Nope, only after a while, Raeder was in charges to start with a battleship man. If Dönitz had been in charge to start, he would have build so many U-Boots that they actually could have won the war.
No, actually the Yamato was at the Battle of Midway and several other big naval battles. It just didnt do anything until the Battle of Leyte Gulf where it fired ineffectually at some USN escort carriers and then ran away. (This makes one of the "What Ifs’ of Naval warfare)
It was then ordered on a suicide mission in 1945
Recent examination of IJN and USN battle reports make a compelling argument that Yamato damaged the carrier USS White Plains with a near miss, from over 31,000 yards. Later, Yamato damaged one of the destroyers.
wiki: Yamato opened fire at 0659 at an estimated range of 34,544 yards, targeting White Plains with her first four salvoes. Yamato’s third salvo was a close straddle landing at 07:04. One shell from this salvo exploded beneath the turn of White Plains port bilge near frame 142, near her aft (starboard) engine room. While the ship was not struck directly, the mining effect of the under-keel explosion severely damaged her hull, deranged her starboard machinery and tripped all of the circuit breakers in her electrical network. Prompt and effective damage control restored power and communications within three minutes and she was able to remain in formation by overspeeding her port engine to compensate. Fortunately the black smoke resulting from the sudden loss of boiler intake air pressure convinced Yamato and Nagato (which was also firing her main battery at White Plains at the time) that they had scored a direct hit and they shifted fire to other targets.[
USS Wasp was a reduced Yorktown design, built to use up the remaining tonnage for aircraft carriers. They tried to squeeze a large air group onto a ship with much less displacement. It had no armor protection, reduced powerplant, and no torpedo protection. These flaws were recognized at the time of construction, but nothing could be done within the treaty restrictions. These flaws proved fatal.
Yamato also hit carrier Gambier Bay, and destroyers Johnston and Hoel, all of which later sank, due to damage from Yamato and other ships.
Indeed, one could make an argument that at the time, battleships were literally the most complicated objects human beings had ever built.
Wasp was not well protected, but there was some armor: a 1.25” main deck. And the lack of armor was not fatal. The damage from the torpedo hits, alone, would not have sank her. Flooding was controllable, and her engines were operating. What doomed her was the gassed-up aircraft burning in the hangar.
I realize now I was replying to a post from 9 years ago. I was trying to make a point about Treaty restrictions applying to aircraft carriers as well, so the USN ended up compromising on the design of Wasp, which lead to its loss.
Looking at a few sources, I see Wasp had some limited armor, but was not well protected from torpedoes–the gas and oil storage areas and magazines were vulnerable.
The torpedoes hit in the area of gasoline storage, and the explosions broke water mains, knocking out fire equipment and making damage control impossible. It went to a blazing wreck in half an hour.
This link seems to be where the Wikipedia entry gets some of its information:
Since this has been re-opened: What did these people discussing the sinking of Prince of Wales think it proved about aircraft carriers, given the Japanese planes that sunk it were based out of Saigon, not a carrier?
Does it really matter where the planes came from?
The point is that a fleet based around battleships would be at a severe disadvantage against aircraft. The Japanese themselves knew (or were forced to know) that aircraft were able to project force for hundreds or thousands of miles, which battleships would not be able to do. Imagine Pearl Harbour if the Japanese had to use only ships to attack. Would never have happened and if it did, the Japanese Fleet would have been quickly ruined.
Yes, it does if you’re making a point about aircraft carriers, rather than just air superiority.
I don’t know why it does matter.
A battleship based group will be susceptible to attack from the air from hundreds of miles away. Whether those aircraft come from shore or from a carrier is not all that relevant. The battleships will be destroyed by bombers while the carriers (or on shore base) sits in safety hundreds of miles away.
