Other than a minor nitpick or two, yes. That is fair.
It’s a strong point, but I beleive it fails in comparison. Here’s why. The question isn’t why the war protestors don’t strongly favor a war in Iraq. Clearly there is good cause for reservations. But there is a big difference between not overtly supporting, and strongly and vehemently opposing. To illustrate this let’s get back to my drowning man analogy. You may see a man drowning in a lake and you may decide that you are not a strong enough swimmer to rescue the person, that you are not qualified, or that you can’t do it. That seems like a reasonable and perhaps realistic position for a person to take it.
However, that is a very different position from attempting to stop a person who wishes to save a drowning person. Doing such a thing does in effect support the drowning of the man in the lake.
Do you see the difference (and yes, I’m aware of how my analogy is imperfect and flawed in this particular instance, but I’m hoping you get the gist.)
What you are suggesting is attempting to make a risk to reward argument in order to argue whether or not the invasion is, on balance, a good idea.
I would guess that if somebody were to take such a tack and weigh the risks for the benefits they might come to the conclusion that the benefits of regime change did not outweigh the costs and risks of this war.
The problem with this Svin, is that this thread is the first time when I’ve even heard somebody talk about a risk/return proposition. I have never seen a protestor or even an anti-war doper even acknowledge the human rights (other than lip service) perspective, much less try to weigh the benefits versus the risks.
This would be a valid criticism of the administration if it is true, but I don’t see how the flightiness or vagaries of the administration should affect or alter one’s commitment to human rights if one is truly committed. Do you?
I really have no idea how much they care, though I suspect that to a degree they generally do. How does it matter though? What really matters if one is committed to human rights is if the human rights condition improves. If you beleive the action will improve the human rights situation in Iraq, how does your beleif that the administration’s concern isn’t genuine alter your desire to support a beneficial outcome?
There’s a forest and there’s trees. Just because the police can’t catch every speeder, doesn’t mean they should refrain from giving you a ticket. Secondly, I am not suggesting that one must go out and propose wars of liberation all over the world. However, it is questionable in my mind why someone would vehemently oppose an action against such a barbaric regime if they truly were committed to human rights.
That’s a simplistic dismissal. There is no flaw in my reasoning, and I am making no mistake by trying to evaluate consequences. The necessity for doing so is intrinsic in the subject matter which we are discussing. I am willing to defend and discuss my evaluations, and change them as logic dictates.
I also have a couple of pretty strong logical arguments supporting my evaluations.
My first evaluation is that a new regime will be much better from a human rights perspective than the old one. This is a likely and logical evaluation as the regime we are replacing is out their on the screaming edge of the distribution curve marked “repressive.” Secondly, I think this evaluation is aided by the stated goal of helping the Iraqi people create a representative government, and not simply another tyrant. Our greatest disasters at nation-building have been when we support or install a tyrant. Our track record with rpresentative governments is much better, and representative governments in general seem to do better from a civil rights perspective.
And, it is fair to say that I have been somewhat dismissive when other people have brought up potential disastrous consequences of this action. If one wishes to make the assertion that we will “destabilize the region,” or what have you, than it is up to the person who makes the assertion to support and defend that statement and show it is a likely consequence. Absent such reasoning, and being presented with only the assertion I think it is valid to dismiss it as hypothetical.
Then too, I can also suggest that many of these unintended consequences may not represent the danger that is suggested by those who raise them, under the grounds that they are the exact same objections that occured during the Afghanistan conflict, and they didn’t prove to be true then. Of course, past performance is no guarrantee of future returns (and be sure and consult your tax-advisor before invading,) so they could be an issue this time around. One would need to argue why it is different this time, and how that difference relates to the consequence.
Finally, I have the current course of events supporting me in dismissing the naysayers. While a dangerous and shallow argument it does present a degree of merit that would need to be addressed (and I intend to only use it properly.) That is, none of the bad shit that y’all have been predicting has yet come to pass. It wasn’t a quagmire, or another Vietnam, and so far the region is showing know signs of destabilization ( a term in need of definition,)
As for creating terrorists in the future, well, the counterargument can be made that we sure as hell are eliminating quite a few of them now, if reports from our troops in the North are to be believed. Quite a few terrorists have answered Hussein’s call and come to Iraq to fight us, and the quote I heard on the radio is that “We are killing these extremists like the morons they are (from one of our generals”) The martyrdom and terrorist attacks don’t work to well against soldiers. Far be it from increasing the terrorists we seem to be a doing a pretty good job of attracting them to Iraq and decimating them.
