The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, the notorious agreement between Nazi Germany and the USSR, enacted on the eve of WWII, makes little sense to me. More specifically, I take it as a given that both sides knew the pact was worthless, and would be violated at some point. With that in mind, what was in it for Stalin? And for that matter, what did Hitler have to gain by signing it?
Rephrasing slightly, I’ll say that neither side could depend on the provisions of the pact, especially with respect to its most sensational component - the promise of non-aggression. Why bother to sign it, then? It most surely didn’t guarantee peace with the other the side, and, if anything, engendered a huge amount of ill will against, and loss of support for, the USSR by its many sympathizers and apologists from around the globe (sympathizers who could have been valuable as pro-Soviet lobbyists in their respective countries and who might also have been a rich supply of intelligence as developments unfolded).
So, my question again: Why did Stalin sign this pact? And, while we’re at it, why did Hitler?
The short answer, I think, is that it was much easier for Russia and Germany to proceed with the partition of Poland by agreement. (BTW, Russia’s moving into Poland was obviously “good” for the Allied side, at least if one agrees Russia would eventually be an Ally.)
The Wiki article you cite claims:
This implies a one-sided view of Allied-Soviet negotiations in 1939. Churchill gives the opposite spin, writing about an April 1939 meeting in Moscow:
Is Churchill’s view to be accepted without question? No. Would I give more credence to a Wikipedia editor than to Churchill? Absolutely not.
Stalin was in total denial when the German attack came, so he must have thought he had gained a lot more time than he did. Also, this time was actually useful: everything starting with number of divisions was better in Red army in 1941 compared to 1939. His thinking why Hitler won’t attack him seems to be close to what actually happened: the German get beaten in a two front war. I’m sure he didn’t think it could get that close.
It seems that his genuine thought was that the capitalist-nazi war would exhaust both of them leaving the way for a European wide communist state. Considering how disruptive stalemate WWI had been for so long, this is not a stupid idea (except for the part where you try to occupy the whole of Europe). He wanted to wait it out, he will simply attack the exhausted winner. I think it’s good evil thinking from his part.
As for Hitler, he thought after the Munich agreement that the West would not go to war over Poland. I don’t know if he at this phase wanted anything else than lebensraum in Poland. He had no border with Russia so he could not invade it. Also, being a politician, gaining the lost area in 1918 gained him the celebrating masses. He did not want a WW. He wanted European dominance, but not thru WW. He did not know yet that blitzkrieg can conquer countries in a matter of weeks.
Germany’s bête noire was a two-front war, where they’d be forced to fight Russia and France (or the equivalent) simultaneously. Hitler’s policy, hitherto successful, was to hit his enemies one at a time. The Pact enabled him to eliminate Stalin as a potential threat, until he was ready to make him a victim.
For his part, Stalin was looking for two things: 1. If you visualize pre-war Poland as an abstract cartoon of a turkey, with the Polish Corridor its head and neck. the “tail” – rhe part northeast of the Brest-Litovsk line – was predominantly Belarussian, won from what would be the Soviet Union by Poland in the war of 1919-20. Likewise, the “turkey’s rump” was mostly Ukrainian. And these two peoples were integral to his economy; he needed their support, and he knew it. Hence, recovering Belarussia i Ukrainia Irredenta was crucial to his plans. And 2. He already knew he needed to buy time to bring the USSR up to a war footing on an even keel with the other Great Powers. The Winter War with Finland would shortly telegraph home to him how very much he needed to do in this regard, after the purges and other politically motivated decisions of the Thirties, but he was already aware, as tensions had been growing, that he needed to buy time to build a war economy.
Well, that depends. Stalin was so determined to keep these new lands that he insisted on keeping troops as far forward as possible, defending every bend of the new frontier. When Germany finally struck, this thin, continuous front was pierced in multiple places and the forward-positioned forces were surrounded and cut off, often on the ground newly seized from Poland.
It’s a subjective exercise to weigh how much of the disastrous Soviet defense is due to the psychological effect the new territory exerted on Stalin, but an argument could be made that the new lands dazzled Stalin into a riskier defensive posture.
Regarding the OP: much of what’s been posted by Polycarp, Walther Ego, and septimus sounds insightful to me, but I’ll also add that Stalin’s personality showed a curious (in light of what we now know about him) respect for legalism. Not just in the war, either. In his whole career, murderous and shifty as it was, he often abided by the letter of agreements (although not the spirit) even when it wasn’t obviously to his advantage. Sometimes he would refuse to make an agreement, reserving his right to act in his own interest, in situations where one imagines Hitler would have cheerfully signed without any intention of honoring. Then Stalin would go ahead and do what he wanted to do, and be a bad guy, but somehow he had not actually broken a promise…because he hadn’t made one.
He also placed considerable emphasis on getting others to sign, and on “getting it in writing” generally. I don’t mean to over-emphasize this trait of his, but it’s definitely detectable when reading about him.
