# WW2, What if Kurita did not see Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 1, 2012, 4:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584 "2012-11-01T16:43:59Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 3
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [August 22, 2015, 2:05am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/41 "2015-08-22T02:05:28Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > You’re new here (and welcome, by the way) but this isn’t my job. I cut you some slack and did some looking around but found nothing. > > You’re the one making the claim; you’re the one who has to back it up with said documentation. > > : Thanks for welcoming me. Fair enough, One good source material is: The Battle Off Samar, Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf: “At the direction of VADM Kinkaid, RADM Oldendorf deployed three old battleships, five cruisers, and two destroyer squadrons twenty-five miles eastward of the northern entrance to Surigao Strait. The remaining forces belonging to the Seventh Fleet were kept well inside of Leyte Gulf. Whether these two groups could have effectively engaged and defeated the IJN Centre Force would never be known.” Chapter 14. See also, The Last of the Tin Can Sailors: “Kinkaid finally ordered Oldendorf to take half his force and rally to the aid of Ziggy Sprague’s beleaguered northern Taffy unit.” Chapter 44, Page 346. I have read a list of the battleships’ names, but I don’t have it handy. Will find it later. Could help the thread. With regards to the remarks about Kinkaid hesitating to risk expensive capital ships to save inexpensive escorts, _See_, The Battle of Leyte Gulf, The Last Fleet Action, as one example. Please understand, I did not comment on this thread to argue with anyone, not to be an authority or expert. I thought the beauty of the thread was to set the time when Center Force would be at the Landing Areas, when Oldendorf could engage it, and with what ships. For those who simply want to say the Battle Off Samar Island made no difference, I bet you could/would say the same thing about the Battle of Coral Sea, Battle of Midway, and Guadalcanal? You would say the War in the Pacific was a done deal - even if the 18.1 inch guns of the mighty Yamato were aimed at you. 4 battleships’, 8 cruisers, and 11 destroyers can do no damage to a major landing area serviced by over 100 surface craft? It took 2 hours for the Taffys to degrade Center Force when they saw it, so how do they do better by not seeing it?. It is a ridiculous argument. Oldendorf’s ships aren’t released until 09:15, and they have to travel 100 miles. Do the math. Maybe, Oldendorf’s gets 3 battleships’ there with assorted cruisers and destroyers by 13:15? ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 22, 2015, 4:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/42 "2015-08-22T16:26:24Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > However, the assumption of this threat is that Center Force DID pass by Taffy 3. Whether it was plausible to do so is a notion for another thread, though it is most welcome. That predication made a huge difference to the situation, which is why I thought it was a refreshing suggestion. Only by going straight into Leyte Gulf could Center Force get there by 11:00 am. The points which **figure9** , myself and others made was that even with the scenario given in the OP (What if Taffy 3 had been in the squall line to the east of its actual position when Kurita’s fleet sailed past?) it is not that Central Force gets a magical pass into Leyte Bay unnoticed by any other force. They had already been observed by aircraft from Taffy 3 prior to the engagement, and would have been spotted sometime before reaching their target area. > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > BUT, you realize that your position makes the valiant resistance of Taffy 3 irrelevant? It’s sort of like the first Indiana Jones movie. It would have ended the same without him in his own movie! If your conclusions are correct, or at least my understanding of your conclusions, then the Battle off Samar Island was insignificant, nothing more than American Bushido. :mad: I don’t follow you. Why should emotions trump discussions? Why bother to debate outcomes? You are placing far too great of a burden on history in you wish to make all [valiant deaths meaningful](http://poetry.eserver.org/light-brigade.html). This is the tragedy of war, that many lives are thrown away often for even more meaningless reasons. How many young men died [taking hills for no purpose](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Pork_Chop_Hill). Neither you nor I have the time to list all war fought for no reason let alone the battles and skirmishes. The brave men who sacrificed their lives in the early morning of October 25, 1944 fought well. Many did so to protect their carriers and their comrades in arms. That is sufficient, we should ask no more. It would be unfair to the other 360,000 killed, missing and wounded US military personnel in the Pacific to single out this group for special meaning. > [@](#): > > You mentioned many issues that plagued the IJN, such as communication between army and navy. . . . Probably much, much worse with the IJN and IJA, as you wrote. Actually, your response was conflating two separate issues which I discussed. First, the IJN and IJA did not cooperate with each other beyond the absolute minimum. This was yet one more factor in their poor performance and is a reason why any bombardment by Kurita’s forces