# WWII: Battle of Midway...why couldn't the Japanese have pressed on and captured the island? **URL:** \ **Category:** Great Debates\ **Created:** [August 1, 2020, 10:36pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029 "2020-08-01T22:36:56Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 21
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 4:46am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/401 "2021-06-05T04:46:12Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Wiki seems to indicate that the Yamamoto class BB only carried 60 per gun, but that they were stored in the turret’s rotating structure to allow faster loading. Ouch. Apparently they learned nothing about Beatty’s battlecruisers at Jutland. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 7:17am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/402 "2021-06-05T07:17:05Z")
> [@smilingbandit](#): > > However, you were talking about the use of battleships. I understood there was a possibility, which in reality Yamamoto sensibly declined, of pushing forward with the Battleships with what would, in normal operations, be considered insufficient support, and using them to attempt a bombardment. Based on the positions of the IJN ships, they could not have grouped them all at Midway without taking much more time than would have been available, whereas the USN formation was tighter and had a massive scouting advantage. Under those circumstances, the possibility of ship losses would have been a reasonable risk for the USN, since they potentially defeat exposed Japanese Battleships in detail. This would naturally have involved combined air & sea power. Maybe you could clarify some more. First, I really disagree with your earlier comment: > [@smilingbandit](#): > > . . . **it may well be a trivial matter** of the USN to ambush or flank the attacking forces with destroyers, subs, and heavy cruisers. My bolding. The USN in 1942 was a mess, disorganized and not ready for prime time. See the disaster of the [Battle of the Java Sea](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_the_Java_Sea) in February 1942 and the naval battles around Guadalcanal, such as the disorganized melee that went by [Second Naval Battle of Guadalcanal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal#Second_Naval_Battle_of_Guadalcanal,_14%E2%80%9315_November), 14–15 November 1942. The idea of using cruisers, destroyers and subs to soften up an enemy fleet was actually the IJN’s doctrine for their final battle, to have the smaller ships and sub attack and weaken the US fleet as they came. However, the Japanese plan was for night attacks, and they spend years developing their superior night fighting abilities. The US simply wasn’t ready to challenge the IJN at night. In _Pacific Crucible_, Ian Toll quotes Lt. Commander Thach’s recollection of his conversation with Adm. Spruance concerning the latter’s plan to withdraw the US forces to the east during that night rather than pursue the Japanese ships. As Ian writes, “Spruance’s prudence was consistent with Nimitz’s desire that he should avoid ‘exposure to attack by superior enemy forces without good prospect of inflicting, as a result of such exposure, greater damage to the enemy.’” Continuing, Ian writes, > [@](#): > > Lt. Commander Thatch, who had fought a magnificent battle on June 4, urged Spruance to chase the Japanese fleet, even if it meant steaming headlong into the west all through the night. [. . .] > > Spruce replied (. . .) "Well, you know we don’t have any battleships. All we have are cruisers, and if we start chasing them, they may be able to chew us up before we can get within gun range at night, and we don’t have much of a night attack capability. As far as subs go, they were there all along attempting to attack, with disappointing results. The US sub commander got better as the war progressed, but it was still in the early stages. There wasn’t an ability to coordinate them in the attack. For these reasons, I can’t see how this would be “trivial.” > [@smilingbandit](#): > > If the First Fleet or the Second Fleet were to advance without substantial support, in my view they risked coming under sustained attack. remember that the fleets were not in one location - First and Second alone were separated by many miles of open ocean. it would certainly have been possible to gather up the IJN forces and then attack, but it would give the USN much more time to regroup as well. Can you be more specific for what you mean by “sustained attack”? When, where, what and how? Are you proposing that the entire fleet, including the two carriers, take the fight to the Japanese, as Thatch proposed? Or perhaps split off forces as our @Capn_Carl is questioning? Is this at night? > [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](#): > > The USN had also broken the IJN’s code and was reading Yamamoto’s messages. This seems to be a commonly held misconception. While the codebreakers back in Hawaii and Washington had broken parts of the IJN code, it was not possible to read all orders in real time. As best some could be read within several hours, but those orders would not be completely understood. The US did not have the detailed plans for the attack. They knew it was big, they were able to figure out that many ships were involved, but they did not have all the specific orders. Famously, while Rochefort, officer in charge of Pearl Harbor’s ``Hypo’’ code-breaking station was able to deduce that Midway was the target of the attack, the question remained concerning the timing of the attack. Hypo initially believed late May or early June and OP-20-G, the unit in Washington which was tasked with interpreting the data, believed the attack would be in late June. The intelligence they had was not specific enough for them to find the task forces, for example. They still needed to search for the groups and to then identify the composition of ships. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 8:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/403 "2021-06-05T08:51:53Z")
