I’m no Constitutional scholar – but I think that this case has the potential for extreme coolness (i.e. a very interesting analysis of both the 21st Amendment and the Commerce Clause respectively, and that interrelationship.) What case? This one - oral argument pending -
As we know, the 18th Amendment’s absolute prohibition on liquor was repealed and the decisions regarding liquor regulation were given to the States via the 21st amendment. So, if a State can’t control imports into that State, then they can’t control liquor within their borders. Hence, the State power to prohibit liquor imports. That’s my understanding anyway –
If the Supreme Court does decide that the Commerce Clause controls, I wonder how the Supreme Court will get past section 2 of the 21st Amendment? This has me baffled. Section 2 seems pretty cut and dry ----- But, again, I’m no Constitutional scholar. Yet, here we have it, the Supreme Court has accepted this case. So, it stands to reason that some of the Justices, at least, must have something in mind. What ever could it be?
Well I thought it was interesting. I’ll send it back up once, dust off the dirt from it’s premature grave, and if no bites — well, I’ll assume reincarnation ain’t reality, and throw this fish back – and let her die one natural death rather than a thousandd unnatural ones -
But again, maybe it’s not the subject — maybe it’s just the way I put it -
I’ll give you a quick take on this, according to doctrine that I think every Constitutional scholar, Bar member or layman, on this board, concurs with.
When a general principle is enunciated, and a later statement of more specificity and equal weight appears to contradict it, the rule is that the general statement holds with the exception of the specific exception made.
I.e., Congress has the exclusive power to regulate interstate commerce and no state has the right to forbid imports except as empowered by Congress to – except that states are given the power to regulate traffic in alcoholic beverages within their borders by the 21st Amendment.
I suspect strongly that they need to be construed together in most cases. I.e., a state may prohibit the importation of intoxicating liquor for sale except in accordance with its laws, but New Hampshire may not declare itself dry and in consequence prohibit truckload shipments of beer from Boston to Portland up I-95. The former is the 21st Amendment authorization to regulate; the latter is an impermissible interference with interstate commerce where the goods in question do not contravene the state’s own authority.
It isn’t quite that simple, Poly. For example, what if New Hampshire passed a statute that barred the delivery and use of all intoxicating liquors in that state, except for Amstel Light? That would undoubtedly not pass constitutional muster.
I don’t know how the Supremes will rule on this, and I find the case intriguing. If I were to guess, I would say that the Supremes would look to the intent of the framers of the 21st Amendment, and determine that the intent was to allow indiviudal states to continue Prohibition if they wanted to, or otherwise limit or prohibit categories of intoxicating liquors (i.e. prohibit anything over 80 proof, 100 proof, etc.).
Once a state has determined to allow a particular category, however, my guess is that the Supremes will determine that the Commerce Clause takes over, and the state must treat everyone within that category the same. IOW, the Wine Institute will win.
But I’m not going to bet the farm on this case, either way.
Yeh, what Polycarp said. Basically, since the 21st A came last, and gives the states the rights to do almost as they please, it trumps the Commerce Clause.
Both are a part of the Constitution and as such, both are part of the supreme law of the land. I don’t see how one part of that supreme law is more or less supreme than any other part. While the SCOTUS will have to reconcile the 21st to the commerce clause - I wonder if they will hold one part of the Constitution as ‘trumping’ another because it came later in time? That’s not how it works — is it?
For some thirty years now, the Supreme Court has been backing away from the proposition that Section Two constitutes a blanket exemption of alcoholic beverages from the Commerce Clause. (See especially Bacchus Imports v. Dias). I believe they have been correct to do so, and I hope they’ll continue to do so in this case.
Neither Section Two, nor the Webb-Kenyon Act of 1913 from which its odd language was copied, were intended to allow state protectionism with respect to alcohol. They were intended to allow states to apply the same restrictions to imports (including a total ban, if so desired) that they applied to in-state production and sale.
States have abused this power to discriminate in favor of local suppliers. For example,
I hope the Supreme Court will put a stop to this. Yes, states have the power to tax and regulate alcohol–but they must do so in a non-discriminatory, non-protectionist manner.