on the landed troops would not have been effective. The separate issue is the IJA communication problems which plagued them on Leyte (as well as many other places) and which would have prevented their forces from capitalizing on any damage even if the battleships had found targets on land. > [@](#): > > Another what if: > By 10/25/1944, Kurita was a shadow of himself. He probably should not have been in command. That he was in command probably undermined any coherent effort in the Gulf, but you never know. Consider this. What if Kurita was not fished out of the sea on 10/24/1944 when his flagship was sunk? Do you know who would have commanded Center Force? It may surprise you, but it would have been Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. The man was relentless. In early 1945, he took command of the Kamikazes and Thunder Gods. I believe it was called the Fifth Air Fleet, but could be mistaken. Ugaki was called the “Suicide Samurai.” Had he been in charge, it would have been a very different thing. But, he wasn’t. Food for another thread, perhaps. Yes, he would have been more aggressive, but it would not have changed the outcome. Maybe he would have gotten to Layte Bay and attacked the transports. However, as I indicated in my previous post, unless you are granting divine powers to the enemy, it still would have not changed anything. Ugaki is infamous for his last flight, another example of killing people meaninglessly. Japan had already announced the surrender. Other leaders had the dignity of slitting their stomachs and dying alone. Ugaki insisted on wasting young men’s lives for his own glory. > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > From the same source cited above: Taffy 1 lost 2 carriers to kamikazes on 10/25. No. Taffy 3’ St. Lo was the only one lost to _Tokkotai_. The other CVE lost was Gambier Bay to surface fire. Taffy 1 and 2’s CVEs all survived the fight. > [@](#): > > _During the course of these critical naval operations, the Japanese air forces had intensified their attacks both on sea and shore. The Seventh Fleet was busily occupied in a struggle for survival, employing its air strength to fight off hordes of hostile planes attacking in co-ordination with enemy fleet units. Its problem was further complicated by the appearance of Kamikaze pilots whose novel suicide tactics initially caused considerable havoc._ The report by McArther’s staff was known for its dramatic writing. The attacks on the 25th were the first for the _tokkotai_. They simply didn’t have the numbers or experience to have dramatically changed their effectiveness. Even had the Central Force gotten through and brought up Odlendorf’s battleships, there was no coordination between the groups. > [@](#): > > With regards to the Princeton, there were conflicting reports as to whether it was a kamikaze attack. Your account is accurate, probably more correct. I believe tge [sic] organized kamikaze attcks [sic] began the next day. A more detailed account may be found in “USS Princeton CVL23 War Damage Report No. 62.” It is available online. Your own cite shows it was a bomb and not a suicide attack, which it could not have been because the tokkotai attacks did not begin until the following day. > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > For those who simply want to say the Battle Off Samar Island made no difference, I bet you could/would say the same thing about the Battle of Coral Sea, Battle of Midway, and Guadalcanal? You would say the War in the Pacific was a done deal - even if the 18.1 inch guns of the mighty Yamato were aimed at you. Employ strawmen much? I’m sort of surprised that your argument has taken a personal note here. Conflating one battle in the late stages of a war when the US had such superior forces and material to others earlier in the game is, in your own words, “ridiculous.” Sorry to be the one to have to inform you of this, but yup, the end result would have been the same. The Japanese could have sunk all the US carriers at Midway, lost none of their own and the end result would still have been exactly the same. Japan would have been completely destroyed and have had to suffer the same unconditional surrender. The US was building so many carriers in the war that the few lost in '42 would not have been enough to have stopped them. Sure, it would have taken a little bit longer, but still, with the overwhelming industrial capacity of the US, firebombing, atomic bombs, and eventual Soviet entry into the war > [@](#): > > 4 battleships’, 8 cruisers, and 11 destroyers can do no damage to a major landing area serviced by over 100 surface craft? It took 2 hours for the Taffys to degrade Center Force when they saw it, so how do they do better by not seeing it?. It is a ridiculous argument. You are misquoting our arguments. No one is saying that no damage would be done. We’re saying that Central Forces couldn’t do enough to change the overall picture. I carefully wrote out a detailed response for which you simply replied with an emotional argument and strawmen, and now are calling _me_ ridiculous? ---
