Nope. That doesn’t follow logically at all. Indeed, it is the fallacy of affirming the consequent.
“Mijin is drunk because he drank beer”
Does that mean that being drunk necessitates having beer, and not whiskey, say?
I look forward to seeing your reboot of Sherlock Holmes
(sorry)
This “otherwise” is a completely different claim though.
Here you are indeed saying that being drunk doesn’t necessitate having beer. Of course not.
It doesn’t support the claim you made in the first part of your compound sentence though.
No, it means that all things that have drunk enough beer are drunk, and Mijin is one such thing. Likewise, ‘humans have the feeling of free will because of the reproductive benefit the behavior this yields confers’ means that ‘all things that have that reproductive benefit have the illusion of free will’, which is false. Which is what I’ve been saying.
The claim is not, ‘humans have the reproductive benefit conferred by that behavior because they have the feeling of free will’. This is true. But it doesn’t help explaining why we have that feeling in the first place.
Wow, I took a break but you’re still hammering on at this in a minority of one, stubbornly ignoring everything anyone has said.
Are you just still just ignoring the technical aspect of genetics that I pointed out numerous times, that for natural selection to operate, only alternate alleles (versions of the same gene) are relevant? So all that is necessary is that among mutually exclusive traits encoded by the same gene this must be the only trait that grants the reproductive benefit.
All that is required in the adaptive hypothesis is that the trait “sense of free will” confers downstream beneficial behavior (“finding more food”, say) that is not conferred by the mutually exclusive traits “no sense of anything” or “sense of compulsion”. This is all that the hypothesis proposes and requires. And you have explicitly agreed that you think this is perfectly plausible, so why on earth are you hammering on at this?
The adaptive hypothesis certainly does NOT preclude the possibility that a different trait encoded by a different gene could also confer the same beneficial downstream behavior “find more food”.
By analogy, all that is required is that “hearing” be better than “no hearing”. It does not require that hearing must be better than sight or smell or touch.
And for the umpteenth time, although you stubbornly refuse to acknowledge it, nobody anywhere (including in the links you found) is making the nonsensical “argument from selection” that you imagine, that the hypothesis that something has a fitness advantage proves that it has a fitness advantage. This obviously circular nonsense that you are “refuting” is entirely in your imagination.
There is a HYPOTHESIS that it has a fitness advantage, not a logically derived “argument”.
I guess if you are going to stop anyone having an interesting conversation about what’s actually worth discussing by bombarding it with your “refutation” of a circular argument that nobody anywhere is making, we’ll have to give up on this thread.
As nearly half this thread is posts by @Riemann (97 posts) & @Half_Man_Half_Wit (76 posts) I’m just going to remind both not to attack the poster. You can attack the post, but not the poster.
In just the last 2 posts and not digging any further, @Riemann is really crossing the line. That many "you"s is a good indication you’re now attacking the poster.
The structure of explanation is 'explanandum because explanans. For this to work, the explanans must imply the explanandum—i.e. for every thing the explanans is true of, the explanandum must be true.
So:
Explanandum: @Mijin is drunk. (We want to answer the question: why is @Mijin drunk?)
Explanans: @Mijin has been drinking beer.
Does this answer the question? Yes! Having drunk enough beer implies being drunk.
Now:
Explanandum: Humans have the feeling of free will. (We want to answer the question: why do humans have the feeling of free will?)
Explanans: Because the behavior associated with having the illusion of free will yields a selective advantage.
Does this answer the question? No! Having that behavior doesn’t entail having the illusion of freedom.
On the other hand:
Explanandum: Humans have the illusion of free will.
Explanans: Humans actually have free will.
Does this answer the question? Well, yes, modulo the possibility of unconscious free will. And in that case, all that’s needed to complete the partial explanation would be to adduce a hypothesis on veridical self-perception.
I don’t see it’s relevance, and you were apparently unable/unwilling to elaborate. Perhaps you could be so kind and for once react to something I post in an attempt to clarify matters, and just point out in the above where you think the argumentative structure is altered.
There is no need for traits to be in direct competition for any of the above logic to work.
EDIT: Sorry, didn’t see the above note. Disregard where inapplicable.
The ones you think you are making, for the most part, make no sense. If you mean that others can easily understand that they make no sense, then that’s accurate.
And you yourself are clearly not understanding the points that others have made.
Not much of an argument there to attack, but: obviously it must. Otherwise, there would be some things that have this reproductive benefit without having the illusion of free will, and hence, being a thing with that reproductive benefit does not support the conclusion that said thing has the feeling of free will.