> [@txtumbleweed](#): > > Not a chance. The Japanese lacked the training and equipment to make an amphibious assault into an organized defense. Midway was anything but an undefended beach and unlike Wake was protected by an atoll the Japanese landing craft couldn’t cross. Exactly. As has been referred to many times in this thread, the authors of _Shattered Sword_ wrote the alt-hist scenario where the Japanese defeated the US, still had their carriers and their airpower, but would not have been able to take Midway. That is the definitive answer to the question. A nitpick: the 407 Japanese casualties in the first attempted raid were not the Special Landing Force troops but navy personnel from the two IJN destroyers sank, one by bombs and the other by artillery. In the chaotic few weeks after Pearl Harbor, US made the difficult and painful decision to abandon Wake and her brave defenders to their fate. They lacked everything, including barbed wire and sufficient personnel. In contrast, Midway’s defenses were augmented prior to the attack, it had sufficient defenders with enough time to properly prepare for the defense. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 12:30pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/404 "2021-06-05T12:30:56Z")
> [@txtumbleweed](#): > > The second landing attempt wasn’t until about 2 weeks later when the Japanese put ashore some 1500 troops (there’s that 3:1 attacker to defender number again) suffering just 144 casualties. > > The 5000 man occupation force sent to Midway (and a landing force that was actually only about 2500 or so) was not going to take the island from 3500 angry, heavily armed, dug in Marines on an island with what was basically a deep moat around it. > > At best the IJN may have been able to bombard Midway, putting the airfield out of service for a day like at Henderson Field until the shell holes could be filled. They did not have the logistics chain for the warships to to stick around 2-weeks. > > I’m not even sure the IJN had the sea lift to ship the 12000 troops minimum across the ocean to Midway that would be needed to make the landing a success. Part II You know this, of course, but to add to this, on the second try, they made unopposed night landing, which were their forte. With only several hundred defenders, it was impossible for the US Marines to cover the entire shoreline. In contrast, the plan for Midway was a daytime assault against dug-in troops. > [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](#): > > The USN had also broken the IJN’s code and was reading Yamamoto’s messages. Response Part II I found the numbers. > [@](#): > > By April 1942 JN25 was about 20 percent readable, so codebreakers could read “about one in five words” and traffic analysis was far more useful. Tiltman had devised a (slow; neither easy nor quick) method of breaking it and had noted that all the numbers in the codebook were divisable by three. “Breaking” rather than “solving” a code involves learning enough code words and indicators so that any given message can be read. I’m not absolutely certain of the amount they were able to read by Midway. The intel before Coral Sea was much more sketchy and incomplete. ETA: Pacific Crucible says that the change to JN-25 came one week before Midway, again making Japanese radio intercepts indecipherable. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 1:00pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/405 "2021-06-05T13:00:43Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > JN-25 JN-25C ---
**Author:** ![Great\_Antibob](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/g/e47c2d/32.png) [@Great\_Antibob](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Great_Antibob)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 2:47pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/406 "2021-06-05T14:47:46Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > No, you can’t _win_ the battle with nothing but air support, but air support can & has meant the difference between victory & defeat. That’s not what you wrote: > [@DrDeth](#): > > But with some 200 aircraft they could have bombed and strafed the island to nothing. No, they really could not have bombed and strafed the island to nothing with conventional weaponry from carrier based craft. ---
**Author:** ![txtumbleweed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/278dde/32.png) [@txtumbleweed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/txtumbleweed)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 3:12pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/407 "2021-06-05T15:12:48Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > A nitpick: the 407 Japanese casualties in the first attempted raid were not the Special