# wwII - pearl harbor attack results **URL:** \ **Category:** Factual Questions\ **Created:** [January 17, 2001, 7:44pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559 "2001-01-17T19:44:25Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 20\ **Page:** 2
**Author:** ![tomndebb](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/b9e5f3/32.png) [@tomndebb](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/tomndebb)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2001, 2:57pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/21 "2001-01-18T14:57:35Z")
The arrangement of the battle was skill. The victory had substantial portions of luck, in it. If nothing else, at the climactic moment of the battle, the Japanese covering aircraft had just finished destroying the the torpedo bomber assaults. The entire CAP was on the deck when the U.S. dive bombers found a break in the cloud cover and fell on the Japanese carriers. As fast a the A6M Zero was, it still took 7 minutes to climb to 20,000 feet. The dive bombers had no fighter opposition while they lined up their runs. Additional points of luck: One Japanese scout plane found the Yorktown long before the actual battle, but radio problems prevented it from notifying the Japanese fleet of the Yorktown’s position. The torpedo bombers were supposed to hit the Japanese in a coordinated attack, but the groups got separated and the torpedo bombers showed up early. Had the attack gone as scheduled, the Japanese CAP would have had to divide between defending against high- and low-level attacks, but neither the U.S. torpedoes nor the planes carrying them were that reliable, so the CAP would probably have concentrated on the dive bombers, reducing our ability to crush three carriers in a single blow. The dive bombers that hit the Japanese were within a few minutes of exceeding their loiter time as they ran out of fuel. Their directions had been imperfect and they spent most of their time flying over heavy clouds with no Japanese below them. The discovery of the Japanese fleet occurred after the initial decision to turn back. Naguno kept vacillating between attacks on Midway or attacks on the U.S. carriers and he had ordered the bombs changed (high explosive for land attack, armor piercing to attack ships) more than once, and in their haste to carry out the successive changes, the unloaded bombs were stacked on the deck instead of being returned to the magazine. It was the presence of so much live ammunition on the decks of the Japanese carriers that caused our fairly small number of bomb strikes to doom them. (You can chalk this up to bad command for Nagumo, but we still got lucky that he gave the specific orders he did.) When the Yorktown was struck, a followup reconnaissance by the Japanese identified it as a separate ship, so instead of continuing to search for the Enterprise and Hornet, the Japanese attacked the Yorktown again, leaving the other two carriers to launch a final, fatal blow against the last Japanese carrier. The U.S. forces fought Midway with intelligence, vigor, and incredible bravery (read some of the accounts of the torpedo attacks, especially in Martin Caidin’s (out of print) **Rugged, Ragged Warriors**. However, the overwhelming nature of the victory owed very much to luck. ---
**Author:** ![Spritle](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/5daacb/32.png) [@Spritle](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Spritle)\ **Post date:** [January 18, 2001, 3:25pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/22 "2001-01-18T15:25:45Z")
**Danimal** , thanks, you’re right; that’s what I was thinking of. **tomndebb** , point well made and taken. I read your first post with the lenses of “being able to get to that point”. Yes, Sara and Dipity were both there for the American fleet. 🙂 ---
**Author:** ![Boris\_B](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/fbc32d/32.png) [@Boris\_B](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Boris_B)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2001, 2:41am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/23 "2001-01-19T02:41:59Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Danimal \* > Weren’t _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ sunk by Japanese bombers? Though I’m not sure if _Repulse_ was technically a battleship or a battle cruiser (the distinction has always struck me as nebulous), _Prince of Wales_ was an honest-to-God _King George V_-class battleship. Yes. December 1941 was bad month for British battlewagons as well as U.S. Japanese aircraft did what the _Bismark_ couldn’t do - sink the _Prince of Wales_. _Repulse_ was a battlecruiser - much older than her companion. I think what allowed the USN to save so many battleships at Pearl Harbor was partly the shallowness of the water. The same ships sunk in 100 feet of water would have been total losses. ---
