Fair enough. But their radio and signals operators routinely repeated the same keys, used predictable phrases, used repetitive terminology, etc. These were the things that allowed Ultra to succeed.
The city in question that was bombed was Coventry. Several years ago I had the chance to visit Coventry, and toured the city, as well as Coventry Cathedral. They have erected a monument to reconciliation there. Very moving.
Interestingly enough, the Americans, not yet in the war, were not told of Churchill’s dilemma until the decision had been made. They might not have been much help. The U.S. Secretary of War, Henry L. Stimson, didn’t entirely believe in code-breaking; he believed that “gentlemen do not read each other’s mail.” And when Roosevelt learned of the situation, he said, “War is forcing us more and more to play God. I don’t know what I should have done.”
Hitler (and the Nazis’) initial aim was to restore the borders of the old German Empire that had been shortened after WWI.
As an Austrian (though born very close to the border with Germany) he also wanted to unite all Germans under one Reich. He almost succeeded in this without war. Had Poland capitulated to his demands for Gdansk (Danzig) and the so-called Polish corridor in what had been northern Prussia, Adolf might have had time to discover nuclear weapons. Polish resistance brought on the war and Dolph’s racial hatreds (perhaps his only motivation) can explain most of his subsequent “blunders”.
As many have pointed out, his ultimate war aim was to conquer the countries of eastern Europe, enslave their populations, murder the ruling classes (especially the communists and the jews) and populate the regions with a new ruling class - the SS and their offspring.
Britain & France were thus just sideshows as evidenced by the fact that Hitler allowed central and southern France to be ruled by the quisling Vichy government. The Balkans were another story. Resistance here was being led by the southern slavs who were both sub-human and the cause of the first world war.
Hitler and his generals believed that Russia in 1941 would be like 1916-18, when the tsarist armies virtually disintingrated and German forces swept unopposed all the way to the same distances gained in WWII.
Initially, the Soviets did melt and surrender by the hundreds of thousands. But as the Nazi murder/enslavement campaign moved on, resistance tightened and Nazi casulaties mounted. Stalingrad wasn’t the turning point, the great tank battle at Kursk later that year proved that the Soviets had matched and bettered the best Nazi tanks and assualt troops.
From then on, the Nazis fought on only in a vain hope of an armistice and of course for the one aim that they could achieve, the murder of all the jews (and other “sub-humans”) they could get their hands on.
Fortunately for the German people, they were conquered before we had the chance to drop the big one. I believe that FDR had chosen Nuremburg - an appropriate choice IMHO.
Jeff_42 wrote:
The Coventry Dilemma was mentioned on an episode of Babylon 5, and sparked a huge amount of discussion on rec.arts.sf.tv.babylon5.moderated. The consensus seemed to be that the Coventry Dilemma never actually happened – Churchill did not know that Coventry was going to be bombed ahead of time. He just made up the story after the fact as a bit of political propaganda.
Every book I’ve read on WWII describes the major turning points as Stalingrad, Midway and El Alamein. Sometimes they include the Battle of the Atlantic or the Battle of Britain, but they always include Stalingrad. Paulus’ entire Sixth Army was destroyed there. The Luftwaffe overextended itself there. Even Manstein failed to achieve his objective in relieving the city there. Kursk was perhaps the last chance the Germans had in the Soviet Union, but Stalingrad broke the back of the German advance before that.
This unorthodox interpretation of the Coventry event is largely the thesis of one man. Does anyone know more?
Sorry… I don’t know more about that…they sure seem to believe it is true in Coventry, if you talk to them…
but
[hijack]
tracer, it is good to see another B5 fan out there!
[/hijack]
BTW, There is at least one book concentrating on the subject of strategic blunders of WWII. Kenneth Macksey also wrote Military Errors of World War Two. I remember it being a good read. Cassell is the publisher.
Why The Allies Won by Richard Overy touches on this too.
And…is Churchill knowing about the Coventry bombings beforehand common knowledge in Britian? I’d never heard it before myself. Has someone written on it?
