# WW2, What if Kurita did not see Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [November 1, 2012, 4:43pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584 "2012-11-01T16:43:59Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 19\ **Page:** 5
**Author:** ![dropzone](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/dropzone/32/7515_2.png) [@dropzone](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/dropzone)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2015, 4:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/81 "2015-09-07T04:42:20Z")
> [@figure9](#): > > WW2, What if Kurita did not see Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf? Wouldn’t have mattered, since Taffy 3 saw him first. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2015, 2:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/82 "2015-09-07T14:38:08Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > From what I have read, the attack on the Princeton was by a dive bomber that dove very low and was seen smoking from the carrier’s deck. I have not seen any reports that he flew away or crashed. It would be reasonable in hindsight to believe it was a suicide attack. However, by technical definition, the USS St Lo (Taffy Three) was the first USN Carrier sunk by a kamikaze… on October 25, 1945, the following day. Horseshit. The _Princeton_ was not hit by a kamikaze, it was hit by a 500lb bomb dropped by a D4Y “Judy” that started uncontrollable fires. The plane did not crash into the Princeton afterwards, deliberately or otherwise. Your own cite, which you apparently did not read before trying to use it to claim ‘contradictory reports’, “USS Princeton CVL23 War Damage Report No. 62” makes it very clear what happened, see [post 44](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=18623267&postcount=44). It is entirely unreasonable to believe in hindsight that it was a suicide attack when nobody has ever reported that the plane crashed into the _Princeton_. Because you have not seen any reports that he flew away or crashed does not make it remotely reasonable to conclude that it crashed into the _Princeton_. One could just as reasonably conclude the D4Y and pilot were warped to the dark side of the moon. Your refusal to concede your simple error and attempts to cling to the notion that the _Princeton_ may or may not have been lost to a kamikaze is quite curious. Where exactly have you read “the attack on the Princeton was by a dive bomber that dove very low and was seen smoking from the carrier’s deck?” By the way, it’s usually not a good sign when you return to a debate two weeks later using larger font sizes. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2015, 3:32pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/83 "2015-09-07T15:32:34Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > However, by technical definition, the USS St Lo (Taffy Three) was the first USN Carrier sunk by a kamikaze… on October 25, 1945, the following day. The difference between a _tokkotai_ attack and a run-of-the-mill suicide attack was that the former was an official, deliberate strategy by the Imperial Japanese forces while the latter were attacks usually where the plane had become incapacitated and the pilot elected to attempt to cause maximum damage. As per my earlier post, this was an action which US pilots also employed on occasions. This is no mere “technical” definition. It was a deliberate, calculated strategy which entailed far more quantities of men and planes, and which ultimately caused a considerable amount of damage to the USN. Second, as **Dissonance** stated, Princeton was not hit by a suicide bomber. You seem to disregard official reports when they don’t fit your narrative. Had it been a suicide bomber, that would have been mentioned. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2015, 4:53pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/84 "2015-09-07T16:53:44Z")
> [@dropzone](#): > > Wouldn’t have mattered, since Taffy 3 saw him first. It does matter in that they were effectively in his path and he cold not simply sail past them. Had they been farther East and he had not directly engaged them, he might have simply regarded the air attacks as one more problem to be addressed as he continued to the landing zone, where he would, within a few hours, have had to address Oldendorf’s surface fleet, radically changing the nature of the battle, (although not affecting the outcome of the war). ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 7, 2015, 7:03pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/85 "2015-09-07T19:03:04Z")
**THE AMMUNITION MYTH** There are numerous posts which beg the issue of what would have happened if Seventh Fleet had engaged Center Force. Admiral Kinkaid reported his fleet was without fuel or ammunition to battle Center Force. His statements are often questioned. Some even recount how many rounds his ships had. I don’t ever recalling anyone citing fuel reserves, if any. With this post, hopefully, there will be actual facts with which to discuss the issue. **BULL’S RUN** When I first learned about “Bulls Run,” I joined others who criticized Admiral Halsey for leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded. Yet, he had several reasons for leaving protection of the San Bernardino Straits to Seventh Fleet. First, he wrongly believed that his attacks on Kurita’s ships the previous day in the Sibuyan Sea had removed it as a viable fighting force. Second, which is not often mentioned, Halsey likely assumed Kurita could not maneuver his fleet