accessible to your brain. Consciousness is computation but the laws of physics aren’t computation. It is possible that true randomness is totally impossible in computation and yet exists in nature.
Besides which, true randomness does not lead to free will.
Yes, exactly. Epistemically I cannot ever prove I am not. Just like I cannot prove that causality exists. And yet…
Right, we don’t observe causality directly. That’s not really relevant to this discussion. Russel correctly points out that notions of “cause” don’t really have a place in our scientific theory. Physics tells us that if ball A hits ball B a certain way, ball B’s motion can be predicted by a set of equations. It does not require causality in that the ball could move according to theory due to causality, or it could move according to theory due to the simulation we live in obeying certain rules, or it could move according to the theory due to God’s will. We can never know the true cause.
And yet, if someone says, “Ball B moved because it was hit by Ball A”, I wouldn’t dream of stopping the physics conversation then and there to have an epistemic or ontological discussion about what “because” means. We all know what it means in context.
I don’t see how you can, in so many different ways in these replies.
But I don’t think you are going to understand, no matter what anybody says.
Ditto.
Is it present in both males and females?