**Author:** ![DRY](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a87d85/32.png) [@DRY](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DRY)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2001, 7:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/24 "2001-01-19T07:04:42Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Danimal \* > \*\* > > > [@](#): > > > > \*Originally posted by justinh \* > > \*\*isnt it incredible how tough a battleship is? carriers sink like rocks. it seems it takes a battleship to sink another battleship. except the YAMATO and it was just disabled and later scuttled. the ARIZONA blew up when the magazine exploded but besides that they are just too stout and fast to beat. \*\* > > Weren’t _Prince of Wales_ and _Repulse_ sunk by Japanese bombers? Though I’m not sure if _Repulse_ was technically a battleship or a battle cruiser (the distinction has always struck me as nebulous), _Prince of Wales_ was an honest-to-God _King George V_-class battleship. \*\* I could very well be wrong about this, but wasn’t the _Musashi_ (sister ship of the _Yamato_) sunk by torpedos? Either from a bomber or a submarine. (I seem to recall the former.) **egkelly** –I don’t claim to be an expert, but I don’t believe an invasion of the Hawaiian islands by the Japanese was logistically feasible. Particularly when the Japanese were also actively trying to make territorial gains in Indonesia. As for Pearl Harbor, I don’t believe the Japanese could have forced the Americans to sue for peace, but they could have done even more damage had they bombed: –the oil tanks –the repair facilities –the airfields Nagumo did not know the whereabouts of the American carriers and overrode the suggestion that a second wave of bombers be launched. ---
**Author:** ![Danimal](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/bb73d2/32.png) [@Danimal](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Danimal)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2001, 2:29pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/25 "2001-01-19T14:29:56Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by DRY \* > I could very well be wrong about this, but wasn’t the _Musashi_ (sister ship of the _Yamato_) sunk by torpedos? Either from a bomber or a submarine. (I seem to recall the former.) > \*\* _Jane’s_ reports that _Musashi_ was sunk by U.S. aircraft at the battle of the Sibuyan Sea. [This website](http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-m/musashi.htm) reports that _Musashi_ took 19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits at Sibuyan Sea, capsized, and sank four hours later. While JustinH may have been exaggerating in thinking that it took a battleship to sink another battleship, I have to agree that it truly is impressive how much punishment it took to sink _Musashi._ Not many ships could have stayed afloat even for four hours after suffering that many high explosive impacts. ---
**Author:** ![justinh](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/j/9fc29f/32.png) [@justinh](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/justinh)\ **Post date:** [January 19, 2001, 2:37pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/26 "2001-01-19T14:37:14Z")
I guess I just remember the Bismark. and how it was not really sank in battle it was just disabled by the combined efforts of the navy and airforce. and the Germans scuttled it themselves. and how many bombs /torpedos were dumped on battleship row at Pearl with only destroying 1 battleship. that was my thought. they are so tough compared to a carrier/cruiser/destroyer… ---
**Author:** ![DRY](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/d/a87d85/32.png) [@DRY](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/DRY)\ **Post date:** [January 20, 2001, 12:24pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/27 "2001-01-20T12:24:35Z")
> [@](#): > > \*Originally posted by Danimal \* > \*\*_Jane’s_ reports that _Musashi_ was sunk by U.S. aircraft at the battle of the Sibuyan Sea. [This website](http://www.history.navy.mil/photos/sh-fornv/japan/japsh-m/musashi.htm) reports that _Musashi_ took 19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits at Sibuyan Sea, capsized, and sank four hours later. > > While JustinH may have been exaggerating in thinking that it took a battleship to sink another battleship, I have to agree that it truly is impressive how much punishment it took to sink _Musashi._ Not many ships could have stayed afloat even for four hours after suffering that many high explosive impacts. \*\* Thank you for the information, **Danimal**! I should make clear that I don’t disagree with **JustinH** ’s point, I only wished to find out that my recollection (read: My old fart memory) was correct. I was going to query whether the _Yamato_ was at Midway (I thought it wasn’t), but I saw that this was addressed already. 19 torpedo hits and 17 bomb hits is indeed a tremendous amount of damage! ---
