WW2, What if Kurita did not see Taffy 3 at Leyte Gulf?

Great Debates
21

And if my Grandmother had wheels she’d be a bicycle. The Americans were not ashore without food or ammunition, as I’ve said they were already ashore in enough strength and with enough supplies that the Japanese were not going to be able to drive them off. Kurita reaching the transports was not going to change that.

It would be nothing like Savo Island. The US Navy would not need any time to recover, and Kurita’s force would be at the bottom of the sea. By late 1944 the US had an embarrassment of riches in the Pacific. The reasons Mikawa reaching the transports after his victory at Savo Island would have been a disaster for the Guadalcanal campaign are several. First, very little in the way of supplies had yet been unloaded, so the Marines in this case would have been left to rot on the vine. Second, Savo Island gave the Japanese *de facto *control of the sea around Guadalcanal at night. With the transports sunk, there would be no functioning Henderson Field, so the US wouldn’t have de facto control of the sea during the day. This meant future resupply would be dicey at best. Finally, the transports that Mikawa could have sunk were pretty much it at the time; they could not be readily replaced if sunk.

None of these factors existed at Leyte. The Americans had already unloaded substantial amounts of supplies, would have effective control of the sea around Leyte both day and night after Kurita’s force fled or was sunk no matter how many transports they sunk, and any transports that were sunk were readily replaceable by vessels already existing in the Pacific.

22

True, (except that it was the British who had so settle for a Royal navy).

23

Jeez, I wasn’t even on the right side of the keyboard with that one. Price of interneting before coffee.

24

This is a great question!

First: timing is everything. if Center Force had simply cruised by Taffy 3, which is entirely plausible, it would have reached the Gulf at about 11 am. Taffy 3 was about 80 miles from Homonon Island, which is at the mouth of Leyte Gulf. At 20 nautes, it should have reached its objective in 4 hours. In real life, Kinkaid learned of the presence of Center Force at about 07:00. Even then, he was unwilling to release any ships to engage Center Force until 08:15. He would have to organize his forces, which had been “mopping up” Southern Force, rearm them, and determine a plan of attack. The WV, perhaps his most effective battleship, had damaged screws and could make only 10 nauts. It’s isn’t like Oldendorf’s ships were already there. many had chased Admiral Shima’s ships out of Suragao Straight. Kinkaid was wary of leaving his position until he could be certain that Shima’s force was not going to turn around, as did Kurita, and head back to the Suragao Straight. Maybe, Oldendorf can engage Center Force in a shootout by 1 pm? Remember, in real life, he intended to send only 4 old battleships, some cruisers and destroyers to meet Center Force. Such a force would be outgunned by the IJN. However, before Oldendorf arrived, the Taffys would harass center Force, causing damage, torpedoing/bombing ships. It isn’t a matter of whether Center Force is destroyed, its a question of when? How long will Kurita have to destroy the Landing? Kamikazes would inflict serious damage on the Taffys and Seventh Fleet. It would be a bloody mess.

Second: the surprise factor is huge. Halsey can never get to the fight. If Taffy 3 had not spotted Center Force, Kurita’s ships would simply have sailed into Leyte Gulf. Admiral Kinkaid, who assumed Task Force 34 was guarding San Bernardino Straight would have left it unguarded. Halsey, who wrongfully assumed that Center Force had been driven from the fight would be 400 miles away hunting down the Japanese decoy force. His planes would be out of range to attack Center Force.

Can you imagine the look on Americans’ faces at Leyte when the Yamato and 3 other battleships, 8 cruisers and 11 destroyers sailed into the Bay unopposed and without announcement? That would have been a Holy F**k moment! I imagine sailors would probably have more choice words. Reaction time would be zero.

Third: much damage would be done. Consider what damage could be inflicted by Southern Force. Give it two hours without opposition. It is A+5 (A Day, as opposed to D-Day, plus 5 days, or October 25, 1944). I have read elsewhere that there were no transport ships there and that American forces had advanced beyond range of naval artillery - WRONG!

