Lee and Johnson

Great Debates
1

This thread is about Robert E. Lee and Joseph Johnston, both high-ranking commanders of the Confederacy in the Civil War.

Reading about the men, I’ve come to the conclusions that Lee was a stark-raving madman. OK, that’s unkind; he was clearly sane. But geez, did that guy take risks. He commonly divided his forces in the face of the enemy, attacked hardened positions, and generally spent blood like water. He also won a lot.

Lee singlehandedly turned the Confederacy’s fortune’s around in 1862. Most likely McClellan would eventually have broken Johnston’s lines by seige. But Johnston got sick and Lee took command, and performed some of the most suicidal moves in the war. But he knew what he was doing and carefully tore apart the Union.

But it also strikes me that Lee constantly faced men like McClellan, Burnside, and Hooker, all of whom simply stopped excercising command in any serious fashion during their campaigns, whereupon Lee was able to brutally hurt each of them - but all of them were able to put the hurt on Lee until or unless they “crashed” psychologically. McClellan got whiny and sulky, and very his refusal to do anything while Pope fought against Lee was criminal, IMHO. Burnside started off well, then ordered a crazy assault against the hardened position, wasting his troops, then retreated without any further action. Hooker went down and got a good position, being in place to utterly demolish Lee, but then stopped and didn’t do anything to help out one of his own Corp! McClellan later had Lee’s entire battle plan, but was still able to pull out nothing more than a draw at Antietam (had he actually gotten out fast and fought, he would have chewed Lee to pieces).

By constrast, Lee was sent packing by William S. Rosecrans early in the war, and Grant ground him down despite horrible terrain disadvantages and poor subordinate actions in 1864 and 1865.*

Joe Johnston, it seems to me, was not crazy enough to take those risks. This was good at times - he avoided being trapped and smashed by Sherman before Atlanta, he couldn’t stop Sherman’s march, but nearly did what Lee repeatedly failed at - giving McClellan victory in the 1864 election. Even if Johnston had been forced out of Atlanta, he could have seriously bedevilled Sherman’s famous March to the Sea, which his replacement, John Bell Hood, failed to do.

He definitely lacked aggressive action against foes, but at the same time, his posts were always against dynamic and energetic opponents. It’s true he wasn’t able to beat them, but it seems unlikely he could have; Sherman and Grant were not Burnside and McClellan, and I think it’s unfair to compare Lee and Johnston in that manner.

*Noting here that in 1864 Grant ordered five simulatneous campaigns against the Confederacy, three of them against Lee. However, only Sherman was able to do squat, as the other three (Grant and Mead led one) completley botched the job, strengthening Lee’s position. Likewise, Mead’s generals in the Army of the Potomac were mostly useless.

2

Lee was faced with an impossible strategic situation, and his operational tactics were appropriate to that situation. Given his side’s enormous material, numerical, positional and strategic deficiencies, his only real choice was to aggressviely pursue battlefield victories. He was, basically, a quarterback starting the game losing 56-0, who has no choice but to heave it long on pretty much every play. He ran up a few touchdowns early but, really, the Confederacy was hopelessly screwed.

Grant was a fine tactical commander but the real difference between him and his predecessors was his persistence and “moral courage,” as Keegan phrased it. Grant understood that it was about winning campaigns, not battles, and that he had to use the advantages the Union had - size, strength, and the ability to wage war on multiple fronts - to destroy the Confederacy in depth, rather than waiting to win a perfect set-peice battle the way Napoleon or Wellington would have.

If Lee and the Confederacy made a mistake in war-making it was inchoosing to fight and die in a completely conventional manner, rather than falling back and fighting an irregular war. Perhaps a guerilla campaign would have worked and perhaps not, and there’s a lot of political reasons why such a thing could not be done, but it MIGHT have worked, whereas the stubborn insistence on fighting a conventional war centred in Virginia was CERTAIN to fail.

3

Bevin Alexander has argued that Stonewall Jackson had a superior strategic sense in a quite opposite manner. That is in his ( Jackson’s ) argument for taking the war more aggressively into Union territory, avoiding battles, but threatening either the capital or the North’s industrial heartland at a time when the Union was not positioned to defend both.

Whereas Davis and Lee were far too conventional and hung up on doggedly defending and fighting battles. Even in his offensives, Lee was more concerned with finding the enemy army and beating it, than in trying to unhinge the Union front and inflict morale-sapping political damage.

I’ve always found his arguments compelling in this, but admittedly Alexander is a huge Jackson ( and Sherman, as I recall ) fan and I probably am overly influenced by his particular view of the Civil War.

4

I heartily disagree that the South was bound to fail in a conventional war for one reason: they came within a hair’s breadth of winning it. Twice.