First off, you certainly asked that question politely.
To answer your question as succinctly as possible, this is going to come down to a matter of personal principles as much as logic.
The principle part goes this way:
I beleive that you cannot allow yourself to be coerced into either action or inaction by the threat of evil that others may make. I think that is important that one refuse to tie the two together.
The logic goes this way:
First the premise may be flawed. I am of the opinion that our action will not encourage other terorists, or cause on balance, more terorrists than there were before. I think our actions are a strong persuader to the contrary in much the same way that El Al doesn’t get hijacked a lot because they act in extreme fashion when they do. If we do not allow terrorism to work there will be little incentive to engage in it. Countries will be loather to have anything to do with it, support or encourage it if they know that to do so will mean the end of them as a county.
You may disagree, and I assume you do. So, let’s for example say for the sake of argument that our actions will inspire more terorrists down the road than there otherwise would be. I still think our action is justified. Iraq is a regime that has tortured, killed and committed genocide on the order of half a million or more, as well as severely repressing a country of millions.
The damage that could be committed by a few terrorists is necessarily small compared to the damage that an outlaw regime can perpetrate upon its populace. Terrorist action is by its nature mostly small and demonstrative rather than collosal in its scope (though that may change.)
Finally, if you beleive that the damage potential is equivalent or greater for new terrorists versus the existing regime, it doesn’t necessarily mean that we desist.
I would argue that doing anything that appeases terrorists, or altering our actions to appease them actually encourages their behavior.
Ultimately there will or there won’t be terrorists regardless of our actions. We can’t control what they will do or won’t. I think our full moral and logical imperative is to fight them as strongly and with as much overwhelming force as we can muster.
I hope that explains my stance to you further, and, even if you don’t agree, I hope you can see why I hold it.
I did not say that your assessment was foolish. I did not accuse you of a moral failing because you evaluated teh situation in a manner different from my own. I did not attempt to paint your concerns as absurd or unrealistic. I simply expressed my disagreement.
More to the point, I answered the OP. The disconnect you speak of applies only to someone who shares both your reliance upon moral consequentialism and your assessment of the likely outcomes. I share neither. I do not imagine that very many of the protesters share both.
Now, if you would like to argue about whose expectations most reasonably model the consequenes of the current conflict, we can, but the one thing that is extremely obvious from your posts is that the terminus lines of your analysis are very different from my own. This applies both to the past, where you draw on genocides more than a decade old and under a markedly different Iraqi and international situation, and to the future, where I extend my analysis well beyond the short-term replacement of the current regime. If we are going to meaningfully compare consequentialist analyses, then we must agree upon the period to be examined.
Let’s start with the past. I argue that it makes no sense to use the 500,000 person death toll in any analysis of what would happen if Hussein had been allowed to stay in power, either ndefinitely or for a set period of time. Quite clealry, Hussein has not been able to launch campaigns of genocide since the dust from Gulf War I settled. We have eliminated his air power and curtailed his capacity in a number of ways. Earlier, you complained about the costs and hardships of maintaining the no fly zones. I think that observation is off-base for a couple of reasons:
[ul][li]The United States likes having a significant air capacity in the region. In fact, much of US foreign policy in teh region has been directed at gaining/preserving/obtaining access to military bases in the area.[/li][li]I do not know the actual cost of maintaining teh no fly zones, but I think it is a safe supposition that they pale before the monetary costs associated with the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq, which will certainly top $100 billion.[/ul][/li]
So, there is no reason to conclude that the alternative to war is an abandonment of no fly zones. It seems similarly unjustified to assume that economic and diplomatic sanctions against Iraq would be withdrawn. Thus, even without the war it seems unreasonable to benchmark the “cost of doing nothing” against results from a period whose military, economic, and diplomatic context were vastly different from those that could be expected to exist had the war not been launched.