The Navy was still in the “Attack Phase” of consolidating the Landing area. There were many transports there on the 25th. Actually, more tonnage was unloaded on that day than the two previous days (11,140 tons). 139 transport vessels were unloaded by midnight of 10/25/44. Many of those were held in San Pedro Bay during the battle. They would have been sitting ducks had there been no advance warning of Center Force coming. Even then, San Pedro was no safe haven. In my opinion, it could have been a disaster.

American marines, soldiers, and sailors would have been in striking distance of 4 battleships, including the mighty Yamato. Leyte Island is approximately 20 miles by 60 miles long. The Yamato can fire 18.1 rounds over 20 miles. Unless I am mistaken, the majority of American forces were within 6 miles of Leyte Beach, many engaged in combat or engineering operations. Would naval fire have been effective on American positions? When used by the USN it was. Well entrenched Japanese forces at Dulag, a stronghold, had been driven away, among others, so why wouldn’t the IJN return the favor? There were many targets for Kurita’s guns. By midnight of 10/25 (A+5), 80,000 troops and 81,000 tons of supplies had been put ashore. Consolidation of the Landing area would have been halted. For examples, the US was linking roads and setting up airstrips, such as at Tacloban. Equipment/supplies would be destroyed. Airstrips could not be completed. Other construction would stop. Many transports would have been destroyed, making resupply nearly impossible, maybe for months. Regarding the airfield of Tacloban, even on 10/25/1944, it had not been completed. One report was that 20-25 of the first 66 planes to land there that day crashed and had to be pushed off the field into nearby waters.

Fourth, there may have been an impact on the war. What effect would it have been on the War? That is a big question. Remember, the Sho Plan was not merely a naval engagement. The Japanese army and air forces also had roles, which they carried out dutifully. Their effectiveness was degraded dramatically by Center Force’s failure. However, had Kurita driven his force into Leyte and blown the hell out of everything he could, their effectiveness would have been far greater. There may even be a threat of putting the issue in doubt.

So, what if Kurita wreaked havoc on the Landing and killed thousands of Americans, sank many ships? Most likely, all of Kurita’s ships will be destroyed. The news will not be about our losses, but it will be about how the Japanese Navy was gloriously sunk in one day by Admiral Halsey and Admiral Kinkaid. Remember, there were no reports about the heroism of Taffy 3 for almost 10 years after the battle, so don’t expect losses of transports to be reported, even with the lives of thousands of Americans lost. It was not until Bull Halsey began writing his autobiography that all hell broke loose and people began wondering the answer to your question. A Naval Study of the Battle of Leyte Gulf omitted the Battle off Samar Island. No one wanted to embarrass American icons.

Maybe, the battle would have an effect on the upcoming Presidential election a few days away? I really don’t know. Many have speculated, but how could anyone know? Then, again, it likely would have some impact on prosecution of the war and conditions of surrender. Don’t know what they would be.

Thank you for a great thread.

25

I’d point out that this is a thread from 2012, but I looked over the participants and most are still here, and likely to disagree to one extent or another.

[jr mod] Carry on. [/jm] :smiley:

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I’m still around, and I still stand by my contribution. There was not Royal Japanese Navy.:wink:

Welcome to the dope. We enjoy these things.

One point which we have to acknowledge about alt-hist scenarios is the tendency to allow for, or rather expect, spectacular performances by the enemy. A lot of the wild “what ifs” have little reality to back them.

Anyway, let’s look at some of the points, I’m taking some of the quotes out of sequence.

Kinkaid had received a reply from Halsey at just after 7:00 that the Strait had been left unguarded and TF34 was on the great fishing expedition. While he could not have had anything in force to intercept, he would have been looking and on alert.

The three Taffys have 400 aircraft between them. In actual history, they did a number on the heavy cruisers and there would be no reason for them to perform less valiantly in this situation.

With the Taffys converging on Kurita, the constant harassment would have prevented Center Force from leisurely attacking targets at will. Your timing gives them two hours, but they are going to be spending a lot of that in circles fighting the air attacks.

There would have been no difference in the tokkotai attacks.