through San Bernardino Strait at night, and Third, he claimed that there were sufficient forces in Seventh Fleet to defend the Landing. The final reason is subject to debate/ When I learned that Seventh Fleet had six battleships, many with Mark Five Radar Fire Control, as well as eight cruisers and dozens of destroyers, Also argued was that there were 16-18 “escort” aircraft carriers defending the Gulf, were the equivalent of four fleet carriers. I began to second-guess blame on Halsey for the “Battle that Never Should Have Been.” Why was Admiral Kinkaid pleading for help? His ships were three hours away. Halsey’s ships were 300 miles away. Was Kinkaid trying to shift responsibility of certain debacle on Halsey? Center Force survived the Sibuyan Sea in fighting condition. Vice Admiral Kurita, in an exceptional feat of seamanship, navigated it through San Bernardino Strait at night. Admiral Kinkaid indicated it was a disaster waiting to happen. In a post-war interview, Admiral Kinkaid stated that two enemy cruisers in the Gulf could put the entire invasion in question (much less the Yamato). Kinkaid explained in a preliminary action report, that his ships were too low on ammunition and too distant for an engagement against Center Force: Preliminary Action Report of Engagements in Leyte Gulf and off Samar Island on 25 October, 1944 Nov 18, 1944 From: Commander Task Force Seventy-Seven To: Commander-in-Chief, United States Fleet. * * * At this point, the situation appeared very critical. Our surface combatant forces were deep in the southern part of Surigao Strait, after the battle of the early morning, and after five days of almost continuous bombardment of shore objectives and fighting a naval action, they were exceedingly short of ammunition and fuel; moreover, the destroyers had expended almost all their torpedoes. Nevertheless, all of our available surface forces were ordered to concentrate at eastern entrance Leyte Gulf, preparatory to moving to the support of the retiring CVEs and an urgent call for assistance was sent to Commander Third Fleet. Was that true? Was (1) an engagement between Seventh Fleet and Center Force possible? and (2) could Seventh Fleet have stopped Center Force? **COULD SEVENTH FLEET HAVE ENGAGED CENTER FORCE?** The timeline I posted was based on historic events. It suggests that Center Force could have reached its destination by 11:00, absent intervening events outside the historical record. It is based on reports and materials, including, among others, [The World Wondr’s: What Really Happened Off Samar](http://www.amazon.com/The-World-Wonder'd-Really-Happened/dp/160888046X), a recent book by Robert Lundgren, who has participated on this Board. He reviewed and translated Japanese logs and compared them with their American counterparts to better determine the true events of the battle. Another valuable resource was . [Richard W. Bates, The Battle for Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume V. Battle of Surigao Strait. October 24-25 (Naval War College)(1958)](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/NWC-5.pdf). Oldendorf’s fleet was not likely to arrive at its destination until 13:00, if then. Could/Would the Taffys delay Kurita by 2 hours? **DID SEVENTH FLEET HAVE SUFFICIENT AMMO TO DEFEAT CENTER FORCE?** Commodore Bates reported that Seventh Force’s battleships had only 19.6% capacity of armor piercing projectiles (Appendix I, p. 677). Cruisers were at 13.9% (p. 678). Among the six battleships, the number of projectiles ranged from 360 aboard the Pennsylvania, which did not fire a shot in the Battle of Surigao Strait, to 111 aboard the West Virginia. There was some question about why the Pennsylvania failed to fire a round, some concerned it may have been technical, others believed it may have been personnel. In either event, the Penn was slated to be on Oldendorf’s front line against Center Force. Among the eight cruisers, the number of projectiles varied from 15 aboard the Minneapolis to 551 for the Phoenix. The cruisers had 2598 shells. Battleships had 1392. The Fleet had 114 torpedoes on board.P. 679. ``` I read briefly about the rate of fire and number of shells used in surface fleet combat. I can understand why Admiral Oldendorf would not want to place his depleted battleships in harm's way. He was not well prepared for the engagement. Yet, he was willing to send half his ships to meet Kurita at the mouth of the Gulf, while the other half refueled and re-armed. Given enough delay, there could have been an unforgettable battle ship beat down. ``` **DID SEVENTH FLEET HAVE SUFFICIENT FUEL TO ENGAGE CENTER FORCE?** I have yet to find reports to indicate how long Oldendorf’s front line could have fought and maneuvered against Center Force without refueling. Likewise, had Center Force engaged Taffy Two, as it had Taffy Three, its fuel supplies would also have been questionable. ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [September 8, 2015, 1:58am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/86 "2015-09-08T01:58:34Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > **THE AMMUNITION MYTH** > > There are numerous posts which beg the issue of what would have happened if Seventh Fleet had engaged Center Force. Admiral Kinkaid reported his fleet was without fuel or ammunition to battle Center Force. His statements are often questioned. Some even recount how many rounds his ships had. I don’t ever recalling anyone citing fuel reserves, if any. With this post, hopefully, there will be actual facts with which to discuss the issue. Do you have an actual point to this? Kurita turned and withdrew after encountering a handful of merchant ships with flight decks and a handful of destroyers. Are you really going to argue that he would have stood and hammered away against the beaches when faced with a squadron of capital ships that roughly equalled his own squadron? (And your persistence in holding to an 11:00 arrival time at the beaches when the hypothetical scenario would have left the three Taffy units less endangered and more capable of inflicting harm on him is odd.) > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > **BULL’S RUN** > > When I first learned about “Bulls Run,” I joined others who criticized Admiral Halsey for leaving San Bernardino Strait unguarded. Yet, he had several reasons for leaving protection of the San Bernardino Straits to Seventh Fleet. First, he wrongly believed that his attacks on Kurita’s ships the previous day in the Sibuyan Sea had removed it as a viable fighting force. Second, which is not often mentioned, Halsey likely assumed Kurita could not maneuver his fleet through San Bernardino Strait at night, and Third, he claimed that there were sufficient forces in Seventh Fleet to defend the Landing. The final reason is subject to debate/ What is the point of this hijack? Halsey was gone in both the actual battle and in the hypothetical. It seems pointless to argue over just how stupid he was to have gone north when his stupidity is not changed by the hypothetical. Are you of the odd opinion that Halsey is defended by noting that he made a false assumption regarding the results in the Sibuyan Sea that he did not correct with reconnaissance or that he made a false assumption (without evidence) that a fleet could not navigate a particular strait? Both of those seem to further condemn him. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 8, 2015, 7:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/87 "2015-09-08T07:43:53Z")
We do fact checking, remember? > [@LittleWolf51](#): > > **WHAT WAS AT STAKE?** > > (. . .) > > “There were 23 LSTs and 28 Liberty Ships, a month’s supplies for combat operations. steel mats for airstrips, including Tacloban, had yet to be unloaded.” > > _- John Toland, T_he Rising Sun Death of the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945\*\* Researching that quote, I found this interesting discrepancy. Perhaps you could explain the following. The same quote shows up on a WWII board, which interestingly enough is about Halsey’s actions in the battle, which may account for the hijack. Anyway, here it is. > [@](#): > > Kurita wouldn’t let himself be interviewed by John Toland for his 1970 Pulitzer-winner The Rising Sun, but arranged a meeting with his Chief of Staff, who said on p569: > “I think now we should have gone into Leyte Gulf,” he said. “So does Admiral Kurita. Then we thought we were doing the best thing but now, with a cool head, I realize we were obsessed by enemy task forces. Just because we got the report - and it turned out to be false - that there was a fleet of enemy carriers nearby, we shouldn’t have set out after them.” > > [Toland:] If Kurita had continued on to Leyte Gulf, he would have first encountered Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet and then undergone a series of air attacks in confined waters. There was considerable shipping in the gulf - including twenty-three LST’s and twenty-eight Liberty ships - but what if all these had been sunk? Most of the supplies had been landed, as Kurita had guessed, and there was enough on shore for a month’s military operations. MacArthur claimed that loss of these ships would have ‘placed in jeopardy’ the entire invasion. Still aboard were most of the steel landing mats for the airstrips, and without these he could have lost local air superiority temporarily. Also, a naval bombardment on American troops might have wreaked momentary havoc. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that MacArthur’s advance would have been delayed more than a week. OK, let’s look at the differences: > [@](#): > > [Toland:] If Kurita had continued on to Leyte Gulf, he would have first encountered Kinkaid’s Seventh Fleet and then undergone a series of air attacks in confined waters. **There was** \*\* (were) \*\*considerable shipping in the gulf - including **twenty-three LST’s and twenty-eight Liberty ships** - but what if all these had been sunk? Most of the supplies had been landed, as Kurita had guessed, and there was enough on shore for **a month’s (supplies for) military operations.** MacArthur claimed that loss of these ships would have ‘placed in jeopardy’ the entire invasion. Still aboard were most of the **steel** landing **mats for** the **airstrips** , **(including Tacloban, had yet to be unloaded)** and without these he could have lost local air superiority temporarily. Also, a naval bombardment on American troops might have wreaked momentary havoc. Nevertheless, it is doubtful that MacArthur’s advance would have been delayed more than a week. (Bolding are word you used, and words in (parenthesizes) are changes you made, and red font is what you cut to change to meaning and for the money quote. What’s interesting is that by selective quoting, you’ve managed to completely change the meaning 180 degrees, making it sound as if the month’s supply were still in the ships and not already ashore. Toland’s conclusion was that Kurita arriving into Leyte Bay wouldn’t have made much of a difference, which is what we have argued. You’ve spend a considerable amount of time on this, which is perplexing because if quotes are distorted then there simply isn’t anyway of having a discussion, at least from me. I really hadn’t been that interested in continuing after the personal attacks of suggesting cowardliness, but I simply made a joke of it at the time. I really don’t want to continue if direct quotes cannot be trusted. Can you please explain this? ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2015, 7:28pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/88 "2015-09-12T19:28:49Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > This is the Straight Dope. We look to fight ignorance. I’m not sure that\* fighting\* ignorance is possible. Yes, you are right, the correct term is _knot_, rather than _naut_. Let us assume that use of the term came from ignorance. You can’t fight misuse of a term. You can educate the person who misused it. That would not be fighting him or her. It would be a discussion. “Ignorance” is defined by Merriam Webster Dictionary as, “a lack of knowledge, education: the state of being ignorant.” Ignorance is a natural state. We are born ignorant. The Crime of Ignorance is refusing to learn from available information when given the opportunity. No matter how hard you _fight_ ignorance, there is more of it than misuse of the word “naut.” Ignorance is demonstrated by refusal to be educated. As examples, the following statements are IMHO ignorant: 1. The Landing was guarded by 18 Escort Carriers, 400 planes, the equivalent of 4 Fleet Carriers. 2. Had Admiral Kurita sailed Center Force into the Gulf, it would have made no difference, either because there was nothing to attack there, or destruction of the Landing would only delay the inevitable allied victory at Leyte Island. 3. Had Kurita continued his course into the Gulf, Center Force would have been obliterated by Oldendorf’s Seventh Fleet. 4. Oldendorf’s battleships were not low on armor piercing ordinance, as reported by Admiral Kinkaid and others. 5. Admiral Kinkaid did not plan to divide Seventh Fleet to engage Center Force. 6. Japanese air power in the Battle of Leyte Gulf was ineffective and irrelevant. When I first posted in this thread, I had knowledge and education about the Battle Off Samar Island. I had read books, including Thomas Cutler’s The Battle of Leyte Gulf and Little Wolf at Leyte by Captain J. Henry Doscher, Jr. I also read numerous articles and threads, including one on this Board, which was astoundingly informative. Still, there was much I did not know and still do not know and never can know. Since, joining the discussion, I read and studied more books, articles and reports, such as [The Battle for Leyte Gulf, October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume V. Battle of Surigao Strait, October 24-25. Volume V (1956)](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/rep/Leyte/NWC-5.pdf) by Commodore Richard W. Bates. Although it is about a different Battle, the detailed Report has information about where Oldendorf’s ships were at, how much ordinance they had after Surigao Strait, how Kinkaid intended to confront Kurita, what ships would be used and where they would engage. It was prepared for the Bureau of Naval Personnel. Commodore Bates was the Head of the World War II Evaluation Group of the Naval War College. He retired as an Admiral. I suggest he is more of an authority than anyone who has posted in this Thread. I also purchased and read, [“The World Wondr’d: What Really Happened Off Samar,”](http://www.amazon.com/The-World-Wonderd-Really-Happened/dp/160888046X) by Robert Lundgren. Mr. Lundgren translated and compared Japanese logs with those of the US Navy and corrected several misunderstandings about the Battle. He has also contributed to this Board. I remember how members argued with his statements, although they had absolutely none of the knowledge he had acquired through hard work. Arguing is often part of a discussion,so it is to be expected on a Discussion Board. Another Book purchased was [Fading Victory: The Diary of Admiral Matome Ugaki, 1941-1945](http://www.amazon.com/gp/product/0822936658?psc=1&redirect=true&ref_=oh_aui_detailpage_o01_s00), by Admiral Matome Ugaki. He commanded Kurita’s Battleship Division at Samar and later the Fifth Air Fleet from which hr planned and directed kamikaze attacks against the USN. His perspective explained much about Kurita’s decisions at Samar. I look forwards to reading his recollection of other Battles, such as Midway. And Another Book purchased was John T. Mason’s Pacific War Remembered: An Oral History Collection, Naval Institute Press. In it, Admiral Kinkaid’s account of the Battle Off Samar was informative. There are numerous materials available online, including [post war interrogations of Japanese Officers](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/AAF/USSBS/IJO/index.html). I read every interrogation regarding Samar Island in forming my own opinions. There is a wealth of information available to anyone willing to look for it. **MY TIME LINE** I prepared a Time Line for use by readers who are interested in this thread. Much of it was taken from Mr. Lundgren’s book. It offers a picture of what forces would be available, where they were, and when they could engage if Center Force had bypassed Taffy Three. You can add to or alter the time line in any way you wish. Use your information and ideas to flesh it out. It is offered as a tool for discussion. Would Kurita have reached his definition by 11:00 am? Yes, _barring anything else happening_. However, much was bound to happen. Whatever it may be is speculative, and it was NOT for me to include in a historic time line. That is for others to do with their own ideas and information. ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2015, 7:38pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/89 "2015-09-12T19:38:43Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > We do fact checking, remember?Researching that quote, I found this interesting discrepancy. Perhaps you could explain the following. I don’t really care if you agree or disagree with what was written. I did not purport to be the author of the statements. Unlike you, I have searched for historical sources. Have you anything to offer the discussion, or is your claim to be the self appointed fact checker it? Frankly, you’re not very good at that. ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2015, 9:11pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/90 "2015-09-12T21:11:59Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > Do you have an actual point to this? Kurita turned and withdrew after encountering a handful of merchant ships with flight decks and a handful of destroyers. Are you really going to argue that he would have stood and hammered away against the beaches when faced with a squadron of capital ships that roughly equalled his own squadron? > (And your persistence in holding to an 11:00 arrival time at the beaches when the hypothetical scenario would have left the three Taffy units less endangered and more capable of inflicting harm on him is odd.) > > What is the point of this hijack? This is funny! I am the one who says he is _not_ an authority. I’m the one who has posted sources and constructed a timeline from _historical_ sources. And, you and tokyobayer each have accused _me_ of hijacking? Good grief! Am I hijacking your thread? I have no vested interest in an opinion about this thread. My opinions have changed as I learned more about the Battle. I don’t know you or tokyobayer. I have no reason to hijack _your_ thread. If you have information to support your claim that Oldendorf would arrive at the Gulf at the same time as Center Force, please share it. I have searched for such information, and what I have found suggests he would not arrive at the mouth of the Gulf until 13:00 at the earliest. Even then, that was with half his force. Why not share your sources? Contrary to your assertion, I do NOT hold to an 11:00 arrival by Center Force, especially at" the beaches." Center Force’s destination was NOT the beaches. It did not need to go to the beaches to achieve its mission. The exact location of Center Force’s destination is reported in Admiral Ugaki’s Diary, probably elsewhere. Oldendorf’s projected location was the mouth of the Gulf. A more detailed destination position is provided by Commodore Bates. I bought the Admiral’s book from Amazon. 11:00 was the PROJECTED arrival time according to Center Force’s historical records. I would expect a delay. I cannot say how long it would be. A delay would likely be caused by orchestrated attacks by Taffy Two and Taffy Three. It could be argued the delay would be similar to the historical delay, about 90 minutes of battle, less distance traveled during that time. Yet, even with a 90 minute delay, Oldendorf probably would not have arrived in time for a shootout as you you wrote - unless he was dispatched earlier than the historical timeline. All I ask is that _if you and tokyobayer have better information, why not share it_? Mine is based from Mr. Lundgren’s book, Commodore Bate’s USN Report, accounts from different USN ships and IJN records - all are available. I suggest you buy Mr. Lundgren’s book as did I. I don’t know if you or tokyobayer have sufficient naval expertise to forecast what strategy Kinkaid would use against Center Force. I don’t. I can only rely on what was done. For instance, I would expect Kurita to proceed in formation if he had not been diverted by Taffy Three. Maybe that would change when he spotted Taffy Two? I can’t say. I would expect a better organized attack by the Taffys than what historically happened. I would expect Taffy Three to be able to better fuel and equip its planes to attack Center Force, but I cannot say. I have no reason to believe that Oldendorf would be ordered to engage Center Force earlier than he actually was. Again, I don’t claim such expertise. Do you? ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2015, 10:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/91 "2015-09-12T22:12:13Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > The difference between a _tokkotai_ attack and a run-of-the-mill suicide attack was that the former was an official, deliberate strategy by the Imperial Japanese forces while the latter were attacks usually where the plane had become incapacitated and the pilot elected to attempt to cause maximum damage. As per my earlier post, this was an action which US pilots also employed on occasions. > > This is no mere “technical” definition. It was a deliberate, calculated strategy which entailed far more quantities of men and planes, and which ultimately caused a considerable amount of damage to the USN. > > Second, as **Dissonance** stated, Princeton was not hit by a suicide bomber. You seem to disregard official reports when they don’t fit your narrative. Had it been a suicide bomber, that would have been mentioned. In your own words, you have “hijacked” an issue to make a personal attack. For heaven’s sake, do you think the Emperor sent me here to sink your battleship? :rolleyes: If you are a “fact checker,” why not show me an official USN report that states a ship was