If there are some humans that are immortal, then Socrates bring a human does not tell us that he is mortal. Hence ‘Socrates is mortal because he is human’ means that ‘all things that are human are mortal’. But this is exactly the same structure as above.
The structure was the way you already described it, in more or less formal logic. You said A → B. B, therefore A. Which is unequivocally a logical fallacy.
Rather than just concede that this single argument that you used to defend your position doesn’t work, instead we’ve had 20 or so posts of you trying to dodge and in the process making more obviously false claims.
But let’s go through it again.
Well Mijin has been drinking beer is one possible explanation for why I am drunk.
Stating that beer makes me drunk does not entail exclusivity. That was the whole point of the example.
Wrong, it’s analogous. Having a selective advantage is one possible reason that the trait exists. There’s no difference here, even though you’ve tried to switch the situation around again (we were talking about the many traits that might have selective advantage, not the many explanations for why one trait exists).
As I’ve said several times, we can ask follow-on questions about what the selective benefit is.
And frankly, I wish we could move on to that, because this logical clown show is both embarrassing, and not on topic.
No. Completely unequivocally: A is explained by B means that B must imply A. If you point to ‘having drunk beer’ as explaining ‘@Mijin is drunk’, then it must be the case that everything that has drunk (enough) beer must be drunk. No claim is entailed that nothing else could get you drunk; drinking beer need only be sufficient.
Likewise, if you want to point to ‘the selective advantage conferred by behaving as if one had the feeling of free will’ as explaining ‘having the feeling of free will’, it must be the case that everything having that selective advantage by showing that particular behavior must have the feeling of free will. That, however, isn’t the case.
Sure. And the fact that you couldn’t have been drinking that amount of beer without being drunk is what makes it an explanation at all. If you’ve had one beer, that wouldn’t explain you being drunk, because most people aren’t drunk after one beer—although some are. Likewise, if most (or some, or any) creatures that behave like having the feeling of free will don’t actually have the feeling of free will, having that behavior doesn’t explain having the feeling.
That’s beside the point. To be an explanation, there must be an ‘if…then’ relationship. ‘If drunk enough beer, then drunk’ being true makes your consumption an explanation of your state of inebriation. ‘If having the behavior of feeling like one has free will, then feeling like one has free will’ being false means that one could have the behavior without the feeling—which isn’t the case in the drunkenness example: you couldn’t have that many beers without being drunk. That’s what makes having those beers an explanation.
I’d still recommend that you actually go and draw the sets as outlined above. It makes the point perfectly clear, and forestalls any of your confusions about what implies what: only that which is a subset of something implies it. There simply are no two ways about this.
If you’re unable/unwilling to do so, I’ll provide the drawings upon having access to a proper computer again. But it should really be quite simple.
The difference is that there are more than one subset of ‘being drunk’, like ‘having drunk lots of whisky’ or ‘having drunk lots of wine’, so all of these would make a good explanation for @Mijin 's drunkenness (the explanandum). Because being a member of each of these sets entails being a member of the set of drunken things.
But the assertion in the case of the argument from selection is that having the advantage brought on by the requisite behavior entails having the feeling of free will. The analogous case would be to look at other ways for having the feeling of free will (the explanandum), like actually having free will, or having been convinced by a magic unicorn, or whatever.
But what we are faced with is rather different ways of having the adaptive behavior without having the feeling of free will. An analogous case would be ways of having drunk the requisite amount of beer without being drunk. Again, being drunk/having the feeling of free will is the explanandum, and having drunk a certain amount of beer/having the selective benefit a possible explanans. If the explanans doesn’t entail the explanandum, we don’t have an explanation. If having drunk a certain amount of beer doesn’t entail being drunk, it doesn’t explain being drunk. If having the selective benefit of having the feeling of free will doesn’t entail having the feeling of free will, it doesn’t explain it. And there’s no such entailment.
I’ll continue to try finding a better way to explain the situation. So:
Affirming the consequent would be: B implies A, A, therefore B. It would be saying that because you are drunk, you must’ve drunk beer. What I’m saying is, for B to explain A, B must imply A, such that asserting B means A must be the case: because you drank beer, you are drunk.
(Yes, I have maybe chosen the names the other way around than it’s put in wiki or whatever, but of course that makes no difference.)