In addition to some excellent counterpoints already presented, Scylla:
Well, this is definitely a flawed premise as you say. To believe that an unsupportedAmerican hardline in this matter --against what is essentially global but especially regional opposition – will result in less terrorism is wishful thinking.
Terrorism is a form of expression that is in no way monolithic. There is no “monad” of terrorism that you can cripple or intimidate into submission, only decentralized splinter factions in the shadows. Terrorism is also not necessarily country-specific. And, most importantly, terrorism can exist despite a host country’s best efforts to the contrary. As such, terrorism is an extremely hard target for violence alone to take down.
How well would the above strategy work against countries in better shape than military weaklings like Iraq or Afghanistan? Or against allies, like Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who produce much more terrorism than Iraq ever has? And isn’t it counterproductive to go around the globe smashing or threatening countries with the intention of eradicating terrorism, when what results is regional – global even – radicalization that leads to more incentives for the discontent to express themselves via terrorism?
I really don’t know about your figures, but let’s leave them be. You engage in lengthy sophistry, summoning forth logic and ethics, but then close your case by claiming that the end justifies the means.
In this case the means employed throughout the process were a plethora of state falsehoods, distortions, bribes, coercion, etc., unprovoked war against a sovereign nation, a disdain for and ignorance of international diplomacy, an excessive arrogance and presumption regarding the will of God (which is precisely the argument terrorists employ!), a deliberate unilateralism that served to push away precisely the organization that could have conferred legitimacy to the attack, a behaviour that destroyed common ground rather than build it, and so forth.
With means like the above, it seems to me the end rather fails to appear justified according to any but the most blinded utilitarian interpretation – assuming that all those people died solely because of Saddam Hussein as you claim, and not owing to, for example, sanctions.
Furthermore, the issue is not a false dichotomy as you seem to be suggesting. The choice is not as clear-cut as going to war right now or not going to war at all – there is much grey area in between wherein rest international support and unity, just waiting to be erected by someone more capable.
Why not? If, for example, the US were to take a strong lead in the Palestine peace process and visibly haul back the leash of that scurvy dog Sharon, don’t you imagine Muslims around the world will have one less important item of contention with the US? You are simply repeating the classic and frequently shot down “they just hate us and we can’t do anything about it” argument here, and it’s a silly argument that serves to conveniently externalize the collective locus of control, freeing its proponents from the responsibility of certain difficult or unpopular decisions.
Overwhelming force? Sounds more like a feel-good fantasy than a logical argument. Let’s oppose the evil, and in the end the forces of good shall be triumphant – and if not, at least we killed as many as possible in the attempt. If that’s not what you’re thinking it’s certainly the way it will be interpreted and broadcast.
Piling on additional violent conflict is unlikely to provide a resolution to terrorism when the sources of terror are fluid and can recombine in a matter of days or weeks, in any country, and when terrorism is itself a response to perceived oppression.
The logical solution is to attempt to mitigate the problem as much as possible while trying not to increase it. The medicine you suggest to cure the problem simply aggravates it: an iatrogenic exercise, or at best a confirmation of the dictum that violence begets more violence.
Scylla, I see where you’re coming from, I think. Is this an accurate restatement of your points?
It is unethical to base one’s decisions on another person’s threat of violence.
War with Iraq will not help develop more terrorists.
Even if it does, they’ll do less damage than Iraq’s regime would do.
Even if they do more damage than Iraq’s regime would do, appeasing them in any way encourages more terrorism by proving it’s effective.
I disagree with some of those points, as outlined below:
My basic principle is this: I share responsibility for the predictable outcomes of my decisions. If I engage in a course of action that results in people dying, and I predicted that outcome (or would have predicted it if I’d stopped to think about it), then I share responsibility for that outcome with everyone else whose decisions helped bring that outcome about. As such, if someone threatens (for example) to shoot a child unless I give them a dollar, if I don’t give them a dollar and they shoot the child, I share responsibility for the child’s death.
Of course, if I walk away from the situation after giving them a dollar, it’s predictable that this asshole will try the same trick on someone else. My goal should be to get the child safe, and then prevent the asshole from ever trying the trick again.
