# WWII - As of VE Day, does anyone know how long government and military officials expected it to take to defeat Japan? **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [April 17, 2023, 10:57am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787 "2023-04-17T10:57:14Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![Kent\_Clark](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/kent_clark/32/105_2.png) [@Kent\_Clark](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Kent_Clark)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 1:43am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/21 "2023-04-18T01:43:23Z")
From what I’ve seen just noodling around, the projected timeline for Operation Downfall has generally been placed at 18 months (a few places say 18-24 months.) But I’ve never seen that timeline linked back to an official document. Also, the timeline seems to be only for the logistics of the invasion, and not for pacifying the population and miscellaneous mopup. And none of the American estimates were made knowing that the Japanese had deduced where the initial invasion would take place, and had already been heavily fortifying Kyushu. ---
**Author:** ![Dissonance](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/85f322/32.png) [@Dissonance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Dissonance)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 2:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/22 "2023-04-18T02:40:20Z")
> [@Quintas](#): > > True. But there _were_ broadly agreed upon projections prior to Normandy even if the specifics regarding the first 90 days ended up being wrong. > > There were no _agreed upon_ projections for Downfall, at least not as of August 1945. It could be that in the 3 months between August and November a consensus would have been reached. Or maybe they would have just held their breath and hoped the optimists were right. There really weren’t broadly agreed upon projections prior to Normandy, and what projections that were made turned out to be wrong. That the Allied positions at D+90 turned out to be roughly where the projections wanted it to be a at that date was a complete accident. Caen was supposed to be taken on D-Day, June 6th but ended up taking two entire months to capture. The Allies were somewhat incredibly entirely unprepared for the effect that the Norman hedgerows would have on offensive operations; nobody had bothered to study the matter ahead of time. While with the safety of hindsight we can see that there was no way the invasion was going to fail to establish a beachhead, Eisenhower felt it necessary to prepare a communique taking full responsibility for the failure of the invasion had things gone incredibly wrong and the landings been a complete failure. The airborne divisions were supposed to have been pulled off the line almost immediately after the landing to preserve their specially, time-consumingly trained elite personnel from suffering the effects of constant attrition staying on the line would result in. The effects of the hedgerows, determined German resistance, and the inexperience of most of the Allied troops sent into Normandy resulted in needing to keep them on the line for over a month. For example, in the case of the [82nd Airborne](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/82nd_Airborne_Division#Normandy), this resulted in > By the time the division was relieved, in early July, the 82nd had seen 33 days of severe combat and casualties had been heavy. Losses included 5,245 troopers killed, wounded, or missing, for a total of 46% casualties. While an actual complete failure to secure a lodgment wasn’t a realistic possibility, what was seriously feared once successfully ashore with the grindingly slow and casualty intensive speed of the advance was that the Germans would be successfully able to contain the lodgment in a stalemate similar to what had occurred at Anzio in Italy, with the lodgment too small to break out of for the rest of 1944 but too large to abandon. Once the German line did eventually break, the rapid pace of the advance brought up its own issues. The Allies had expected a steady pace of advance to support logistically and had hoped to capture the port of Cherbourg relatively intact to push supplies through. In the event, the German demolition of the port facilities of Cherbourg were very thorough and prevented it from being used for a very long time, with it still being unusable and supplies still being delivered over the beach at D+90. The rapid pace of the drive cross France eventually had to slow down due to the inability to properly supply the entire front, leading to the crisis of September where Eisenhower had to decide who was going to be getting enough supplies and who wasn’t. This outpacing of their ability to push supplies forward, combined with the German ability to scrape together fresh forces resulted in the stalling of the Allied advance on the Seigfried Line around the end of August and beginning of September. Fighting to slowly break through it slogged on until March 1945. ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 11:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/23 "2023-04-18T11:46:07Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Also note that the estimated number of casualties has become part of the postwar debate over the use of the bomb and the two sides of that debate have honed their skills at cherrypicking numbers. Yes. I recommend meticulous historian Gar Alperowitz’s book. He devotes a whole chapter on how the supposed casualty estimates “grew” — after the war was over — until the “million US soldiers” became the (false) number that forever lodged in the public’s mind. As others have noted, the actual estimates ranged from about 30,000 to about 180,000. ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 11:48am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/24 "2023-04-18T11:48:31Z")
> [@Dissonance](#): > > Getting onto the home islands would have been extremely problematic for the Soviets… Good to know - thanks. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 12:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/25 "2023-04-18T12:56:27Z")
From the [Naval History and Heritage Command](https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-057/h-057-1.html), tasked with the mission to provide a history of the US Navy. > [@](#): > > **Operation Downfall** > > The intent of Operation Downfall was to invade, occupy, and bring about the unconditional surrender of Japan within 18 months of the defeat of Germany. It would require 1,700,000 U.S. troops, according to the plan. American political and military leaders believed that it was essential to bring about the end of the war as quickly as possible, as war fatigue in the American population was becoming increasingly apparent. And it goes on to state: > [@](#): > > Although General of the Army Douglas MacArthur, Commander-in-Chief of the Southwest Pacific Area of Operations, was an outspoken critic of high-casualty, Navy-led operations like Tarawa, Saipan, Peleliu, and Iwo Jima, he was the most vociferous proponent of an invasion of Japan, despite the expected cost. Chief of Staff of the Army George Marshall was less enthusiastic, but firmly believed that an invasion was necessary. Marshall did become increasingly concerned as the intelligence estimates of the number of Japanese troops on Kyushu continued to climb along with casualty estimates. The bloody battles for Iwo Jima and Okinawa were a real shock. Casualties on Saipan had been bad enough, and initial planning for Downfall was based on the “Saipan ratio” of about one U.S. casualty for every seven Japanese defenders. By Okinawa, it was closer to one U.S. casualty for every one or two Japanese defenders. (Do the math on 900,000 Japanese troops fighting on their home soil on Kyushu, which explains while many U.S. leaders started getting cold feet on an invasion.) > > On the Navy side, Chief of Naval Operations Fleet Admiral Ernest J. King was consistently opposed to an invasion (although he acquiesced to the necessity for detailed planning for Olympic) and on that score was in rare alignment with the U.S. Army Air Force. King supported establishing a lodgment on the coast of China (Operation Longtom) for a base to strangle Japan via blockade, although King’s vision of using the Chinese Army to do the dirty work of invading Japan was never realistic for many reasons. The Air Force believed they could bomb the Japanese into submission, although they were fast running out of cities to incinerate. Fleet Admiral William D. Leahy, roughly analogous to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, firmly believed that an invasion of Japan was neither necessary nor desirable. Fleet Admiral Chester Nimitz, Commander-in-Chief of the Pacific Ocean Area, was initially supportive of an invasion, but the carnage of Iwo Jima, Okinawa, and the kamikaze attacks changed his mind. Admiral Raymond Spruance, who would command the initial invasion of Kyushu and had first-hand experience at Saipan, Iwo Jima, and Okinawa, was not in favor of an invasion. Spruance recommended continued blockade and aerial bombardment to Nimitz, with the belief that the Japanese should be allowed to “stew in their own juices” for a while and “wither on the vine” as had been done with other Japanese strongholds in the war. > [@JKellyMap](#): > > Yes. I recommend meticulous historian Gar Alperowitz’s book Unfortunately, Alperrowitz is equally guilty of cherry picking quotes and taking things out of context as well. He’s had an antinuclear agenda which seems to color his research. There are many, many objections to his books. Here is one, for example. > [@](#): > > It must be conceded: Gar Alperovitz is consistent. For thirty years, from the publication of Atomic Diplomacy (1965) to the present monograph, Alperovitz has made it the defining task of his career as a historian to discredit the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. The moral theme of his work has never changed: the bomb was an unrequited evil. Nor has the message: the Truman administration clearly understood “before the atomic bomb was used that the war with Japan could be ended by other means without significant loss of life” (p. xiii). In the face of this evil, Alperovitz believes the historian must adopt the mantle of the prophet Jeremiah, and protest. 