I believe mlees is asking about the roles of Spruance vs. Sprague, not about the hypothetical.
For that matter, had Taffy 3 been farther east that it actually was, (so that Kurita did not see it), it would most likely have still seen him among its numerous scouting and anti-submarine patrols. In fact, the very first contact was a flight of ASW TBMs who dropped depth charges on a Japanese cruiser (rather than flying back to re-arm with something different). Taffy 3 had the bad luck to be in Kurita’s direct path, but had they been out of his path, their patrols would have still found him.
Correct. Sorry I was not clear. I assume Spruance was back in Hawaii (or San Francisco) planning for Iwo Jima. Spruance’s name was mentioned a couple times, and I was 
:dubious: .
*Sprague then joined Admiral Spruance’s fleet for the assault on the Marinas Islands. He was part of Admiral Mitscher’s Task Force 58 and in that role took part in the battle of the Philippine Sea (June 1944).
After that battle Sprague was promoted to rear admiral and given command of Escort Carrier Div 25. He led this force during the invasion of Ulithi (September 1944). Next came the post that Sprague is best known for, command of Taffy 3, a ground of six escort carriers that formed part of the 7th Fleet during the battle of Leyte Gulf. Confusingly Taffy 3 was part of a larger formation of escort carriers commanded by Admiral Tommy Sprague, who also directly commanded Taffy 1. On 25 October 1944 Ziggy Sprague’s Taffy 3 was attacked by Admiral Kurita’s powerful striking force (Battle of Samar).*
It was Admiral Spruance who issued the order, “Small Boys (destroyers and escorts) attack.” It was Rear Admiral Sprague who carried out that order.
No. Spruance was not there. Rear Admiral Clifton Sprague (no relation to Rear Admiral Thomas Sprague) was in command of Taffy 3, attached to the U.S. 7th Fleet, and he is the one who ordered the DD/DE’s to cover the withdrawal of the jeep carriers.
Halsey was in command of Third Fleet. When Spruance is in command, the Third Fleet becomes Fifth Fleet.
Thank you for your post. The typos would have been corrected, but the 5 minute editing time had expired. No edit was allowed by the time I rewrote it. As with others, whenever I post from my tablet or phone, I’m lucky if the auto spell checker does not manage to “correct” words that did not need correction. My fingers are also a bit large for typing. I make mistakes, as does anyone else. I would like the 5 minute editing limit to be changed without needing the administrator’s permission. In any event, I intend to continue the discussion, but I will do so with my notebook. Hopefully, I will have no more typos. If it happens, I apologize in advance.
I will post again. I intend to make several posts, each with historic support. Hopefully, the information I post, and the authorities cited, will give food for thought. The thread offers a unique situation, which could very well have occurred. The rain squall that sheltered Taffy 3 from Center Force began at 07:15. Had it occurred a half hour earlier, the scenario may have played out much differently. It is also similar to the question, “What would have happened if Center Force had proceeded in Force to its destination without engaging Taffy 3 with anything but its destroyers and perhaps a cruiser or two.” The time wasted in engaging Taffy 3 made Vice Admiral’s Kurita’s mission impossible.
In further posts, I will submit a detailed timeline, supported by historic authorities. I will correct misstatements and misunderstandings repeated which are often repeated here and elsewhere. My goal is to have a discussion, nor an argument, about The Battle Off Samar Island, also called by one Naval authority, “The Battle that Should Never Have Happened.”
Hopefully, a new course has been set.
First, You have exactly what documentation? I have read accounts of the battle, and it’s very clear that there were not 400 planes attacking Center Force. The Taffys were escort carriers. All but three were Casablanca Class Carriers. The other three were Bogue Class. It was common for them to carry 17 planes. The maximum was 27-28 and most of those would have to be carried on the deck.
Second, In this timeline, by 9:35 five carriers have been struck by suicide bombers, one sinking (St. Lo). Where did all these 400 planes land? An estimated 100 landed at Tacloban airfield, many of which crash landed on the unfinished, marshy surface and were unusable. Another 50 (approximate) landed at another unfinished airfield at Davao. Hard landings took a toll on any usable aircraft.
Third, Whatever air power was available to the USN was limited by the need for CAP from Japanese bombers. Taffy One is an example. It’s fighters were busy with Japanese attacks. It’s ability to support Taffy 3 was limited.
