A modern symbological assessment of the ontological argument for the existence of God

Great Debates
61

** Excellent, I’m very pleased for him (or her or it or whatever). But that’s beside the point. I’m suggesting that the same argument can be used to prove the existence of a being that is not “God” (as per your definition) but is “just like God except that it lacks one of God’s attributes.”

So far, your response has been “but that wouldn’t be God!” Yes, fine, I agree. But can this argument be used to prove the existence of such a being? If not, why not?

I also point out (though I hesitate as it is, at this point, a distraction from the more basic point above) that “God is the convergence of all greatest possible attributes.” raises my orthogonality problem again, e.g. “Perfect mercy is incompatible with perfect justice. No being can be as just as possible while being as merciful as possible. Therefore, neither mercy nor justice are attributes of God.”

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BTW, I don’t have a general disdain for ontological arguments. I merely observe that they are often proposed by people setting out to prove a particular point. [NB - I certainly am not suggesting that Lib falls into this category.] Anselm wasn’t engaging in an open-minded enquiry into the nature of deity, he was setting out to prove the existence of his conception of God. If it could be shown that his reasoning also validated, say, Hinduism, he would have been the first to reject it.
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62

We’re going in circles. We’re now back to where you need to establish a first axiom that does not use a God who is positively described as the perfect existence (the perfect existence, of course, being all existence that is necessary).

Because axiom number 1, g -> g, is not about the god that you describe. Each step in the argument depends on the prior steps. If you pull the first one out, the whole argument must be reconstructed from scratch, beginning with step 1.

Notice that when Newton objected, he wanted to change axiom 2. He did this so that he could derive a different argument with a different result. That’s what will happen if you change axiom 1. Change it, and the argument cannot be made the same way.

I disagree. :slight_smile:

Now, you’re bringing a subjectivity to the table that is unwarranted and irrelevant. What cannot be introduced with perfect mercy is perfect mercilessness. What cannot be introduced with perfect justice is perfect injustice. Mercy might itself be just, and justice might itself be merciful. These are concepts that we cannot analyze.

The attributes of God that must be included are all positive ones, because the statement that He is the maximum perfection is a positive statement.

Well, we can find agreement here. He would have rejected it. His argument had weaknesses, and it can be argued that all such arguments do (though surely you would acknowledge that late 20th century modal approaches are more interesting and at least more difficult to dismiss).

When all is said and done at the end of the day, Kant was right. The assertion that existence exists is a tautology. :wink:

63

Lib
It’s not so much that we’re going in circles as that we keep backing up.

I can’t say it better than the quote I’ve already provided. Is it that you disagree with this? "One argument for the first premise is that the greatest possible being would by definition have the greatest possible form of existence: necessary existence. If this is true, it logically follows that If God exists, he does so necessarily. "

Perhaps I’m simply missing something mind-numbingly obvious, but “the greatest possible being who is not omnipotent” would still have the greatest possible form of existence: necessary existence unless omnipotence is a prerequisite for necessary existence, which you agree it is not. BTW “perfect existence” is not essential (as I understand this proof, anyway), “necessary existence” is. Nor can you conflate “necessary” and “perfect.” The fact that every attribute of X is “perfect” may imply X necessarily exists. However, the fact that X necessarily exists does not imply that every attribute of X is “perfect.”

My definition of God[sub]-omnipotent[/sub] appears to me to meet all the necessary criteria. If g -> g is true, then g[sub]-omnipotent[/sub]-> g[sub]-omnipotent[/sub] is also true because g[sub]-omnipotent[/sub] has the same quality of “necessary existence” as g by definition.

I am not, therefore, violating the first axiom. The first axiom refers to one of the attributes of “God”: existence. The axiom derives from the definition of “God”. However, so does mine. My definition is equally compatible with the first axiom, is it not? Or do you suggest that “only that which is as perfect as possible can necessarily exist?”