1 There is no room for the counsel of Spinoza, who once pressed philosophers to take “great care to understand human actions, and not to deride, deplore, or denounce them.” Here is another critical [book review](https://www.jstor.org/stable/44643121?seq=1), but unfortunately it is in PDF format. It’s been a while since I’ve read some of his material, but it didn’t seem convincing. > [@Dissonance](#): > > The division of Germany that was agreed upon at Yalta also made it clear that there was to be no partition of Japan, so an attempt by Stalin to brute force his way into the occupation of any of Japan proper wasn’t going to be looked upon too kindly or result in the US trying to help pull his chestnuts out of the fire in a botched invasion of Hokkaido. Also note that even had they succeeded against all odds, all they were hoping was to get the northern chunk of Hokkaido, which is a whole lot of nothing. (With apologies to some Japanese friends who live in Shari, 50 km away from one of the disputed islands.) It’s nothing like the partitioning of Germany or Korea. ---
**Author:** ![Common\_Tater](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/common_tater/32/13846_2.png) [@Common\_Tater](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Common_Tater)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 1:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/26 "2023-04-18T13:08:32Z")
In anticipation of the invasion of the home islands the War Department ordered a fresh batch of Purple Hearts be made up. A big batch. Thankfully they weren’t needed and went into storage. These same Purple Heart medals are still in the inventory, and still being awarded today some 80 years later, they haven’t ran out yet. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 1:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/27 "2023-04-18T13:19:23Z")
> [@engineer\_comp\_geek](#): > > That number probably came from how quickly Germany folded towards the end of the war. But many allied soldiers often commented that the Germans no longer had their heart in it and were quick to surrender when they realized that defeat was inevitable. Of course, there was also a lot of comments that they couldn’t believe Germans fought as hard as they did. Resistance remained ferocious long after there was no hope for them; consider the truly vicious Battle of the Bulge, or determined resistance in the Netherlands. The Germans held out in Budapest for two months. Those were obviously hopeless, yet the Germans fought hard. Germany collapsed in large part because they simply had no way to defend themselves; Germany has no natural defensive barrier against invasion from the low countries and northern France, or from the east through Poland, and they were being absolutely pummeled from above, as the Luftwaffe ceased being capable of effective resistance around the 1944-1945 new year. After the catastrophic defeats of summer 1944, they had zero chance of holding out any longer than they did. There wasn’t any WAY they could mount a real defense. Unlike Japan sitting on her islands, German forces were in constant contact with Allied and Soviet attackers, being ground down at all times; it was a mathematical inevitability that the German state would effectively cease to exist at about the time it did. ---
**Author:** ![Jackmannii](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jackmannii/32/311_2.png) [@Jackmannii](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Jackmannii)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 4:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/28 "2023-04-18T16:36:08Z")
Troops seem to have been less optimistic than their leaders about when the war in the Pacific would end, as well as what they could expect to come home to. Hence the slogan: “Golden Gate in '48, Bread line in '49” ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 6:14pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/29 "2023-04-18T18:14:48Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > It’s been a while since I’ve read some of his material, but it didn’t seem convincing. Fair enough, but this particular fact is true: the planners for the home islands invasion anticipated US casualties on the order of tens of thousands to about one hundred thousand — yet the number most people “remember” since about 1950 is “one million.” ---
**Author:** ![Fir\_na\_tine](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/f/a587f6/32.png) [@Fir\_na\_tine](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Fir_na_tine)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 6:33pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/30 "2023-04-18T18:33:46Z")
I’ve seen this claim many times but have never seen any citation to prove it. Have you? ---