Same thing with terrorism – and I think this is in line with modern hostage negotiation tactics. We should definitely let our actions be affected by the threat of violence: if we do not, then we share responsibility for lots of deaths (although naturally the terrorists get the bulk of the responsibility there). However, although getting those people free should be a high priority, we must balance it against the importance of preventing this group of terrorists from repeating their acts and discouraging future groups of terrorists from trying this trick.
I do believe, as Abe lays it out above, that this war may encourage more terrorists. This is a matter of fact, though, not principle, and it’s being debating plenty elsewhere. And not to nitpick, but since this point (even if true) wouldn’t turn my argument into a fallacy, I’ll pass it over for now.
I think that, if we’re weighing the acts of terrorists against the acts of Hussein’s regime, we should assume a course of action in Iraq other than either war or inaction. Since most peace advocates recommend other measures to pressure Hussein, that’s what we should use as a measure. But this point measures one “what-if” against another, and I think it’d be very difficult to build a convincing argument either way – either that terrorists would, or terrorists would not, do more damage than Hussein’s regime when pressured by the international community.
Although appeasing terrorists may encourage them, I’m not talking here about appeasing terrorists. I’m talking about approaching our foreign policy with an eye toward making terrorism seem unappealing. You do this in two ways: by being a real asshole to existing terrorists, and by being a real nice guy to potential terrorists. Stick, but also carrot.
If the US casually imposes its own rule in foreign countries, then we’re not just being mean to existing terrorists: we’re being mean to folks who haven’t decided to be terrorists. In doing so, we make it easier for existing terrorists to recruit new folks. Were we nice to those folks instead, they’d be less likely to become terrorists.
It’s possible that some potential terrorist thinks, “Aha! I’ll kill a bunch of Americans because they’re being nice to that country over there, and if I kill a bunch of them, they’ll be nice to my country because they don’t want to breed more terrorists like me here!” But frankly, I doubt it.
This is not appeasement. This is an ounce of prevention.
Not to pick on you Daniel but I’m quoting you here since I’ve heard repeated mention of (and read up on) the third option presented by anti-war protesters. So this statement is really addressed to everyone who proposed an alternative solution to Saddam, not just you.
The problem, as I see it, with the other proposed solutions (or combination of solutions) is that they have virtually no chance of removing Saddam from power. Yes, we could step up the inspection program and hire more inspectors (which of course, were only producing some results, limited as they were, because there was an army at Saddam’s doorstep). We could continue to try and work through the UN to form a broader coalition WRT to Iraq. However if the UN SC won’t authorize force under any conditions (as per France’s threatened veto) then Saddam knows his power within Iraq is secure. He’s crushed internal uprisings before and has his thumb on the windpipe of the populace. Foreign armies won’t invade “under any conditions”. He’s home free. He can play the shell game with impunity. All the while he remains in power.
So, to summarize:
Continuing to pursue diplomatic methods of disarming Saddam would likely have continued to produce results, though limited, and only what Saddam felt he needed to in order to appease world opinion.
The limited results are only accomplished via the perceived credible threat of force being used against Saddam.
A credible threat of force is seriously undermined if the U.S. were to accede to France’s “no war under any condition”.
The result is that no war occurs, a large heavy stick in the form of the U.S. armed forces is semi-permanently staged in the region, limited and slow progress is made in investigating Iraq’s WMD, and Saddam stays in power.
I have seen no proposed solution (absent the use of force) that had a reasonable chance of removing Saddam from power.
But under what evaluation is “removing Saddam from power” the appropriate standard of success. In this thread, scylla has proposed a consequentialist humanitarian evaluation based upon the expected results of various courses of action. If Saddam Hussein remains in power but does not cause through presonal action/determination more deaths/human suffering than an alternative solution, then leaving him in power is not a flaw.
Now, if one wants ot propose an alternate method of analysis, say one in which it is important to achieve retribution for past actions or deliver punishment for current violations, then leaving Saddam Hussein in power might be a flaw. that is not the analysis presented in the OP, however.
This is true. From a “deaths/human suffering” standpoint my thinking has been (and generally continues to be):
Saddam’s atrocities against his own people are well documented. Even after his crushing of the various internal uprisings post Gulf War I his track record has been abysmal (though, undoubtedly, the bulk of his bodycount is due to those uprisings).
