Knowledge from the future might have had a major impact on the end-game in Europe. Knowing that the Soviets would claim half of the continent, a guy from the future might urge the Allies to make damn sure Patton had enough fuel to push through and finish what he started, or otherwise to make sure of beating the Russians to Berlin with better strategy. This could have re-drawn the entire post war map of Europe.
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I can see that. They wouldn’t need to know every single detail, just having an overall idea of their goals and objectives as well as how they had viewed their strategies would made considerable difference, even if the actual situations were necessarily changed from the historical past, as they would be able to better guess what the enemy was more likely to be doing.
It seems that in early 1942, the Allies were overestimating the Japanese abilities and were far too cautious. Knowing the historical outcome would have completely changed the approach to the conduct of the war.
Things look so clear in hindsight are not so in the moment because it’s not known what is part of the signal and what is the noise. Looking back now, the case that the Japanese were planning an attack on Pearl Harbor is so much easier to build because we already knew their intentions.
Likewise, “knowledge from the future” would help them avoid all of the pitfalls which were discovered to be ineffective only with the benefit of knowing the result. Once the Germans get involved, Italy is not longer the “soft underbelly” of Europe. Incompetent generals and admirals could be sacked; bad strategics stopped short.
This knowledge would help the allied objectives on the essential factors, such as oil. Without external oil, the Japanese military was doomed.
The US was not aware of the internal struggles for power and influence within the Japanese government, for example, or that the Japanese would be willing to surrender after particular sets of circumstances occurred. The civilians and some members of the military, predominantly within the IJN, were more accepting of the situation, but the militaristic faction, including most of the IJA were not. We know now that allowing the Japanese to keep their emperor as a figurehead became the tipping point in having Hirohito to make his historic decision to break the deadlock.
That all said, I believe it would have still required beating the shit out of them in order for enough people to say “No Más.” They had to be beaten badly enough that the same military dictatorship be allowed to reemerge.
Not be allowed to reemerge, right?
Hmm.
This link states the the Japanese DoW was delivered two hours after the attack on Pearl Harbor. (As does wiki .)
This link states that only the 14-part message (which did not actually state that “a State of War exists”) was delivered 2PM December 7 (Washington time), and that a formal DoW was written, but never delivered.
Of course.
Japan got lucky in the start of the war with the US in 1941 and 42. Damn lucky. The had the unbelievably good fortune of facing the worst excuses for British leadership in defending Malaya and Singapore, and got the jump on MacArthur in the Philippines. The USN spend months in shock, unable to respond.
I don’t believe it would have taken much to have denied them the much of their conquests during the first six months.
Had the Final Countdown occurred, (and supposing the leadership actually listened), they could have ended the Pacific War within a couple of years. Without the Kido Butai, and with the Pacific Fleet unharmed, it’s reasonable to believe that the US could have saved the Philippines and gone on to defeat the attackers in Singapore, preventing the invasion of the NEI. Without the oil, rubber and other natural resources, Japan’s war machine grinds to a halt.
combinedfleet.com makes the point that at the declaration of war, Japan lost 50% of it’s ship transportation requirements, but got 25% back through its conquests. Prevented from these gains, they would already be in a huge hole, even before the US subs (with their quickly refitted Mark 14 fish) could have quickly started the blockage of the homelands from the submarine base in Subic Bay, which its much shorter distance to Formosa and Japan.
Among the world powers in WWII, Japan was unique for its dependence on ocean freight for a much higher percentage of its basic requirements, including rice and sugar. Over 95% of that latter were shipped from Ryukyu islands or imported, mainly from Formosa. Over 20% of Japan’s rice was imported, and a high percentage of the domestic rice was cultivated in Hokkaido, the northern island, which also supplied valuable coal and other resources.
The US conducted numerous studies post war in both Germany and Japan on the effects of strategic bombing (or lack thereof). During the summer of 1945, the USAAF was busy implementing changes in the bombing targets in Japan based on the surveys in Germany, and started to more specifically target the transportation system.
While land based four-engine bombers would have been still been required to completely destroy its industry, Japan is also particularly vulnerable to sea-based attacks, with the vast majority of its population and factories within carrier based aircraft range. The major link between Tokyo, Nagoya, Osaka and points west (Japan think of itself as East and West, rather than north and south) falls within range of battleship bombardment. With over 80% of Japan as steep mountainous terrain which come close to the coast, the railroad and surface road bridges could readily be bombed and destroyed.
The US also conducted extensive surveys on its mining campaign, and found such deficiencies such as the lack of coordination between those planes dropping mines and those targeting the repair facilities in the ports. These are the types of lessons which the US would have available.
The first link is wrong. (And amusingly, they have accidentally displayed the Japanese file upside down.)
Also, the second (wiki) link is the exact same link I’ve given twice for the imperial rescript published on the front page of the evening edition of Japanese newspapers. Unless I’m mistaken, it does not in fact state a time at which it was printed anywhere, only the date, so it doesn’t state that the DoW was delivered two hours after the attack.
The third, final link is to a paper written by a student at University of Virginia School of Law, Jeffrey D. Fox, who unsurprisingly agrees that the 14 part note neither declared war nor broke off diplomatic negotiations.
Please don’t be offended. Please believe that this day is the very first time that I have heard that the Japanese DoW was not delivered until the day after PH.
FWIW, I am not offended.
Not just pilot identification, either. In the Battle off Samar in the Battle of Leyte Gulf, the IJN Center Force command leadership managed to convince itself that the Taffy 3’s escort carriers and destroyers were actually the battleships and fleet carriers of Halsey’s Third Fleet. Of course, they may have been mislead because of both positive and negative expecations: Maybe Adm. Kurita didn’t expect Halsey to drag the entire Third Fleet off on a decoy chase, and no sane human being would expect tin cans and baby flattops to suicidally charge into battle against one of the heaviest non-carrier warship formations in history.
If they’d realized what they were really fighting, maybe they could have interfered with the US landings after polishing off Taffy 3. Or maybe the beating they Taffy 3 gave 'em, plus the fact that 7th Fleet’s heavy elements supporting the landings couldn’t be ignored, may have meant very little change: the landings would succeed, the Philippines revert to American hands, but maybe both sides have heavier losses.