Fourth, I have never read any source that claimed the Taffys were only armed with depth charges and AP bombs. In fact, Taffy One was used in the Battle of Surigao Strait and was still engaged in that matter when Taffy 3 was first attacked by Center Force. If you’re claiming that the Taffys were adequately armed with torpedoes to confront surface ships, that is questionable. As an example, the Gambier Bay had a total of nine torpedoes.
Fifth, the claim that 16 escort carriers had the equivalent of the 400 planes carried by 4 fleet carriers also overlooks the fact that fleet carriers carry dive bombers, in addition to fighters and torpedo/bombers. None of the escort carriers had dive bombers, with the possible exception of the Bogue class carriers. Another ignored fact is that the escort carriers had older obsolete wildcat fighters, not the newer hellcats. Further, escort carriers had a different ration of fighters to bombers, with a higher proportion of fighters to bombers.
Finally, the assumption that the 16 escort carriers had 400 aircraft, the equivalent to 4 fleet carriers, overlooks the fact that by 09:35 five carriers had been damaged by suicide bombers (1 also by torpedo). Are you claiming that there were 16 operational escort carriers, fully loaded with aircraft during the engagement?
It is often claimed that the Taffy carriers had 400 planes, the alleged equivalent of 4 Fleet Carriers. The claim is overblown and misleading.
Some accounts report there were 18 Taffy escort carriers. That would be six each. However, there were 16 carriers at the beginning of the fight. Taffy One had 4 carriers. Two of its complement were away carrying junk planes, which is the sort of task jeep carriers performed. That left 16 escort carriers of two classes. One was the Casablanca Class. All but three of the escort carriers involved were Casablancas. The other two were converted oilers, the Bogue Class. Typically, a Casablanca Class ship carried 336 aircraft, not 400.
Casablanca Class Escort “Jeep” Carriers could carry a maximum of 28 planes. 50 were built. A typical complement would include 12 Grumman F4F Wildcat Fighters and 9 Eastern TBM-1C Avenger Torpedo Bombers, or 21 planes. That suggests the Taffys probably carried a total of 336 planes. Of those, there would not have been any dive bombers, unless with the Bogue carriers, which may carry up to 3. The proportion of bombers to fighters between escort and fleet carriers is very different, as will be discussed below.
By War’s end, 22 Essex Class Fleet Carriers had been built (fleet carriers). Each carried typically 90-100 planes: 36 fighters, 36 dive bombers and 18 torpedo planes, including top line aircraft such as the F6F Hellcat, as their standard fighter, the SB2C-1 Helldiver as their standard scout aircraft and dive-bomber, and the TBF Avenger torpedo plane often used in other attack roles. Later in the war some Essexes, such as Bunker Hill, also included F4U Corsairs. A late Essex-class fleet carrier could carry a total of 103 aircraft organized into separate fighter, bomber and torpedo-bomber squadrons.
A typical complement of planes aboard an escort carrier would include Grumman F4F Wildcat Fighters and General Electric TBM-1C Avenger Torpedo Bombers. They did not include dive bombers, as did the Fleet Carriers. Their fighters were less effective (older/obsolete) than those of fleet carriers. The Wildcat’s production stopped in 1943 as it was replaced by the newer, faster, more maneuverable Hellcat. Their ships and their crews were armed and trained for anti-submarine and troop support, not surface engagements. That ncluded some torpedoes. As an example, the Gambier Bay carried 9 torpedoes on 10/25/1944. By the time, Center Force turned away from the battled, the Taffys had exhausted their supply of torpedoes,among other things.
The proportion of fighters to bombers/torpedo planes with a fleet carrier is 36/100, or slightly more than t 1/3. However, with an escort carrier, a typical proportion would be 12 fighters to 9 bombers. From a contingent of 400 fleet aircraft, one could expect to have 256 bombers. If the Taffys fielded 400 aircraft, which is very unlikely, they would have only 43 bombers. That is a substantial difference. If the escorts had typical numbers of aircraft (21 instead of 28), there would have been even less bombers.
The oft-repeated assertion that three Taffys had a compliment of aircraft equivalent to four fleet carriers is wrong, misleading, and probably was invented to protect the reputations of Admirals Halsey and Kinkaid.
I have already provided a link to a list of the Order of Battle listing the actual aircraft complements.