Saddam’s atrocities cannot be reasonably expected to stop while he is in power. I think it reasonable to think that Saddam would kill/torture/rape hundreds if not thousands of people yearly while he remained in power. At the very least Saddam could have, at any time, greatly reduced his people’s suffering by substantively cooperating with measures that would have guaranteed the easing of sanctions.
Popular support in Iraq for Saddam has not been high due to his repressive rule. Based on this, the poor training and organization of his military, and the overwhelming advantage of the coalition militaries I expected (and still expect) wartime casualties to be relatively small. Smaller perhaps then the number killed annually by Saddam himself and almost certainly smaller than the number killed by Saddam in 3 - 5 years.
Based on what I feel are reasonable assumptions the only wild card in the human rights equation is the possible loss of life from increased regional instability and acts of terrorism. At this point that’s an unknown quantity and will be highly dependent on the method and effectiveness of the post war rebuilding of Iraq.
The final equation is: If Saddam stays in power thousands of horrific human rights are practically guaranteed. If Saddam is removed by force immediate casualties (relatively speaking) will likely be light. Future casualties due to the fall out of the action are not guaranteed, are unknown in amount, and are highly dependent on the success of post war operations.
Well, I would want to see some fihures for how many people the Iraqi regime has killed over the last 5 years or so. That way we would at least have some standard from which to hypothesize future results.
Also, it seems to me that your analysis has not included the deaths caused by teh current armed invasion. Are you discounting those humans from the equation for some particular reason?
Sorry, that should have said the “military deaths caused by the current armed invasion”. The assumption inherent in this is your description of those deaths (and serious injuries, if our analysis extends beyond simple killings) as “(relatively speaking) likely to be light.”
I apologize if it seemed that way. I’m including all military (both sides) and civilian deaths in my evaluation of the human life cost of the current operation.
Please, toady away. With me, flattery will get you everywhere.
Scylla:
So how am I to express my reservations, then, when it seems obvious (at least to me) that the current administration has clearly decided to launch a war despite them? Am I to merely sit back, light my pipe, and say, “Well, you know old chap, I do have serious reservations…” ? In a free, democratic society I have a right to express my views through protest, especially if I feel that I don’t have any other option, so I protest.
Then, of course, there’s the “polarization effect.” I and millions like me make our reservations known, but the administration merely dismisses them. Those who support the war belittle our opinions. We who oppose the war feel marginalized from the decision-making process, ostracized from the political discourse. My reservations become convictions, strengthened by the fact that none of the important players seem to be interested in my views. I become more radical and vehement in the expressing them, so that my voice may be heard. Wash, rinse, repeat. Etc.
That’s why Blair’s speech to the British parliament was so effective, IMO. He didn’t shirk from the fact that there were good reasons for opposing the war, and expressed a profound (possibly rhetorical, but anyway) respect for those who did not share his point of view. He had to, of course, considering the fact that Robin Cook had resigned because of the government’s pro-war stance. But admitting that the opposing side has a point – that its not simply a naive, unpatriotic, un-American stance – and arguing for your own convictions in the face of those reservations is much more effective than simply ignoring the opposition while appealing to patriotic jingoism and religious conviction, if you ask me. So, at least in part, the rejection of the official line by the anti-war crowd was also simply a visceral response the rhetoric of the Bush administration (especially here in Europe).
Finally, it’s important to remember that the war was not only about human rights. As Abe detailed so clearly above, the human rights issue was only one of entire raft of concerns among the anti-war movement in relation to the administration’s actions. I might agree with the human rights stance, for example, but strongly disagree with the policy of “preemptive self-defense.” (As far as that goes, the Bush administration played directly into the hands of the protest movement by stressing the self-defense argument over humanitarian concerns, even though the argument that Iraq represented a major threat to the US was little more than a farce.)
Yes, of course I see the difference. If war with Iraq was the simple equivalent of rescuing a drowning man, then who in their right mind would possibly oppose it? Any US soldier who rescues a drowning man (or woman) from the Euphrates has my full support.
