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Cheney signed it. That in itself means something. Businessmen (which Cheney was at the time) generally prefer to not seek out controversy that could sour business relationships. (Bauer was immune to that problem.)
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As Suskind illustrates at length in The One Percent Doctrine, Cheney was very much a believer in some of the neocons’ core beliefs, such as using the exercise of American might against one nation not just to prevent that nation from doing anything to threaten us, but to change the thinking of other possible opponents as well.
I can’t think of many, either. Doesn’t mean they’re mutually exclusive.
At that level, planning isn’t something you just forget to do. The failure of officials at that level to plan, and their willingness to go ahead with a war in its absence, is prima facie evidence of their disconnect with reality.
Planning certainly comes with costs, but they’re trivial compared to those of even a short, quick war. So it’s hard to imagine that economizing was an issue. Besides, you’ve already got the people on the payroll; it’s just a question of what account their time might be charged to. And it’s not like the kind of army needed for the postwar was an issue until they had done some planning for it. I don’t ‘get’ you at all here.
Here’s the thing: even that takes some sort of basic plan, even if it looks like:
“9 April 2003: pull down Saddam’s statue.
10 April 2003: proclaim Ahmed Chalabi as President of Iraq.”
And even that skeleton forces the people involved to take further steps. Bush would have to sign off on installing Chalabi as President; Chalabi would have to be notified to prepare himself for this; Chalabi would want guarantees of the extent to which the U.S. government would be prepared to back him with force if the army and the bureaucracy didn’t accept the legitimacy of his rule; and it quickly becomes clear to everyone that a plan for the transition is needed that everyone can agree on.
But there wasn’t even that much of a plan. Jay Garner was going to be in charge of Phase IV, as they call it, but he was never given significant guidance on what he was supposed to do, or what help he could call on to get it done.
No, there was overreliance on the idea of the U.N. taking over afterwards, without actually negotiating with them in a substantive manner before the war over the nature of their postwar role. The U.N. existed so the Bushies could say, “oh, the U.N. will do the nation-building stuff; we don’t have to worry about that.” Until.
They didn’t realize, themselves, that we were going to have one. But once again, even a minimal role in Iraq would have required planning in order to smoothly, quickly exit while leaving even a shell government in charge that would collapse the week after our last soldiers left the country.
The failure of the Bushies to make any plan for the postwar was to live in a dream world.