That list showed:
TASK UNIT 77.4.1 (TAFFY ONE) 79 fighters, 37 bombers
TASK UNIT 77.4.2 (TAFFY TWO) 90 fighters, 69 bombers
TASK UNIT 77.4.3 (TAFFY THREE) 97 fighters, 72 bombers
266 fighters + 183 bombers = 449 (And accounts for the two carriers dispatched to Morotai during the battle.
Regardless of whatever source you rely upon for estimates of the number of planes carried, we are relying upon the Navy’s actual list of the planes there.
And, given that the premise of the debate is “What would have happened had Kurita not attacked the TAFFYs?,” pointing out the level of damage they incurred because he did engage them is irrelevant.
I make no claims regarding the “equivalence” of the TAFFYs vs fleet carriers, but your dismissal of the number of planes is in error.
TASK UNIT 77.4.1 (TAFFY ONE) 79 fighters, 37 bombers
RADM T. L. SpragueCarrier Division 22
Carrier Division 22
RADM T. L. Sprague
CVE-26 SANGAMON—CAPT M. E. Browder
12 F6F-3, 5 F6F-5—LCDR S. E. Hindman
9 TBM-1C—LCDR P. G. Farley
CVE-27 SUWANNEE—CAPT W. D. Johnson
22 F6F-3—LCDR H. O. Feilbach
9 TBM-1C—LT W. C. Vincent
(*CVE-28 CHENAGO—CAPT G. Van Deurs
*22 F6F-3—LCDR F. T. Moore
*9 TBM-1C—LT C. F. Morgan)
CVE-29 SANTEE—CAPT R. E. Blick
24 FM-2—LCDR H. N. Funk
6 TBF-1C, 3 TBM-1C—LCDR T. M. Bennett
Carrier Division 28
RADM G. R. Henderson
(*CVE-82 SAGINAW BAY—CAPT F. C. Sutton
*15 FM-2
*12 TBM-1C)
CVE-80 PETROF BAY—CAPT J. L. Kane
16 FM-2
10 TBM-1C
* NOTE: CVEs CHENANGO, SAGINAW BAY, and DEs EDMONDS and OBBERENDER departed for Morotai at 1645 on 24 October. The two CVEs were carrying “dud” aircraft from the CVEs for transfer ashore. They returned with replacement aircraft after the battle.
TASK UNIT 77.4.2 (TAFFY TWO) 90 fighters, 69 bombers
RADM F. B. Stump
Carrier Division 24
RADM F. B. Stump
CVE-62 NATOMA BAY—CAPT A. K. Morehouse
16 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-61 MANILA BAY—CAPT F. Lee
VC-80—LCDR H. K. Stubbs
16 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
Carrier Division 27
RADM W. D. Sample
CVE-77 MARCUS ISLAND—CAPT C. F. Greber
12 FM-2
11 TBM-1C
CVE-76 KADASHAN BAY—CAPT R. N. Hunter
15 FM-2
11 TBM-1C
CVE-78 SAVO ISLAND—CAPT C. E. Ekstrom
16 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-79 OMMANEY BAY—CAPT H. L. Young
16 FM-2
11 TBM-1C
TASK UNIT 77.4.3 (TAFFY THREE) 97 fighters, 72 bombers
RADM C. A. F. Sprague
Carrier Division 25
RADM C. A. F. Sprague
CVE-70 FANSHAW BAY—CAPT D. P. Johnson
VC-68—LCDR R. S. Rogers
16 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-63 ST LO—CAPT F. J. McKenna
VC-65—LCDR R. M. Jones
17 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-66 WHITE PLAINS—CAPT D. J. Sullivan
VC-4—LCDR E. R. Fickenscher
16 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-68 KALININ BAY—CAPT T. B. Williamson
VC-3—LCDR W. H. Keighley
16 FM-2
1 TBF-1C, 11 TBM-1C
Carrier Division 26
RADM R. A. Ofstie
CVE-71 KITKUN BAY—CAPT J. P. Whitney
VC-5—CDR R. L. Fowler
14 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
CVE-73 GAMBIER BAY—CAPT W. R. Vieweg
VC-10—LCDR E. J. Huxtable
18 FM-2
12 TBM-1C
PREVIEW TO THE TIME LINE
In a later post, I will supply a historical Time Line. In this scenario, Center Force does not engage Taffy 3. Kurita sails his force into Leyte Gulf by 11:00. In a 1954 in an interview, the Admiral said that he should not have attacked the aircraft carriers, but but that he should have instead sailed into Leyte Gulf as ordered. By engaging Taffy 3, Center Force lost several hours, not to mention attrition to its fleet. By the time Kurita regrouped, he knew that certain death awaited his men and ships at Leyte Gulf. By arriving at 11:00 am, Center Force beats Oldendorf's big boys by 2 hours in which the IJN can wreak havoc. It appears that in this thread, Admiral Kurita's primary adversary will again be the three Taffys.