The explanans must imply the explanandum, otherwise there’s no explanation. Being human must imply being mortal, otherwise it makes no sense to appeal to something’s humanity to explain its mortality. Having drunk a good amount of beer must imply being drunk, otherwise it makes no sense to appeal to having drunk beer to explain being drunk.
This doesn’t mean there can’t be any other explanations. Being a dog also implies being mortal. Having drunk whisky also implies being drunk. But that’s entirely beside the point.
It’s the same with the feeling of free will. If you want to explain why we have it—if you want to answer the question ‘Why do we have the feeling of free will?’—then whatever you point to must imply having that feeling. Otherwise, the purported explanans being true does not imply the explanandum being true, and you have no explanation.
The purported explanans in the case of the argument from selection does not imply the explanandum. That’s it. End of story. It’s just that simple.
Please at least consider the possibility that you’ve got this a bit wrong. It happens, we’re only human.
No, “B”, remember, is “Mijin is drunk”. So “B must imply A” means “Mijin is drunk implies [or even the phrase you used: logically entails] Mijin drank beer”. Which we don’t actually know, because many things can make me drunk.
Or, in the actual topic, “Humans have a survival benefit” entails “humans have a sense of free will”. It doesn’t follow at all.
You are reasoning from an effect backwards to a singular cause.
If that logic held up, there would essentially never be anything humans couldn’t trivially explain. The cause of anything would always be logically entailed.
‘@Mijin is drunk’ is the thing we want to explain, the explanandum, A. We want to answer the question: why is @Mijin drunk? We do so by positing an explanans, B, something that, if true, explains—meaning entails or implies—the explanandum. We can say that because of B, A.
Now, in the more pertinent case, the explanandum is ‘having the feeling of free will’. We want to know why we have that feeling, particularly if we don’t actually have free will. The purported explanans is that this bestows some survival advantage. To be a sufficient explanation, the explanans has to entail the explanandum: if B, then A; only then does B explain A. If B could be the case without A following, then being B would not explain being A. All B must be A.
However, this fails to be the case. The survival benefit can be gained without the illusion of free will following. Some B are not A. That something has the survival benefit fails to entail that it has the illusion of free will. Having that illusion is thus not explained by the survival benefit.
Now, I won’t claim to have used the labels ‘A’ and ‘B’ consistently throughout the thread. It’s been a couple of posts. But of course, what the variables are called doesn’t matter for the logic; and on that, I’ve been consistent. (I’m reasonably sure, at least, although as you say we all make mistakes.) The entailment is always explanans → explanandum, which necessitates that for everything the explanans is true, the explanation likewise must be. That’s the case for @Mijin being drunk because of drinking beer, it’s the case for Socrates being mortal because of being human, and it’s not the case for humans having the feeling of free will because of the selective benefit the associated behavior provides (as a creature could show that behavior without having the feeling).
I don’t know why you’re insisting on switching what the meaning of A and B were in my example, so I’ll just avoid the algebra and stick to a description:
Yes, Mijin drank beer explains why Mijin is drunk. It explains it because drinking beer is a thing that can cause drunkeness. And note that we cannot reason backwards: that if we see a drunk Mijin infer that he must have drunk beer. Because other things can cause drunkeness.
And it does. The hypothesis is that this trait provided a survival advantage.
This is irrelevant. For any trait that any organism has you could claim that something else might provide an equal survival benefit. There is no requirement for a solution being unique.
It matters to me though because I want to put your posts side by side and show the inconsistency.
There it is again. Affirming the consequent.
Suddenly, for the last example only, there’s a requirement that the “explanans” be unique.
Why do you say “as a creature could show that behavior without having the feeling” and not “as a Mijin could be drunk without having had beer”?
That’s all correct. Of course, nobody ever did any backwards reasoning, so it’s also irrelevant, but nevertheless correct.
But for it to explain that we have the feeling of free will, it must be unique! Just think: would having drunk however many beers explain @Mijin being drunk if it were possible to drink that many beers and not be drunk? Would being human explain Socrates’ mortality if some humans were immortal?
No, there never is such a requirement. The only requirement in each and any of those cases is that the explanans necessitates the explanandum, i.e. that it could not be the case that the explanans is true without the explanandum being true. If humans could be mortal or immortal, being human doesn’t explain Socrates’ mortality. If drinking beer could make you drunk or fail to, having drunk beer would not explain @Mijin 's drunkenness. As having the survival benefit could entail having the feeling of free will or not, positing it fails to explain that we have said feeling. They’re just completely analogous, elementary cases.