But moreover, Lee didn’t want a guerrilla war for the same reason no sensible person wants it if avoidable: it would have led to a ruination fo the South for decades, perhaps even a century. The South would not and could not have won that.

Let me explain: this was no some wussy hearts-and-minds campaign. If the CSA had come out and killed a few random Union boys, they would have retaliated by simply obliterating the South. Which is, in fact, what they eventually did in the Shanandoah Valley. The Union was willing to raise armies of millions of men and destroy the livelihood of whole regions to save the nation. It also would have effectively meant the total annihilation of the CSA itself, the total loss of their bargaining power, and the surrender of their entire war aims.

5

Which two times?

6

My instructor last semester has said that McClellans problem was that he was a fine commander, on paper, but that he was unwilling and incapable of ordering his soldiers to die. I haven’t researched that on my own yet, but it does strike me as a crippling failure, and would explain his unwillingness to actually do anything with his forces.

As for the South winning the war… no way. Especially after the Gettysburgh Address, when Lincoln laid out plain and simple that the future of the US rested on the outcome of the war.

The only conceivable way the South would have won is if Lee had seized Washington DC, and the US had (despite Mexico’s failure to do so during our conflict with them) surrendered. Given Mexico’s example that a nation can continue fighting once it’s capital is seized, I imagine the US would have continued fighting, and in fact would have redoubled their efforts.

7

Um, no. The sad fact of the Civil War is that it took so long for each side to come to the realization that neither side was willing to give up based upon any specific battle result. Each side had a hardened attitude, and each side’s willingness to wage war increased with each loss it suffered on the battlefield. Had the rebels won at either Antietam or Gettysburg, all that would have happened is that there would have been a follow up battle somewhat closer to the nation’s capital, with even more Union troops present.

The South’s inability to gain the support of any major nation doomed it to its inevitable death. The anaconda simply continued squeezing, until the life was spent.

8

That’s debatable. I agree that the South could not have won a prolonged conventional war. Only the North giving into a political defeat would have worked, and a southern victory at Gettysburg would have gone a long way towards that. I’m not saying it was assured, but it would have been a possibility…

9

William Forstchen wrote an essay, “Lee’s Victory at Gettysburg…And then What?”, where he argues that a Confederate victory at Gettysburg really wouldn’t have changed much…the US army had enough troops that Lee couldn’t have taken Washington or moved much further north, and that the army had enough reserves, they could have pretty much reconstituted the Army of the Potomac almost from scratch.

10

I agree. But at what point would enough Northerners have said “enough is enough” and let the south go their own way peacefully?

11

Getting back here, the two major events were Antietam and Gettysburg. The South couldn’t win solely on the basis of arms (but no one ever does in modern war), but the fall of a Lincoln government would have seriously damaged the Union cause. In addition, a victory at either Antietam or Gettysburg could have easily altered foreign opinion, and hurt the Union commercially and helped the South economically.

Antietam was a very close thing. Had McClellan not lucked into getting Lee’s plans, there was every chance Lee could have rampaged across Maryland and southern Pennsylvania and put a serious hurt on the North’s credibility, not to mention Lincoln’s.

Gettysburg could have been another disaster (after a brutal series of them). True, Vicksburg was taken in the west, but people tended not to notice that theater compared to the nearer, bloodier battles int he East. Had Lee won at Gettysburg, he and his troops might well have beseiged Washington. They couldn’t take it, but doing this would terribly damage the Union morale again, and there was already a gowing peace movement, which would have been much strengthened. And of course, while we can never truly know public opinion, Lincoln hardly dared believe he would be re-elected until Sherman took Atlanta. Instead, he thoughthe poepe would vote in favor of a peace democrat, and this was after Sherman had driven all the way to Atlanta’s gates, Lee had been pushed back, and the victory at Gettysburg finally cut off the hope of foreign recognition.

12

Never. That was the whole point.

13

Lee was never intending to “beseige Washington” with his campaign into Pennsylvania. So even had the South won at Gettysburg, all that would have happened is Lee would have continued his raid across southern Pennsylvania, probably hoping to inflict at least one more serious defeat upon the Union forces. But marching down the Potomac and trying to beseige the capital was never going to work, and Lee would have known that.

14

I don’t know how you can say that so definitively. As smiling bandit pointed out, there was a growing peace movement at the time, and if Lee was travelling through PA at will, Lincoln would have been under enormous pressure from the people, the Congress, and foreign governments to give in. Even if he persisted, he would have certainly lost the 1864 election to a “peace” candidate.

I agree, though, that it would have been foolish for Lee to try and take Washington, D.C. That’s not to say that Jefferson Davis wouldn’t have been on his heels ordering such an assault.