**Author:** ![r2d6.51](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/r/54ee81/32.png) [@r2d6.51](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/r2d6.51)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2011, 7:19pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/28 "2011-05-31T19:19:31Z")
> [@Boris\_B](#): > > [DANFS: USS Lexington (CV-2)](http://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/USN/ships/dafs/CV/cv2.html) > Note that the above link is pretty flexible; change the little 2 to a 3 and you’ll go from Lexington to Saratoga, etc. > > On December 7th, 1941: > > _Lexington_ (CV-2) was en route from Pearl Harbor to Midway Island. > > _Saratoga_ (CV-3) was just entering San Diego. > > _Ranger_ (CV-4) was sailing to Norfolk from Trinidad. > > _Yorktown_ (CV-5) was in Norfolk (where she remained until the 16th) > > _Enterprise_ (CV-6) was en route to Hawaii from Wake Island. > > _Wasp_ (CV-7) was in Grassy Bay, which I think is in Bermuda > > _Hornet_ (CV-8) had been commissioned six weeks earlier, and was in Norfolk > > _Essex_ (CV-9) was launched seven months later and commissioned New Year’s Eve, 1942 (I mention her as a sort of “bookend”; I think the other bookend, _Langley_ (CV-1) had been decommissioned or relegated to training by this point). > > So only three of our CVs were in the Pacific at that point. Four were in the Atlantic, but three were moved quickly to the Pacific, leaving only Ranger (which missed the incredible carrier battles of the Pacific but supported Operation Torch in North Africa). It is interesting to speculate what would have happened had all Lexington, Enterprise, and Saratoga all been in Pearl Harbor that morning. > > Interesting fact: where were four of these carriers (CV-2 through CV-8) on December 7, _1942_? The bottom of the ocean. Only two carriers remained afloat in the Pacific (Saratoga and Enterprise, which had been damaged in the battles for Guadalcanal) until Essex arrived, and she didn’t see action until long after the battle of Guadalcanal was over. > > Trivia: CV-10 was also called _Yorktown_. She was laid down six days before the attack on Pearl Harbor, but before she was completed her namesake was sunk _doffs hat_ at the Battle of Midway before she was commissioned. The Straight Poop Very good straight dope & statistical references to what you cited. Yours was the most relevant as the amount of ignorance on PH is astounding but not surprising. 1. The fact is the Pacific War was won primarily through Naval Aviation(Carriers) & Amphibious Warfare Doctrine. Thus losing ships belonging to the Navy’s Gun Club had no real impact on determining the outcome of the war. It was Carrier Task Forces & Tough as naiils Marines who hit the beaches to take property back that kicked their ass back to Tokyo that won the day. 2. Had the Japs focused on destroying shore installations like the Tank Farm(Oil), Dry Dock & Repair Facilities would have done far more to set us back & give them more time to build Island strongpoints & secure more property for defending the largest chunk of the planets surface(Pacific Ocean domain) in the No. Pacific, Central. Pacific, So. Pacific,S.E. Asia., & Far East that the Pearl Harbor attack did nothing to alter the inevitable outcomeif for no other reason than for every 1 aircraft carriers they sink of ours, & the 1 we sink of theirs it takes the Japsa year to put 1 more at sea to our 10, so by 43’ it was all over but the shouting. 3. Simply look at the industrial might of the US & you’ll see we supplied nearly the entire war effort against all Axis powers for the Brit’s, the Aussies, the Soviets to a large degree due mainly by the extraordinary efforts by Russin people to completely remove from the floor foundation on up, every factory from the Industrial Region of Rosto on Don & Kharkov Industrial behemouth regions of the Soviet Union who mfg. The vast majority of Soviet Armored hardware that took Berlin in 45’ like the T-34 medium tank arguably the best overall tank of WWII & moved past the Ural mountains where they kept pumping them out like nobody’s business. But the US was then & still is the most productive workforce on the planet, & in the end is how wars are won, until you start launching 50 megaton Nukes that can destroy an entire 25 square mile area of land in a sgl. Stroke 7 when you have 30,000 of them like the Soviets & us have it becomes a moot point. Hence the Cold War. Nevertheless, what the Japs destroyed (because as tragic as it is to lose people they are always expendable) in Battleships & heavy floating cannon devices, did little if anything to determine the inevitable outcome. The Navy Gun Club in Battleships, & Heavy Cruisers played no strategic part in winning the Pacific war . They were however relegated to shore bombardment for tactical operations during Navy/Marine Corp.amphibious operations to take back occupied American or allied property (islands) but were no longer a strategic warfare asset as Naval Carrier Operations