Landing Force troops but navy personnel from the two IJN destroyers sank, one by bombs and the other by artillery. There was a voice trying to go if in my head that the SNLF hadn’t even attempted a landing the first time around at Wake but it got overwhelmed by what a beautiful counterpoint the numbers made. Got to listen to the voices sometimes. > [@DrDeth](#): > > No, you can’t _win_ the battle with nothing but air support, but air support can & has meant the difference between victory & defeat. > > Note the Stuka and the many calls for air support form the army in Europe, not to mention Patton praying from clear weather so he could be air support. Air support is a lovely thing against a maneuvering army. Troops, tanks, and supplies are all out in the open and exposed. Against dug-in troops air power is much less effective. The Japanese pilots were the best in the business in June 1942 and their first attack on Midway Island had little effect on the islands’ defenses. It did fairly serious infrastructure damage, destroying water and fuel lines/supplies and several buildings but I don’t think any of the gun emplacements were destroyed. IIRC, the marines only suffered a handful of casualties from the strike so few of the bunkers, dugouts, and foxholes were even touched. The Japanese timeline didn’t allow much room for Nagumo to just stand off and pound Midway into submission, either. He had a day for air strikes and bombardment then a day to occupy the island. Troops were to be landed on June 7. Three or four ever weakening airstrikes (the first strike of 110 aircraft had something like 25 aircraft destroyed or heavily damaged) throughout the day was not going to soften up the island for a successful assault the next morning. Remember, if the USN is not in the area, Nagumo is still under orders to hold half his force in reserve so those 100 aircraft are not available to attack Midway. They sit on the carrier waiting in case the USN turns up early. If the day goes as it did historically, but with the IJN decisively defeating the USN carriers, how many aircraft are left to do the job of softening up the island? Based on how the attacks went for both sides, not very many. ---
**Author:** ![DesertDog](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/desertdog/32/11503_2.png) [@DesertDog](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DesertDog)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 5:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/408 "2021-06-05T17:41:16Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > Famously, while Rochefort, officer in charge of Pearl Harbor’s ``Hypo’’ code-breaking station was able to deduce that Midway was the target of the attack, the question remained concerning the timing of the attack. Hypo initially believed late May or early June and OP-20-G, the unit in Washington which was tasked with interpreting the data, believed the attack would be in late June. Besides the later date OP-20-G also maintained the assault would be in the Aleutians, not Midway. The IJN sent a diversionary force sent up there to hopefully draw attention away from Midway but it was small potatoes. OP-20-G did not appreciate having egg on its face. > When Nimitz recommended Rochefort for a [Navy Distinguished Service Medal](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Navy_Distinguished_Service_Medal), Rochefort said that it would only “make trouble”.[[21]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Rochefort#cite_note-21) Other sources suggest Rochefort received no official recognition during his lifetime because he was made a scapegoat for the embarrassment of OP-20-G. Redman (whose brother was the influential Rear Admiral [Joseph Redman](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Redman)) complained about the operation of the Hawaii station; as a result, Rochefort was reassigned from cryptanalysis to command the floating dry dock ABSD-2 at San Francisco. [Cite.](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joseph_Rochefort) US Navy bureaucracy at its finest. Posthumously, Rochefort got his DSM and was inducted into the NSA’s Central Security Service Hall of Fame. Redman has not. ---
**Author:** ![Elmer\_J.Fudd](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/elmer_j.fudd/32/1211_2.png) [@Elmer\_J.Fudd](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elmer_J.Fudd)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 7:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/409 "2021-06-05T19:58:58Z")
> [@DesertDog](#): > > Besides the later date OP-20-G also maintained the assault would be in the Aleutians, not Midway. The IJN sent a diversionary force sent up there to hopefully draw attention away from Midway but it was small potatoes. The Aleutians being a diversion was one of the myths put to rest in _Shattered Sword_. It’s main purpose was to deprive long range US bombers of a staging ground for strikes against the Japanese home islands. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 8:05pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/410 "2021-06-05T20:05:33Z")