This is where the “what ifs” start to unravel. The US had had two solid years of schooling on naval bombardment and even then it was ineffective much of the time. The Japanese simply did not have this expertise, even if Kurita was so inclined for which there is no indication that he was.

What’s more, the IJN and IJA rarely talked to each other, and with the US forces far enough inland, off the beaches, without spotters those 18" guns aren’t going to find their targets on their own.

By that point in the war, the US had a zillion transports and was producing equipment and supplies like weeds. It would not have been months before they would have replaced them.

It would not have halted the consolidation of the landing area. The US forces were far too far inland and had already taken many strategic targets including key hills. Construction would not have been halted and the US would not turn around and give up.

No. The issue would not have been in doubt. The Japanese air forces were already so seriously damaged that they had been forced into suicide missions. Central Force or no Central Force, they could not have made any more impact than they did.

This assessment suffers from the overly optimistic look at the enemy in alt-histories. The IJA had serious structural, leadership, communication and a myriad of other problems which would not have allowed them to capitalize on any damage which Kurita may have been able to cause.

Roosevelt had the election with 432 electoral votes to 99. With the way they controlled information in those days, even if the damage had been much worse than what I allow, the news would have been kept quiet until after the election.

No. The end game for the war depended on other factors. The firebombing of Japanese cities from bases in the Marianna Islands, already taken by US forces… The surrender of Germany which brought the Soviets into the war on August 8th. The atomic bombs on the 6th and 9th.

Unless Godzilla helps the Japanese, the Central Force would not have been enough to have changed the course of history.

27

Well stated. And I already admitted I don’t know how to type! :stuck_out_tongue:

But that is the essential take-away from the question. No matter what Kurita did, it would have had zero impact on the prosecution of the war in general and the invasion of Luzon in particular. The IJN just didn’t have the forces or the specific experience to do anything but die gloriously for the Emperor.

28

I’d been cobbling together a response only to find that Tokyo Bayer covered pretty near all of it (and better than I could). Curses!

The only thing I can add is that in addition to ascribing super-powers to the IJN, most alternatives seem to depend on some kind of “the Assyrian came down like the wolf on the fold” scenario where the first inking of Center Force’s approach would be 18" shells ripping the transports to shreds. In reality, all three Taffys would have had antisubmarine patrols up shortly after dawn, as well as ground support missions throughout the day. The idea that Center Force could slip by completely undetected strikes me as just short of ludicrous.

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Oldendolf didn’t have to reorganize, rearm his force, or plan an attack. Shima wasn’t chased out of Surigao Strait by Oldendolf, he turned his rear-guard force of 3 cruisers and 7 destroyers around when he ran across what he took for both of Nishimura’s battleships sinking (likely it was actually both halves of the Fuso which had broken in half from destroyer torpedoes; Yamashiro made it far enough to be obliterated by radar directed battleship and cruiser fire that he couldn’t even return fire against). Oldendolf’s battle line had far more than enough ammunition to engage Center Force in decisive battle; the largest ammunition expenditure at Surigao Strait had been by West Virginia which had only fired 96 shells in the engagement. As I said in 2012 the erroneous notion that Oldendolf was low on ammo came from Kinkaid’s messages to Halsey trying to light a fire under his ass and get TF34 down there instead of racing to get into gunfire range to finish off some of the sinking cripples of the decoy force. West Virginia had damaged screws since Oct 21, had fought Surigao Straight with them, and wasn’t limited to 10 knots:

Considering that her top speed was 21 knots, a loss of 3 knots wasn’t such a great deal.

Where do you get that Oldendolf was only going to take 4 battleships with him? His force substantially outgunned Center Force, and even if he had only taken 4 battleships it would have been an even match, with the proviso that a) the Yamato outgunned anything he had but b) he wouldn’t be under constant air attack. Kurita’s force was in disarray and he had lost tactical control of the battle when he gave the order to withdraw; the Yamato which was his flagship was only able to take a very limited part in the battle as it was forced to steer north to evade torpedo spreads fired from US destroyers and destroyer escorts early in the fight.