**Author:** ![engineer\_comp\_geek](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/engineer_comp_geek/32/504_2.png) [@engineer\_comp\_geek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/engineer_comp_geek)\ **Post date:** [April 18, 2023, 6:49pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/31 "2023-04-18T18:49:17Z")
> [@From the Wikipedia article on Purple Hearts](#): > > During World War II, 1,506,000 Purple Heart medals were manufactured, many in anticipation of the estimated casualties resulting from the planned Allied [invasion of Japan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Operation_Downfall). By the end of the war, even accounting for medals lost, stolen, or wasted, nearly 500,000 remained. To the present date, the total combined American military casualties of the seventy years following the end of [World War II](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/World_War_II)—including the [Korean](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Korean_War) and [Vietnam Wars](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vietnam_War)—have not exceeded that number. In 2000, there remained 120,000 Purple Heart medals in stock. The existing surplus allowed combat units in [Iraq](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iraq) and [Afghanistan](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Afghanistan) to keep Purple Hearts on hand for immediate award to soldiers wounded in the field.[[11]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Purple_Heart#cite_note-surplus_hearts-11) This is the cite given: Giangreco, D.M.; Moore, Kathryn (2000). [“Half a Million Purple Hearts”](http://www.americanheritage.com/half-million-purple-hearts). _American Heritage_ . **51** (8): 81. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 1:13am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/32 "2023-04-19T01:13:55Z")
> [@JKellyMap](#): > > Fair enough, but this particular fact is true: the planners for the home islands invasion anticipated US casualties on the order of tens of thousands to about one hundred thousand — yet the number most people “remember” since about 1950 is “one million.” Interesting. Very interesting. Your argument is that the lower end would have been “tens of thousands”, so let’s use 30k, although 40k wouldn’t be significantly different. Moreover, the plan was to invade Kyushu first, Operation Olympic then Kanto the area, includingTokyo, Operation Coronet. Just to demonstrate the absurdity of this argument, let’s split the number in half for each campaign, 15,000 and 15,000. Your assertion is that it’s a fact that the anticipated number of US casualties for the invasions of the Imperial Japanese home islands, for both campaigns(!) would be on the same scale as Iwo Jima, a speck of rock defended by about 21,000 Japanese troops and attacked by 110,000 US. Interesting. The US suffered about 27,000 total casualties, which is close to your lower estimate. Interesting. Oh, and look at the number of US casualties again against the number of defenders. 21,000 Japanese troops inflicted 27,000 US casualties, which had a casualty rate of about 25%. Compare the number of US casualties to the number of defenders and note that each Japanese caused more than one casualty. You are telling us that although the invasion of Kyushu by over 580,000 US troops against an estimated 900,000 Japanese soldiers, with over 5,000 planned Kamikazi attacks, the suicide destroyers, suicide boats, suicide mini subs and suicide frogmen, all planning on attacking transports and landing craft, on a terrain that precludes effective naval bombardments, would be significantly easier than Okinawa, with about 50,000 US casualties (a rate of about 30%ish of the 183,000 combat troops) against 76,000 Japanese. Really? Also look at the number of US casualties again against the number of defenders. 76,000 Japanese troops inflicted 50,000 US casualties, with a rate about 30%ish. 580,000 US troops are going up against 900,000 Japanese ones, who are preparing specifically to inflict absolutely as many casualties as possible and the belief that the US will abandon the invasion of their sacred home island, where they have dug into the walls of the canyons to wait for the invaders, and a mere 15,000 Americans will be killed or injured? Really? A casualty rate 2.6%? Even your “high end” rate of 50,000 (half of 100,000) would only be a rate of 8.6%. Compare that to the Battle of Peleliu, where 10,900 Japanese inflicted 10,500 US casualties against a force of 47,000 troops for a rate of 22% and again close to 1:1 ratio of US casualties to defenders. Concerning [that battle](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Peleliu), which occurred September 15 to November 11, 1944: > [@](#): > > After their losses in the Solomons, Gilberts, Marshalls, and Marianas, the Imperial Army assembled a research team to develop new island-defense tactics. They chose to abandon the old