**Author:** ![silenus](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/silenus/32/166_2.png) [@silenus](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/silenus)\ **Post date:** [August 22, 2015, 5:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/43 "2015-08-22T17:38:39Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > I carefully wrote out a detailed response for which you simply replied with an emotional argument and strawmen, and now are calling _me_ ridiculous? It is the Way of the Dope. He’ll fit right in. 😛 ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 22, 2015, 8:27pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/44 "2015-08-22T20:27:39Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > From the same source cited above: Taffy 1 lost 2 carriers to kamikazes on 10/25. It says no such thing. > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > With regards to the Princeton, there were conflicting reports as to whether it was a kamikaze attack. Your account is accurate, probably more correct. I believe tge organized kamikaze attcks began the next day. A more detailed account may be found in “USS Princeton CVL23 War Damage Report No. 62.” It is available online. If it was not a kamikaze, then it was a very skillful dive bombing, more of which could be expected. There are **no** conflicting reports regarding how the _Princeton_ was lost; it was lost to a dive bomber, not a kamikaze. That the pilot of one dive bomber had the extreme luck to both get the jump on the _Princeton_ and to place a single 500lb bomb where it was able to start uncontrollable fires that caused the loss of the _Princeton_ is not indicative of a trend; there is no reason to expect any more such skillful dive bombing to have occurred. Why? Because it didn’t happen again. Did you happen to actually read [“USS Princeton CVL23 War Damage Report No. 62.”](http://www.history.navy.mil/research/library/online-reading-room/title-list-alphabetically/w/war-damage-reports/uss-princeton-cvl23-war-damage-report-no-62.html)?There is absolutely no mention of a kamikaze, because no one ever thought it was one. What it actually says is: > [@](#): > > SECTION I - SUMMARY > > 1. PRINCETON (CVL23) was hit by an estimated 250 kg. GP bomb on the morning of 24 October 1944 while participating in the Battle for Leyte Gulf off the coast of Luzon about 150 miles east of Manila. At the time of the attack, enemy action was expected and the ship was at General Quarters with Material Condition ABLE set. Planes were being recovered and refueled and six torpedo planes, loaded with torpedoes and fully gassed, were spotted in the hangar ready for a scheduled strike. > > 2. At 0938 a single enemy plane scored a bomb hit about 15 feet off the centerline to port at frame 98 on the flight deck. The bomb passed through the flight deck, went through a torpedo plane on the hangar deck, pierced the hangar and main decks, and detonated in B-204-2L on the second deck or between the main and second decks. The resulting structural damage was relatively minor. > > 3. In the hangar a gasoline fire started immediately in the wreckage of the plane through which the bomb passed. The fire spread rapidly. By 0953 the entire hangar was ablaze. Difficulties were encountered in turning on the hangar sprinkling bays and water curtains; only one of the four hangar sprinkling bays and one of the three water curtains were reported as being definitely turned on and there was no report of anyone actually seeing these sprinklers in operation. The after fireroom and engineroom were abandoned almost immediately due to heat and smoke. This resulted in loss of firemain pressure aft within three minutes after damage was received. Except for a break in a high pressure air line in the after engineroom, there was no derangement of machinery in the engineering spaces. > > 4. Between 1002 and 1020 there occurred a series of heavy explosions in the hangar. Some of the torpedo warheads in the planes were roasted and may have detonated or gasoline vapor may have exploded violently. These explosions blew up the flight deck, wrecked both elevators, and forced evacuation of all machinery spaces. All firemain pressure was lost at 1010. As a result of the explosions, the Commanding Officer ordered Salvage Control, Phase I at 1010 followed by Salvage Control, Phase II at 1020. Etc. You can’t try to just hand wave facts away and invent a middle ground when you are shown to be wrong as you did with the _West Virginia_’s speed limitations. ---
**Author:** ![Alkash](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/a/ec9cab/32.png) [@Alkash](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Alkash)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 1:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/45 "2015-08-23T13:47:34Z")
> [@figure9](#): > > Finally how would this change the course of the war and history? It wouldn’t change the course of war or history one bit. The Soviets would still steam-roll through Germany, and then would crush Japan, regardless of what happened at Leyte Gulf. ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 3:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/46 "2015-08-23T15:55:09Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > You can’t try to just hand wave facts away and invent a middle ground when you are shown to be wrong as you did with the _West Virginia_’s speed limitations. Yes, I can. This is a discussion board, not an encyclopedia. The premises of this thread is based upon an assumption which was not fact. Your complaint is that the Official Damage Report I mentioned did not use the word, “kamikaze.” Because of that, you concluded that NO ONE ever assumerd the Princeton was sunk by one. You are aware that organized “kamikaze” attacks began the next day. October 25, 1944? Have you ANY idea when the word, “kamikaze” was first used by the USN? Do you really believe that none of the survivors of the attacks of 10/25 believed the Princeton had not also been attacked with the