sunk by a “kamikaze” attack? It’s funny how you and Dissonance both try to make a _technical_ distinction with the word. Why not report when “kamikaze” attacks first occurred? It was October 25, 1944. _By that definition, the Princeton could not have been sunk by a “kamikaze,” even a suicide bomber._ Do you deny that the term “kamikaze” was _later_ invented by Naval intelligence, and that “kamikaze” attacks were kept secret from the American public until April, 1945? Do you also deny the word has been _commonly used_ to refer to Japanese suicide bombers? :smack: Do you deny that the carrier St. Lo was sunk by a “kamikaze” the next day? Do you deny three other carriers were also attacked by “kamikazes” the next day? After reading more materials, I can’t say whether the Princeton was not sunk by a suicide bomber. I have learned it could not have been sunk by a “kamikaze,” per military definition. It may have been sunk by a very well executed bombing attack. There are differing accounts. Unlike your opinions, mine aren’t locked to past information. My opinions change with information. I do know that others believe the Princeton was a kamikaze victim: As an example: _“It was a kamikaze attack that had sunk the carrier USS Princeton.”_ [Mark H. Lewis, The Sun Will Rise: Air War Japan, Volume III (1946)](https://books.google.com/books?id=LgeLAgAAQBAJ&pg=PA213&lpg=PA213&dq=was+the+uss+princeton+sunk+by+a+kamikaze?&source=bl&ots=jraksFkvXT&sig=73f7GbeupIIIgOZfJXyJsd6E9ow&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0CBgQ6AEwATgKahUKEwj-9LmN1uDHAhVPgw0KHaxgCzk#v=onepage&q=was%20the%20uss%20princeton%20sunk%20by%20a%20kamikaze%3F&f=false) Dissonance also claimed to be a fact checker, but failed to Google anything.☹ So, what is your point? This is supposed to be a thread about what would have happened if Taffy Three had been hidden by a squall. You’re just wasting bandwidth.😕 ---
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [September 12, 2015, 10:51pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/92 "2015-09-12T22:51:05Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > So, what is your point? This is supposed to be a thread about what would have happened if Taffy Three had been hidden by a squall. You’re just wasting bandwidth.😕 I direct your question back to you. You continually try to pick apart others’ posts, (frequently getting your own facts wrong or challenging facts that had already been supported by references), yet you do not appear to have an actual point. Your accusation of a “personal attack” is ludicrous when one compares his comments to your own. Now, if you are serious about participating in this thread, please provide, in two or three sentences, (and without copying walls of text from other message boards), just what you think would have happened if Taffy 3 had not been seen by Kurita. If you can actually describe your scenario, then we can debate whether your scenario is plausible. Until then, you are doing nothing to promote your cause by picking fights with other posters. [/Moderating] ETA: In reviewing the last few posts, I have noticed that you arranged quoted portions in a way that seriously changed the meaning and context of the way they were posted. That sort of behavior will stop. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 13, 2015, 1:22am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/93 "2015-09-13T01:22:57Z")
> [@LittleWolf51](#): > > I don’t really care if you agree or disagree with what was written. I did not purport to be the author of the statements. Unlike you, I have searched for historical sources. Have you anything to offer the discussion, or is your claim to be the self appointed fact checker it? Frankly, you’re not very good at that. You presented that as a direct quote which normally is done to increase the authority of the words. Frankly, if you have no interest in the accuracy of what you are quoting, then we do not share enough values to have a conversation. I have searched enough information to conclusively conclude, for example, that Princeton was hit by a bomb and not a suicide bomber. I see no point in having to squabble over known historic facts, especially when the validity of quoted cannot be assured. It doesn’t seem that you are interested in a dialogue so I’ll leave the thread unless someone else has something to say. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [September 14, 2015, 3:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/94 "2015-09-14T15:24:57Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > It doesn’t seem that you are interested in a dialogue so I’ll leave the thread unless someone else has something to say. Famous last words, of course. I had always thought that the claims of the times required for Oldendorf’s battleships to arrive was far too late. Reading Commodore Richard W. Bates’ Battle for Leyte Golf, I found the following: > [@](#): > > Although the majority of his heavy ships were dangerously low on ammunition to meet a force as strong as the Main Body, FIRST Striking > Force, and the majority of his destroyers were short of torpedoes, CTG > 77.2, at 1015, in accordance with these instructions (a) formed a special > force consisting of the three battleships with the most armor-piercing > projectiles (TENNESSEE, CALIFORNIA, PENNSYLVANIA), one heavy cruiser > division embracing all the heavy cruisers under his command including the > SHROPSHIRE from TG 77.3 (LOUISVILLE, PORTLAND, MINNEAPOLIS, SHROPSHIRE) > and twenty destroyers consisting of five units from DESRON FIFTY-SIX > (ROBINSON, BRYANT, LEUTZE, HEYWOOD L. EDWARDS, HALFORD) each armed with > five torpedoes; all six units of DESDIV XRAY, of which four (CLAXTON, > AULICK, CONY, SIGOURNEY) were each armed with ten torpedoes and two (THORN, > WELLES) were each armed with five torpedoes; five units from DESRON TWENTY- > ONE (NICHOLAS, 0«BANN0N, TAYLOR, LONG, RUSSELL) each armed with ten > torpedoes; and four units from DESRON FIFTY-ONE (HALLIGAN, HARADEN, TWIGGS, > WICKES), each armed with ten torpedoes to go to the aid of the escort > carriers, and (b) directed the remaining ships to protect Leyte Gulf and > to obtain fuel and ammunition as opportunity permitted. > > 675 CONFIDENTIAL > > CONFIDENTIAL EPILOGUE > > \*\*With this special force, and after a delay ordered by CTF 77, > CTG 77.2, at 1127, departed the Gulf and headed for sea and the CVE’s. \*\* > However, at 1257, he was recalled by CTF 77 and directed to concentrate > at the entrance to the Gulf. Here he remained during the remainder of > the day while certain of his ships fueled and replenished anmunition. My bolding. So, at 1127, the special force was already out of Leyte Golf and into the sea to the east. In other words, they had already been in the Gulf. The position of the Gulf can be seen here. [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Leyte\_map\_annotated.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Leyte_map_annotated.jpg) The US battleships had not chased the Southern Force down the Surigao Strait. > **[File:Surigao Strait.jpg](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Surigao_straight.jpg)** > > Original file (1,000 × 1,493 pixels, file size: 200 KB, MIME type: image/jpeg) > Battle off Surigao Straight. Part of the Battle of Leyte Gulf > Source: Scanned from Reports of General MacArthur (1994 facsimile printing), Vol 1. Plate #61 ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2015, 3:11am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/95 "2015-09-20T03:11:51Z")
\*\* > [@figure9](#): > > What if Taffy 3 had been in the squall line to the east of its actual position when Kurita’s fleet sailed past? How bad would the Allies loses have been? Would Halsey have been kicked out of the Navy? Finally how would this change the course of the war and history? > Wikipedia link: [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle\_of\_Leyte\_Gulf#The\_Battle\_off\_Samar\_.2825\_October.29](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#The_Battle_off_Samar_.2825_October.29) \*\* Thank you for an excellent thread. It is a hypothetical which requires real information. Most “Battle Off Samar Island” threads have no time line. Many assume an inevitable engagement between Center Force and Oldendorf’s Seventh Fleet. However, history may indicate otherwise. Would Oldendorf have had time to assemble his force and engage Center Force? Admiral Oldendorf was ordered to do so, and the time of that order is established, as is the location of his ships when the order was given. The ships designated to meet Center Force is available from Naval records, as is their ordinance. The exact time that Center Force was first observed by the USN is established historically, as is Admiral Kurita’s scheduled time of destination (which one would assume would be altered by naval engagements anticipated herein). The question of this thread is what would have happened if not for the surprise engagement between Center Force and Taffy Three? Would the Taffys have delayed Kurita long enough for Oldendorf to engage? If so, what would have happened? To offer intelligent answers requires actual information. Fortunately, it is available, and it is interesting. ``` To those who have been kind enough to offer me corrections to my posts, can you provide answers to the following? It would save me from posting further information for you to have to fact check. Thank you in advance. ``` **1.** \*\*At what time was Oldendorf ordered by Admiral Kinkaid to assemble a force to engage Admiral Kurita’s Center Force? \*\* **2.**** What Seventh Fleet ships were assigned to engage Center Force?** ``` *a.* How many armor piercing 16 inch shells did they have? *b.* How many armor piercing 14 inch shells did they have? *c.* How many torpedoes did they have? *d.* How long could those ships engage Center Force at current fuel levels? ``` **3.** \*\*How long was it expected to take Oldendorf to assemble his force and sail it to his destination point? \*\* **4.**** Where was Center Force’s destination?** **5.**** Where was Oldendorf’s assigned destination?** **6.** \*\*What air power did the opposing sides have? \*\* _a._ How many fighter planes did the Taffys have? ``` *b.* How many torpedo/bomber planes did the Taffys have? *c.* How many torpedoes did the Taffys have aboard for their planes? *d.* How many armor piercing bombs did they have aboard? e. At what time did Japanese air power begin to attack Taffy Three? *f.* How many/what USN ships did Japanese kamikazes sink/damage on 10/25/1944? ``` **7.**** For those who would skirt the questions posed in this thread by claiming that Center Force would not have caused significant damage to the Leyte Landing, please provide the following information:** ``` *a.* How many transport ships remained in Leyte Gulf on 10/25/1944? *b.* Where were most of those transport ships located? * c.* How many operable landing fields would have been in range of IJN naval artillery guns once Center Force reached its destination? *d.* What materials and supplies remained unloaded from the transports? *e. * What men, supplies, and materials remained within 300 yards of the beach on 10/25/1944? ``` ---