Because the first thing is of the structure (explanans) without (explanandum), while the second is of the structure (explanandum) without (explanans). So the second one does not impinge on @Mijin being drunk being explained by having drunk beer, while the first one invalidates having the feeling of free will being explained by having the survival benefit.
I suppose the lack of response means you’ve either decided it’s hopeless, or grown bored (or maybe the penny has finally dropped). Anyway, just in case there’s any lingering interest, I’m going to make good on my earlier promise to provide you with some graphic illustrations of the basic logic involved here, to try and resolve any lingering misunderstandings.
So, first, we find some situation we feel is in need of explanation (an explanandum). Some x is found to be A—it has a certain property, shows a certain behavior, or in some other way is deemed remarkable.
We want to answer the question: why is x A? Variations on that theme in this thread have included:
As an explanation, we posit an explanans: x is A because x is B.
For the given examples, we have:
Socrates is mortal because he is human.
@Mijin is drunk because@Mijin has drunk beer (of sufficient quantity).
We have the feeling of free will because we have free will.
We have the feeling of free will because it provides a selection benefit.
An explanation works if being B entails being A; if all things that are B also are A. Then, pointing out that something is B immediately allows us to conclude that it must be A. This supports modus ponens and modus tollens-type inferences: from ‘x is human’ implying ‘x is mortal’, and ‘Socrates is human’, we can deduce ‘Socrates is mortal’. Likewise, from ‘Jesus is not mortal’, we can deduce ‘Jesus is not human’ (which is not to affirm that either of these is true).
Note that this in no way implies that something must be B, to explain its being A: there could be another subset B’ of A that gives just as good of an explanation. Dogs are mortal, too, so if somebody named their dog Socrates, its dogness would explain its mortality. Likewise, drinking whisky gets you drunk just as well as drinking beer does.
But now suppose that ‘x is B’ does not imply ‘x is A’. This is the following situation:
Here, saying that ‘x is B’ does not license us to conclude ‘x is A’: some Bs are not As. Suppose, for instance, that humans find a cure for death in the 23rd century: then, in general, something being human no longer implies it is mortal. It would not do to posit ‘Socrates is human’ as an explanation for ‘Socrates is mortal’, if it didn’t in fact follow! Likewise, we no longer can draw modus tollens-type explanations: ‘Jesus is not mortal’ no longer implies that ‘Jesus is not human’, because some humans (those born after the 23rd century) aren’t mortal. Likewise with the other cases: ‘@Mijin isn’t drunk’ does not imply ‘@Mijin hasn’t drunk (a large quantity of) beer’, if beer doesn’t always lead to drunkenness (which it doesn’t, if you count non-alcoholic beer).
Now, finally, the case we’re most interested in: the feeling of free will. The argument from selection alleges that there is a certain survival benefit garnered by having this feeling. But the feeling is not what natural selection acts on; rather, it acts on a certain behavior. However, the feeling is in no way necessary to show that behavior: a creature could feel like whatever they do is the only possible course of action, with acting otherwise being impossible, or could feel an irresistible compulsion to act, or what have you: as long as it acts in all the right ways, it will reap the same selective benefit. Consequently, the set of all creatures that reap this benefit is not a subset of the set of all creatures that have the feeling of free will. Hence, the explanation can’t work. As a marker of this, we also don’t have modus tollens-type reasoning available: not having the feeling of free will does not entail not having the survival advantage.
The final wrinkle on this is then that one can adduce additional explanatory hypotheses to supplement an incomplete explanation. If humans only become immortal beyond the 23rd century, then the intersection of the sets defined by ‘being human’ and ‘being born before the 23rd century’ is a set that’s a subset of the set of all mortal creatures, hence, we can explain ‘Socrates is mortal’ by ‘Socrates is a human and was born before the 23rd century’. If we want to get rid of non-alcoholic beer, we can look at the intersection of ‘being beer’ and ‘containing alcohol’, in order to restore our explanation.
However, doing so is tantamount to saying that the original explanation was insufficient. And so is the explanation that purports to explain that we have a sense of free will because of the selective benefit it provides: something else must be adduced to make a convincing case.
The length of your post illustrates why I haven’t bothered to reply. I’ll give you credit though, i was starting to think you were not being serious.
The length of your last post though, shows you really mean it: you have the strong conviction that “feeling of free will” must be treated differently to all other biological traits, and all the other examples of A->B that we’ve discussed, and must necessarily be a unique solution.