same tactic? Further, what difference does it masker tyo this thread? Next , you complain that WV could not have ever been slowed to 10 nauts, because she had to do 17 nauts for Suragao Strait? Do you know the speed used by USN battleships. They crossed the T and maneuvered at 5 nauts. That being said, I believe the WeeVee could possibly do 17. I have read both claims and am comfortable with 17, but it makes no difference. Please explain what difference does it make to this thread? You complained when I wrote that Kinkaid was going to release Oldendorf to meet Center Force with 3 battleships. You wrote you searched for that information and could not find it. You demanded a citation. Read below. You didn’t search too hard. Here is an example of how I can just “wave” facts around, or at least what you claim to be facts. Remember, this is a discussion board, not an encyclopedia. Further, “facts” about the conflict still are undetermined. One member of this Board recently authored a book in which he read and translated IJN logs and compared them with USN logs. The accounts I tead and wrote about that Seventh Fleet eas 300 miles from Leyte were misleading, or wrong. Note they were frtom ther US Army. Perhaps, there were Seventh Fleet destroyers that far from Taffy 3, but the battleships were already in the Gulf. I found Admiral Kinkaid’s account and a naval map. If you really are interested in questions raised in this and other threads about Oldendorf’s vs. Kuritga. I suggest you read. “Pacific War Remembered, An Oral History Collection,” by John T. Mason, Jr. In it, Kinkaid discusses why he rejected Sprague’s request to move Taffy 3 to the protection of 7th Fleet. He also recounted that he ordered Oldendorf to assemble all of his ships at the northern entrance of Leyte Gulf as quickly as possible. He then ordered that Oldendorf divide his force into two groups and send one outside to engage Center Force. Kurita’s Force turned around before the designated half started out. What have you contributerd to the thread? And, this is a great thread! You’re not the only naysayer. Claims that there were no transports at 11:00 and that there was nothing to defend ate baseless. For somerone who demands citations, why haven’t you demanded authority for such claims, or provided it yourself? From the information I have gathered, not you, we can place Oldendorf’s ships at the entrance of Leyte Gulf with one half ready to engage Center Force. Other accounts, which maybe YOU should find and cite state what ships Oldendorf’s had and how they were armed. I believer the USS Nashville was to join the Force with General McArthur aboard, as well as nine destroyers. Why don’t you research that? If you are smarter and more well informed than the rest of us, sent not contribute something positive? Another false assertion mader repeatedly has been how Japanese air power was ineffective on 10/25. Read what Kinkaid had to say. Finally, as to naysayers that said operations off Samar Island made no contribution to the War, you would have been the worst leaders possible. I doubt anyone would trust you to lead anyone. Frankly, such claims ate reminiscent of WWI Generals who were quite comfortable with losing hundreds of thousands of men, because they knew their side was going to win. Great thread, but contributors are lacking in imagination and understanding. Maybe, it’s time to close the thread? I don’t see it going anywhere. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 4:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/47 "2015-08-23T16:49:18Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > Yes, I can. This is a discussion board, not an encyclopedia. The premises of this thread is based upon an assumption which was not fact. > > Your complaint is that the Official Damage Report I mentioned did not use the word, “kamikaze.” Because of that, you concluded that NO ONE ever assumerd the Princeton was sunk by one. You are aware that organized “kamikaze” attacks began the next day. October 25, 1944? Have you ANY idea when the word, “kamikaze” was first used by the USN? Do you really believe that none of the survivors of the attacks of 10/25 believed the Princeton had not also been attacked with the same tactic? Further, what difference does it masker tyo this thread? Trying to sort through the typos here, the simple fact of the matter is that the _Princeton_ was sunk by a 500lb bomb dropped from a dive bomber. Said dive bomber did not then proceed to crash into the ship. There is no uncertainty about said facts, there never has been. No survivor ever claimed the _Princeton_ had been struck by a plane, deliberate or otherwise. It is utterly irrelevant when the word “kamikaze” was first used by the USN. The difference it makes to this thread is that when told the only major loss to kamikaze attack was the escort carrier _St. Lo_ you proceed to make incorrect claims of 2 escort carriers being lost to kamikazes on 10/25 and that the _Princeton_ was lost to a kamikaze on 10/24. You claim cites say things that they absolutely do not say. THE CAMPAIGNS OF MACARTHUR IN THE PACIFIC: Chapter 8 does not say “Taffy 1 lost 2 carriers to kamikazes on 10/25.” The Official Damage Report does not say “there were conflicting reports as to whether it was a kamikaze attack”. When shown to be wrong, rather than admit your error you continue to insist that you might possibly be right. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 6:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/48 "2015-08-23T18:18:15Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > . . . 10 nauts, . . . Please. Ship speeds, (among English speakers) are [measured in _ **knots** _](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knot_(unit)), based on the use of an actual rope with evenly tied knots tied to a [floating plank or log](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip_log), in the days before more accurate devices came into use. ---