I don’t doubt that he was a realist who did not expect everyone to keep their word, and I have no illusions he was a good guy, so it’s hard to explain. Maybe he felt that, even though they were breakable, signed treaties made his country or his rule slightly safer from the democracies. Maybe he was just “lawful evil.” It’s an intriguing part of his (otherwise generally sociopathic) character.
Revenge. Stalin got half of Poland. Stalin was commander of the southern front in the Soviet-Polish war of 1919-1921. He refused to help Trotsky’ northern strategy of capturing Warsaw and as a result the Soviets lost on both fronts. Trotsky blamed Stalin and later on Stalin go revenge by having Trotsky assassinated and thousands of Poles massacred at the Katyn Forest and the Warsaw rebellion during World War II by refusing to assist them.
He hoped the fascists and the capitalists would fight each other to mutual exhaustion. He was appalled at how short the 1940 campaigns in the West turned out to be.
He got more than just half of Poland. He was guaranteed a free hand in the Baltic States (which he invaded and forced into the Soviet Union), Finland (which he invaded and failed to force into the Soviet Union), and Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina (which he forced Romania to give the Soviet Union). He also got a commercial treaty with Germany.
I think this is one of the key differences between Stalin and Hitler. Stalin was an unrepentently evil son of a bitch - but he was also capable of recognizing circumstances in which acting like an evil son of a bitch would threaten his hold on power. This was, of course, the only thing he gave a damn about, and so in those circumstances he was capable of constraining himself. He didn’t do it perfectly - witness the military purges, for example. But Stalin was capable of recognizing things like “if no one can rely on their treaties with the USSR, then the risk of accidental war at a time and place not of my choosing goes up”, and “if my generals (whom I haven’t purged) give me advice, I should listen to it.”
I wouldn’t call Stalin “lawful evil” - but “thoughtful evil” might not be a bad description.
This is a good example of what I was getting at in the OP. All the things you mention (except the commercial treaty) were ‘on paper’ only and, as events showed for example, he didn’t get the Baltics without first dislodging the pact-breaking Nazis. In other words, the “guarantees” of the agreement were worthless in terms of territorial aspirations/protections.
This is a major point. Everybody, including the Germans, were surprised at how quickly the war in the west ended. Stalin almost certainly didn’t expect that France would be defeated within ten months of his signing the pact with Hitler in 1939. Heck, most people thought Poland would be able to hold out for about a year.
Stalin probably figured he was safe until at least 1944. By then he’d have brought his army up to full strength. Germany, France, and the United Kingdom would be exhausted by years of fighting in the west like they had been in 1918. The Soviet Union could then step in with its fresh forces and overrun Eastern Europe on the cheap.
Technically the 1939 pact gave the USSR hegemony over Estonia and Latvia, but reserved Lithuania to Germany. This did not, however, stop Stalin from annexing the latter in 1940.
Um, no. Soviet infiltrators put pressure on the Baltic States’ governments to sign agreements binding their nations closely to the USSR – followed by a change in ministries to one that ‘freely requested’ annexation by the USSR. (Sneer quotes intentional in this context.) Much of the Estonian, Latvian, and Lithuanian ethnic cultural and political leadership found its horizons broadened by the cultural wonders of Siberia. This was 1940.
Then, in 1941, the Wehrmacht rolled in and made them part of Ostland Protectorate. When the Red Army liberated them in 1944-45, they resumed the role of SSRs largely doing what Moscow wanted.
Probably a bit more of a nitpick than a substantial criticism of your point – but in point of fact Stalin DID implement the Pact against them first, before Hitler’s invasion.
<sigh> Not much to add except that every time I think of the history of Eastern Europe between 1930 and 1955 I get depressed. Being brave and freedom loving apparently didn’t count for squat when faced with the real-life version of Sauron and a horde of 20,000,000 orcs, with no magic ring to save the day. If you opposed Stalin you died.
Correct me if I’m wrong, but I believe the reason for this was that the German invasion of Poland having been much faster than expected, the Soviet Union hadn’t been able to occupy as much of it as planned. For example, Warsaw, which was supposed to be occupied by the Soviet Union, was instead occupied by Germany. So the pact was revised to give Lithuania to the Soviet Union (except for some parts which Germany really wanted).
Stalin knew that he was going to fight Hitler at some point, but he needed time to rebuild his army officer corps (he had murdered most of the army officers above the rank of major in the 1930’s purges).
He thought that the treaty was a signal that Hitler would leave him alone for 5-10 years…by that time, the Red Army would be up to snuff, with politically reliable officers, modern tanks, and airforce.
Stalin was also supplying Germany with raw materials, oil, and foodstuffs-and thought this gave him some leverage over Hitler.
Ultimately, bot Fascism and Communism would have to fight to the death-Hitler was VERY clear about this, from his “Mein Kampf” days.
In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement of the areas belonging to the Polish state, the spheres of influence of Germany and the U.S.S.R. shall be bounded approximately by the line of the rivers Narev, Vistula and San.