turned out to be. As for no one knowing what they were doing with Carrier Operations thats nonsense & clearly someone whose not researched or well read on the Pacific War as an ignorant joke of an answer. The Black shoe Navy Cannon Club who were still running thngs in WA DC would as time & attrition would weed them out of leadership billets in time, put Naval Aviators at the helm of NavOps, but Naval Aviation was esp. relevant and top strategic doctrine for offensive strategic operations by the mid 30’s where the Brits & Japs considered it a vital part of overall defense of the realm & taking the fight to the enemy doorstep, as it still is today. You can put an air force in operation anywhere on the planet in minutes to conduct all sorts of air ops.to destroy or defend targets for strategic development & doctrine. We were catching up & why so many carriers esp Jeep carriers were built during WW II. In the end we rolled over the Japs in the amount of Carriers we built & put to sea by late 43/44 then 45 over 100 in service; it was game over in the Pacific Ocean. NAV Air & Semper Fi Bulldogs won that war in the air over sea & the sandy beaches with Jarheads. Semper Fi Dude ---
**Author:** ![Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/e/7cd45c/32.png) [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Elendil_s_Heir)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2011, 7:50pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/29 "2011-05-31T19:50:18Z")
“Japs” is, uh, not the preferred nomenclature. ---
**Author:** ![engineer\_comp\_geek](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/engineer_comp_geek/32/504_2.png) [@engineer\_comp\_geek](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/engineer_comp_geek)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2011, 7:56pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/30 "2011-05-31T19:56:39Z")
r2d6.51, did you realize that you were dragging up a thread that is more than 10 years old? Most of the original thread participants are no longer around. ---
**Author:** ![mlees](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/ba8739/32.png) [@mlees](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mlees)\ **Post date:** [May 31, 2011, 8:52pm UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/31 "2011-05-31T20:52:17Z")
> [@r2d6.51](#): > > It was Carrier Task Forces & Tough as naiils Marines who hit the beaches to take property back that kicked their ass back to Tokyo that won the day. Nitpick: The Silent Service (not yet employing zombies) had something to do with victory, too. 😉 Subs sank half of the Japanese merchant fleet, crippling their ability to supply their forces overseas, and their ability to bring the conquered resources home. Both Germany and Japan underestimated the U.S.'s production potential. I don’t know what metrics they had available to measure the U.S.'s potential threat, in that regard, in the 30’s. The mobilisation of the U.S. industry was staggering. War Plan Orange, the plan drawn up by the U.S. interwar planners, foresaw the island hopping campaign that actually came about. (With CVs instead of BBs.) “Gun Club” v. Carriers was not really that important of a debate. The Japanese thought that they could carve out and defend a huge Pacific perimeter. The problem with this plan was that the Allies could pick and choose where to attack, and bring all the forces they cared to commit to bear on one targeted area, while the Japanese would be eventually relegated to a reactive defense, which turned out to be the weaker plan. > [@engineer\_comp\_geek](#): > > r2d6.51, did you realize that you were dragging up a thread that is more than 10 years old? Most of the original thread participants are no longer around. I blame Memorial Day. ---
**Author:** ![Sailboat](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/sailboat/32/461_2.png) [@Sailboat](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Sailboat)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 4:15am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/32 "2011-06-01T04:15:20Z")
> [@justinh](#): > > I know 7 battleships were damaged/sunk but sinking a battle ship in 30 ft of water is not that big a deal. I doubt most other countries would have been able to raise and refit the battleships. The recovery effort was pretty remarkable. ---
**Author:** ![Snnipe\_70E](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/s/b5a626/32.png) [@Snnipe\_70E](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Snnipe_70E)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 4:53am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/33 "2011-06-01T04:53:54Z")
> [@egkelly](#): > > Could the japanese have followed up the Pearl Harbor raid with an invasion? As I understand it, General Short had almost a complete Army division on Oahue-but what about the other islands? Seems to me yamamote should have told Tojo to plan a limited invasion of the Hawaiain Islands. That would have kept the US Navy in San Diego for most of the war! I read one of those alternative history books several years ago. In the book the invasion of the Islands started the next day. The six carriers and the main batle group continued and were accompanied by an landing group. After a 3 wave on December 7th. the carriers kept up a CAP to take out the US carriers and the battleships shelled the islands to finish the defences. It left the US having to mount a counter attack from the west coast. ---
