Grant later said that he never expected any of the attempts to go around Vicksburg via the swamps to work, but he wanted his men to have something to do until he was ready for a full campaign.
They figured that Vicksburg could stand any frontal assault (and were right), and that if Grant tried to attack them from the rear (as he eventually did), they could attack his supply lines, keeping Grant from advancing. Grant’s genius was deciding he didn’t need supply lines, so there was nothing to attack. Once the south realized what was going on, they sent troops, but too little too late.
Given what they knew at the time, there didn’t seem to be any reason to send additional troops to Vicksburg that could be used elsewhere. The fortress kept Grant’s army bottled up.
As for Gettysburg, a northern defeat would have allowed Lee to advance on Washington and would have demoralized the North. The issue was that the battle was so close the first two days: the South nearly defeated the North each day. On the first day, Ewell didn’t press the attack (whereas Jackson would have if he had been alive). On the second day, if they capture Little Round Top, they win. Lee probably was so frustrated at how close the battle was that he ordered Pickett’s charge.
A Northern loss the first day would have been bad, but not all the troops had reached the battlefield, and Meade had a second line of battle all prepared. A Northern loss on the second or third day would have been a disaster for the North, since nothing would have stood in the way of Lee attacking Washington City.
I heard someone on Public Radio say earlier today that many of the young men welcomed the chance to get away from home and have an adventure. Bet that was a short learning curve.
Newt Gingrich (yes that one) along with William Forstchen wrote an alternate history trilogy based on a Confederate victory. They had much the same conclusion as you. I know few around here would give it a try due to the author but it is one of my favorite alternate history series. Very well written.
I’ve read those books, and I agree - very well written.
Chamberlain’s charge down Little Round Top won the day for the Union Day 2, but if Lee had listened to Longstreet things would have been much different. A wide swing to the right could have bypassed the hill and avoided the futlie uphill charges. Personally, I thought the South was done by the end of Day One. They had their chance and muffed it.
BTW, I had a direct ancestor involved in the battle. At the Peach Orchard, in fact. Kershaw’s Brigade. Amazing he survived.
There was an aritcle a couple of days ago in our local paper about how a local re-enactor was traveling to PA to participate in the re-enacted battle. He’s a Confederate.
I read that the movie Gettysburg had, as extras, a huge amount of reenactors. It was advertised for a couple years in advance, and guys came from all over the world to be in it at least for part of the filming. They’d save up their vacation time.
On a total side note, I was lucky enough to tent camp with my kids Cubscout pack about 100 feet behind tha tree line at Pickett’s ridge about 8 years back. I remembered commenting about how perfectly uniform the tree line was.
One of the guides explained that they were all just barely beyond the edge of the Union artillery range. At that time, there were probably just as many trees along that field as back by where we were camping before that battle,
but that the artillery barrage was so intense and so sustained that any tree even a foot closer was blasted into pulp and splinters down to the roots. :eek:
The other very weird thing was that by me, lightning-bugs / fire-flies glow yellow at night, but there they flash light blue.
There’s the famous exchange between Sherman and Grant after the disastrous first day at Shiloh.
“Well, Grant, we’ve had the devil’s own day, haven’t we?”
“Yes. Lick 'em tomorrow, though.”
That was Grant’s greatest strength. He never panicked or gave up. If he made a mistake, he would just try something different. If he lost a battle, he’d just begin planning the next battle. Being as he was a competent general and had more troops and resources, he was bound to win in the end. He showed this at Vicksburg where he kept trying different plans until one of them worked.
Deservedly. Their piece is riddled with poor arguments. Marotta and Russell apparently base it on what Jefferson Davis wrote in 1881. They apparently ignore what secessionists were saying in 1860 (even when they quote them) which is a much accurate guide to the reasons for secession.
They also make a big deal out of tariff rates being a major political issue in the 1830’s. Which is true. But what does that have to do with 1860?
They also point out that Lincoln took a hard line on tariffs and was conciliatory on slavery. Their conclusion is that this is evidence that tariff was the more important issue. That’s a bad conclusion. The reason Lincoln was more conciliatory on slavery was because he recognized it was the more important issue - slave-holding states would secede over the issue. Meanwhile he could afford to take a harder line on tariffs because he knew it was a relatively minor issue that wouldn’t lead to secession.
The two writers are attempting a historical revision to support their current political position, which they state outright is that they think taxes are bad. So they’re just a couple of Groverites witnessing the faith.
I remember reading that volunteers in the west were afraid the war would be over before they had enough time to travel east and get in on the fighting. The state government in Sacramento was concerned about this also and was worried no California units would arrive in time to participate. So they recruited a special “California” unit from volunteers in the eastern states in order to have a unit in the field as early as possible.
In the book I mentioned above the plot (iirc) was basically that Lee decided he didn’t like the terrain and was able to maneuver his troops away from Gettysburg. Gettysburg became little more than a skirmish and Lee was able to win a decisive victory when he had the high ground.
A lot has been written about Lee not having been in his best mental state at the time due to a recent heart attack, but the research indicates the heart attack happened in March 1863, and thus he should have been two months more recovered by Gettysburg than he was at Chancellorsville, which is considered one of his most brilliant high risk-high yield moments. I think stress and the need for a victory and perhaps depression and a “Hail Mary” attitude and a number of other factors played just as big a role in his poor judgment as his heart problems.
I do have a mental image of a Confederate choir singing chorus after chorus of “Where in the world is James Ewell Brown Stuart, yo?” on the eve of the battle.