WHAT WAS AT STAKE?
[FONT=“Courier New”]“When the action started, when Kurita and his force came down the coast of Samar with the idea of going into Leyte Gulf, our beaches were full of ammunition, food, everything we needed. Our army commanders were camped just a few yards from the beach, a hundred yards or so, and were wide open. Just two cruisers loose in that gulf could have done a lot of damage… If they had destroyed what they found on the beaches and killed some of our commanders, it would have delayed the operation for many months, maybe stopped it altogether.”
- *Admiral Thomas C. Kinkaid*
“There were 23 LSTs and 28 Liberty Ships, a month’s supplies for combat operations. steel mats for airstrips, including Tacloban, had yet to be unloaded.”
- John Toland, The Rising Sun Death of the Decline and Fall of the Japanese Empire, 1936-1945**
WHY OLDENDORF COULD NOT STOP CENTER FORCE
Center Force Has Two Hours to Wreak Havoc. I have read no authorities that support the notion that his attack would have serious consequences.
Oldendorf was ordered at 08:50 to block the mouth of Leyte Gulf. He had an impressive force, which is set forth below. His only problem in this scenario is that he is 60 miles away when ordered. He is 3 hours away. Kurita will get there at 11:00. There are 23 LSTs and 28 Liberty ships there for target practice. Oldendorf’s front line passed the mouth of the Gulf at 11:27. Am uncertain as to what ships passed. Before then, the army is protected by the three Taffys and whatever other ships that returned from the Battle of Suragao Strait.
Because the Battle Off Samar Island never occurred in this scenario, more ships will be in the fight. No Japanese ships would have been damaged, crippled, or lost in the Battle of Samar. Likewise, the Gambier Bay, Hoel, Roberts and Johnson would not have been sunk. Neither the IJN, nor the USN, would have been caught by surprise. There should be time for each to maneuver and organize battle plans.
The scenario does not change certain, historical facts. Taffy 1 is effectively attacked by Japanese planes, including kamikazes. Two of its carriers were hit and damaged. Hundreds of sailors were killed, wounded, and missing in action. Its fighters were kept home for CAP. The St. Lo was sunk by a kamikaze attack at 11:00. Taffy 1 is besieged by effective Japanese air attacks. Two of its carriers are damaged. Hundreds of men killed, missing and wounded. Admiral Thomas Sprague ordered his fighters to provide CAP, instead of helping Taffy 3.There remain 11 undamaged carriers.[/FONT]
TIMELINE
With the exception of the times listed for Seventh Fleet and Center Force reaching their destination, the following events occurred historically. There is no compelling reason that the scenario would change them:
05:55 Pilots of the Kadashaw Bay (Taffy 2) note blips on their radar screen 35 miles away and decide to investigate.
06:37 CIC reported intercepted Japanese voice conversations on Inter Fighter Net
0:640 Taffy 3 lookouts spot antiaircraft fire from Center Force.
0:645 Pilots of Kadashaw Bay spot Center Force. Ensign Jensen reports 4 battleships, 8 heavy cruisers, and a number of destroyers 25 miles from Taffy 3. Admiral Clifton Sprague is initially annoyed. Afterwards, the Ensign dove at a Mogami Class cruiser and released 3 depth charges, which exploded on the ships starboard. His gunner strafed the decks. He alerted the Task Force. Admiral Sprague, doubting the initial report, asks for confirmation which is shortly afterwards received. Admiral Kinkaid is notified. He also questions identity of ships, but its confirmation is reported.
0:645 Four FM-2 fighters from Fanshaw Bay, then flying CAP over Taffy 3, turned towards enemy fleet.
0:646 Yamato’s lookouts spot 2 Grumman type torpedo bombers. Anti-aircraft fire attacks the planes, which make harassing attacks on the fleet.
06:47 Ensign Brooks, flying a TBM-1C emerged from the clouds to find Center Force. He made a contact report that the enemy was 20-30 miles from Taffy 3. He reported it consisted of 4 battleships, 4 heavy cruisers, 2 light cruisers, and 10-12 destroyers.