I don’t know specifically about Coventry, but the general principle is true. The British did limit their response to decrypted messages so the Germans would not realize their codes had been broken.
Kursk was more of a “straight fight”, where German tanks headed into well-prepared, layered anti-tank defences. Stalingrad was certainly a more humiliating defeat; it was solely because Hitler’s intereference disrupted coherent planning, and his arrogance prevented an army of several hundred thousand men from escaping, perhaps to fight another day. Hitler was so concerned at the possible effects on morale in Germany that any commander hinting at failure was replaced (often, as in Paulus’ case, by officers with far less experience and ability). Goering made promises he knew couldn’t be kept - that the Sixth Army could be entirely resupplied by air.
The end results?
- An entire Army was effectively wiped out (whether dead or captured).
- The Luftwaffe’s transport capability was shattered; future German airborne missions or air resupply would not be possible to any large degree.
- Morale was very badly hit. German civilians did find out about the defeat, and troops in units that did survive spread the word rapidly.
- Faith in Hitler’s ability was badly damaged at both low and high levels of the military.
Mars Horizon wrote:
It’s disconcerting every time a waiter in a restaurant asks me “What do you want?”. 
The way that the Japanese over-extended themselves and over-estimated the extent of anti-British feeling in India has to be considered a serious error.
Yes they had the longest advance in modern history but it was followed by the longest retreat.
Their treatment of civilian populations and captured troops ensured that they would never be able to achieve any sort of peace treaty on their terms with nations they had encroached into.
That the Japanes were as succesful against US forces for so long was down to the European theatre being made the priority, and even then the US inflicted major defeats on them.
I came across this very interesting site today:
http://www.battleofbritain.net/contents.html
It contains an awful lot of information I wasn’t aware of. For example, this is Churchill’s address to the nation on September 11th (60 years ago come Monday and 5 days into the Blitz):
http://www.battleofbritain.net/section-5/appendix-51.html
In it, he talks of the invasion barges being readied and RAF recon (the page is there but I’ve lost the link, sorry) was reporting 1,200 invasion barges as being gathered in the Channel ports.
Elswhere on the site, http://www.battleofbritain.net/section-5/appendix-45.html , is detailed Beaverbrook’s efforts at increasing fighter production
(interesting on Henry Ford, for example:
“Beaverbrook used his powers on both sides of the Atlantic to assist in the aircraft production in Britain. He approached automotive tycoon Henry Ford to assist by building Rolls Royce Merlin engines under licence, but Mr Ford stated that it was not the policy of the United States to become involved in the war in Europe at this time and refused to support the British war effort saying that Britain had enough automotive manufacturers to construct “the damm engines themselves””.)
This got me thinking about the consequences of a successful invasion. It would seem that the war would not be over although the Battle of, and control of, Britain would have passed to the Germans.
Beaverbrook was able to supply nearly 200 fighters manufactured outside the UK during the Battle of Britain. This together with the idea that Britain would still have a largely intact Navy, partially intact RAF and Empire troops drawn from all four corners (Australia, New Zealand, Canada, India, chunks of Africa, etc.) plus other Europeans (Free French, Free Poles, French colonies, etc) makes me think there would still have been an effective oppostion
It might have been based in Canada (with the Monarch in exile) but it does bring forward the curious notion of the British Navy blockading Britain (a distict possiblity as the Battle of the Atlantic was, in any event, finally won with the help of better tactics, sonar, Enigma decryption, etc.).
Perhaps later and by using the liberation of Ireland as a staging post (plus any UK resistence movement), the re-capture of the ‘Mother Country’ (the Irish being, by then, between a rock and a hard place: Nazi’s in charge - or at least in the North - or being used as a battlefield) might have been feasible.
Interesting ?
WW2 is full of blunders on the parts of many of the parties involved…
If someone had said “STOP” to Hitler when he made his bloodless conquest of the Chechs the war would have taken a different course. Actually, they would have had to say “stop or we’ll come and kick your ass”. Hitler would have quit. Hitler needed resources and the Chechs and Poles had what he needed. France and Britain did nothing when they should have hit the Germans with everything they had. Of course, the Brits had good old Neville running the show and the man had no balls. Churchill on the other hand… HUGE balls.