**Author:** ![doorhinge](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a5b964/32.png) [@doorhinge](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/doorhinge)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 11:18pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/49 "2015-08-23T23:18:48Z")
I’ve notice that the dates for WWII battles in the Pacific don’t always agree with one another. This may be a combined result of a miscommunication caused by the international date line and where the source information came from. (When it’s 7:00 AM December 7 in Hawaii, USA, it would be 2:00 AM December 8, in Japan.) The USS ST LO (CVE 63), formerly the USS MIDWAY (CVE 63) until it was renamed on Oct 10, 1944, was the first U.S. naval vessel to be sunk by a kamikaze on Oct 25, 1944. > **[USS St. Lo (CVE-63)](https://military-history.fandom.com/wiki/USS_St._Lo_(CVE-63))** > > USS St. Lo (CVE–63) was a Casablanca-class escort carrier of the United States Navy during World War II. On 25 October 1944, St. Lo became the first major warship to sink as the result of a kamikaze attack. The attack occurred during the Battle of... _The Battle off Samar was the centermost action of the Battle of Leyte Gulf, one of the largest naval battles in history, which took place in the Philippine Sea off Samar Island, in the Philippines on October 25, 1944._ > **[Battle off Samar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar)** > > Seventh Fleet > Combined Fleet > Visayas And there are pictures. [![](https://bosamar.com/files/kk12.jpeg) ](https://bosamar.com/files/kk12.jpeg) _U.S. Navy Photograph From the USS KALININ BAY/VC-3 Association Crewmen aboard the escort carrier USS KALININ BAY (CVE 68) survey the damage caused by the kamikaze attack. She suffered serious damage when two aircraft impacted the ship shortly after 1110. USS ST LO (CVE 63) visible in the background, would sink in less than fifteen minutes from the time this photograph was taken. Image 4 of 22_ > **[Kamikaze Strike Photographs - BOSAMAR.COM](https://bosamar.com/pages/kami0)** > > RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague's U.S. Seventh Fleet Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy III | Powered by liveSite @ https://www.camelback.net \*U.S. Navy Photograph from the personal collection of Mike McKenna An enormous mushroom cloud rises behind the escort carrier USS ST LO (CVE 63) as she lists heavily to port. This photograph was taken from USS HEERMANN (DD 532), Taffy III’s sole surviving destroyer. "The estimated approximate chronological sequence of explosions is as follows: 1. 1053 - Jap plane hit the flight deck. 2. 1054 - Medium explosion. 3. 1055 - Heavy explosion blew part of the flight deck out. 4. 1059 - Medium explosion folded forward elevator back. 5. 1105 - Very heavy explosion - blew out part of port side. 6. 1107 - Very heavy explosion blew out part of starboard side. 7. 1114 - Very heavy. 8. 1120 - Very heavy. 9. 1125 - Ship sank." Action Report, USS ST LO (CVE 63) F.J. McKenna, Captain, USN, Commanding Image 17 of 22\* > **[Kamikaze Strike Photographs - BOSAMAR.COM](https://bosamar.com/pages/kami0)** > > RADM Clifton A.F. Sprague's U.S. Seventh Fleet Task Unit 77.4.3, Taffy III | Powered by liveSite @ https://www.camelback.net ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [August 23, 2015, 11:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/50 "2015-08-23T23:43:16Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > Please. > Ship speeds, (among English speakers) are [measured in _ **knots** _](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knot_(unit)), based on the use of an actual rope with evenly tied knots tied to a [floating plank or log](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chip_log), in the days before more accurate devices came into use. Great, and typos are your concern, too. You are offered a great thread, and that’s where you’re at? There is an absence of any meaningful contribution since I first posted. It is a waste of time. Statements, such as that US had 400 planes in Leyte. Where does that figure come from? Taffy 1 had 4 carriers. See how many planes they carried. Find out where they were. See how many were operational - how many were struck by kamikazes. How many planes crashed on temporary air strips? I have read about that, but why share it? You don’t care. You aren’t really interested in the subject. You offer nothing of substance. As Dissonance wrote earlier, he has an opinion, and he’s satisfied with it. That’s fine, but what kind of opinion depends on being closed minded? It’s time to close the thread. It was a great try. It put Oldendorf and Center Force in battle at 11 am, or earlier. You now gave composition of the forces. I can provide a list of the ships that would be sent to meet Center Force, but it would be wasted. You would search hard for a misspelled word or typo, or simply make an unsubstantiated claim. That’s said, you sit on claims such as there was overwhelming air support there, with 400 planes! As with my mistaken assertion that Center Force was 100 miles away, which was from US Army history, the claim about 400 