And, yes, my observation was subjective – that’s the whole point of my “orthogonality” concern. This is a different, though related problem because, it seems to me, it implies, at the very least, that there are some attributes that “God” cannot have.

[hijack]
Satan is the opposite of God, therefore, Satan is as imperfect as possible. That which is exists is more perfect than that which does not exist. Therefore, Satan does not exist. :stuck_out_tongue:
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64

You have responded to my request to explain your terms with more unexplained terms. Can you tell me, in English, why “If you want to posit that there is no perfect chess player, then you must first posit that the perfect chess player is possible”?

So ~e would be a denial of a positive existential statement? And therefore self-contradictory? And therefore imperfect? And therefore not the most perfect denial of a positive existential statement?

65

Does the ontological argument actually have a point to it.

All it does - if correct - is show that a perfect being must exist.

So what?

66

I don’t know that I can satisfy you, but I’ll make one last attempt, presuming that by “English”, you mean nontechnical terms.

Impossible is the negative (or opposite) of possible. If you cut out the possible, disallowing it entirely, then all that’s left is the im. There is nothing to negate.

Well, after that, personal moral decisions are made, and are no longer a matter of ontology, e.g., this being is or is not worthy of worship, etc.

It’s like science showing how gravity works. The “so what” is that you shouldn’t jump off cliffs.

67

Ackkk! You’ve unintentionally misunderstood me. :wink:

Omnipotence is NOT a prerequisite for necessary existence, BUT if power exists (and it does), then omnipotence (which is necessary power) is an attribute of necessary existence. Not a prerequisite; simply a requisite.

“The greatest possible being who is not omnipotent” is a contradiction, unless your who clause is a dependent clause. And in that case, it merely describes a being who is not as great as one who IS omnipotent. In other words, of all the beings who are not omnipotent, this one is the greatest. It is arbitrary, and formulation of an axiom for it would meet with much protest. Axioms are things we must all agree are true, like “A is A”.

68

Sorry, Ryan. I meant to respond to that earlier. You’ve got it basically right. That’s the nature of contradictions. And that’s why Ayn Rand made her very first axiom, “existence exists”.

69

Absolutely not.

Gravity is a theory which explains and predicts phenomena.

The Existence of a Perfect Being does not explain and predict phenomena. It is irrelevant.

70

Irrelevant? :smiley:

How can what is necessary be irrelevant? If there is a Perfect Being, then we are the ones who are irrelevant unless He values us.

At any rate, you missed the point of the analogy. Yes, science tells you what will happen if you jump off a cliff. But it doesn’t tell you that you ought not. People jump off cliffs every day.

71

I’m sorry Lib, but I just don’t get it. You may have to just give up on my ontological education as a bad job.

** It seems to me that you’re mixing Allahs and Vishnus here. I think you’ve got this exactly backwards. Necessary existence is a requisite of omnipotence. Omnipotence (or any other attribute of “God,” except, of course, existence itself) is not a requisite of necessary existence. While something that is omnipotent must exist (or it isn’t omnipotent), it does not follow that something that must exist must be omnipotent.

To put it another way, are you making both of the following assertions? “Everthing that is as perfect as possible must necessarily exist. Everything that must necessarily exist is as perfect as possible.” The first assertion is, as I understand it, the first axiom in the proof we are discussing. The second assertion seems to be the axiom you’re suggesting. It does not seem to me to be obviously true on inspection.

Yes, that’s what I’m saying, “The being who is just like God except omnipotent.” Obviously, this being is not as perfect as “God” not being as omnipotent as possible. However, this being is, for example, as omniscient as “God.”

** True, but that is all the proof we are discussing proves, too. “God” is not perfect. “God” is “as perfect as possible.”

The bottom line here seems to me that you wish to add the axiom, “Only that which is as perfect as possible has necessary existence.” I simply do not understand why this axiom is necessary to this proof or indeed, why this axiom is even correct. I can understand, however, why this axiom is needed from some theological perspectives.