When Germany invaded France they were doing it on a shoestring and a prayer. Had the French shown any resistance at all the Germans would have turned around and run all the way home. These were their orders. The French army had them outnumbered somewhere in the neighbourhood of 10 to 1 and had they fought back Hitler realized that his troops would have been decimated. The French, like many other Europeans did not want another bloody war so like many other nations they just let the Germans do what they wanted. Germany succeeded in their initial invasion and France was effectively removed from the playing field.
America did not want to get involved in another war, no-one was bombing them and the isolationist movement was very strong. It took the Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbour to awaken America to the threat of the Axis powers. While they sat back many other brave soldiers held the line against the Germans. I get pissed off when Americans assume wrongly that they won the war, many men had already sacrificed themselves so that there would still be a chance of winning against Germany.
The invasion of Russia is one of the biggest mistakes Hitler could have made, he had his back covered and was winning at the front. What does he do? He turns around and bites the Bear. The Bear was shocked and initially unprepared for this unprovoked attack but when bears bite back you should know it’s going to hurt. Alot. Hitler’s attack on Russia united the Russian people as nothing else could have. Hitler grossly underestimated the will and the resources of the Russians and we all know about fighting in Russia in the winter. When I have read about the Germans firing on Russian tanks only to see the shells bounce off it seems like a good illustration of not knowing your enemy very well.
Hitler’s overestimation of himself and underestimation of many others was probably his greatest blunder. Otherwise he was fairly brilliant and could have won. Scary thought to thik that we came close for all of us to be speaking German right now…
Feynn wrote:
Yet another WW2 rumor I’ve heard (probably as “true” as the theory that Churchill didn’t really know about the Nazi’s plans to bomb Coventry):
Neville Chamberlain was secretly building up a British air force when Nazi Germany invaded Czechoslovakia. He knew that the paltry British Royal Air Force available at the time would be no match for the Nazi Luftwaffe. So he let Hitler overrun the Czechs, giving some wimpy-sounding public excuse about “peace in our time,” to buy time – so that Britain could build up its secret Royal Air Force to the level necessary to fight the Luftwaffe. Then, later, when Churchill took over, he pretended that the new Royal Air Force was all his (Churchill’s) doing and that wimpy ol’ Chamberlain hadn’t helped out at all.
Is there any truth to this rumor?
I would like to had to this discussion because WWII has been a long time interest of mine. And I confess I just skimmed throught the other opinions… there are a few things I’d like to point.
First I fully agree with Jeff_42 when he says that had the Allies behaved differently after defeating the Central Powers in WWI the Nazis probably would not have been elected in the first place - as it was the German Reich was viewed as a threat (specialy by the French) and reduced to a state of submition. It was not a fair peace treaty and the theory of the “betrayal of the undefeated army on the field” was widespread among Germans.
Second some things which affected the outcome of the war cannot be considered a strategic blunder. Ultra is one of them. I think the merit goes to the British. I question that German communication practices were any more inneficient than enemy nations. Problem is that the British got hold of an Enigma machine and codebooks off a captured U-boat. Many other examples come to my mind but I’ll refrain from going over it…
Third was that Stalin could not be relied upon and the invasion of USSR per se was not a mistake, rather the way in which it was conducted. It certainly was not an impossible task. Communist and Slavs were the enemy. Stalin was afraid of the German military power and aware of the limitation of the Red Army, but he was only waiting for the oportunity to strike at the best time in my opinion. The eastern front was not secure with the non-agression pact. If the Germans commited themselves to other fronts they would need to secure their eastern border and the longer it was the more dangerous the Soviets would become. Stalin would expect the Germans to dig up against the French as had happen in WWI and only then take the offensive when and if he thought the opportunity presented itself. According to Heinz Magenheimer’s book “Hitler’s War” the intial momentum of the German attack was aided by the offensive arrangement of the Soviet units. What killed Barbarossa was the 200km plus or so the division of Poland introduced and the delay in the operation with underestimation and lack of suitable preparation for the challendge to come. I think going immediatly all-out for Moscow would also have been wiser.