0:648 Ensign Brooks confirms identification of Japanese ships. Ships have pagoda masts.
0:650 Taffy 3, hidden in the squall, is not observed by lookouts aboard Yamato. Kurita would not assume that a unified Third Fleet was within striking distance) Admiral Clifton Sprague orders his fleet to the East… Such movement hidden in the squall.
0:700 Ensign Brooks made a glide bombing attack and released 3 depth charges alongside a cruiser.
07:02 Adm Clifton Sprague (Taffy 3) radios Adm Thomas Sprague (Taffy 1) for help. In this scenario, however, Taffy 3 is not under attack. [In this scenario, he would have instead appraised him of the situation and awaited instructions.]
07:08 Adm Clifton Sprague (Taffy 1) radios Admiral Felix Stump (Taffy 2) for help. Again, this transmission in this scenario would likely have been to appraise Adm Stump of the situation, which was coming his way and await instructions from Admiral Kinkaid.
07:08 Adm Thomas Sprague orders all Taffys to launch all aircraft. 65 fighters and 44 TBMs were launched. (Only a few had torpedos, many were under-fueled)
07:10 Admiral Kinkaid was unaware of the attack on Taffy 3 in the real-life situation. He would be unaware of the approach of Center Force until
07:12 Admiral Kinkaid received response from Adm Halsey that Task Force 34 was not guarding San Bernardino Strait. He immediately sent orders for a search to the northeast to Admiral Thomas Sprague (Taffy 1) to locate the Japanese Fleet. Within minutes, he learned the exact location of Center Force.
07:15 USS Louisville launched a scout plane to search San Bernardino Strait.
07:15 Fighters attacked Yamato Class battleship, then a light cruiser with strafing runs. Pilots headed to Tacloban air field to refuel and re-arm.
07:24 Historically, Admiral Kinkaid contacted Rear Admiral Oldendorf to rendezvous his force to the eastern entrance of Leyte Gulf. R. Adm Oldendorf with the slow battleships was 3 hours steaming from the amphibs and his cruisers and destroyers about 1 hour away.
07:31 Historically, Oldendorf changed course and headed north back up Surigao Strait.
07:28 Kinkaid received a dispatch that escort carriers were being attacked by enemy units comprised of battleships, cruisers and destroyers 25 miles Northeast of Samar Island,
07:40 Taffy 1 was attacked by Japanese planes with complete surprise. USS Santee was hit on her flight deck
07:52 USS Santee (Taffy 1) torpedoed by submarine.
07:54 Admiral Kinkaid sent all available destroyers plus the Nashville to join Oldendorf’s battle line.
07:59 USS Suwanee hit by suicide bomber. 106 killed, 106 wounded, 144 missing.
08:00 Oldendorf is 65 miles from the action, three hours steaming.
08:15 Oldendorf’s ships under air attack.
0:815 Kinkaid releases Oldendorf to meet Center Force. 3 battleships will venture from Leyte Gulf to meet Center Force. The remaining 3 will position themselves to ambush Center Force, much as had been done in Suragao Strait. McArthur’s command ship, the cruiser Nashville will join Oldendorf’s ships with destroyers.
08:16 Taffy 1 switches from bombs to torpedoes.
08:50 Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to move to block the mouth to Leyte Gulf. Kinkaid ordered Oldendorf to send a battleship division, a heavy cruiser division, and supporting destroyers to assist the carriers. Oldendorf chose to send the three battleships that had the most armor-piercing ammunition remaining, all four of his heavy cruisers, and twenty destroyers, all of which had at least five torpedoes.19
09:44 Nimitz sends coded message to Halsey, “Where is Task Force 34?”
09:40 USS Suwanee – all fires out from kamikaze attack.
09:53 Kinkaid orders Oldendorf to send one division of battleships, one division of heavy cruisers, and half of his destroyers, which were dangerously short of torpedoes.
10:00 Halsey receives Nimitz’s message with padding, “The Whole World Wonders,” a phrase from Charge of the Light Brigade.
