The problem with this statement is that it is self-justifying; he’s an authority, therefore his ideas are right. In the hard sciences nearly every prior authority has been at least partially wrong, and often enough dramatically wrong. Consider, for instance, Aristotle, whose theories on mechanics, chemistry, biology, and medicine were, while innovative, often far afield from what we currently hold as working theories. One could argue that Albert Einstein was, in the public consciousness, the most influential physicist of the Twentieth Century, but when it came to his ideas about quantum mechanics and hidden variables he turned out to be utterly wrong. The Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen paradox, intended to debase quantum theory, instead resulted in demonstrating the viability of the statistical theory. Relativity itself is likely to be seriously revised when a successful theory of quantum gravity is recognized (although the overall macroscale rules of GR will probably remain consistent with our observations).
With specific regard to the Chomskian theory of Universal Grammar (which is the crown jewel in Chomsky’s career and reputation) there are significant reasons to believe that it simply isn’t true, or at least, not as absolute as Chomsky claims. For instance, see John Colapinto’s article, “The Interpreter” (The New Yorker, 16 April 2007). Field Linguist Dan Everett–a trained Chomskian linquistic reserarcher–discovered a tribe of people in Brazil whose language simple doesn’t conform to the precips of UG, and specifically the concept of recursion. (The Piraha do not use recursion or allusion to refer to or ideate analogues.) Noted cognitive scientist Stephen Pinker–also an MIT faculty member–considers this “a bomb thrown into the party” of Universal Grammar and the devotees of Noam Chomsky, and it is not an isolated example (though, due to geographic and social isolation, one of the most extreme and unpolluted).
Chomsky has instigated some interested ideas and lines of inquiry, but it is likely that his specific theories will be found to be false, or at least, only superficially accurate. Today’s authority is tomorrow’s discarded crackpot. See the unfortuante Jean-Baptiste Lamarck (who proposed the now-discarded notion of inheritance of acquired characteristics) as another example.
Nonsense. Simply being a contrarian doesn’t by default make one smart or true. It is useful that he provides an antipodean view (even if it is wrong) because it prompts one to critically consider the validity of the accepted wisdom, but that doesn’t make him right, and he is far more often wrong in his demonstrable facts than he should be, particularly for one regarded as an authority. His views on the Vietnam war, for instance, were often as woefully misinformed as those he was challenging. A better example of respectable contrarianism is Christopher Hitchens, who at least makes the effort to fact-check his details even as he is telling his particular spin on the story.
Stranger