Having said this, I think that the biggest “strategic blunder” of the war was the Battle of Britain along with Dunkerque. Britain was never a target but more of an inconvenience.
It’s late and I’m tired. Later…
add
Stupid typo up there. Sorry.
I have skimmed through some of the posts and, having enjoyed the discussion a great deal, I prepare to add my grain of salt.
Summing up the essential flaws committed by nazi Germany mentioned so far (from what I read):
Erroneous tactics used in battle of England.
Invading Russia and thus initiating a two-front battle.
I agree with both assessments and would like to posit another one, which to me is equally relevant. Before I do, though, I must mention that I am not an expert on the second world war scenario. My proposals are more strongly based on rational analysis than on scholarly knowledge–even though I’m learning quite a bit here thanks to you guys! That cautionary statement having been made, I shall abstain myself from getting into specifics as I don’t want to tamper with the factual strength that, regarding this subject, has been so eloquently displayed so far on this thread.
Before I enunciate my personal stance on the matter, allow me to quote the great Prussian general and war theoretician Von Clausewitz:
“Tactics is the art of utilizing troops in battle. Strategy is the art of using battles to win the war.”
Or in other words: strategy governs tactics.
This simple, yet lucid, argument is clearly applicable to Hitler’s actions during the war. He couldn’t precisely grasp the situation objectively and hence limited the spectra of possible alternatives available to him under the particular strategic frame of reference in which he was immersed.
Before explicitly presenting my diatribe on his role, let me introduce a concept which to me manifested his strategic flaws.
More than any other resource, technology is the key element that defines the victor in a military conflict. Sure, human resources, tactics and overall strategy are fundamental but, in the end, superior technology usually ends up becoming the decisive factor.
Just take a look at how Cortes subjugated the Aztecs with a minimal but formidably equipped (relative to their enemies) army in terms of weaponry. The same applies for the role of the radar in the battle of England.
Based on that diagnosis of the essential requirements for an effective war campaign, my critique towards Hitler’s actions focus on his inability to visualize the imminent and decisive role that technology, more specifically nuclear weaponry, could eventually develop as the war went on. His overconfidence let to his failure in developing a contingency plan in case his prodigious forces didn’t live up to expectations. In due turn, the absence of planning for failure led to his inevitable downfall and cost his country the war.
Of course, when I refer to his failure to properly utilize technology I focus on criticizing the way he neglected the development of the a-bomb. Since 1905 the knowledge of the explosive power of such a weapon had been acquired; in 1938, if I’m not mistaken, the essential requirement for its development–feasibility of nuclear fission–had been conquered, thus remaining “only” technological and obstacles to overcome, the science being already established.
Of course it was a behemoth of a challenge, but a conquerable enterprise nonetheless. The important aspect to consider is the feasibility fact and that, if success were to be accomplished, it would provide tremendous support towards the cause of winning the war and installing the nazi regime of white-man supremacy. Clearly it was a chance worth taking, the potential payoffs clearly outweighed the prohibitive costs and technological barriers.
And besides, it is not like Adolph had any morals or ethical values of any kind that could have prevented him from using the bomb. Complementing this aspect, even if Germany hadn’t decided to tackle the bomb-developing project, they could have prevented the exodus of European scientists into America, thus preventing their potential enemies from developing a decisive military advantage in the near horizon. This, IMHO, constituted the primary example of Hitler’s lack of strategic vision and long term planning. Maybe overconfidence blinded his reason, maybe Lord Acton’s eloquent words: “Power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely” proved prophetic and a state of megalomania betrayed his judgment. But, of course, we will never now.
