If that’s all you can say, that a BB is no match to carrier aircraft, then people will tell you that a carrier is as good as dead if it comes within sight of a battleship. Survivors of Taffy 3 must still be giving prayers of thanks for getting second lives. No, battleship obsolescence is due to something else.
I agree.
However the Curtis “Helldiver” dive bomber, which sank 4 IJN carriers at Midway,
had a range of 1,013nm carrying a 1000lb bomb, and A/C were as fast if not faster
than IJN B/S, so there was no way an IJN B/S could avoid USN A/C aircraft, and
no way an IJN B/S could get within sight of a properly handled A/C. In fact none did,
except for the Samar aberration.
B/S obsolescence is due to A/C speed, combat radius and throwweight. No A/C was
ever meant to duke it out with even a light cruiser, I don’t think; maybe not even
a couple of destroyers.
If Yamato and Musashi had fighter cover, neither would have been sunk. If force Z had one carrier with them, both Prince of Wales and Repulse would have survived. One instance of battleships surviving a concerted air attack: the Gneissnau and Scharnhorst Channel run. Read about that?
Samar told you that fighting around islands or within an inland sea is ideal for a battleship. Combat radius vis-a-vis a carrier is only meaningful in a mid-ocean battle. And Samar was not an aberration. It was a brilliantly thought of plan that fell short at the crucial moment.
Also, remember the HMS Glorious?
You know people can actually still read what you wrote in previous posts, right? Here, it was:
You are now trying to claim that your contention all along was actually that the battleship was less vulnerable than the aircraft carrier?
??? And Yamato was with Musashi when she sank, continued on and was well within sight of and shelling US ships off of Samar the next day, which makes your statement incorrect. Trying to hide this by claiming you didn’t mean the Yamato never came within sight of US ships only on her last voyage is just plain silly. By this logic the HMS Barham was sunk without ever coming in sight of a German or Italian ship, since she was torpedoed by a U-boat on her last mission. Never mind her action at the Battle of Cape Matapan.
- Your statement in post 11 was factually wrong. 2) Your making up this ‘specious’ objection in your head, not on anything I’ve actually written.
You might want to consider the number of slipways actually able to construct Iowa class battleships for the explanation on this. What this has to do with the price of Tea in China I don’t know. The fact remains both Illinois and Kentucky were laid down post Pearl Harbor and were being constructed as fast as they could when the war ended. Ironically, you actually looked up the date that Wisconsin was laid down, 1/25/42, which is both after Pearl Harbor and amazingly funny in light of your statement about her as the last Iowa class battleship:
Again, you are arguing against things I never said. Where, exactly, did I say you claimed no aircraft carriers were ordered before WW2?
Considering CVEs in the same category as the fleet carriers that were the instrument of decision in the war against the IJN is fairly absurd. There’s a reason they were never deliberately put into fleet actions with the IJN: they were far too slow, carried too few planes, and were build on converted merchant hulls. Using your same illogic to conclude that Illinois and Kentucky don’t count, most of the 8 Essexes and none of the Midways count, and/or are proof of how little the USN cared about aircraft carriers, as they were not completed during the war; all 3 Midways were completed after the war, 7 Essexes were completed after the war and a further 2 Essexes were cancelled after production on them had begun.
Again, all you are doing is displaying your complete ignorance on the subject. Battlescruiser are considered capital ships. This is not subject to dispute; they have been considered capital ships since the concept of the battlecruiser was introduced. You will be unable to find any serious source on such matters that claims they were not capital ships.
Now this is just ridiculous. Reread what I wrote, you appear to not have understood it and think I wrote the opposite of what I actually did:
The Scharnhorst was a capital ship. You won’t be able to find a serious source that describes her otherwise. Here, the first sentence from the wiki link on her I gave:
the_diego corrected you on the Samar ‘aberration’ (I’m sure the crew of HMS Glorious would like to have a word with you as well), but to add to your errors, the Curtis SB2C Helldiver didn’t sink 4 IJN carriers at Midway since they didn’t first see combat until 18 months after Midway. You meant the SBD Dauntless.
I do not see how any of what follows challenges what i have claimed for Aircaraft Carrier preeminence in the WW2 Pacific.
Fine- that only serves to confirm B/S vulnerability to those A/C attacking them with swarms of planes from far over the horizon.
I think force Z was sunk by land-based aircraft.
Yes I read about it. The local UK air defence was manned by those same biplanes that jammed Bismarck’s rudder. In other words the most obsolete aircraft in UK inventory finally ran out of luck. Also, the Germans devoted enough of their own air assets to provide temporary local superiority for their fleet.