**Author:** ![mac\_bolan00](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/m/b3f665/32.png) [@mac\_bolan00](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/mac_bolan00)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:04am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/34 "2011-06-01T05:04:46Z")
pearl harbor, coral sea and specially midway taught carrier boys one crucial lesson: at the break of dawn, make sure you put in the first strike. if you do, you’re likely to win the battle before the day’s over. that was nagumo’s decisive failure at midway. twas his fault, not careless codes, not poor operations planning, not over-confidence, not luck. ---
**Author:** ![Boyo\_Jim](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/87869e/32.png) [@Boyo\_Jim](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Boyo_Jim)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:38am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/35 "2011-06-01T05:38:01Z")
> [@tomndebb](#): > > …The U.S. forces fought Midway with intelligence, vigor, and incredible bravery (read some of the accounts of the torpedo attacks, especially in Martin Caidin’s (out of print) **Rugged, Ragged Warriors**. However, the overwhelming nature of the victory owed very much to luck. I have a ragged copy of this excellent book somewhere on my shelves. It covers the Army Air Force during the first year or so of the war, when they were fighting with obsolete and inadequate… everything. There’s also chapters on Singapore, the AVG and the Japanese assault on Burma. I think I was most surprised to learn that the British had gotten a squadron of Spitfires to Singapore, and the British were certain they would now be safe from Japanese airstrikes. The Japanese in their Zeros shot them all down in just a couple of days. Almost forgot, it has an excellent section on the Pearl Harbor attack, and the lesser known battles that took place in the following months in the Philippines. Something I’ve read about the loss of American battleship was that it turned out to be a blessing in disguise. No one really understood it yet, but the battleship was a dinosaur and in the future would be almost useless for anything other than shore bombardment. Their loss forced the Navy to restructure their strategy and tactics around carriers, which were the only capital ships they had left, and it was what they should have been doing anyway. ---
**Author:** ![Bartman](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/779978/32.png) [@Bartman](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Bartman)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:40am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/36 "2011-06-01T05:40:39Z")
> [@Snnipe\_70E](#): > > I read one of those alternative history books several years ago. In the book the invasion of the Islands started the next day. The six carriers and the main batle group continued and were accompanied by an landing group. After a 3 wave on December 7th. the carriers kept up a CAP to take out the US carriers and the battleships shelled the islands to finish the defences. > > It left the US having to mount a counter attack from the west coast. That would be a bit unlikely. Hawaii was a low priority target. The goal of attacking Pearl was to neutralize the US fleet so they Japanese could conquer the “Southern Resource Areas” (mostly the Dutch East Indies). It was simply a raid to secure the west flank from American action, while the real attacks were going on. The Japanese had the ability to ship and supply by sea what? around 11 divisions total? Invading Oahu alone would require at least one division and more likely something closer to three divisions. So to take Hawaii the Japanese would have to delay or scratch the Malaya or Philippines invasions. Which means they can’t take the Dutch East Indies. And as the whole point of the exercise was to secure the Dutch East Indies, taking Hawaii is worse than pointless. It is a distraction from the vital oil fields the whole war was started to gain. Add in the fact that Nagumo was basically out of fuel by the end of the 7th, and the idea of an immediate invasion becomes even more impractical. The kind of logistics train Nagumo would need to keep station off of Hawaii was simply unavailable to the Japanese. ---