> [@TokyoBayer](#): > > As has been referred to many times in this thread, the authors of _Shattered Sword_ wrote the alt-hist scenario where the Japanese defeated the US, still had their carriers and their airpower, but would not have been able to take Midway. That is the definitive answer to the question. This is called a “Argument from Authority”. While that is certainly a great book, and one can certainly quote the many solid facts the book mentions, such as the great difficulties the Landing force would have found, one does not settle a argument in GD by referring to a _opinion_ by a authority. While it is clear it would have been no walk in the park, and would have taken longer than planned- I think that if the IJN had thrown enough resources at it they could have taken Midway. Would they have wanted to spend the time and resources? That is a fair question, and I think not. I do agree that without the carriers, they could not have done it at all. Even with the carriers the losses would have been high and the results problematic. ---
**Author:** ![OttoDaFe](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ottodafe/32/356_2.png) [@OttoDaFe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OttoDaFe)\ **Post date:** [June 5, 2021, 10:41pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/411 "2021-06-05T22:41:39Z")
Certainly, pretty much anything can be taken if the attacker is willing to spend the time and resources to do so; unfortunately for Yamamoto, time and resources were two items in short supply where Midway was concerned. For one thing, there were no reserves, so in the quite likely event that the Marines repelled the IJA and IJN assault forces with heavy losses, there was no redo — the Japanese would have to start the operation from scratch. For another, the naval forces were pretty close to the end of their logistical tether, and a significant percentage of them were slated for operations in the South Pacific (taking Fiji, Samoa and New Caledonia in order to sever the US-Australia supply line) immediately after AL/MI. Parshall and Tully do not say that the Japanese couldn’t take Midway: what they _do_ say is that the June 1942 invasion, as constituted, was almost certainly doomed. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2021, 12:39am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/412 "2021-06-06T00:39:36Z")
> [@OttoDaFe](#): > > Parshall and Tully do not say that the Japanese couldn’t take Midway: what they _do_ say is that the June 1942 invasion, as constituted, was almost certainly doomed. At least the first attempt, I will grant that. ---
**Author:** ![OttoDaFe](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/ottodafe/32/356_2.png) [@OttoDaFe](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/OttoDaFe)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2021, 2:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/413 "2021-06-06T02:15:43Z")
Even on the eve of battle, the Japanese expected: - No USN presence; - A few hundred Marines on Midway, armed with nothing more than light WWI-vintage weapons; - A couple dozen obsolescent planes; - No fortifications to speak of; - No awareness of the coming attack. If those had been the actual conditions, I’d guess there was a pretty good chance they could have taken the islands (although the idea that the airfield would have been usable the next day was asinine: if nothing else, the fuel supplies were rigged with detonation charges and would have been blown up). But supplying the garrison would have been a logistical nightmare, and the US could have chosen the time to take them back. (One of the ironies of the story, IMHO, is that reports from the one part of the pre-battle reconnaissance plan which _did_ work — surveillance from _I-168_ — either didn’t get through or were ignored. Had they been heeded, the Japanese might have realized that Midway wasn’t the “sleepy backwater” they assumed it to be.) ---
**Author:** ![txtumbleweed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/278dde/32.png) [@txtumbleweed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/txtumbleweed)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2021, 3:59am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/414 "2021-06-06T03:59:11Z")
> [@DrDeth](#): > > At least the first attempt, I will grant that. So a second attempt at a landing? With what? ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2021, 4:26am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/415 "2021-06-06T04:26:42Z")
Naval troops. Reserves. How many they had, i dunno. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 6, 2021, 5:20am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/416 "2021-06-06T05:20:16Z")
> [@txtumbleweed](#): > > There was a voice trying to go if in my head that the SNLF hadn’t even attempted a landing the first time around at Wake but it got overwhelmed by what a beautiful counterpoint the numbers made. Got to listen to the voices sometimes. Listen to the voice! Not that much is written about it, but Robert Cressman in _“A Magnificent Fight” The Battle for Wake Island_ mentions that the rough seas had overturned the landing boats almost as soon as they were launched. I’ve seen that in other cites as well, but without details. At any rate, it appears that they quickly withdrew and didn’t even get the landing boats loaded, let alone made an assault on the beaches. Something interesting about _Wake I, the Oops_ (from the Japanese point of view) was that the US marines noticed how poorly the shore bombardment happened. Because the ships were firing at the naval standard low trajectory, the shells were frequently under- or overshooting the atoll. It seems certain that the