strategy of trying to stop the enemy on the beaches, where they would be exposed to naval gunfire. The new tactics would only disrupt the landings at the water’s edge and depend on an in-depth defense further inland. Colonel Nakagawa used the rough terrain to his advantage, by constructing a system of heavily fortified bunkers, caves, and underground positions, all interlocked in a “honeycomb” system. The traditional “banzai charge” attack was also discontinued as being both wasteful of men and ineffective. These changes would force the Americans into a war of attrition, requiring more resources. Now you are stating that 900,000 Japanese troops on a Japanese home island are going to only cause 50% more casualties than 10,900 defenders of some speck of land in the middle of nowhere? How are the Japanese going to become so ineffective? Does this make any sense at all? Note that the beaches on Kyushu quickly lead to steep mountainous terrain, where the Japanese were digging in. They had anticipated our planned invasion sites (which isn’t that difficult, looking at a map shows the only possible areas) and were well prepared with caves and stored ammunition. In all the battles up through Okinawa, there were either zero or close to no surrenders. What had changed by for the minds of the American military leaders to believe that this enormous campaign would have a similar number of American deaths and wounded as in Saipan? And that, in a nutshell, is why I intensely dislike Gar Alperovitz. Reading him is bad for my blood pressure and the heath of my laptop and the bedroom window. ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 1:45am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/33 "2023-04-19T01:45:33Z")
I appreciate your fighting my ignorance; I indeed was led astray by Alperovitz’ selective inclusion among contemporary estimates. (Richard Frank is in between the “traditionalists” and the “revisionists,” and he estimated about 140,000 US casualties — of which 35,000 are deaths — for the invasion of Kyushu, plus 200,000/50,000 to complete the task on Homshub— so, 340,000 total). We’ll never know for sure, but the “about 100,000” that Alperovitz cited from cherry-picked contemporary estimates is surely far too low — but “one million” is just as surely too high, yet that’s the only number many people have heard in the decades since. (And, some of the figures confuse casualties and deaths). ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 1:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/34 "2023-04-19T01:53:06Z")
> [@JKellyMap](#): > > We’ll never know for sure, but the “about 100,000” that Alperovitz cited from cherry-picked contemporary estimates is surely far too low — but “one million” is just as surely too high, yet that’s the only number many people have heard in the decades since. And what is the specific basis for your opinion? I’ve shown how absurd your claim of “tens of thousands” was, so show the absurdity of “one million.” That is, if you have some actual numbers to point to, rather than grabbing random quotes from the Net. ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 2:10am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/35 "2023-04-19T02:10:21Z")
The study by Stimson’s staff came closest to the six figures you seek — perhaps two million casualties, about 700,000 of these deaths. I’ll accept that now. Like I said, your cites and others I’ve read today (and their specific reasonings - comparisons to Okinawa; likelihood of mass civil defense; etc.) have changed my mind in this. BUT, the figure that most people have in their minds ever since is “a million US military DEATHS.” Not even Stimson’s report predicted that (but at least it’s not off by an order of magnitude, so I wouldn’t quite call it “absurd,” that’s true). Maybe this is the nub of it — the public has confounded “casualties” with “deaths.” Anyway, these are big numbers — horrible numbers — and it has shifted my thinking somewhat regarding Truman’s decision to drop the Hiroshima bomb (not completely, but I understand it better now). (No such excuse for Nagasaki, certainly not so soon after Hiroshima — but that’s a matter for a different thread.) ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 3:23am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/36 "2023-04-19T03:23:45Z")
