So in this Pit thread there’s a discussion about the violent protest, sparked by Pastor Jones’ burning of a Koran, that killed at least 12 people at a UN outpost in Afghanistan. Specifically, there’s a dispute about whether and to what degree Jones bears moral responsibility for the deaths. I’m starting this thread because I wanted to raise the issue in the context of a broader ethical idea (and also so that there will be a non-Pit thread on the topic).
To start: Of course Pastor Jones is morally responsible for these deaths.
Why? All he did was burn some paper; it was these other guys that did the killing. These deaths weren’t his goal – in fact, it was exactly this sort of behavior that Jones was protesting. So, how is this his fault?
Because we bear responsibility for the reasonably foreseeable consequences of our actions (to the degree that they were, in fact, reasonably foreseeable). I hope no one will object that I take it as given that these deaths easily fit that criteria.
Doesn’t that absolve the actual murderers of (at least some degree of) responsibility?
No, because morality isn’t zero sum. They can be *fully *responsible for the deaths without being *solely *responsible.
**But we’re each responsible for our own actions, not for the despicable acts of others! **
Exactly, we’re each responsible for our own actions. Only superficially was Jones’ act “just” the burning of a book. The action of his own for which Pastor Jones is responsible is this: indirectly – but knowingly and recklessly – causing the deaths of innocent people.
In and of itself, it doesn’t matter that it was indirectly, nor that his action could have easily caused zero deaths – for instance, one can not absolve oneself of a murder by mailing a letter bomb with faulty wiring that may or may not detonate. (It DOES matter that these deaths were not Jones’ goal, but only to the extent that that makes this something other than “murder.”)
In any killing/death, there are going to be intermediaries between the ultimate and proximate causes. These can be as flimsy as “the knife in his chest killed him, not me” to the most complex and impenetrable chaos theory scenarios. What matters isn’t the number or type of intermediaries which buffer the consequences, but only the extent to which the intermediaries *obscure *said consequences. If I knowingly do something which puts the lives of others at risk, it makes no difference whether the intermediary is a volatile explosive in the trunk of another’s car, or a volatile crowd which is prone to murder at the kind of provocation I intend.
But that means that our decisions will be held endlessly hostage by the threats of the most unreasonable, intrusive, and violent people among us.
Not at all, because of course the possibility of an incitement to murder is never the only possible ethical consideration. At some point we have to honor our own ideals (or just get on with our own lives) and accept that doing so *may *cause *some *marginal deaths, because the alternative would be worse. You’d still be responsible for the deaths, because they must factor into your moral calculus, but your action can be honorable nonetheless because of other, greater concerns.
If you want to argue that Pastor Jones was within his (moral) rights to burn that Koran, then, you have to argue that the benefits to his action outweighed the known likely consequences.
But they clearly do not. He wasn’t doing anything noble or worthwhile; his actions are analogous to burning the flag outside of a VFW and thus getting the crap kicked out of … some innocent bystander. To put it bluntly, it’s just a dick move with all-around horrible consequences. He’s not just responsible, he’s culpable.
But even if that were all true, why do some people focus their anger on Pastor Jones instead of the people who were directly responsible for the deaths and who, surely, are guilty of the greater crime?
Because their responsibility is pedestrian and obvious, and therefore uninteresting. Because no one disputes their responsibility, and so nothing more is required than to acknowledge it in passing. Because many people don’t recognize Jones’ culpability, and ought to be corrected. Finally, because Jones is one of us, and, to be honest, though I know I shouldn’t, I therefore expect more out of him.