IJN would not have made changes to their doctrine so this would also impact Midway. (Or, rather wouldn’t impact Midway. Ouch.) This is similar to the difficulty of getting onto a green with a low numbered iron. I believe it’s already been mentioned in this thread that much later in the war, the US found that low trajectory rounds did minimal damage to reinforced positions because of deflections, and made the changes necessary to allow high trajectory shelling. > [@txtumbleweed](#): > > Air support is a lovely thing against a maneuvering army. Troops, tanks, and supplies are all out in the open and exposed. Against dug-in troops air power is much less effective. The Japanese pilots were the best in the business in June 1942 and their first attack on Midway Island had little effect on the islands’ defenses. It did fairly serious infrastructure damage, destroying water and fuel lines/supplies and several buildings but I don’t think any of the gun emplacements were destroyed. IIRC, the marines only suffered a handful of casualties from the strike so few of the bunkers, dugouts, and foxholes were even touched. This is where I miss @Dissonance and his encyclopedia knowledge of the war, especially the European theater, but IIRC in the fall of France, one of the many disadvantages the French army had was that they also had little ground support doctrine for their air force. That was what the artillery was for. They were also hampered by the lack of communication equipment in individual tanks and simply that there were not coordinating ground and air forces. The Germans had that ability down to a science, which allowed local units to call in air support. (I may have these details wrong.) This is exactly the same problem that the Japanese would have faced in a theoretical invasion. Not only would the initial airstrikes be ineffective, the ground troops would not have been able call in for help. > [@OttoDaFe](#): > > If those had been the actual conditions, I’d guess there was a pretty good chance they could have taken the islands (although the idea that the airfield would have been usable the next day was asinine: if nothing else, the fuel supplies were rigged with detonation charges and would have been blown up). But supplying the garrison would have been a logistical nightmare, and the US could have chosen the time to take them back. Simply letting the Japanese take Midway and then retaking it a year later after the new carriers started coming off the line was a viable option, but the chance to ambush the IJN carriers was an opportunity Nimitz didn’t want to miss. > [@OttoDaFe](#): > > (One of the ironies of the story, IMHO, is that reports from the one part of the pre-battle reconnaissance plan which _did_ work — surveillance from _I-168_ — either didn’t get through or were ignored. Had they been heeded, the Japanese might have realized that Midway wasn’t the “sleepy backwater” they assumed it to be.) One reason I really love _Shattered Sword_ is the thorough analysis, and their examination of why it was likely that Nagumo saw the report but failed to act is another outstanding read. Alt-hist scenarios suffer from cherry picking, in which very specific problems are identified and ask what if, but fail to see that the changes would nullify the whole question. As @Dissonance often would write, Hitler _could_ do X, Y or Z, but that that would mean he wasn’t Hitler. A major reason that this plan was contemplated, approved and enacted was that the Japanese held the US forces’ abilities in contempt. Parshall and Tully argue that Nagumo saw the reconnaissance report and shrugged. Yamamoto also would have seen the report and not let that phase him, although he seemed almost delusional at this point. What the Japanese managed to accomplish in the first six month seems unbelievable, and for the victors to not acquire “Victor’s Disease” may have been asking too much. Just as the Western Powers had hopelessly discounted Japanese abilities pre-war, six months and their astonishing run of wins later, they had started to believe they were invincible. At Pearl Harbor, one knock against the Japanese was that they failed to attack the oil farm (leaving aside if it would have succeeded or not), but as one Japanese officer said post-war that if logistics were being considered that carefully, they would never have started the war in the beginning. Not only were the Japanese attempting to invade and hold Midway, they were also moving forward with plans to invade Hawaii, which was delusional. If they weren’t delusional, they would have understood that they needed a better grasp of the situation on Midway, before they started the attack. But if they weren’t delusional, they would have done the math and realized it was impossible. ---
**Author:** ![RickJay](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/bb73d2/32.png) [@RickJay](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/RickJay)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2021, 6:40pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/417 "2021-06-07T18:40:35Z")
> [@Elmer\_J.Fudd](#): > > The Aleutians being a diversion was one of the myths put to rest in _Shattered Sword_ . The dependence on this one source is starting to raise my eyebrow. ---