planes is also wrong, though frequently written. If you would do a little work, as I did with the distance claim, you could determine how many air planes were available and what armaments did they have? How many carriers did Taffy One have? How many were put out of action by kamikazes? How many planes were lost in those attacks? How many planes crash landed on unfinished air strips? Instead, we have a demonstrated lack of curiosity. In a battle that has long been argued to be about Landing Transports/Areas/Operations, no one, other than me, has even measured the Landing/Transports at the Gulf. Instead, we get sweeping statements such as nothing mattered. If so, why even post on the thread? Does it make sense to you that Oldendorf would risk his capital ships in battle for nothing? Yeah, right. I suggest this thread be locked and closed. It’s going nowhere. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 12:21am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/51 "2015-08-24T00:21:09Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > Great, and typos are your concern, too. You are offered a great thread, and that’s where you’re at? This is the Straight Dope. We look to fight ignorance. Using “naut” to indicate “knot” is not a typo. It appears to be a misunderstanding which I endeavored to correct. I posted as a member, not a Mod, so I am not sure where that objection originated. We are not closing this thread because you think that it has run its course. If it has run its course, others will decline to post to it and it will roll off the front page of the forum, on its own. As to your other objections, some may be worth correcting (so the thread should remain open), and some may require explanation, (so the thread should remain open). For example, the “400 planes” remark is attested in several documents. That number is taken from all the units, (Taffy 3 plus Taffy 1 and Taffy 2), having planes within striking distance of Samar. While the surface squadrons would require several hours to arrive on the scene, 200+ mph planes could be (and were) summoned from various other units. It is usually noted that they were hampered by carrying HE and ASW rather than AP bombs or torpedoes, but they still made attacks on Kurita’s fleet. [For example](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#Battle): > [@](#): > > Meanwhile, Rear Admiral Thomas Sprague (no relation to Clifton) ordered the sixteen escort carriers in his **three task units** to immediately launch all their aircraft equipped with whatever weapons they had available, even if these were only machine guns or depth charges. Collectively, Sprague had a **total of some 450 aircraft** from the carriers at his disposal. Although most of these aircraft were older models, such as the FM-2 Wildcat and TBM Avenger torpedo bombers, the fact that the Japanese force had no air cover of its own meant that American planes could commence their attacks unopposed. Consequently, the air counterattacks were almost unceasing, and some, especially several of the strikes launched from Felix Stump’s Task Unit 77.4.2 (Taffy 2), were relatively heavy. Bolding and underscore mine. The [Order of Battle](http://www.navweaps.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Samar.htm) lists the aviation units for the three “Taffy” groups as 501 planes, (302 fighters and 199 bombers). I would guess that the estimates of 400 or 450 recognize that maintenance issues or the need to continue some CAP flights would have reduced the units available for a strike on Kurita to fewer than 500. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 7:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/52 "2015-08-24T07:31:45Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > For example, the “400 planes” remark is attested in several documents. That number is taken from all the units, (Taffy 3 plus Taffy 1 and Taffy 2), having planes within striking distance of Samar. While the surface squadrons would require several hours to arrive on the scene, 200+ mph planes could be (and were) summoned from various other units. It is usually noted that they were hampered by carrying HE and ASW rather than AP bombs or torpedoes, but they still made attacks on Kurita’s fleet. That’s a bit of a misnomer about The Battle off Samar that just won’t die; it sounds more heroic that they were carrying out attacks armed only with HE and depth charges rather than AP bombs and torpedoes. Escort carriers did in fact carry AP bombs and torpedoes and did use them at The Battle off Samar. [For example](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Japanese_cruiser_Chikuma_(1938)#Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf), the loss of the heavy cruiser _Chikuma_, bolding all mine: > [@](#): > > On 25 October, during the Battle off Samar, Chikuma engaged U.S. escort aircraft carriers, helping to sink USS Gambier Bay, but came under fire from the American destroyer USS Heermann and heavy air attack. **Chikuma inflicted severe damage on Heermann, but was soon attacked by four TBM Avenger torpedo-bombers. Richard Deitchman, flying from the USS Manila Bay, succeeded in hitting her stern port quarter with a Mark 13 torpedo that severed her stern and disabled her port screw and rudder**. Chikuma '​s speed dropped to 18 knots (33 km/h), then to 9 knots (17 km/h), but more seriously, she became unsteerable. \*\*At 1105, Chikuma was attacked by five TBMs from USS Kitkun Bay. She was hit portside amidships by two torpedoes and her engine rooms flooded. \*\ ***At 1400, three TBMs from a composite squadron of ships from the USS Omanney Bay and the USS Natoma Bay led by Lt. Joseph Cady dropped more torpedoes which hit Chikuma portside.