what is the official stand for the Bush-adm. today about this issue?
do they still believe they are hidden there ?
I belive Bush acknowledged at some point that they were mistaken and the things weren’t there. I don’t believe the acknowledgements have been universal from the right wingers however and there are certainly some who continue to contend that the things were there (or moved to Syria or some such).
Whats the debate?
-XT
Although I wouldn’t be surprised if Dick Cheney or some individuals in high places believe that Saddam did in fact have WMD hidden in early 2003, the CIA concluded in September 2004 that Iraq destroyed all significant stockpiles of chemical weapons after the 1991 war; abandoned its biological weapons program in 1995; and that the nuclear weapons program ended in 1991. The report also says that Iraq could have restarted a number of these programs if the order was given.
The White House also appointed a commission in February 2004 to investigate why intelligence agencies believed there were large scale WMD programs in Iraq before the war. One could see that as an admission of error, but I don’t believe the Administration has really commented all that much on an issue that is settled in nearly everyone’s minds, save some black helicopter types.
Just last summer, there was a news item about pre-Gulf War I warheads with traces of mustard gas being discovered in Iraq. Shodan started a thread about it here.
So the Right hasn’t completely given up hope that the WMD BS was real.
have Bush or someone in his government said something like: “There where no WOMD in Iraq”
I disagree with this completely – I’m firmly convinced that the decision-makers in the Bush Administration knew damn well that Iraq didn’t have any significant WMDs, but merely touted that as an excuse to go to war. The OSP wasn’t exacltly a team of rogue operatives whose existence was a secret from Rumsfeld and Cheney.
I also believe that evidence proving this point won’t come to light until well after the members of the Bush Administration are out of office.
I run out a little short of that. I think they believed it, largely as a result of ideological naivete. Saddam was evil, so of course he had bad mojo. In their minds, the very fact that we couldn’t find any proof was in itself proof! He’s hiding them, therefore they must exist.
The lie isn’t so much in stating that they were there when they weren’t, the lie is testifying to certitude, swearing that they know what they don’t know, fully aware that people will die if their agenda is followed. Its a kind of blood oath, far more serious than mere perjury.
While I disagree with you, too, I really ought to restate the bit you quoted from me. What I really meant to say, and now realize it came out kind of wrong, is that “I wouldn’t be surprised if Dick Cheney and other higher ups in the Administration believe that Saddam did indeed hide his WMD in early 2003.”
As in, they may think that “if we only keep searching (perhaps in Syria) we will find the stuff that Saddam really had and we’ll be proven right.”
I apologize for the confusion, but I guess we still disagree, so we end up where we began.
The problem is, Saddam Hussein went and destroyed all his WMD well before Operation Clusterfusk ever began. The bastard!
There’s no engaging some mindsets, unfortunately. I remember hearing from very sane and intelligent people that the fact that Starr could find no evidence of Clinton’s evildoing simply proved that he’d been hiding it.
Here’s what I believe can be said: thanks to Bart Gellman’s reporting in the WaPo all the way back in May 2003, we know that the invasion plan put a very low priority on securing prospective WMD sites: when the objectives of securing the sites, or driving on to Baghdad, collided, the sites were left unsecured, and were looted to the ground before our task force dedicated to finding WMDs could verify whether or not there were any there.
Therefore, either: (a) the Administration didn’t believe that Saddam possessed WMDs that posed a threat to the United States if they should have fallen into terrorists’ hands, but took us into war on that excuse anyway, or (b) they did believe that, but designed a war plan that did little to prevent that very outcome in spite of their beliefs.
I can’t decide which is worse.
I thought that GWB knew the WMD’s were there because Daddy Warbucks told him they were there. Poppy knew they were there because he and Hollywood Ron sold them to Saddam when they were all good friends. Then decided it would not be a good idea to find WMD’s with made in the USA stamped on the side of them, so they had to “not” find them in order to save face. Which still made them look like the war mongers/assholes they are.
The other story is that the WMD’s that weren’t “made in the USA” were shipped to Syria and Lebanon to cousin Hussein for safe keeping.
Oh sorry, you wanted the official GWB stand on the issue? Who the f*** knows? You’re talking about Dubya & Co. and their version of the truth on a subject, any subject?
Yeah, I guess you could say I’m not impressed with the guy.
Some cites for **Ravenman’**s first post:
The Iraq Survey Group, a CIA related entity, published a report, - Cite #2from Fox News in October 2004 that basically officially put the U.S. Government on the record as saying there were no WMDs --Bush in the middle of a re-election campaign didn’t dispute this and basically said – Sadam wanted WMD and wanted to preserve his ability to get them, but never again (and here you can prove me an a$$ if I am wrong) claimed that Sadam actually had them.