**Author:** ![DrDeth](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/b487fb/32.png) [@DrDeth](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DrDeth)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2021, 7:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/418 "2021-06-07T19:37:38Z")
The source has lots of good facts. However, it has also opinions. Their opinions are just that- _opinions_, even if based upon their research. ---
**Author:** ![txtumbleweed](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/278dde/32.png) [@txtumbleweed](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/txtumbleweed)\ **Post date:** [June 7, 2021, 10:58pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/419 "2021-06-07T22:58:19Z")
If anyone is interested in further details as to the difficulty of naval bombardment (issues that seem to have continued throughout the war), I found a dissertation that makes good reading. [The American Doctrine for the Use of Naval Gunfire in Support of Amphibious Landings: Myth vs Reality in the Central Pacific of World War II.](http://analysis.williamdoneil.com/Hist/NGFS%20Doctr%20in%20CentPac%20-%20Mitchener%20diss.pdf) It addresses several issues that @TokyoBayer mentioned regarding the difficulty of shore bombardment by naval ships as well as some of the issues aircraft faced. Trajectory has already been mentioned, that high velocity naval guns tended to be great for targets that presented a vertical target, but against defiladed and reverse slope positions they were ineffective. It took a couple of tries for the USN to learn to use partial instead of full charges when firing so that shot would fall at a higher angle. More relevant to our discussion is the comment of Adm HF Kingman, Commander of Battleship Div 2 at Tarawa (p126) > 1. From an observer’s viewpoint, after witnessing the aerial > bombardment, the surface bombardment, and aerial strafing, it > seemed almost impossible for any human being to be alive on BETIO > Island. Ton after ton of explosives was rained upon an island less than > 0.4 miles square, and yet, when bombardment was stopped, Japanese > manned machine guns and literally annihilated the first two assault > waves. > Superficial examination of BETIO after its occupation revealed that > military installations, bombproofs, and machine gun emplacements > were, in most instances, practically intact. Our HC [High Capacity] > projectiles, with superquick fuzes, made a grand display, but > accomplished little if any real destruction of installations or > personnel…. There is no reason to believe that a Japanese fleet whose doctrine and armament was hyper focused on the decisive naval battle would have drawn up an effective bombardment plan for Midway Island. > [@RickJay](#): > > The dependence on this one source is starting to raise my eyebrow. _Shattered Sword_ was the first popular book to come out that focused on the Japanese side of the battle and put into words (with citations) many of the Midway myths others of us were struggling with. ---
**Author:** ![TokyoBayer](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/tokyobayer/32/13989_2.png) [@TokyoBayer](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/TokyoBayer)\ **Post date:** [June 8, 2021, 1:31am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029/420 "2021-06-08T01:31:20Z")
> [@RickJay](#): > > The dependence on this one source is starting to raise my eyebrow. As you must know, popular history authors don’t rigorously research every single detail from primary sources. A storyline develops and subsequent authors pass along that theory without challenging it, because of the challenges of researching, especially in a difficult foreign language such as Japanese. A couple of common myths that were retold by countless authors are the one that the large coastal guns of Singapore couldn’t be turned to face inland and that the atomic bombs were the sole cause of Japan’s surrender. For the former, the problem was that they mostly had AP armor-piercing shells rather than sufficient HE high explosives, as well as overall incompetence. For the latter, the Soviet entry was also a major factor, yet popular authors more often than not avoid the complicated answer. The idea that the Aleutian campaign was a diversion actually dates back to the wartime itself and continued through the 90s. It was challenged by others prior the _Shattered Sword_ but those authors laid it to rest. More historians now are accepting the idea that the Aleutian campaign wasn’t a diversion but a complementary campaign. Here is [an article](https://www.history.navy.mil/about-us/leadership/director/directors-corner/h-grams/h-gram-016/h-016-2.html) by \*Samuel J. Cox, Director Navy History and Heritage Command. If you aren’t familiar with them, they are > [@](#): > > The Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), headed by the Director of Naval History, is an Echelon II command headquartered on the Washington Navy Yard, D.C. > > Vision: To serve our nation, by using the power of history and heritage to enhance the warfighting capability of the U.S. Navy. > > They are also a great source of YouTube videos on the war. Anyway, the article: > [@](#): > > The Japanese carrier-based air attacks on Dutch Harbor in the Aleutian Islands chain of the U.S. Alaska Territory on 3 and 4 June 1942 (Operation AL) are frequently described as a diversion for the main Japanese navy operation at Midway (Operation MI). Operation AL was not a diversion. It was a complementary operation for the purpose of setting the conditions