**Author:** ![Boyo\_Jim](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/87869e/32.png) [@Boyo\_Jim](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Boyo_Jim)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:50am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/37 "2011-06-01T05:50:59Z")
> [@mac\_bolan00](#): > > pearl harbor, coral sea and specially midway taught carrier boys one crucial lesson: at the break of dawn, make sure you put in the first strike. if you do, you’re likely to win the battle before the day’s over. > > that was nagumo’s decisive failure at midway. twas his fault, not careless codes, not poor operations planning, not over-confidence, not luck. He got in the first strike, but against the wrong target – Midway Island. The American carriers weren’t expected in the area for at least another day or two. The Japanese had launched a diversionary attack against the Aleutian Islands, and they expected the American to race north to deal with it. They expected to have taken Midway before any significant American naval forces were in the neighborhood. Because of the code breaking, the Americans just ignored the feint, and were waiting iat Midway in advance. I’ve also read some speculation that if the Japanese had just sent all their forces to Midway instead of splitting them, there’s a very good chance they would have won despite the American ambush. The Aleutian attack was supported by two large carriers and other substantial surface forces. It’s an interesting question what would have happened had they had six carriers rather than four at Midway. The Americans had three, though I believe the American carriers could hold substantially larger numbers of planes than their Japanese counterparts. ---
**Author:** ![Tim\_T-Bonham.net](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/t/46a35a/32.png) [@Tim\_T-Bonham.net](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Tim_T-Bonham.net)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/38 "2011-06-01T05:51:50Z")
> [@Elendil\_s\_Heir](#): > > “Japs” is, uh, not the preferred nomenclature. True, but as this is not the Pit, we can’t use the nomenclature that is most appropriate. ---
**Author:** ![Askance](https://sea3.discourse-cdn.com/straightdope/user_avatar/boards.straightdope.com/askance/32/8281_2.png) [@Askance](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Askance)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 5:51am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/39 "2011-06-01T05:51:59Z")
> [@DRY](#): > > Nagumo did not know the whereabouts of the American carriers and overrode the suggestion that a second wave of bombers be launched. There _were_ two waves or strikes launched at Pearl. What was at issue was a _third_ strike, which would have exhausted pretty much all aviation fuel and armament on the strike fleet and left it vulnerable to a counter-strike from land or carrier planes. In retrospect neither were likely but there was no way of the Japanese knowing that. Also the returning planes would have had to have landed at night. IMO bombing the airfields and fuel tanks at Pearl would not (_pace_ Nimitz and Yamamoto) have had any significant strategic effect. By this time the British were repairing airfields within hours of a Luftwaffe raid, and the last thing the US was short of was fuel. The submarine base and cryptanalysis unit there would have been far more damaging losses, but were not designated targets. ---
**Author:** ![Boyo\_Jim](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/b/87869e/32.png) [@Boyo\_Jim](https://boards.straightdope.com/u/Boyo_Jim)\ **Post date:** [June 1, 2011, 6:03am UTC](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559/40 "2011-06-01T06:03:15Z")
> [@Askance](#): > > There _were_ two waves or strikes launched at Pearl. What was at issue was a _third_ strike, which would have exhausted pretty much all aviation fuel and armament on the strike fleet and left it vulnerable to a counter-strike from land or carrier planes. In retrospect neither were likely but there was no way of the Japanese knowing that. Also the returning planes would have had to have landed at night. > > IMO bombing the airfields and fuel tanks at Pearl would not (_pace_ Nimitz and Yamamoto) have had any significant strategic effect. By this time the British were repairing airfields within hours of a Luftwaffe raid, and the last thing the US was short of was fuel. The submarine base and cryptanalysis unit there would have been far more damaging losses, but were not designated targets. The airfields weren’t particularly important, but the fuel storage tanks were. IIRC, they had enough for the Navy’s needs for several months of operations. It would have taken a long time to replace that stock one tanker at a time, especially when we were about to start losing tankers like crazy in both oceans over the next several months. [Previous page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559.md?page=1) [Next page](https://boards.straightdope.com/t/wwii-pearl-harbor-attack-results/50559.md?page=3)