Not a Commonwealth country, or direct military aid, but the French gave the UK info (final para of the Falklands War section) on their Exocet missiles to lessen their effectiveness, and apparently also cancelled or delayed sales of them to Peru, in case they were passed on to Argentina.
Not that it helps much, by Lawrence Freedman’s The Official History of the Falklands Campaign does not seem, at a casual glance, that much of anything was either asked by the British or offered by Commonwealth or NATO countries in ways of direct support. Freedman notes that New Zealand offered a frigate to release a RN ship from duties elsewhere (p. 421) and that the threat of direct Australian and NZ involvement was briefly suggested as a disinformation to be supplied to Argentinian spies. However, a fairly large number of foreign citizens served in British forces, including Australian airmen in the Vulcan raids.
OK, thanks!
$20.68 for a paperback? WTF?
$13.40 in India at present exchange rates.
BTW, I recently read this about the USS Iwo Jima. Quite surprising!: USS Iwo Jima (LPH-2) - Wikipedia
Interesting . In One Hundred Days Admiral Woodward describes the loss of a carrier as his biggest fear, since it would render the operation impossible. This contingency was not mentioned .
Another vote for the Jenkins/Hastings book. Listened to it in the past month, very good. Covers not just the conflict but a very good account of the run up to it. The Sandy Woodwood book is also good for a personal perspective on the campaign. Might be hard to get hold of however.
Two ways to look at it. Many Commonwealth countries were represented in the war by virtue of being in the UK Forces - over 10% of the UK military were non-UK born. Special Forces, for example, always tend to have a sprinking of Fijians. Plus there are always on going secondments between the Anglo-speaking nations.
Nationally, you can’t ask another country to go to war over an Island in the South Atlantic. That doesn’t mean all resources desired weren’t forthcoming, of course they were.
Chris Parry’s Down South is well worth reading for the perspective of a junior officer. He was a helicopter observer. He took part in the assault on South Georgia and made the initial attack on the Santa Fe.
Bumped.
Just finished it (on the anniversary of the Argentine surrender, as it happens), and highly recommend it. Well-researched, not afraid to point out mistakes by both the Brits and the Argies, and some of the wittiest, most engaging writing in any history book I’ve ever read. The authors cover the political, diplomatic and military aspects of the conflict with equal skill.
Just as a side note: Alternate History author Marc Jones has a short novel titled The Fireflies of Port Stanley that speculates how the war might have been different if three British Firefly* tanks had been sent to Port Stanley back in 1953.
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- Fireflies were up-gunned Shermans, with the standard 75mm gun replaced with a much more powerful 17 pound gun.
Just started reading it now.
Hastings and Jenkins, or Jones?
Jones. I think he’s rather optimistic about the accuracy of the tank gunners, but it is dramatic license!
I’ve read Hastings & Jenkins’ work several times, as well as a couple of others like Ward’s Sea Harrier book and Parry’s Down South, the latter of which I mentioned above. My uncle was out there too.
Especially considering none of them had been trained on that tank! But yeah, call it dramatic license for the sake of the yarn.
Jeanne Kirkpatrick does not come off well in this tale.
Hastings and Jenkins write that she tilted far more to the Argentines than to the British, and was made grumpy by the Reagan White House and State Department’s vacillations (including conflicting and poorly-timed instructions for a key UN Security Council vote).
Just finished this, and really liked it. Having spent most of his career in submarines, Adm. Woodward got the Commander Battle Group gig largely because he was the closest senior naval officer to the Falklands - on maneuvers off Gibraltar - when the Argentines invaded. He discusses the difficulties of protecting his fleet, juggling limited resources, trying to guess what the Argentines would do next, and dealing with casualties, logistics problems, bad weather, mechanical breakdowns and unreliable missile systems. He’s surprisingly forthright about his own shortcomings (snappish when tired, too easily frustrated with what seemed like slowness/incompetence by the RAF and Army, and less than gifted in dealing with the press).
A great book.
The Lessons of Modern War series are interesting as they enter into the technical side of things. Volume 3 deals with the Soviet Afghan campaign and the Falklands.