for a Japanese occupation of the Aleutian Islands in order to prevent the United States from using them as a base to attack Japan from the north. [Another article](https://researchoutput.csu.edu.au/ws/portalfiles/portal/8894586/Spennemann%2C+Hindcasting+Midway.pdf) which goes further in depth as this to say: > [@](#): > > The Aleutian Operation—A diversion? > > The Battle of Midway was not confined to the Central Pacific: there was also a North Pacific dimension: the Aleutians. It is a commonly advanced argument that the Aleutians operation was a mere diversionary attack, aimed at confusing the U.S. command and timed to draw any U.S. carriers to the Aleutians and away from the Central Pacific area (Johnson 1977). While that view was the canon for much of the post-war years (Hailey 1944, p.21ff; Morison 1949, pp. 77-78; Fuchida & Okumiya 1955, p. 17; Stephan 1974, p. 138) and was still en courant in the 1990s (e.g. Allard 1995), the diversion theory has lost some traction in recent years (e.g. Lenihan 1992), with the myth being exploded by Parshall and Tully’s recent work Shattered Sword. > While there can be no doubt that the Midway operation was the main game, the Aleutian component was an essential part of the entire Japanese defense strategy. That point was not lost on several contemporary commentators, but was in subsequent years overlooked in the myth developing around the Battle of Midway. The diversion myth had been born, in part, by the interrogations of low-level IJN personnel that were not fully briefed on the larger strategic picture (e.g. Amagi 1945), while statements by other, higher ranking staff were misinterpreted to conform with the flanking and diversion hypothesis (e.g. statement by Okumiya 1945). The problem rests in the fact that two issues were conflated early on: a diversionary attack on Dutch Harbor to distract U.S. planners, and a planned occupation of one or more islands in the Aleutians (Ito 1945; Okumiya 1945). > > The idea that the entire Aleutians operation was diversionary makes no sense at all if we consider that Yamamoto detailed two of his six carriers, the Ryūjō and the Junyō to that operation. Given that his main objective was to take Midway and to lure the U.S. carriers into battle, every additional flight deck was going to strengthen his hand. After all, the Ryūjō and Junyō could have served as flight decks to attack Midway, while the four larger and faster fleet carriers could have been positioned to intercept the U.S. carriers. Why sacrifice strength for more diversion (Lenihan 1992)? Moreover, if this had been a mere diversion, then a single carrier would have sufficed to project air power and engage any enemy air forces in the Aleutians, coupled with a well composed battle fleet capable of wide-ranging shelling and onshore destruction. Moreover, in a diversion scenario there was no real need for any landings let alone occupation to occur. If landings were seen as desirable for the psychological impact, then all that was required was to land shock troops, cause mayhem with concomitant destruction/demolition of shore facilities and to withdraw before the enemy could react. Ian Toll in his 2012 _Pacific Crucible_ accepts Pashall and Tully’s arguments that the Aleutian account was the product of the Naval General Staff without a clear strategic relationship to the Midway operation. What is the reason for raised eyebrows here? As @txtumbleweed says, _Shattered Sword_ a popular historical account which provides the Japanese side of the battle. It is well researched and provides solid arguments for its conclusions. More importantly, the authors’ findings have found acceptance within community of historians. In this thread, the chief “dependence” has been Tully’s and Parshall’s examination of a hypothetical invasion in an alt-hist scenario where the Japanese defeat the US carriers and then attempt an invasion. The reason that is being cited so frequently is simply it’s the only authoritarian work available. Most books simply give the numbers of the defenders, guns and planes with brief accounts of the defenses. This account is well researched. What’s more, the conclusions in Appendix V are well supported by other sources. The problems with navy bombardments has been researched extensively. The logistics issues as well. The pisspoor planning of the Japanese is well documented. In the second part of his WWII trilogy,\* The Barrier and the Javelin: Japanese and Allied Strategies, February to June 1942\*, H.P. Willmott points out that > [@](#): > > Few operations can have been so underprepared as Operation AL [the Aleutians], although it must be remembered that the forces earmarked for the landings on Midway were scarcely better provided. The officer who had been tasked to plan the actual amphibious phase of Operation MI [Midway] did not know of the existence of gaps in the coral reef of the atoll, and H-Hour remained unfixed when the operation began. More importantly, if there are valid arguments against the conclusions, let’s see them. The problem isn’t with those of us quoting the professions, it’s the people who close their eyes and say “I don’t think so.” OK, if you don’t think so, why not? [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029.md?page=20) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-battle-of-midway-why-couldnt-the-japanese-have-pressed-on-and-captured-the-island/917029.md?page=22)