Reposted from forever ago
tldr:
The best the US intelligence Community could come up with was that the Iraqi WMD to Syria story seems unlikely, we don’t have corroborating evidence for it, but we can’t completely rule it out.
THE IRAQI DOCUMENTS: A GLIMPSE INTO THE
REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION
APRIL 6, 2006
Serial No. 109–184
Brigadier General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Usa, Director, Joint Center For Operational Analysis, United States Joint Forces Command
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Woods, Usa (Ret.), Project Leader And Principal Author Of Iraqi Perspective Project, United States Joint Forces Command*The Iraqi Perspective Project is a research effort conducted by United States Joint Forces Command, specifically the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and it focuses on Operation Iraqi Freedom in the time period from March to May 2003.
Using information gathered through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders during the fall and winter of 2003–2004, and making use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, we have a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drive our opponents’ decision.
Now, to accomplish this, the project leader, Kevin Woods, led a small team of professionals in a systematic 2-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the first major product of that effort.
Essentially, Kevin and his team crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision making process. Moreover, we believe it goes a long way toward revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from an insiders’ point of view.
The overall objective of the project was to learn the right lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and while the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing feature of the U.S. Military, **in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a ‘‘blue’’ or a friendly view of what happened.
While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions.**
In this case, by shedding light on the actual ‘‘red team’s view,’’ this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war.
It should be noted that this is the first such effort by the United States Government since World War II, when the United States conducted a comprehensive review of recovered German and Japanese documents, as well as interviews with key military and civilian leadership of our former enemies.
Though this is an important first step, we acknowledge that our understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom remains incomplete.*
The second assumption that Saddam made had to do with the nature of his opponents. Through the distortions of his ideological perceptions, Saddam simply could not take the Americans seriously. After all, had they not run away from Vietnam after suffering what to him was a ‘‘mere’’ 58,000 dead? Iraq had suffered 51,000 dead in just one battle on the Fao Peninsula against the Iranians. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Americans had appeared on the brink of destroying much of Iraq’s military, including the Republican Guard, but then inexplicably stopped—for fear of casualties, in Saddam’s view. Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all added to Saddam’s belief that the Americans could not possibly launch a ground invasion that would seriously threaten his regime. At best they might be willing to launch an air campaign similar to OPERATION DESERT FOX in 1998 with a few small ground attacks around Iraq’s periphery. But from Saddam’s point of view, the idea that the Americans would attack all the way to Baghdad appeared ludicrous.
A few senior military officers believed that the coalition might launch a ground campaign, especially given the enormous buildup that was taking place in Kuwait. But even they believed that as in OPERATION DESERT STORM, the Americans would wage a sustained air campaign before they launched their ground forces on an invasion of Iraq. Therefore, the entire Iraqi leadership—military and civilian— was surprised by Coalition ground forces beginning their offensive into Iraq at the same time the air campaign was starting. Adding to their incomprehension were the speed and power of the American offensive, which were simply beyond their understanding of military operations and logistical capabilities.
nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition either
The guy pimping the WMD to Syria story says that the United States’ Defense Intelligence Agency thinks the story is B.S.
About Jack Shaw, Another Presenter at the Summit
Mr. Shaw said he acquired his intel about Iraq’s WMD going to Syria from a “good friend” of Dick Cheney’s and that this info was derided by the DIA as [COLOR=Red]“Israeli disinformation.” After the Shaw launched the story, the Fox news reported “it isn’t clear how this person has the authority or the knowledge to speak on such a matter.”
In the recent past, it seemed that Jack Shaw did some illegal and questionable things. But, then a DoD press release seemed to have cleared him. Subsequently, the exonerating press release had to be pulled because “information has become available that indicates it may not have been accurate at the time it was issued. The matter is under review to determine the facts and circumstances involving the information contained in the original release.”
AFAICT, the DoD page revoking the exoneration was last updated 2005-08-25.
Coincidentally, the previously cited article about what prompted the FBI to investigate the actions of Mr. Shaw mentioned the port of Umm al Qasr. At the Summit, Mr. Shaw also mentioned port of Umm al Qasr. He said there were floodable storage areas in Qasr that had held WMD. He also said that in Umm al Qasr, the Soviets loaded Iraqi WMD onto ships so as to sink the weapons and possibly other untold evidence in the depths of the Indian Ocean.[/COLOR]
[RIGHT]*19 Feb 2006 by Simon W. Moon
http://irrationallyinformed.com/aud…aelidisinfo.wav[about 53 mb]
Starting about 45 sec in he begins to talk about shopping the WMD to Syria story to the DIA. He says the DIA told him that the WMD to Syria thing is “Israeli disinformation.”[around the 60 second mark] He then says that there was an effort to discredit him and the people associated with the story even though one of them was one of “the Vice Presidents very best friends.” [around the two minute mark]
**What the best info currently available re the WMD to Syria theory says.
Addendums to the Comprehensive Report of the Special Advisor to the DCI on Iraq’s WMD (pdf) page1 (page 4 of the pdf)ISG formed a working group to investigate the possibility of the evacuation of WMD-related material from Iraq prior to the 2003 war. This group spent several months examining documents, interviewing former Iraqi officials , examining previous intelligence reports, and conducting some site investigations. The declining security situation limited and finally halted this investigation. The results remain inconclusive, but further investigation may be undertaken when
circumstances on the ground improve.
The investigation centered on the possibility that WMD materials were moved to Syria. As is obvious from other sections of the Comprehensive Report, Syria was involved in transactions and shipments of military and other material to Iraq in contravention of the UN sanctions. This indicated a flexibility with respect to international law and a strong willingness to work with Iraq—at least when there was considerable profit for those involved. Whether Syria received military items from Iraq for safekeeping or other reasons has yet to be determined. There was evidence of a discussion of possible WMD collaboration initiated by a Syrian security officer, and ISG received information about movement of material out of Iraq, including the possibility that WMD was involved. In the judgment of the working group, these reports were sufficiently credible to merit further investigation.
ISG was unable to complete its investigation and is unable to rule out the possibility that WMD was evacuated to Syria before the war. It should be noted that no information from debriefing of Iraqis in custody supports this possibility. ISG found no senior policy, program, or intelligence officials who admitted any direct knowledge of such movement of WMD. Indeed, they uniformly denied any knowledge of residual WMD that could have been secreted to Syria.
Nevertheless, given the insular and compartmented nature of the Regime, ISG analysts believed there was enough evidence to merit further investigation.
It is worth noting that even if ISG had been able to fully examine all the leads it possessed, it is unlikely that conclusive information would have been found.
At best, barring discovery of original documentary evidence of the transfer, reports or sources may have been substantiated or negated, but firm conclusions on actual WMD movements may not be possible.
[COLOR=Red][COLOR=Black]Based on the evidence available at present, ISG judged that it was unlikely that an official transfer of WMD material from Iraq to Syria took place.**[/COLOR] However, ISG was unable to rule out unofficial movement of limited WMD-related materials.
Note that “WMD-related materials” ≠ WMDs
But as WMD to Syria devotees and Bigfoot devotees may be tempted to say, “Absence of evidence does not equal evidence of absence.”
And of course, they’re both right.
However, in the meantime, folks in the reality-based community have to deal with the facts that are available and make the best decisions in light of what’s known.
And, based on the evidence available at present, the WMD to Syria transfer theory seems unlikely.
[SIZE=2]But, so does Bigfoot, so who’s to say.[/SIZE]
[/COLOR][/RIGHT]