Back to the scientist’s exodus argument, Europe had the greatest scientific minds in the world back then. The only great American scientists of the time that come to mind are Oppenhaimer and Feynman, compared to intellectual heavyweights such as Heisenberg, Fermi, Einstein–although I believe by the time the war was imminent he had already left Europe for America, Bohr, Szilard, Teller–he might have been American, I’m not sure about him, and many others that I fail to recall right now. The relevant factor here is that European scientists were much better prepared towards tackling the mysteries occulted in the atom and tumbling down the technological barriers impeding humans from harnessing its destructive potential.
How difficult would have been to have coerced German scientists and the ones from conquered countries into developing the elusive bomb? Besides, as mentioned previously, by allowing them to immigrate to America they allowed potential adversaries–us–to have a shot at constructing the mother of all weapons. It’s like saying, Hey! we don’t give a damn about the bomb, we don’t need it, but if you want to take at shot at it please do so. As a matter of fact, how would you like if some of our intellectual luminaries give you a hand. Take them, we don’t need them. Good luck!!!
So in synthesis, overconfidence led to poor strategic vision which in turn generated the defective decision making–failure to grasp the importance of technology, specifically nuclear weaponry–that impeded an appropriate reaction when adversity surfaced, thus annihilating any hopes for the survival and posterior expansion of the III Reich, and the subsequent genetic intolerance that would have plagued humanity under it’s reign of terror.
My take on the hypothetical scenario which would have manifested itself had the aforementioned mistakes had been omitted: Hitler develops the bomb, Europe falls, no bomb insight yet for the Americans. In due turn, a combination of Von Braun’s rocketry expertise and Germany’s nuclear advances lead to a more compact, more powerful bomb with a far reaching delivery system. In short, Germany has ICBMs, America doesn’t, America falls, the nazis rule the world, humanity is dehumanized.
I stand to be corrected on any factual mistakes I might have made. Commentaries and critiques are welcome!
**
His superior technological advantage wasn’t nearly enough to take on the entire Aztec empire. To begin with he had disease on his side. He also had several other Indians on his side who hated the Aztecs. If he simply used brute force he would have been squashed.
Marc
I think much of the talk about Germany’s major blunders missed some of the really meaty stuff.
Yes, GErmany made some operational errors:
- The Battle of Britain/Blitz screwups
- Any number of errors in Russia
- The failure to retreat from Falaise, resulting in the annihilation of Army Group West
- Not payng enough attention to the needs of the submarine arm at the beginning of the war
- And so on
Germany’s biggest blunder, though, was at a higher strategic level. Germany was simply never properly organized for the war. There was no substantial independent military staff. There was no civilian cabinet (really.) There was no cooperation of any sort between the Wehrmacht and civilians production heads. NOTHING was organized as a whole; everything was in parts.
As a result, strategically, nothing went right:
- German military technology, at he beginning of the war the best in the world, was by the end of the war way behind the Allies in many respects and hopelessly out of sync with military needs.
The Germans had a jet plane that was of no value at all against fighters and they didn’t have enough decent propeller-driven planes. They had ballistic missiles, which had no real impact, but were hopelessly outdated in electronic warfare, which had a HUGE impact.
There was no committee for making these decisions. The Americans, British and Russians all had combined military/civilians decision-making bodies. The Germans had nothing independent of Hitler.
- German war production was absurdly disorganized.
Germany never once from 1939 to 1945 had the same level of shell production they’d acheived in 1917.
At one point, the Wehrmacht was using 22 different kinds of motorcycle. They used God alone knows how many kinds of tanks. Nothing was standarized; every possible kind of equipment came in 57 varieties, with the accompanying logistical burden.
There were never enough spare parts; in 1944, the armies on the eastern front had one spare engine for every 5-10 tanks, depending on the model. The Soviets had a spare engine for EVERY tank.
See, losing the Battle of Britain didn’t matter. Losing Stalingrad didn’t even matter. You lose battles; the Allies lost huge battles. I mean, the Allies lost FRANCE, for God’s sake, which was supposed to be one of the big Allied powers. What killed the Germans wasn’t any of of those losses, it was all of them. They just weren’t organized right. The trains weren’t running on time.