Should voting machine manufacturers have security clearances?

Great Debates
1

While perusing Slashdot about Diebold’s threatened withdrawl from North Carolina (because they’d actually have to reveal the source code in their voting machines, the horror), I stumbled across this message, which documents the backgrounds of the Diebold Election Systems division (formerly GEMS, Global Election Machine Systems) top dogs:
[ul]
[li]Norton Cooper (1988 founder, GEMS) – Convicted of political corruption in 1974. In jail for a year in the 1980s for fraud against the Canada government. Ordered out of stock pitch schemes and was part of the collapse of the Vancouver stock exchange.[/li][li]Charles Hong Lee (1988 founder, GEMS) – Real estate fraud; defrauding Chinese immigrants; aided Cooper in stock pitching schemes.[/li][li]Michael K. Graye (1988 founder, GEMS) – Stole $18 million from three companies in the '80s, jailed for stock fraud in the '90s. Arrested for tax evasion and money laundering in 1994. Currently in Canadian jail.[/li][li]John Elder – ran ballot printing plant for GEMS/Diebold. Convicted of cocaine trafficking in the '90s.[/li][li]Jeffrey Dean (computer consultant and programmer) – Convicted of 23 counts of computer-aided embezzlement, defrauded a law firm of $450,000. Full employee and lead programmer for the GEMS vote-tally product as of October 2000. Quit in 2002 and immediately re-hired, perhaps as an effort to hide his criminal past.[/li][/ul]
A quick check with Google (and the resources at Black Box Voting.org) confirms much of this information, so I’m assuming it’s not just random slander.

Putting aside the question of whether or not you should trust a Diebold voting machine any further than you can throw a Hummer H2 (I sure wouldn’t), this begs the question of why people with such… colorful… backgrounds are allowed anywhere near the development and/or operation of electronic voting machines. As someone who works on military computer systems and software, I feel safe to say that none of these guys would be allowed to do anything more sensitive than cleaning out the restrooms at my place-of-employment, since their backgrounds simply scream Unreliable Security Risk™ in seventeen different languages. Having these guys in positions of power is wrong on so many levels.

Which begs the simple question: given that fair and proper elections are (well, supposed to, anyway) arguably the most important thing in a democratic society, shouldn’t we – as in the voting populace – demand the same level of security clearances and vouchsafes that we give to our other sensitive computer software/hardware? Or is this all just an admission that our “open elections” are a sham, and that our election results are in the hands of naked partisans?

2

I don’t know why we need to use voting machines at all.

I can’t comment on the “naked partisan” article because I only saw 1-2 direct quotes and I’ve seen far too many quotes taken out of context such that their meaning changes fundamentally when you get the full picture. I make it a policy not to put any weight in quotes that have apparently been cherry picked or speech somewhere.

3

should have been “cherry picked out of an interview or speech somewhere.”

4

…just picturing a slim woman wearing a beret and tight skirt, passing information to the Allies through her Resistance cell…
…mmmmm… naked partisan…

5

Well, Diebold is the largest manufacturer of ATMs, and voting machines can superficially be considered to have similar security requirements. I can understand why they’d be the first company to be thought of.

Ed

6

Considering that in light of the OP’s revelations about Diebold’s standards for hiring programmers . . .

:eek:

7

I don’t either, but given that they don’t seem to be going away any time soon (and that some folks are really gung-ho about getting them in place ASAP), I think it’s reasonable to ask about the level of trustworthiness of the folks making them.