Bush’s appointment of the Committee on Intelligence failures all but admits that there were no stockpiles but all he explicitly says is :
*
“Dr. Kay also stated that some prewar intelligence assessments by America and other nations about Iraq’s weapons stockpiles have not been confirmed. We are determined to figure out why.”*
The U.S. leaked that they had given up given up the search for WMD’s about 2 years ago today to the day.
One of the reasons that led to the intelligence failure before the war was that after the first Gulf War, the CIA discovered that they had been wrong about Iraq’s nuclear program, and that in fact it was a lot more sophisticated than their intelligence led them to believe. This led to a culture of not making the same mistake twice, so ambiguous intelligence was interpreted as supportive of the worst-case scenario. In other words, the pendulum swung over in the other direction.
Don’t forget, it wasn’t just U.S. intelligence. The belief that Saddam had stockpiles of WMD was widespread. The intelligence agencies in France, Germany, Britain, Canada, and I believe even Russia all thought Saddam had WMD. Aside from Britain, they were just less willing to act on their belief, and they were less willing to state it with the certitude coming from the U.S. and Britain (and correctly so, it turns out).
People like to say this, and it’s true in a way. But the intelligence communities of the world thought it likely that Saddam had WMD in the form out badly outdated chemical weapons and a mostly dormant but restartable biological weapons program. (It should be noted that all you need to restart such a program is an anthrax or smallpox sample sitting in a fridge somewhere and a country not completely devoid of biology labs.) Sure everyone thought Saddam had a few bio or chemical weapons kicking around. That doesn’t mean they agreed with what the White House was saying about Saddam’s WMDs.
It swung in the other direction?
Was its swinging beyond the powers of mortal man to fathom, or was it rather swung by men?
About Jack Shaw, Another Presenter at the Summit
Mr. Shaw said he acquired his intel about Russia’s help in moving Iraq’s WMD to Syria from a “good friend” of Dick Cheney’s and that this info was derided by the DIA as “Israeli disinformation.” After the Shaw launched the story, the Fox news reported “it isn’t clear how this person has the authority or the knowledge to speak on such a matter.”
In the recent past, it seemed that Jack Shaw did some illegal and questionable things. But, then a DoD press release seemed to have cleared him. Subsequently, the exonerating press release had to be pulled because “information has become available that indicates it may not have been accurate at the time it was issued. The matter is under review to determine the facts and circumstances involving the information contained in the original release.”
AFAICT, the DoD page revoking the exoneration was last updated 2005-08-25.
Coincidentally, the previously cited article about what prompted the FBI to investigate the actions of Mr. Shaw mentioned the port of Umm al Qasr. At the Summit, Mr. Shaw also mentioned port of Umm al Qasr. He said there were floodable storage areas in Qasr that had held WMD. He also said that in Umm al Qasr, the Soviets loaded Iraqi WMD onto ships so as to sink the weapons and possibly other untold evidence in the depths of the Indian Ocean.
[RIGHT]19 Feb 2006 by Simon W. Moon[/RIGHT]
Starting about 45 sec in he begins to talk about shopping the WMD to Syria story to the DIA. He says the DIA told him that the WMD to Syria thing is “Israeli disinformation.”[around the 60 second mark] He then says that there was an effort to discredit him and the people associated withe th story even though one of them was one of “the Vice Presidents very best friends.” [around the two minute mark]
About Jack Shaw, Another Presenter at the Summit
Mr. Shaw said he acquired his intel about Russia’s help in moving Iraq’s WMD to Syria from a “good friend” of Dick Cheney’s and that this info was derided by the DIA as “Israeli disinformation.” After the Shaw launched the story, the Fox news reported “it isn’t clear how this person has the authority or the knowledge to speak on such a matter.”
In the recent past, it seemed that Jack Shaw did some illegal and questionable things. But, then a DoD press release seemed to have cleared him. Subsequently, the exonerating press release had to be pulled because “information has become available that indicates it may not have been accurate at the time it was issued. The matter is under review to determine the facts and circumstances involving the information contained in the original release.”
AFAICT, the DoD page revoking the exoneration was last updated 2005-08-25.
Coincidentally, the previously cited article about what prompted the FBI to investigate the actions of Mr. Shaw mentioned the port of Umm al Qasr. At the Summit, Mr. Shaw also mentioned port of Umm al Qasr. He said there were floodable storage areas in Qasr that had held WMD. He also said that in Umm al Qasr, the Soviets loaded Iraqi WMD onto ships so as to sink the weapons and possibly other untold evidence in the depths of the Indian Ocean.