10:15 Oldendorf formed a special force consisting of the three battleships with the most armor piercing projectiles [Tennessee, California, and Pennsylvania], one heavy cruiser division [Louisville, Portland, Minneapolis, Shropshire], and 20 destroyers consisting of 5 units from DESRON 56 [Robinson, Bryan, Leutz, Heywood L. Edwards,Halford] each armed with 5 torpedoes, all six units of DESDIV XRAY of which 4 were armed with 10 torpedoes [Claxton, Aulick,Coney, and Sigourney] and 2 which were each armed with five torpedoes [Thorn and Wells], five units from DESRON21, each armed with ten torpedoes [Nicholas, O’Bannon, Taylor, Long, and Russell], and four units from DESRON 51 [Halligan, Haraden, Twiggs, Wicks] each armed with ten torpedoes. The remainder of the units were to protect Leyte Gulf and obtain fuel and ammunition as time permitted.
*Bates, Battle for Leyte Gulf, Vol. 5, p. 675*
10:16 USS Santee radios submarine astern.
10:47 USS White Plains attacked by suicide bombers
10:49 USS Kitkun Bay damaged by suicide bomber
10:50 USS Kalinin Bay hit by suicide bomber (large hole in flight deck)
10:51 USS St. Lo hit by suicide bomber, order to abandon ship at 11:00
11:00 Center Force enters Leyte Gulf.
11:15 USS Kalinin Bay damaged by suicide bomber
13:00 Oldendorf reaches Landing area of Leyte Gulf.
Bad assumption. It is far more likely that the Battle Off Samar would simply have unfolded differently, with Kurita still moving toward the landing zone, but under constant attack from the three escort carrier groups with none of them suffering damage to the ships, themselves. The idea that Kurita could have escaped notice by all the various reconnaissance and ASW flights carried out by fourteen jeep carriers is not tenable. He would have been seen. He would have been attacked. This would have slowed him down, even if he did go on to the landing beaches.
Despite naval records, there are repeated claims on Discussion Boards that his ships had sufficient ammunition to fight Center Force. In this scenario, it is unlikely that Oldendorf would face Center Force. However, perhaps there are circumstances in which that may happen. For instance, if Kurita decides to attack Taffy Two as he he did historically with Taffy Three, would Center Force be delayed long enough for Seventh Fleet to confront Kurita?
Of course, the Battle Off Samar would have unfolded differently. That’s the point of the thread.
The Timeline I posted is historic. I did not invent it or imagine it. I could not add to an actual timeline a delay which did not happen. As noted, there were two events which were hypothetical. One was that Kurita would reach his objective by 11:00. That obviously did not happen.
Would air attacks delay Center Force? I think so, but it was not for me to to say. Offering an arrival time, which was based on actual reports, was as far as I could go. How much of a delay would you suggest? 30 minutes, an hour, two hours? There are multiple factors to be considered. First, Taffy One was already being attacked by kamikazes. Second, Taffy Two was within range of Center Force’s guns when Kurita called for it to retire. Third, Taffy Three would have three carriers struck by kamikazes. The St. Lo was actually sunk. Fourth, Japanese air power was beginning to assert itself shortly after Center Force retired. Had Kurita not retired, how would Japanese air attacks impact the fight?
Whatever information you have could be very helpful. I would be very interested in reading it.
Thank you,
Littlewolf51
More accurately, if we change the premise of the battle, you must add or subtract from the timeline, provided you do it in a reasonable fashion.
Not really. There is no way that Kurita’s force would have maintained course while under aerial attack. I cannot think of any air-to-ship battle in which the naval units maintained course, particularly when threatened by torpedoes. So the 11:00 arrival must be forced back. By how much, I don’t know.
Misleading. The first kamikaze attack occurred at 10:47, just thirteen minutes before Kurita’s predicted arrival at the beachhead, so the kamikaze attacks would have played no role in disrupting the attacks on Kurita prior to his arrival at the beachhead–which would still have been later than 11:00 due to his required evasive maneuvers. (If sufficiently later, Kurita might have even encountered the U.S. battleships, and been forced to engage in a ship-to-ship battle rather than attacking the beachhead.)
With Taffy 3 not engaged in direct gunfire with Kurita, there is no reason to believe that Taffy 2 would have put itself in that situation. With no American units endangered by direct gunfire, it would seem more likely that they would have stood off to the east, out of range of gunfire, and simply launched planes. (And out of range of the surface fleets that could radio the American positions, the kamikazes would have probably spent more time searching for the American units before attacking, although a lucky reconnaissance sighting would be possible.)
I would guess, based on what Japanese air power did accomplish, that with fewer American carriers damaged or sunk, the Japanese Army and Naval air units would have met more defenders and been less effective.