Like TokyoBayer said, Kurita’s force was going to be spending a lot of that time in turning in circles fighting air attacks. Kamikazes were not a major factor at Leyte Gulf; it was the first time they were used and the only significant loss they inflicted was sinking the escort carrier St. Lo.

That’s the important part - US forces had already been unloading for 5 days. There was already enough men and material ashore that the Japanese were not going to be able to threaten the beachhead. It wasn’t August 1942 and it wasn’t Guadalcanal.

You’re vastly overestimating the impact Kurita shelling the beach could have had, but even if they were wildly effective, you’re missing a word in the first sentence: there were too many targets for Kurita’s guns. How are four battleships supposed to manage to squeeze in any meaningful damage in shore bombardment to a force that large while simultaneously sinking the US transports, fending off air attacks and remaining able to reform into a line of battle to try to engage Oldendolf’s battle line in something approaching an even engagement all in a couple of hours? It just isn’t going to happen.

I like the way you phrased this so much I’m going to have to steal it.:slight_smile: Any loss of transports Kurita could have inflicted would have been immediately replaced by transports already in theatre engaged in other operations and Kurita’s force would be at the bottom of the sea. It would push some timetables back, but the issue of the US retaking the Philippines wasn’t in doubt. The US was, for example, cranking out an Attack Cargo Ship (AKA) every eight days from 1943-45. 1,051 LSTs were built in US shipyards during the war.

It has been estimated that, in the combined fleets assembled for the war on Japan, the tonnage of landing ships, excluding landing craft, would have exceeded five million tons and nearly all built within four years.

30

Joshua Chamberlain would like to have a word with you.

31

However, the assumption of this threat is that Center Force DID pass by Taffy 3. Whether it was plausible to do so is a notion for another thread, though it is most welcome. That predication made a huge difference to the situation, which is why I thought it was a refreshing suggestion. Only by going straight into Leyte Gulf could Center Force get there by 11:00 am.

32

Hey Dissonance, great user name for a Discussion Board.

Remember, the assumption is that Center Force went straight to Leyte Gulf without engaging Taffy 3. That meant, Kurita’s ships were stalled for three hours battling the pesky Americans, that he did not then retreat and spend another 2 hours trying to figure out what to do. Timing is everything with this thread. Simply put, what would have happened if Kurita had not wasted so much time with Taffy 3 - and was able to sail to Leyte Gulf unnoticed by it.

You are right about the WV. The figure I read was 17 nauts, but I doubt anyone knows for sure. Speed wasn’t necessary in Suragao Straight. It was an ambush, a massacre, and yes, Shima’s ships were pursued. You’re right they didn’t need convincing, but Kinkaid wanted to make sure they did not come back (As Kurita had done with Center Force). Mopping up operations continued until 08:15. While Taffy 3, in real life, was fighting Center Force, for the first 1 1/2 hours Taffy 1 was still looking for the remnants of Southern Force.

You are also right about the armor piercing ammunition. The battle was heralded as a battleship on battleship battle, but by the time USN battleships got involved, there was one Japanese Battleship, an old battered, somewhat undersized battleship (30,000 tins), a cruiser, and one destroyer. Everything had been sunk or damaged by destroyers and then cruisers. The shortage of munitions, if any, was with the destroyers which had used half their torpedoes.

The information about Oldendorf taking only 4 old battleships to meet Center Force (with cruisers and destroyers) is documented. I will let you dig it up. There was criticism of it, but since Center Force fled, he never had to take anything there.

I disagree about kamikazes. The Princeton was sunk on 10/24/1944, a day before St. Lo. Organized Kamikaze attacks began against Taffy 3 as Center Force limped away. A surface battle in the gulf would make a target rich environment for kamikazes.

BUT - Centerforce did engage Taffy 3. It was engaged from approximately 06:45 - 09:15, then retreated and circled around for a couple of hours. For that, Kurita was criticized, and the question always was what would have happened had he not engaged Taffy 3. This thread provided an opportunity to explore that.

Thanks for a great reply!

33

Thanks dropzone. I saw it was not fresh, but the topic was very interesting. Had no one joined in, that would have been disappointing, but okay. The question of what would have happened if Kurita had taken Center Force into Leyte Gulf without engaging Taffy 3 will never get old.

