Okay. Politicians often cite the Supreme Court’s 1976 decision in Buckley v. Valeo as applying First Amendment protection to campaign contributions and expenditures. According to this perspective, any proposed revisions of campaign finance which restrict an individual’s ability to give are implicitly unconstitutional. Got it so far?
The thing is, the opinion in Buckley said that while restricting the amount a candidate spends on his campaign was an unconstitutional limitation on their freedom of speech, it was proper to limit the amount donated to campaigns, in order to remove corruption or “the appearance of corruption” from the democratic process. Now, we all know that the two rationales have somewhat melded together in the eyes of donors today–loopholes were found in the contribution limits (soft money, bundling, issue advocacy), and those loopholes are defended strenuously on free speech grounds (and have been upheld by the Rehnquist court), even though that was explicitly not what Buckley says.
Anyway, when “the appearance of corruption” is brought up, both candidates and donors swear that contributions have no undue influence on future policy considerations (no quid for the quo), that donors can in no way buy a candidate, and that large contributions are made simply because the donor thinks the candidate has views which represent their interests, in the classically democratic fashion.
All of this can be disputed–numerous instances of pork barrel contracts, patronage, and invaluable access time to office holders can be traced back to contributions in a relatively straightforward causality. In many observers’ opinions–and in the eyes of the Court which decided Buckley–such influence on the political system makes a mockery of democracy.
The solution? Take the donors at their word. If all they’re doing is contributing to a like-minded office-seeker, and not expecting any favors in return, then surely it wouldn’t harm anything if their donations were made anonymous. As long as the money got there, right? Here’s what you do: require that all political contributions be made through a non-partisan government clearing-house. Basically, the clearing-house would launder the money, doling out to each candidate the amount of donations received every week or so–without telling them the names of the donors. Individuals can donate as much as they want, but the candidates won’t know who to “thank”–there’d be no recognition, and no suggestion of impropriety.
Here’s the tricky part: in order to make this really work, and to ensure as much as possible that political contributions are in no way contingent upon reciprocal favors, the government would have to require that the records of the clearing-house be sealed, and subject to protection against scrutiny in the same way as attorney-client, doctor-patient, or spousal privilege.
Of course, what’s to stop a donor from simply telling a politician, “Hey Frank, you know that $100,000 that cleared your account last week? That was from me.” First, raw contribution numbers could be made public every week–“the Bush campaign received $210,000 this week.” If the donor names were kept confidential, anyone could claim to have donated all or part of that money. This would muddy the waters, perhaps to the extent that the flow of money into politics would slow to a trickle, as donors worried about others taking credit for their contributions. But wait–couldn’t donors just show a copy of their check to the candidate, proving that they’d made the contribution? Not if such circumventing of the clearing-house was rendered illegal, using the clear and present danger standard set down by Oliver Wendell Holmes. An extreme remedy would be to apply strict penalties to anyone claiming to have donated over a certain amount, on the basis that recognition for large contributions posed a potential threat to the health of the republic.
Anyway, that’s my Black Box model of campaign finance reform. I’d appreciate considered responses. (I know you libertarians out there are frothing at the mouth at the prospect of additional government regulation, but this seems the simplest way of addressing the problem of money’s pernicious influence on politics, while giving the benefit of the doubt to all those people and corporations out there who claim altruism while donating tens of thousands of dollars to both parties at the same time.)