This page has gotten so hard to read because of the lack of right, left borders. My fault, sorry. Can we fix that somehow, or just fill up the page in order to start a new page? Will the new page be free of the border problem?
I’ve seen those charts and get the impression that no matter whose interpretation you use there will be an increase over present figures, which is really the point, if you think present figures are too high. Where does the UN get it’s figures from? I think they partially rely on the US Census Bureau.
hanson, if we are not taking care of the present world population what makes you think we’ll do better with a few billion more?
From the UN, which you might find interesting:
THE STATE OF WORLD POPULATION 1999
C H A P T E R 2
Population Change and People’s Choices
Population Continues to Grow, and to Grow Older
At the beginning of the 20th century, the world’s population was approximately 1.5 billion; by 1960 it had doubled; and by late 1999, it had quadrupled to 6 billion. The global population is unlikely ever again to grow as fast as it has in the last few decades and particularly the past 12 years, in which a billion people were added.
Annual additions to the global population rose from 47 million per year in 1950–1955 to a peak of 86 million in 1985–1990. This unprecedented growth was the net result of faster declines in mortality than in fertility, both from initially high levels. As a consequence, the fourth, fifth and sixth billion marks in global population were achieved in only 14, 13 and 12 years, respectively.3
Today, a “demographic transition” from high fertility and mortality to low fertility and mortality is under way or has already occurred in much of the world. In many respects, the less-developed regions are now about halfway through this transition, approximately where the more-developed regions were a half-century ago.
Death Rate Cut by Half
The most important story behind the rapid rise from 3 to 6 billion people since 1960 is the unprecedented drop in mortality. This trend actually began in the 19th and early 20th century, but intensified after World War II as basic sanitation, clean drinking water and modern health care became more available in larger areas of the world. Since 1950, the death rate has been cut in half, from about 20 to fewer than 10 deaths per year per thousand people. At the same time, average global life expectancy has risen from 46 to 66 years.
The world’s population is healthier from infancy through old age than it ever has been. Global infant mortality has fallen by two thirds since 1950, from 155 per thousand live births to 57 per thousand; this rate is projected to be reduced by a further two thirds by 2050. Maternal mortality has also declined, but much more slowly and less generally (see Chapter 3). Other promising health trends include improvements in immunization levels and health education.
One positive effect of lengthening life-spans and better medical treatment has been that the annual number of deaths actually fell by more than 10 per cent between 1955 and 1975 even as nearly 1.5 billion people were added to the world population. Subsequently the number of deaths began to increase. The current number of deaths per year, 52 million, is the same as in 1950, when the population was less than half the size it is today.
Death rates have declined substantially in the less-developed regions since 1950, but have remained roughly constant in the more-developed regions because of their greater proportion of older people.
Fertility is Declining, but Unevenly
The number of births per year rose from 98 million in 1950 to a peak of 134 million in the late 1980s, and is projected to remain just under 130 million for the next 20 years while death rates slowly rise as the global population ages.
Although only a very few countries have declining populations, 61 countries (with about 44 per cent of the world’s population) already have below-replacement fertility rates (less than 2.1 births per woman). The number of such countries is projected to grow to 87 by 2015, encompassing about two thirds of the world’s population.
On the other hand, in 2050, 130 countries will still have positive growth rates, 44 of them above 1 per cent per year, about the rate observed in more-developed regions in 1965.
In 1950-1955, the average fertility rate in the more-developed regions was 2.8 children per woman; it has since dropped to 1.6 and is projected to begin a slow rise, to 1.8, by the middle of next century. In the less-developed regions, the fertility rate was almost 6.2 in 1950; it was slightly less than 3 by 1999, and is projected to fall to less than 2.1 by 2045.
Death rates have fallen by half since 1950,
accounting for much of the rapid growth of world population.
Fertility has declined most quickly in Latin America and Asia, less rapidly in North Africa and the Middle East, and much more slowly in sub-Saharan Africa. Asia’s fertility fell sharply in the last 50 years, from 5.9 to 2.6 children per woman. Sub-Saharan Africa’s has dropped much more slowly, from 6.5 to 5.5. Latin America and the Caribbean have seen a decline from 5.9 to 2.7, North Africa and Western Asia from 6.6 to 3.5.
Europe’s fertility rate fell from 2.6 to 1.4, well below replacement level. On the other hand, Northern America’s fertility fell from 3.5 in 1950-1955 to 1.8 in the late 1970s, and then rebounded to the 1.9 to 2.0 range, where it has remained. It is projected to stay around 1.9 to the middle of the 21st century.
Variations between and within regions, and among different population groups within countries, remain considerable. Some nations, such as Brazil and the Republic of Korea, have moved swiftly to near-replacement level or below; others, such as Nigeria and Guatemala, have seen only a slight fall in fertility rates. However, the pace of decline has varied dramatically in different parts of both Brazil and Nigeria.
Hopes of finding a simple and consistent explanation for the demographic transition 4 have been repeatedly dashed by the realities of data on local experiences.5 In fact, there is no tight statistical link between development indicators and fertility rates, and the reasons for fertility decline are widely debated by demographers, economists and policy makers. While development is still considered an important factor, it remains unclear why fertility transitions occur earlier in some places than others. The pace of development does not appear to affect the initiation or the rate of fertility transition. However, once a transition has begun, fertility declines more rapidly in countries with higher levels of development.6
Helping women and men to realize their family size desires
It seems clear that the family size desires of men and women are influenced by a variety of factors: mortality declines; increased social opportunity, especially for women; employment opportunities; incomes; and educational access. Women and men cannot realize these desires, however, without the means to translate social opportunity and choice into action. The creation and progressive strengthening of population programmes over the last 30 years 7 — along with the development and distribution of more-effective and safer forms of contraception — has been a crucial catalyst in reducing fertility rates.8 Population programmes have been given credit for about half the decline in fertility since 1960. 9
Since the ICPD, they have adopted an approach based on individual rights and needs.
Population programmes have been crucial
in reducing fertility rates in the past 30 years.
The spread of information about family planning techniques and new ideas about social issues — including the rights of women to reproductive health and equality of opportunity — facilitates the fertility transition.10 Discussion and debate among relatives, friends and neighbours, the diffusion of ideas between communities, and mass media images trigger changes in preferences and fertili