Island with airfields were the stongest chess pieces of the Pacific war. They unsinkable carriers, and added value to any ships operating within their air umbrella. However, the Japanese were down to almost no adequately trained pilots, and so could take advantage only via Kamikaze suicide missions. Also, a ship operating within an archipelago the size of the PI is going to have its movements severely confined. That was one reason the Musashi-Yamato fleet was such a sitting duck until Halsey turned his back on it.
Samar was an aberration because if Halsey had not been so stupid he would have stayed put at San Bernardino Strait, and either crossed the IJN’s T or hammered them again with aircraft.
I’ll go out on a limb- from memory: British A/C caught by German ?cruiser(?s) during the 1940 Norweigan campaign, wasn’t it? Improper tactics by the UK to allow an A/C to go unprotected so close to the enemy. Also, I think the German Admiral violated his orders by being so aggressive in that action, and got canned even though he took out that A/C. Glorious might have been the only case during the entire war where an A/C was lost to gunfire.
Nope. Bringing Samar back into it, USS Gambier Bay was sunk by gunnery from the Japanese Center Force’s cruisers.
This was the only US carrier sunk by naval gunfire.
ETA: Admittedly, Gambier Bay was a Casablanca-class escort carrier, so much smaller than Glorious, but a carrier nonetheless.
I meant was that B/S could take more punishment than A/C. Akagi was sunk by one hit and two near-misses. There was no possibility of sinking a modern WW2-era B/S with the same one hit and two near-misses.
Range of action confers a different category of relative vulnerability, and for WW2 Pacific combat the value of range of action outweighed the value of armor protection.
Here, for the 3rd and last time is the original, relevant, clarifying statement:
(from post #11):
This statement obviously refers to the actions during which the ships were sunk. No other interpretation is reasonable. I should not have to add for an informed reader that they were sunk during different actions, months apart.
What is wrong with the logic?
What about it?
Addressed above.
Citation please, for this alleged slipway bottleneck.
18 Essex-class and 3 Midway-class A/C were ordered after but laid down before Illinois and Kentucky (not all were completed).
Essex-class A/C were (LengthxWidth) 820x93’ Midway-class A/C were 968x113 and Iowa-Class B/S were 887x103. I omit draught because it can be relatively easily remedied by dredging.
Midway would have required a larger slipway than Illinois-Kentucky, and would have been postponed if I-K had been considered more essential.
Essex was too close in size I-K to provide inference that I-K could not have been constructed on the same slipway. And even if the slipways had to be enlarged for *I-K *construction it would not have taken 5 years to do so under conditions of wartime urgency.
Your absurd hypothesis is that a five-year order to laid-down lag was not unusual. The lag for the 1st 4 ships in the class is enough to disprove that, but I though I would drive a few more nails into your absurd hypothesis by providing information on A/C construction.
A perfectly reasonable guess prior to looking up the dates.
From post #17 (emphasis added):
Every CVE launched was a category above unlaunched Illinois-Kentucky!
The issue is the comparative importance and consequent building priority of the A/C, any and all A/C, compared to the B/S, and that issue is not in doubt: the A/C win.
Also, the debate has not been confined to the Pacific theater, so it is reasonable to point out that CVE were definitely an instrument of decision in the Atlantic Theater.
Not that their services were inessential in the Pacific: 18 CVE served at Leyte alone, and it does not matter that they had no anti-ship surface ship mission.
What do you mean by “fleet action”? I expect the mission of the Leyte CAV included anti-submarine duty, which should be considered a type of fleet action.
The logic of our debate concerns building priority. Building priority is logically determined by beginning of construction, provided construction is not begun on one ship and then interrupted in favor of construction on another ship. Such interruption did not occur at all vis a vis the 100+ A/C and the 2 Illinois-Kentucky B/S at all as far as I can tell from scanning Wiki.
The “capital ship” designation is insignificant for the purpose of this debate. Details previously addressed.
For the first time in our discussion part of a post of yours has gotten something right. Trivially right. I was thrown off by he double negative. However, that does nothing to support your contention that the three ships at issue should be considered on a par with or in the same class as a modern WW2-era B/S.
Addressed.
I have expained the incompetent admiralship which made Samar an aberration.
You are correct that I misientified Helldiver. However, that does not affect the point I was making since the Dauntless’ range and carrying capacity were virtually the same as the Helldiver.
You are right, and I should have caught it, escort or not.