34

Great reply, TokyoBayer. Agree with very much of what you say, and it’s hard to argue what-ifs. I’m so glad to read so many interesting, provocative views. BUT, you realize that your position makes the valiant resistance of Taffy 3 irrelevant? It’s sort of like the first Indiana Jones movie. It would have ended the same without him in his own movie! If your conclusions are correct, or at least my understanding of your conclusions, then the Battle off Samar Island was insignificant, nothing more than American Bushido. :mad:

You mentioned many issues that plagued the IJN, such as communication between army and navy. That was big and was discussed in post war interrogations with high ranking IJN Officers. They are available online, including the interrogation of Vice Admiral Kurita. I was surprised to learn that typical command communications often took 2 hours in the USN. I think of communications as being instantaneous today, but they weren’t in 1944. Probably much, much worse with the IJN and IJA, as you wrote.

Another what if:
By 10/25/1944, Kurita was a shadow of himself. He probably should not have been in command. That he was in command probably undermined any coherent effort in the Gulf, but you never know. Consider this. What if Kurita was not fished out of the sea on 10/24/1944 when his flagship was sunk? Do you know who would have commanded Center Force? It may surprise you, but it would have been Vice Admiral Matome Ugaki. The man was relentless. In early 1945, he took command of the Kamikazes and Thunder Gods. I believe it was called the Fifth Air Fleet, but could be mistaken. Ugaki was called the “Suicide Samurai.” Had he been in charge, it would have been a very different thing. But, he wasn’t. Food for another thread, perhaps.

I have only offered hypothetical answers to a great thread. I hope to read more points of view.

Was the sacrifice of Taffy 3 without meaning? Did their heroism have no effect on the battle or War? Not in my mind. But, that’s just me.:slight_smile:

35

There was a naval board of inquiry, which recognized Halsey’s error. However, (1) Halsey was a war hero, (2) Kinkaid was also at fault by failing to confirm whether Task Force 34 was still there, and it looked poorly that he was begging for help from Halsey when Halsey was 300 miles away, but Kinkaid had a formidable surface fleet which could much sooner engage Center Force, and (3) the error had not allowed harm to the Landing.

I had for years assumed Halsey was at fault. He was in one respect. He assumed Center Force was degraded so badly that it was no threat. However, as early as the evening of 10/24, he and Kinkaid knew Center Force had turned back. Yet, neither did anything! What bothered me was Kinkaid kept crying to Halsey while deliberately doing nothing to save Taffy 3.:He did not release any ships to assist until 08:15 am, leaving them to carry the fight alone for about 1 1/2 hours. It was reported that Kinkaid did not want to risk expensive capital ships, including Pearl Harbor survivors, to defend inexpensive, easily replaceable escort vessels.

36

Which, to be honest, is a valid and acceptable command decision. In retrospect it was probably a mistake and left the escort carriers hanging, but quite frankly, that was their job.

No matter what the heroics, and there was a lot of that, the actions of Taffy 3 and the others had zero impact on the war. Ditto the entire Sho-Go 1 battle plan.

37

Tokyo would have been Godzilla’s dessert after eating the navy.

38

:snerk:

39

Taffy 3 is still going to put all of its planes in the air attacking Center Force, it just isn’t going to be under Japanese shellfire while doing so. Kurita is still going to be under constant air attack while trying to sink the American transports, somehow find the time to do meaningful damage via shore bombardment to the large force already ashore and remain able to reform into an effective line of battle once Oldendorf’s battle line shows up all in a few hours. Trying to manage a battle line while under air attack is going to be pretty much impossible. It wasn’t just the planes from Taffy 3 that were attacking Kurita at the Battle off Samar; all 3 escort carrier task forces were attacking him.

The crew of the West Virginia knew, and it could do 16 knots, 18 in emergencies, not the 10 knots you originally claimed.

Speed was very necessary at Surigao Strait; if the West Virginia could only manage 10 knots the speed of the battle line would be limited to 10 knots. That is unacceptably slow for a battle line, West Virginia would have been considered a cripple restricted to that speed and would have been removed from the battle line and likely send back for repairs on Oct 21. Oldendorf did not pursue Shima. Taffy 1 conducting air searches for Shima’s retreating rear guard does not constitute pursuit.