72

I would say that all my questions can be dealt with, and so far I see no reason why they don’t lance the argument directly in the heart: the explain both exactly why such an argument would seem possible (easy to get a very large conclusion out of very little), but be useless (explain nothing). In any case, I think I laid out the problem fairly clearly, and it requires response.

—It means existence where perfection converges (i.e., necessary existence).—

Existence is not a perfection. Perfection is a word of comparison: this entity (or characteristic of an entity) is perfect -blank-. The word cannot work in isolation of at least one -blank-.

“This is the perfect entity” is not a meaningful sentence. Perfect in what sense because it perfectly fits which ideal model? “An entity” is not a model, or if it is, all entities are by definition perfect. Neither is “existence.”

73

I sure am glad you said that, Truth, because this is the first moment that I think I’ve understood what you’re saying, namely, that you don’t believe that axiom 1 is a biconditional. (So, you’re not the one who’s dense here.)

But, yes, it is a valid question as to whether the implication in axiom 1 ought to be biconditionally equivalent. It is NOT stated that way in Tisthammers argument, even though I KNOW that it is in Oppy’s 1991 version. I actually hadn’t noticed that until now, and you’ve got me wondering whether it was a simple oversight on Tisthammer’s part.

But, yes, I take it as axiomatic that everything that must necessarily exist is as perfect as possible because no existence is more perfect than existence in all possible worlds. It is itself a maximum.

74

Apos

Perfection simply means absolutely necessary (exists in all possible worlds). The simplest ontological argument would go something like this: “God, by definition, is perfection. Nonexistence is an imperfection. Therefore, God exists”

75

Is there anyone who can tell from Tisthammer’s webpage whether he is actually using a horseshoe or a triplebar for axiom 1? For some reason, his symbols don’t show up in my browser.

76

:stuck_out_tongue:

**
Sorry, I simply cannot accept this. It is certainly possible to conceive of something that must exist without being perfect in every attribute. To repeat, you can say that that which is as perfect as possible must exist because existing is more perfect that not existing. I don’t see any reason whatsoever why you can turn this around.

Also, I think that this axiom leads to absurd results.
“If existence exists, it must necessarily exist. If existence necessarily exists, it must be as perfect as possible. We, therefore, can conclude that existence is God.”

77

Yeah, like I said, I can’t see the symbols, so I missed that in Tisthammer’s argument. It isn’t necessary for the argument, but it’s your tangent, so if you don’t want me to discuss it with you, just say so. :wink:

I can’t accept that either. But then, I’m not saying that. This deals with the convergence of perfection, not just one perfect attribute. (That’s why I assumed that Tisthammer was using a biconditional. That’s how he defined God.)

Nope. Not ALL of existence IS necessary.

You may say this: If necessary existence exists, then it must necessarily exist. If necessary existence necessarily exists, then all necessary existence must be as perfect as possible. Therefore, all necessary existence is God.

78

Lib
It is my “tangent.” I merely point out that you specifically requested discussion be limited to Tisthammer’s proof as opposed to ontological arguments in general.

**
But that’s not the point, is it? Existence is necessary to existence, i.e. existence is necessarily a property of that which exists. Therefore, E “the property of existence” is necessary in all possible worlds that exist.

Now it is, arguably, a slight leap to say that “all possible worlds exist, therefore, E”. However, it is no more of a leap than saying that “God necessarily exists in possible worlds that don’t exist.” Is it?

Not all of existence is necessary, true. However, the property of existence is necessary to all that exists. That doesn’t make existence “as perfect as possible,” at least not mine!

79

I agree that existence exists. I don’t have a problem with that.

But I have no idea who is saying that God necessarily exists in possible worlds that don’t exist. I know I’m not. In fact, I don’t think that worlds that don’t exist are possible. (Which isn’t to say that I don’t think that it is not impossible that there don’t exist world’s that aren’t.)

80

Gah. That last sentence is frigging awful. I should have said that it isn’t to say that I don’t think that certain possible worlds might not exist.