**Author:** ![LittleWolf51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/l/2acd7d/32.png) [@LittleWolf51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/LittleWolf51)\ **Post date:** [September 20, 2015, 3:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/96 "2015-09-20T03:40:50Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Famous last words, of course. > > I had always thought that the claims of the times required for Oldendorf’s battleships to arrive was far too late. Reading Commodore Richard W. Bates’ Battle for Leyte Golf, I found the following:My bolding. > > So, at 1127, the special force was already out of Leyte Golf and into the sea to the east. In other words, they had already been in the Gulf. The position of the Gulf can be seen here. [https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Leyte\_map\_annotated.jpg](https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/f8/Leyte_map_annotated.jpg) > > The US battleships had not chased the Southern Force down the Surigao Strait. > [File:Surigao Strait.jpg - Wikipedia](https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Surigao_straight.jpg) That was good work. ---
**Author:** ![1360jerry](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/1/bb73d2/32.png) [@1360jerry](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/1360jerry)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2016, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/97 "2016-03-12T18:33:21Z")
Even if Kurita had pressed on to Leyte Gulf after his encounter with the Taffy groups, why couldn’t Kinkaid have blocked him using the same tactics he’d used in the Battle of Surigao Straight? Was it because he had expended his ammunition? ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [March 12, 2016, 8:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/98 "2016-03-12T20:41:35Z")
> [@1360jerry](#): > > Even if Kurita had pressed on to Leyte Gulf after his encounter with the Taffy groups, why couldn’t Kinkaid have blocked him using the same tactics he’d used in the Battle of Surigao Straight? Was it because he had expended his ammunition? He could have; Oldendorf’s battleline was not short of ammunition after Surigao Strait. The idea that it was came from a radio message sent from Kinkaid to Halsey trying to light a fire under [his ass](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Leyte_Gulf#Crisis_.E2.80.93_US_7th_Fleet.27s_calls_for_help), bolding mine: > [@](#): > > Shortly after 08:00 on 25 October, desperate messages calling for assistance began to come in from 7th Fleet, which had been engaging Nishimura’s “Southern Force” in Surigao Strait since 02:00. One message from Kinkaid, sent in plain language, read: “MY SITUATION IS CRITICAL. FAST BATTLESHIPS AND SUPPORT BY AIR STRIKES MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP ENEMY FROM DESTROYING CVES AND ENTERING LEYTE.” Halsey recalled in his memoirs that he was shocked at this message, recounting that the radio signals from the 7th Fleet had come in at random and out of order because of a backlog in the signals office. It seems that he did not receive this vital message from Kinkaid until around 10:00. Halsey later claimed he knew Kinkaid was in trouble, but he had not dreamed of the seriousness of this crisis. > > **One of the most alarming signals from Kinkaid reported, after their action in Surigao Strait, 7th Fleet’s own battleships were critically low on ammunition. Even this failed to persuade Halsey to send any immediate assistance to the powerful 7th Fleet.[4][6][7] In fact, the 7th Fleet’s battleships were not as short of ammunition as Kinkaid’s signal implied,[7] but Halsey did not know that**. Samuel Eliot Morison gives an exact shell count of available ammunition after Surigao Strait on pages 294-295 of [History of United States Naval Operations in World War II, Leyte, June 1944-January 1945](http://www.amazon.com/Leyte-1944-January-History-United-Operations/dp/0785813136): > [@](#): > > The following table tells the story of the battleships’ main battery ammunition, which would have been crucial had they engaged Kurita: > > 16 inch (8 guns) > West Virginia AP 107 HC 172 > Maryland AP 192 HC 445 > > 14 Inch (12 guns) > Tennessee AP 327 HC 262 > California AP 177 HC 78 > Mississippi AP 189 HC 543 > Pennsylvania AP 360 HC 14 > > It will be observed that Maryland, Tennessee and Pennsylvania had 24 rounds or better of AP per gun; Mississippi, 15 3/4 rounds; West Virginia and California a trifle over 13 rounds per gun. Every gunnery officer wants his magazines full, but the shortage here was nothing to be alarmed about. AP being of course armor piercing, HC being High Capacity, the term in use at the time for HE or High Explosive. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [March 13, 2016, 5:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584/99 "2016-03-13T05:23:22Z")
> [@1360jerry](#): > > Even if Kurita had pressed on to Leyte Gulf after his encounter with the Taffy groups, why couldn’t Kinkaid have blocked him using the same tactics he’d used in the Battle of Surigao Straight? Was it because he had expended his ammunition? Please see my [post 94](http://boards.straightdope.com/sdmb/showpost.php?p=18684536&postcount=94). There was a special force en route to intercept Kurita which was recalled after Kurita retreated. The special force was already inbetween Kurita and Leyte Gulf. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/ww2-what-if-kurita-did-not-see-taffy-3-at-leyte-gulf/639584.md?page=4)