**
Tisthammer is – g->g. If you agree that worlds that do not exist are not possible worlds, we’re OK.
**
It is to say that, I think, though I admit I had to reset my circuit breaker twice attempting to parse this sentence and the one it replaced. Which is it?
Well, I’m saying that — although worlds that don’t exist aren’t possible (they can’t be, or else they would exist) — just because a world is possible doesn’t mean that it exists. Possibility alone is not enough to prove existence.
**
“All worlds that do not exist are not possible worlds.”
All W[sub]NE[/sub] are ~W[sub]P[/sub]
“Some possible worlds do not exist.”
Some W[sub]P[/sub] are W[sub]NE[/sub]
It’s no big deal. All cows are bovines, but all bovines are not necessarily cows. How can a world that does not exist be possible? And how can a world that is merely possible be said with a certainty to exist? A mere conception does not an existence make, outside the context of definition and proof. It is possible that there is a saddle-shaped universe somewhere where circles are not ratios of pi. But who is to say?
**
But this is not analogous to what you are saying. If it were, you would be saying, “All worlds that exist are possible, but not all worlds that are possible necessarily exist.”
You said,
**
This is to say that if a world were possible, it would exist. The statements of your position, as I outlined them in my previous post, contradict each other. I remain
Let’s take it out of the subjunctive mode. If a world is possible, then it might exist (if it also exists necessarily), but if it doesn’t exist, then it isn’t possible (because it isn’t necessary).
**
“A possible world might exist.” Is my paraphrase a correct statement of your position?
**“But if a world does not exist then it is not a possible world.” Is my paraphrase a correct statement of your position?
It seems to me that Lib is either making an argument disproving Christianity, or at best irrelevant to Christianity (or indeed any earthly religion). Even if you grant that the argument is valid (which rests on accepting several nonobvious premises), it still doesn’t attach the ‘God’ of the argument to any earthly religion or religious text. It fails the old IPU test; you can replace ‘God’ with ‘Invisible Pink Unicorn’ in the argument and it still works, which makes the whole thing a bit silly for the believer of a formal religion to use. (Note, of course, that ‘Invisible Pink Unicorn’ is metaphorical, not a literal application of positive descriptive terms).
I’m especially interested in the fact that the ‘God’ discussed in this argument specifically cannot have a positive descriptive term applied to him, according to Lib. Now, perhaps I’m misremembering, but doesn’t the Bible attach some positive descriptive terms to the entity that it refers to as ‘God’? If so, and presuming we accept the ontological argument as laid out by you, it appears that you’ve proved that ‘God’ as described in the Bible doesn’t exist. You’ve shown that there is an omnipotent being who cannot be the diety referenced in the Bible, and, of course, you can’t have two all-powerful beings at once, therefore ‘God’ as described in the Bible doesn’t exist.
My point which ended up another thread was: what is the consequence of the existence of the perfect being? The next step - to choose a religion - is a leap of faith.
Nicky
Actually, under the proof we are discussing, it may not matter which conception of “God” you choose as they may all be equally true. While what Lib and I are discussing seems pretty arcane, if you came in at the middle, what it boils down to, (at least part of it) is whether this proof can also be used to prove the existence of other “God-like” beings. Lib has (sort of) agreed that it can but he believes this proof unintentionally mis-states one of the axioms.
Unfortunately the need to put butter on the table deterred me from participating in this interesting revival of good old Anselm’s ontological proof. But, as I worked, I few of my free processing moments compulsively kept beating the drum of this millennial question: can we reasonable use the argument to prove the existence of something which is perfect but not God? Fine, so a perfect island is out of the question since it isn’t the greatest of all perfect things. For example it erodes. Not good. Since anything which is perfect must by all means necessarily be eternal, right? I mean, who doesn’t want to exist for ever? And if it doesn’t erode, can it be called an island? Nah. Well, I guess were left with the Perfect Being necessary in all Worlds…
Hold on, I though, what about…what about…what about Winnie the Poh! The Tao! Yes. The Perfect Way…
Could something which can’t be said to have any consciousness like ours, something which can’t help itself, something which simply happens because that’s the way it is and always has been and always will be, can it be said to be perfect? Hmmmm. Why not? Thruth Seeker’s big capital E. Existence per say. Not existence as what actually is (let’s call it little e), but Existence with a big capital E. The thing that you just flow along with as it carries you from here to eternity in every possible world. The Perfect Process, mightier than Vishnu or any other conception of the divine. Hold on, is it then equal to God? Perfect Being? Perfect Existence? Is this Perfect Process the same as God portrayed by Plotinus?
Gee whiskers. Maybe. But somehow they seem oddly different. It doesn’t jell well. GOD = TAO = E = PERFECT BEING? Something itches the scalp. I’m not a theist. Or at least that’s what I thought. No, no, I’m not. I swear. Something just isn’t right about this. I feel they are different. Equally perfect. But different. They carry sooooo much luggage. Centuries of conceptions about their meaning. Maybe something will eventually give…
Ah! Perhaps this is a viable difference:
G is the perfectly inconceivable
E is the perfectly conceivable
E is certainly knowable. Therefore should we not be able to apply modal logic as to its necessity and possibility? But What about G? Since it’s perfectly inconceivable, i.e. perfectly unknowable, how can we do anything with it?