Wow, your post repeats almost every mis-statement about the Battle. Without addressing each one in this reply, I answer your question above.
My information came from the United States Navy, specifically,“The Battle of Leyte Gulf. October 1944. Strategical and Tactical Analysis. Volume V. The Battle of Surigao Strain. October 24th-25th.”
Richard W. Bates, Naval War College. For your information, the following ships would serve as Admiral Oldendorf’s frontline and would confront Kurita before he entered Leyte Gulf. Do you know of a higher authority?
USS Tennessee (BB-43)(Tennessee Class Battleship)(14 inch guns)(327 rounds armor piercing)
USS California (BB-44)(Tennessee Class Battleship)(14 inch guns)(213 rounds armor piercing)
USS Pennsylvania (BB-38)(Pennsylvania Class Battleship)
USS Louisville (CA-28)(Northampton Class Heavy Cruiser)
USS Portland (CA-33) (Portland Class Heavy Cruiser)
USS Minneapolis (CA-36)(New Orleans Class Heavy Cruiser)
HMAS Shropshire [Royal Australian Navy, London Class Heavy Cruiser]
USS Robinson (DD-562)(Fletcher Class Destroyer}
USS Bryan (DD 665)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Leutz (DD-481)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Heywood L. Edwards (DD-663)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Halford (DD-480)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Claxton (DD 471)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Aulick (DD-569)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Coney (DD-508)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Sigourney (DD-643)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Thorn (DD-647)(Gleaves Class Destroyer)
USS Welles (DD-628)(Gleaves Class Destroyer)
USS Nicholas (DD-449)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS O’Bannon (DD-450)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Taylor (DD-468)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Long (DMS-12)(Converted Clemson Class Destroyer - Destroyer Minesweeper)
USS Russell (DD-414)(Sims Class Destroyer)
USS Halligan (DD-584)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Haraden (DD-585)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Twiggs (DD-591)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
USS Wickes (DD-578)(Fletcher Class Destroyer)
The remainder of his ships were to re-arm and refuel.
No matter how you tweak it and no matter what figures you use, Kurita’s attack was doomed from the start and had absolutely zero chance of altering the course of the war one iota.
Excellent. Then please check facts about “kamikazes.” Wikipedia is a good first step, but it isn’t enough to fact check another member. FYI - there are lists of ships sunk by “kamikazes,” which you can access online. The Princeton and others are not on them, because they were sunk before October 25, 1944. Another ship, a transport, was also sunk in Leyte Gulf by a suicide bomber on October 24, 1944; it also is not listed as a kamikaze victim. Organized attacks by Japan’s Special Units did not begin until October 25, 1944. If you really can’t find claims/reports online that the Princeton was sunk by a kamikaze, please let me know, and I will provide them for you in this thread.
Likewise, if you cannot find sources that kamikaze attacks began on October 25, 1944, please say so, and I will provide sources for that, as well. Whether such claims are accurate or proper is another issue. It’s not for me to say what happened 70 years ago halfway across the world. I have reported what I read and given my opinion. That is what happens on a Discussion Board. We can agree or disagree, but we shouldn’t claim to spell check one another when we didn’t.
From what I have read, the attack on the Princeton was by a dive bomber that dove very low and was seen smoking from the carrier’s deck. I have not seen any reports that he flew away or crashed. It would be reasonable in hindsight to believe it was a suicide attack. However, by technical definition, the USS St Lo (Taffy Three) was the first USN Carrier sunk by a kamikaze… on October 25, 1945, the following day.
If, as you acknowledge, the special forces’ attacks did not begin until October 25, there is no reason to claim that an attack prior to that date was a “kamikaze” attack. By definition, it was not.
As to your claim regarding the Princeton, here is the Navy’s description of the Princeton’s loss. If one scrolls down to the end of the text, one will find a series of photos. The very first photo, while blurry, is of the actual bomb crater. There is no plane wreckage surrounding that hole made by the bomb. Had it been a suicide bomber, he would have flown the bomb laden plane into the ship rather than releasing the bomb. This evidence indicates that the plane was not flown into the ship.
It seems like, even if a Japanese pilot flew into the Princeton, there’s a difference between a deliberate suicide attack and a “my plane was hit, I’m going down, might as well try to take the enemy with me” sort of thing, or diving too deep into a dive bomb and not being able to pull up in time.