Lee simply didn’t have the men to do it, and D.C. was the most heavily fortified city in the world at that time…

15

Gettysburg was well in advance of the 1864 elections. The result at that battle would have been nil on that election.

A loss at Gettysburg would have resulted in another battle at a different location. At most, there would have been some panic in the North, similar to the panic felt after the First Battle of Manassas/Bull Run. But the simple fact was that there were ample troops in the Washington D.C. area to bring Lee to a halt and force a decisive victory.

A far better argument would be to go with what Lee was attempting, which was to force the hand of Great Britain into the Confederate camp. A major victory at Gettysburg by the South might have swayed the British to at least stop being relatively Union-sided on the issue, which might have allowed for better resupply of the South through the blockade. But even that was a bit chimerical I think; there never was much evidence that the British were willing to support the rebels, especially after the events of 1862 showed how futile the effort to break away was going to be.

16

I think the original post is fascinating. I’ve never actually heard Lee’s talent challenged before, but it actually does make a lot of sense when you consider that most of his success was against timid or outright foolish opponents.

After thinking about it for awhile, I think you’re probably right. Johnston can’t be called a brilliant commander by any means, but usually performed competently even against superior opponents.

17

The problem with the South’s chances lies directly with Jefferson Davis. A graduate of West Point, a former USA Secretary of War, and de facto CSA Sect. of War, he believed that the Confederacy would have to win their independence on the battlefield. Look what happened to Joe Johnston - he fights a delaying war to keep Sherman out of Atlanta as long as possible and is replace by Bragg who promptly gets beaten.

So knowing

  1. that your CinC requires you to fight
  2. your opponants’ thinking through your time in the army
  3. you are hopelessly out-supplied by your enemies

what would you have done differently than Lee or Johnston? Lee probably would have won at Sharpsburg if McClellan hadn’t acted out of character by actually fighting. Gettysburg would have been a Southern victory if Jackson hadn’t died forcing a major reorganization just before the battle.

But that’s the neglecting the main point, doesn’t it. The CSA’s armies job was to defend the South until recognized by England and France. Beating the USA army was never a realistic goal.

18

You seem to keep assuming that Lee would head down the Frederick Road (now Route 15) from Gettysburg and hit Washington City. I’ve never read ANYthing that indicated that was the plan. Or even considered as part of the plan.

Instead I find it much more likely that Lee’s target would be Harrisburg and the ability to threaten (though likely not attack) either Baltimore or Philadelphia. But cutting the railroad junctions at Harrisburg or Erie would have been a real blow to the Union’s ability to communicate/resupply the forces in the trans-Mississippi. While it wouldn’t have prevented the ability of the Union to keep operating in the west it would have made it more difficult.

I’ve always considered Lee’s moves on Pennsylvania in 1862 and 1863 to be political moves rather than military ones. Both had the ability to threaten the Union’s European sympathy and the staunchness of the Union citizenry’s desire to continue the war.

As for the lack of British support concerning CSA victory I refer you to this story from the January 18, 1914 edition of the New York Times which details British Ambassador Lord Lyons complacency and even his chief Lord Russell having told US Secretary of State Seward that it would be a good thing if the CSA won its independence.

There was, in England among the gentry (and above), significant desire to see the United States taken down a peg or two to demonstrate the inherent inferiority of a Republic based on popular vote instead of a ‘Lords’ class of landed group with inherited power.

19

Lord Lyons aside, it would have been really difficult politically for the UK to recognize CSA independence in 1863, even had Lee won at Gettysburg.

20

Mostly you are correct, but at the time there was a pro-Confederate movement in English politics, which they saw as a way of dividing down the Yanks. IIRC, the House of COmmons was forcing the issue through and the House of Lords was similarly in favor, and they were pressuring the government. The Prime Minister was very cautious, but probably would have gone along with it with one more big victory.

This would have amply encouraged Southern economy (some credit terms required recognition as a belligerent or something) by allowing them buy much more than they had and without hard currency. Likewise, France would have gone gung-ho for the South if England had moved in that direction. Napoleon III was extremely pro-southern, but couldn’t act without England. He couldn’t beat the entire blockade, but he could seriously trouble parts of it.

And had Lee won Gettysburg, he would have gone on cut northern rail lines, threaten Baltimore and even Pennsylvania, and frankly would only have retreated weeks or months later. It would have been a giant blow to Union prestige and especially Lincoln’s, and he would have been unlikely to win. Grant would have been called earlier, and the entire Chattanooga/Atlanta campaign would have been put on hold, and probably would not have occured fast enough to make it by the elections. Not only that, but McClellan would have been much more willing to adopt a Peace platform than he was. As it was, he officially had one but semi-reputed it to hold his options open.