Yes, you are correct that the Prince of Wales only directly demonstrated that air superiority was critical, not aircraft carriers, but the notion is a rather obvious corollary. The Pacific is big and aircraft carriers were the only way to obtain air superiority in the Pacific theater. Yes, island bases were established, but they could not be established until/unless the carrier groups ensured they could be set up.
Yes. I can’t even remember another time that land-based aircraft made a big difference in some Pacific Ocean battle, although I’m sure someone will be along to tell us!
The issue with the PoW etc was that they had crappy AA batteries and almost no escorts. Tow of the Iowa class with 150 AA guns each wouldnt have been hit like that.
Are you only thinking of naval battles or do you mean the war in the Pacific, in general?
If the latter, then there were too many to count. Land-based bombers and fighters from Formosa (Taiwan) destroyed the USAAF planes in the Philippines, mostly while the US planes were on the ground. They chased away the US Navy, and supported the invasion.
Japanese land-based planes destroyed the British aircraft guarding Singapore, which were mostly obsolete fighters, and then supported the attack on Malaya.
The whole campaign by the Japanese to conquer the DEI was done mostly by land-based planes, were the Japanese would attack Dutch airfields, take them over and move on to the next.
MacArthur’s New Guinea campaign was again fought with mostly land-based aircraft with hundreds and thousands of aircraft, including a battle where the US destroyed 350 Japanese planes mostly on the ground.
Of course, the battle of Guadalcanal was all about land-based airpower, and Henderson Field kept the IJN away during the day, forcing the Japanese navy into night action.
Allied land-based aircraft allowed the US to isolate Japanese strongholds with hundreds of thousands of troops, which then minimized Allied losses.
It you want to only look at naval actions (which isn’t fair, IMHO), there is the March, 1943 Battle of the Bismarck Sea, where the USAAF and the Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) attacked a Japanese convoy carrying troops to Lae, New Guinea. Most of the Japanese task force was destroyed, and Japanese troop losses were heavy. The US had turned the tide in the war after Midway and Guadalcanal and the meat grinding slug towards the land of the Rising Sun had begun.
Japan, realizing they needed to protect their major base at Rabaul, tried to bring in some 6,000 troops in an eight-transport convoy escorted by eight destroyers and land-based fighters. The Allies destroyed all the transport and sunk four of the destroyers, killing close to 3,000 and preventing all but 1,200 from making it to Lae. Here is a map of the battle. This is a war-time documentary of the battle, including footage shot from attacking Allied aircraft.
Thanks, TB! Lotta good stuff in there.
Of course, in November, 1944 the US were able to set up bases in the Mariana Islands which brought Japan into range of US long-distance land-based heavy bombers, with the subsequent firebombing campaign and then the atomic bombs.
Carrier-based planes continued to be used through the end of the war, and by 1944 and ‘45 the US could overwhelm regional land-based planes with the massive numbers of her carriers.
The two-day First Battle of the Philippine Sea pitted 15 American flight decks against 9 Japanese, and 950 U.S. carrier aircraft against some 750 carrier- and land-based Japanese planes.
Elendil, perhaps you are thinking of Midway, etc where we tried to hit fast moving ships with high level B17 bombers, which failed miserably.
At Bismarck Sea we used (wiki) “mast-height bombing, in which bombers would approach the target at low altitude, 200 to 500 feet (61 to 152 m), at about 265 to 275 miles per hour (426 to 443 km/h), and then drop down to mast height, 10 to 15 feet (3.0 to 4.6 m) at about 600 yards (550 m) from the target. They would release their bombs at around 300 yards (270 m), aiming directly at the side of the ship.”
Even at Bismarck sea, when the US tried high level bombing with heavy bombers it wasnt very successful. Medium bombers coming in low worked quite well, however.
Did the United States operate any fleet carriers in the Atlantic? I know the USS Ranger (which was too small for Pacific use) and various Escort Carriers were used but I’m curious if the Germans even attempted to make the Zeppelin operational even in a late state if we would see Essex class carriers deployed to the Atlantic.