[RIGHT]19 Feb 2006 by Simon W. Moon[/RIGHT]
http://irrationallyinformed.com/audio/jshawisraelidisinfo.wav[about 53 mb]
Starting about 45 sec in he begins to talk about shopping the WMD to Syria story to the DIA. He says the DIA told him that the WMD to Syria thing is “Israeli disinformation.”[around the 60 second mark] He then says that there was an effort to discredit him and the people associated withe th story even though one of them was one of “the Vice Presidents very best friends.” [around the two minute mark]
More water for the conspiracists’ fire of the WMD to Syria theory - Hussein did not believe that the US posed an existential threat, so why give up the goods?
THE IRAQI DOCUMENTS: A GLIMPSE INTO THE
REGIME OF SADDAM HUSSEIN
HEARING BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON OVERSIGHT AND INVESTIGATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ONE HUNDRED NINTH CONGRESS SECOND SESSION
APRIL 6, 2006
Serial No. 109–184
Brigadier General Anthony A. Cucolo III, Usa, Director, Joint Center For Operational Analysis, United States Joint Forces Command
Lieutenant Colonel Kevin M. Woods, Usa (Ret.), Project Leader And Principal Author Of Iraqi Perspective Project, United States Joint Forces Command
[INDENT]*The Iraqi Perspective Project is a research effort conducted by United States Joint Forces Command, specifically the Joint Center for Operational Analysis, and it focuses on Operation Iraqi Freedom in the time period from March to May 2003.
Using information gathered through dozens of interviews with senior Iraqi military and political leaders during the fall and winter of 2003–2004, and making use of thousands of official Iraqi documents, we have a comprehensive historical analysis of the forces and motivations that drive our opponents’ decision.
Now, to accomplish this, the project leader, Kevin Woods, led a small team of professionals in a systematic 2-year study of the former Iraqi regime and military. This book is the first major product of that effort.
Essentially, Kevin and his team crafted a substantive examination of Saddam Hussein’s leadership and its effect on the Iraqi military decision making process. Moreover, we believe it goes a long way toward revealing the inner workings of a closed regime from an insiders’ point of view.
The overall objective of the project was to learn the right lessons from Operation Iraqi Freedom, and while the practice of self-critique and gathering lessons learned are distinguishing feature of the U.S. Military, **in almost every past instance our understanding of events remained incomplete because any assessment was limited to a ‘‘blue’’ or a friendly view of what happened.
While we often had a relatively complete picture of what our adversary did, we remained in the dark as to what motivated his actions.**
In this case, by shedding light on the actual ‘‘red team’s view,’’ this study hopes to contribute to a more fully developed history of the war.
It should be noted that this is the first such effort by the United States Government since World War II, when the United States conducted a comprehensive review of recovered German and Japanese documents, as well as interviews with key military and civilian leadership of our former enemies.
Though this is an important first step, we acknowledge that our understanding of Operation Iraqi Freedom remains incomplete.*
The second assumption that Saddam made had to do with the nature of his opponents. Through the distortions of his ideological perceptions, Saddam simply could not take the Americans seriously. After all, had they not run away from Vietnam after suffering what to him was a ‘‘mere’’ 58,000 dead? Iraq had suffered 51,000 dead in just one battle on the Fao Peninsula against the Iranians. In the 1991 Gulf War, the Americans had appeared on the brink of destroying much of Iraq’s military, including the Republican Guard, but then inexplicably stopped—for fear of casualties, in Saddam’s view. Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo all added to Saddam’s belief that the Americans could not possibly launch a ground invasion that would seriously threaten his regime. At best they might be willing to launch an air campaign similar to OPERATION DESERT FOX in 1998 with a few small ground attacks around Iraq’s periphery. But from Saddam’s point of view, the idea that the Americans would attack all the way to Baghdad appeared ludicrous.
A few senior military officers believed that the coalition might launch a ground campaign, especially given the enormous buildup that was taking place in Kuwait. But even they believed that as in OPERATION DESERT STORM, the Americans would wage a sustained air campaign before they launched their ground forces on an invasion of Iraq. Therefore, the entire Iraqi leadership—military and civilian— was surprised by Coalition ground forces beginning their offensive into Iraq at the same time the air campaign was starting. Adding to their incomprehension were the speed and power of the American offensive, which were simply beyond their understanding of military operations and logistical capabilities.[/INDENT]
nobody expects the Spanish Inquisition either