You’re new here (and welcome, by the way) but this isn’t my job. I cut you some slack and did some looking around but found nothing. You’re the one making the claim; you’re the one who has to back it up with said documentation.

The Princeton was not lost to a kamikaze, it was sunk by a dive bomber:

A surface battle in the gulf would have made for a friendly fire rich target environment for kamikazes, who likely would have struck several IJN ship by mistake and would have come under AAA fire from Kurita’s ships who couldn’t or wouldn’t have the time or inclination to sort out who was who in the confusion while they were being attacked by some 450 American airplanes from the escort carriers. Regardless, the fact remains the only significant loss those organized kamikaze attacks inflicted was sinking the St. Lo.

Halsey was supposed to leave TF34 there. He didn’t, he didn’t even leave a single destroyer on picket to provide warning, he left San Bernardino Strait completely unguarded and was entirely derelict in his duty in doing so and even more derelict in not informing anyone San Bernardino Strait was wide open with nobody even watching it. Blaming Kinkaid for failing to confirm if Halsey was doing something so monumentally stupid is completely absurd. Calling what Kinkaid did “begging” is equally absurd. Halsey had vaingloriously failed to do his job; then compounded it by continuing to race TF34 north so they could shell and torpedo some sinking cripples of Osawa’s decoy force.

Where, exactly, was this reported?:dubious:

40

Battle off Samar Island…October 25
Charge of the Light Brigade…October 25
Battle of Agincourt…October 25

All occurred on St. Crispens Day.

Thank you guys for quoting me so much. I appreciate the dialogue. I disagree with the notion that there was nothing in the Gulf to protect. The first phase of the Landing was the Attack phase. It ended Midnight of … October 25, 1944. The next phase was Resupply. This was not just a drop off point. Operations were launched from there, including one to Samar Island on 10/24.

Regarding the ships Oldendorf’s was to command against Center Force, I will list them, at least the battleships by name. Off hand, I don’t want to be mistaken. I do remember the WV was not one of them. BTW - have you seen pics of her after being refitted? Darn handsome ship. Thanks for looking though. I have read many different materials and will find it. It may add quite a bit to the thread, because we will have a Force to measure with Center Force. You do understand that when Kinkaid learned San Bernardino Strait was unguarded, his ships were 100 miles awayl I know, you want a citation. Remember, I’m not writing a doctoral thesis. If we have to cite a comment as if it were a legal brief, who will post? However, the source of that info Chapter 8: The Leyte Operation: US Army Center of Military History. It would take the WV nearly 6 hours to get there (13:00). At 25 mph, the fleet could get there by 11:00, but I’m not sure how many ships could make that speed. :
There may have been as many as 408 planes from the Taffys. Casablanca class escort carriers held 27-28 planes. Taffy’s 1 and 2 had six carriers each (324 max). Taffy 1 had 4 carriers. 2 had been dispatched to carry junk planes. Another 24 planes were searching for Shima. That left a max of 408. 20-24 crash landed at the airstrip which had not been completed. From the same source cited above: Taffy 1 lost 2 carriers to kamikazes on 10/25.

During the course of these critical naval operations, the Japanese air forces had intensified their attacks both on sea and shore. The Seventh Fleet was busily occupied in a struggle for survival, employing its air strength to fight off hordes of hostile planes attacking in co-ordination with enemy fleet units. Its problem was further complicated by the appearance of Kamikaze pilots whose novel suicide tactics initially caused considerable havoc.

Page 223.

With regards to the Princeton, there were conflicting reports as to whether it was a kamikaze attack. Your account is accurate, probably more correct. I believe tge organized kamikaze attcks began the next day. A more detailed account may be found in “USS Princeton CVL23 War Damage Report No. 62.” It is available online. If it was not a kamikaze, then it was a very skillful dive bombing, more of which could be expected.

Got to go. I will find my info on Oldendorf’s ships and post it.

Thanks!