> [@JKellyMap](#): > > The study by Stimson’s staff came closest to the six figures you seek — perhaps two million casualties, about 700,000 of these deaths. I’ll accept that now. Like I said, your cites and others I’ve read today (and their specific reasonings - comparisons to Okinawa; likelihood of mass civil defense; etc.) have changed my mind in this. I appreciate the acknowledgment of this change. Note that there are two separate issues at stake. The first is what was the anticipated number of casualties by US military leaders _at that time_, given their limited awareness of the situation in Japan and based on necessarily flawed intelligence? A separate issue would be what do historians believe the number would be, given a much better understanding of the actual situation, including the numbers of Japanese, their state of readiness, their defense plans and preparations, etc. All of this is much easier done in hindsight. The estimates were all over the place in the summer of 1945, but for the ones who were actually trying hard rather than attempting to minimize the situation, the estimates were increasing as more information became available and as the Japanese continued in pour men into the potential combat zone. Also note that I’m not taking a position on what the numbers “ought” to be. I’m looking at the narrower question of what did the planners anticipate and, as you noted, there were legitimate concerns that it would be well over a million. > [@JKellyMap](#): > > BUT, the figure that most people have in their minds ever since is “a million US military DEATHS.” Not even Stimson’s report predicted that (but at least it’s not off by an order of magnitude, so I wouldn’t quite call it “absurd,” that’s true). > > Maybe this is the nub of it — the public has confounded “casualties” with “deaths.” Noted, but that’s a strawman argument. Yes, there are people who are wrong on the internet or in real life, but this comes back to the point of this thread which what did the military planners anticipate. > [@JKellyMap](#): > > (No such excuse for Nagasaki, certainly not so soon after Hiroshima — but that’s a matter for a different thread.) Now we switch modes and judging the morality of Truman’s decision can be aided by hindsight, although a similar case may be made by looking at what they knew at the time. The actions and many of the actual thoughts of the [Big Six](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Supreme_War_Council_(Japan)), plus the Emperor, Koichi Kido (Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal of Japan and the gatekeeper to the Emperor) and others are known. The note of the meetings are available and we have records of what was said. Not only did it require the two bombs, the final decision to surrender also required the entry of the Soviets into the war. (OK, this is off into GD territory, so that’s for another thread.) I anticipate that if you look at the issue as carefully as you have revisited the number of casualties, even though you may not agree with the same conclusions, you could at least appreciate that point of view. ---
**Author:** ![JKellyMap](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/jkellymap/32/15880_2.png) [@JKellyMap](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/JKellyMap)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 3:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/37 "2023-04-19T03:46:43Z")
All noted, and thank you. Yes, the number of Japanese troops stationed on Kyushu was seriously underestimated at the time — as I understand it, that was the most important misconception, at least during early planning. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 4:42am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/38 "2023-04-19T04:42:20Z")
The problem is that all of this was well known, especially after the war, so it’s inexcusable for a historian to ignore this. It’s a dishonest argument and Gar should be ashamed of himself. ---
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 2:08pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/39 "2023-04-19T14:08:35Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > And that, in a nutshell, is why I intensely dislike Gar Alperovitz. Reading him is bad for my blood pressure and the heath of my laptop and the bedroom window. Thank you for that astute analysis. I have had an interest in the Pacific War but not so much the end game. ---
**Author:** ![md-2000](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/9d8465/32.png) [@md-2000](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/md-2000)\ **Post date:** [April 19, 2023, 7:20pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787/40 "2023-04-19T19:20:11Z")
I’m not a WWII history buff, but I recall reading about the Iwo Jima invasion - that the Japanese army also coopted the locals into the fight, convincing them that the Americans would torture them to death and rape their women - thus motivating many to use tricks like fake surrenders and suicide grenade attacks. Also not mentioned in the discussions above, is what happens when the US army takes an area - how do they tell Army people gone guerilla (like Iraq) from local farmers and workers? What was the plan to pacify theoccupied areas? How do you defend against suicidal attacks by the locals, as opposed to confrontations with troops? I think one of the lessons the brass were contemplating was what occupation would look like against a force that was willing to resort to subterfuge and suicide. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787.md?page=1) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-as-of-ve-day-does-anyone-know-how-long-government-and-military-officials-expected-it-to-take-to-defeat-japan/982787.md?page=3)