** Cady was later awarded the Navy Cross for his action. It is generally thought that destroyer Nowaki took off survivors from Chikuma, and then scuttled her at > > 11°25′N 126°36′ECoordinates: 11°25′N 126°36′E in the late morning of on 25 October 1944, but a more recent study suggests Chikuma sank from the effect of the air attack, and Nowaki only arrived in time to pick up survivors from the water.[4] > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > As Dissonance wrote earlier, he has an opinion, and he’s satisfied with it. That’s fine, but what kind of opinion depends on being closed minded? Excuse me? I wrote that where, exactly? My opinions clearly are not what bothers you; I’ve pointed out factual errors you have made, that you have tried to back them up with cites that do not say what you claim they say, and that you attempt to hand wave these facts away with ‘I’m probably more correct, but who knows?’ ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 10:34am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/53 "2015-08-24T10:34:38Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > That’s a bit of a misnomer about The Battle off Samar that just won’t die; it sounds more heroic that they were carrying out attacks armed only with HE and depth charges rather than AP bombs and torpedoes. Well, my claim was not that no AP or torpedoes were used, only that they were not always available. When Spruance was notified that Kurita had made it to the east side of the Philippines, he ordered an immediate attack with whatever was loaded, so the first wave was carried out without using AP weapons. Certainly, subsequent sorties would have used whatever appropriate armament as was available. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 3:26pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/54 "2015-08-24T15:26:30Z")
> [@silenus](#): > > It is the Way of the Dope. He’ll fit right in. 😛 Yes, unfortunately so. (For LittleWolf, this is not anything about you, it’s a slam on other posters who can’t be named outside of the Pit.) > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > Your complaint is that the Official Damage Report I mentioned did not use the word, “kamikaze.” Because of that, you concluded that NO ONE ever assumerd the Princeton was sunk by one. Please reread his reply. The question was not if the word _kimizaze_ appeared or not, but that the report clearly states that it was sunk from a bomb. There were times when pilots from both sides deliberately crashed their planes into the enemy, but usually when their planes were shot or otherwise disabled. In one of the attacks by US dive bombers during the Battle of the Coral Sea, Lt. Power held his dive to below 1,000 feet, released his bomb late and his plane was engulfed by the explosion of his own bomb. He traded his life (and that of his backseater) to unsure they would not miss. > [@](#): > > You are aware that organized “kamikaze” attacks began the next day. October 25, 1944? Have you ANY idea when the word, “kamikaze” was first used by the USN? Sometime in 1945. The word actually was read incorrectly by the US military Japanese specialists. The Japanese word is 神風 and can either be read as “kamikaze” or as “shinpuu” which was the correct reading. The suicide squadrons were called 特別攻撃隊 or _tokubetsukougekitai_ but usually shortened to 特攻隊 _tokkoutai_. One of the leaders of the early tokkoutai, Capt. Inoguchi named his unit the “shinpuu tokubetsukougekitai” after a _dojo_ in his hometown. As I wrote, that name was misread by Americans as “kamikaze.” It would have been sometime in 1945, though. > [@](#): > > Further, what difference does it masker tyo this thread? As you may have noticed, we love fact checking here. You had claimed that the attack was by a kamikaze and that’s not the case. > [@](#): > > Claims that there were no transports at 11:00 and that there was nothing to defend ate baseless. It does appear that you have us confused with another forum. No one here has made such claims. The first mention of that was in your original contribution in which you refuted the nonexistent argument. > [@](#): > > Finally, as to naysayers that said operations off Samar Island made no contribution to the War, you would have been the worst leaders possible. I doubt anyone would trust you to lead anyone. Another strawman. No one has said that it didn’t make a contribution, just that whatever happened there would not have changed the final outcome. It doesn’t seem that you appreciate the difference. I will have to plead guilty of potentially being a horrible leader of either ships or fighting men. One would hope that the Navy would have picked someone out of the several hundred thousand more qualified men than I. > [@tomndebb](#): > > For example, the “400 planes” remark is attested in several documents. That number is taken from all the units, (Taffy 3 plus Taffy 1 and Taffy 2), having planes within striking distance of Samar. While the surface squadrons would require several hours to arrive on the scene, 200+ mph planes could be (and were) summoned from various other units. I was the first to use that number as it was the number which were engaged in the historic battle. The overall point was that this number of planes was not insignificant and that it would have prevented Kurita’s forces from simply attacking at will, as posited by **LittleWolf**. B]LittleWolf\*\*, you seem upset. That’s unfortunate. If you search through the various threads about WWII on the board, you can see that this is fairly typical for what we do. The OP was asking a specific question about how the outcome of the war would have changed. As many of us have stated, the simple fact is that it would not have made that much of a difference, for reasons several of us have outlined. This does not mean that we have no imagination or are emotional about things. It simply means that this is our conclusion concerning the OP. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 4:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/55 "2015-08-24T16:00:15Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > \ but by the time USN battleships got involved, there was one Japanese Battleship, an old battered, somewhat undersized battleship (30,000 tins), \ 😕 She was just as big as the six that crossed her “T”. ---
**Author:** ![doorhinge](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a5b964/32.png) [@doorhinge](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/doorhinge)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 4:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/56 "2015-08-24T16:08:34Z")
If Kurita’s Center Force had somehow managed to avoid it’s initial contact with Taffy 3, Center Force would have been able to inflict considerable damage to the Allied landings on Leyte. Until Spruance ordered an immediate and all out attack. Center Force would have been trapped. Surrounded by the Taffys, Taffy’s 1, 2, and 3 aircraft and ships plus land-based aircraft would have inflicted even more damage than they actually had. Plus, the longer Center Force was held near Leyte, the closer the American Fleet’s big guns came. The Yamato’s sister ship, Musashi, had been sunk on Oct 24, 1944, and the Yamato would have been a high priority target on the 25th. Would any of the Kurita’s 4 battleships, 6 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 11 destroyers have escaped? As it was, Center Force lost 3 heavy cruisers, 3 more were damaged, as was 1 destroyer. The only thing that prevented the complete destruction of Center Force was the fact that Yamato, and the others, retreated from the area as quickly as they did. IMHO, of course. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 5:09pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/57 "2015-08-24T17:09:56Z")
> [@doorhinge](#): > > If Kurita’s Center Force had somehow managed to avoid it’s initial contact with Taffy 3, Center Force would have been able to inflict considerable damage to the Allied landings on Leyte. > > Until Spruance ordered an immediate and all out attack. What was Spruance in charge of, at this time? ---
**Author:** ![doorhinge](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a5b964/32.png) [@doorhinge](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/doorhinge)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 6:55pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/58 "2015-08-24T18:55:00Z")
> [@mlees](#): > > What was Spruance in charge of, at this time? Spruance was in command of Taffy 3, which would have been abaft Center Force (assuming Center Force and Taffy 3 had not met). ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [August 24, 2015, 9:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/59 "2015-08-24T21:40:17Z")
> [@doorhinge](#): > > Spruance was in command of Taffy 3, which would have been abaft Center Force (assuming Center Force and Taffy 3 had not met). Then wiki is wrong? > **[Battle off Samar](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar)** > > Seventh Fleet > Combined Fleet > Luzon > [@wiki](#): > > A Japanese surface force of battleships and cruisers, battered earlier in the larger battle and thought to have been in retreat, instead turned around unobserved and stumbled upon the northernmost of the three groups, Task Unit 77.4.3 (“Taffy 3”), commanded by Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague. ---
**Author:** ![doorhinge](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a5b964/32.png) [@doorhinge](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/doorhinge)\ **Post date:** [August 25, 2015, 12:32am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/60 "2015-08-25T00:32:32Z")
The OP - > [@figure9](#): > > WW2, What if Kurita did not see Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf? > > What if Taffy 3 had been in the squall line to the east of its actual position when Kurita’s fleet sailed past? How bad would the Allies loses have been? Would Halsey have been kicked out of the Navy? Finally how would this change the course of the war and history? > Wikipedia link: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle\_of\_Leyte\_Gulf#The\_Battle\_off\_Samar\_.2825\_October.29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#The_Battle_off_Samar_.2825_October.29) > [@mlees](#): > > Then wiki is wrong? > > [Battle off Samar - Wikipedia](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_off_Samar) No, wiki does not appear to be wrong. The difference between wiki and this thread is the OP’s assumption that Kurita did not see Taffy 3 when Center Force entered Leyte Gulf on Oct 25th. Once Center Force began shelling the Allies troop and supply ships at Leyte Gulf, there is a very high probability that Taffy 3 would make it a point to go see Center Force and begin kicking it’s ass. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584.md?page=2) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584.md?page=4)