Unfortunately the need to put butter on the table deterred me from participating in this interesting revival of good old Anselm’s ontological proof. But, as I worked, I few of my free processing moments compulsively kept beating the drum of this millennial question: can we reasonable use the argument to prove the existence of something which is perfect but not God? Fine, so a perfect island is out of the question since it isn’t the greatest of all perfect things. For example it erodes. Not good. Since anything which is perfect must by all means necessarily be eternal, right? I mean, who doesn’t want to exist for ever? And if it doesn’t erode, can it be called an island? Nah. Well, I guess were left with the Perfect Being necessary in all Worlds…
Hold on, I though, what about…what about…what about Winnie the Poh! The Tao! Yes. The Perfect Way…
Could something which can’t be said to have any consciousness like ours, something which can’t help itself, something which simply happens because that’s the way it is and always has been and always will be, can it be said to be perfect? Hmmmm. Why not? Thruth Seeker’s big capital E. Existence per say. Not existence as what actually is (let’s call it little e), but Existence with a big capital E. The thing that you just flow along with as it carries you from here to eternity in every possible world. The Perfect Process, mightier than Vishnu or any other conception of the divine. Hold on, is it then equal to God? Perfect Being? Perfect Existence? Is this Perfect Process the same as God portrayed by Plotinus?
Gee whiskers. Maybe. But somehow they seem oddly different. It doesn’t jell well. GOD = TAO = E = PERFECT BEING? Something itches the scalp. I’m not a theist. Or at least that’s what I thought. No, no, I’m not. I swear. Something just isn’t right about this. I feel they are different. Equally perfect. But different. They carry sooooo much luggage. Centuries of conceptions about their meaning. Maybe something will eventually give…
Ah! Perhaps this is a viable difference:
G is the perfectly inconceivable
E is the perfectly conceivable
E is certainly knowable. Therefore should we not be able to apply modal logic as to its necessity and possibility? But What about G? Since it’s perfectly inconceivable, i.e. perfectly unknowable, how can we do anything with it?
Sorry about the doubble entry…
I ain’t no philosopher, but couldn’t “the universe” be replaced for “God” here?
It’s obviously the greatest possible being, and if it’s possible for it to exist, it’s necessary, being the whole of existence.
Shit, you guys just beat me to it (good thing I read the second page of the thread before posting).
Lib:
So is there anything about this definition (or others from which ontological proofs flow) that means that “God” must have will? Isn’t the universe (being the universe) “the convergence of all greatest possible attributes”? Taken together, everything that exists (the universe) is the greatest possible everything . . . no?
>> though it’s hidden under a thick layer of modal baggage, the proof rests on the direct assumption that God has to exist.
Exactly. The argument is “I define God to be perfect; I consider existence part of perfection, therefore God exists”. And that can work with anything. I can define the perfect woman as fulfilling the following conditions:
1- Breasts change size regularly so her man will enjoy the variety and not get bored.
2- Must enjoy pleasing her man above anything else.
3- Must exist (as one that fulfills the above two conditions but not this one is clearly inferior and, therefore, not perfect).
So I have just demonstrated this woman exists? I don’t think so.
—Perfection simply means absolutely necessary (exists in all possible worlds).—
Then why use the term “perfection” at all? This suggests subterfuge, not communication.
You still seem to be using the word “perfect” and “perfection” as it was all by itself a characteristic of an given entity. But it is not: something is perfect inasmuch as it exactly models a specific and specified ideal. In what way is god perfect? You seem to be saying: by necessarily existing in all possible worlds. Okay, why not simply say that, instead of burying the claim in “perfection?” I can guess why…
—The simplest ontological argument would go something like this: “God, by definition, is perfection. Nonexistence is an imperfection. Therefore, God exists”—
By your definition, this translates into “God, by definition, is absolutely necessary (its existence is a neccessary conclusion). —the second claim is totally unecessary— Therefore god exists.”
This seems to be a tautological argument, as does anything of similar form.
Further for something to be judged as perfect OR NOT in any respect, it must first exist. You can’t win the lotto without holding a ticket. To say that existing is more perfect than not existing is to express nonsense.
Worse, you still haven’t solved the problem that the “god” entity is still a non-entity. All the gramatical elements of a proof are present, but none of the litteral meaning.
So if I say that something is not possible, I can’t later say that it’s impossible, because the word “impossible” contains the word “possible”, and I’ve already disallowed “possible”?
Yes it is. If a world is possible, either it exists or it doesn’t. If it doesn’t, then it’s an example of a world that doesn’t exist but is possible. But you said that worlds that don’t exist aren’t possible. So it must exist, and possibility therefore proves existence.
We’re confusing two phenomenological levels. We’re applying the word “exists” to both what is corporeal and what is ideal. We need to distinguish what is conceptual and what is actual. If I say “bear”, does it mean that BEAR exists? No. Only that I can conceive of something possessing a quality of bearness. It could be that “bear” only exists has something I can imagine, but never as something tangible. For example. “Darth Vader” is by all means conceivable. Otherwise, how could George Lucas ever have written so extensively about him? Whether he could really ever exist is another matter. Yet, “Darth Vader” remains a possibility. “The set of all sets that don’t include themselves” can never be conceived of (except as a meaningless contradictory statement). By necessity of it’s meaninglessness it can, with absolute certainity, never gain corporeality in any conceivable world.
It’s right to deny that possibility alone doesn’t prove existence. We need to be careful in how we use the term “exists”. Saying "there exists a statement ‘there exists a bear’ " isn’t the same as saying “there exists a bear”.
First off,
Who can possibly come up with an argument again the perfection of non-existence?
This pretty much rules out God IMO.
Second, when you attribute properties of necessity to God (to make God meaningful in some sense) - those properties make God corruptable and inflexible … which also makes God meaningless.
The best a person could do to establish the existence of God IMO, is to equate god with any random body in existence, and simply ignore the fact that it doesn’t matter if it doesn’t exist.
-Justhink
God is defined in Tisthammer’s proof as the “greatest possible being”. Even an armchair logician can see the absurd contradiction in any conclusion that states that which is possible is not possible.
You may substitute any term you like for God, such as “universe” or “tooth fairy”, and use it consistently throughout, but you aren’t changing anything except that definitions of those terms.