And in fact, let’s give credit where credit is due. The current US administration has managed (with a little help from its friends) to oust one of the worst dictators of the 20th Century, against a very great deal of strong popular resistance. I’ll drink a toast with any pro-war partisan to the end of that regime!
On the other hand, your “drowning man” analogy doesn’t in any sense reflect the complexity of the real situation – which you seem to recognize as well.
Well…to a certain extent, maybe. But also, it’s a question of principles – like, for example, respect for the UN Charter, respect for previous US commitments to international law, respect for the concept of national sovereignty, and so forth.
Well, I have, in several threads, over the last year or so. I’ve also consistently claimed that, from my perspective, the human rights argument is the strongest case for intervention. And I’ve stated several times that should the UN Security Council decide in favor of military intervention, I would probably support the decision.
I can’t answer as to why few war opponents have been unwilling to address this problem, if that’s the case. In a sense, it does pose a dilemma, and maybe people are just uncomfortable with the internal cognitive dissonance it causes. From my own experience, on the other hand, I haven’t seen too many anti-war folks shying away from the question, or merely paying “lip-service” to the human rights perspective. Do you have any specific examples in mind?
No, maybe not one’s commitment to human rights. But it might affect one’s relationship to the current US government.
These are very good questions that require quite a bit of soul-searching. But to keep it short:
Will Iraq be a better place? Or will the US be bogged down in the seemingly-endless occupation of a foreign country, facing a hostile population led by a faction of radical fundamentalists, a lá Iran after the Shah? I sincerely hope that the human rights situation in Iraq will improve, but we have yet to see that outcome. Let’s see what things look like in 5 or 10 years.
In addition, yeah, in some way, perhaps irrationally, deep down, something shifts inside of me when I see some slimy politician pleading respect for human rights, while I know (or at least sense) that his only real concerns are power and money. It has to do with the corruption of the human spirit, with the conceit of self-righteous falsehood aping integrity. Sorry, I can’t really explain it any better than that.
Marx once observed that, because the ruling classes are always a minority, they must appear in “ideological disguise” in order to exercise their authority. In that vein, did you know that the Chinese government justifies its occupation of Tibet on the basis of “human rights” – that is to say, they claim that they have “liberated” Tibet, for the good of its people, from the old, repressive political/caste system of the Tibetan lamas?
“Human rights” can be, and often is, exploited as a pretext for military intervention, while the real motives hide in the shadows.
And finally, then, to return to brass tacks: I think we should invade North Korea, as soon as possible. After all, we’ve seen how useless sanctions are – look at the history of Iraq. The US Army accomplished in 21 days what the entire international community failed to accomplish in 12 years! It grates upon me, that insufferable regime repressing so many innocent people! We must invade at once, regardless of the opinion of the international community!
You agree, yes? Surely, you wouldn’t want to take a position that, “in effect,” supports the current North Korean government, would you?
As I mentioned this is a subject which necessarily rests on the weighing of probabilities. To simply state that you disagree is simplistic, IMO. I would suggest that the nature of the debate would require one to engage and assess these probabilities in support of one’s point of view.
**
My apologies. I did not mean to give the impression that you did any of those things, or that I was upset in any way. I was just suggesting that simple disagreement was “simplistic.”
**
If you beleive that we’ve come to the point where we should simply agree to disagree, that’s ok. I was regarding our debate as constructive and interesting, and would not have minded hearing you extrapolate further on our points of disagreement beyond just simple disagreement.
**
An excellent point. As you note, I have been staying fairly short-term. The reason for this would be that I guess geopolitics would be much like the weather in terms of being a chaotic system.
One may argue cause and effect over the short-term just as one may predict the weather over the short-term.
Over the long-term it seems to become more of a rhetorical exercise, like butterfly coughs leading to hurricanes.
I see really no way around this conundrum of complex systems, interrelated causation and the folly of trying to predict what this war will lead to 20 years down the line.
However, if you think it is a useful exercise I am more than happy to listen, learn, and argue.
**
I would argue that the Kurdish genocides occured after the dust settled, but, okay. We have larger fish to fry.
[quote]
**We have eliminated his air power and curtailed his capacity in a number of ways. Earlier, you complained about the costs and hardships of maintaining the no fly zones. I think that observation is off-base for a couple of reasons:
[ul][li]The United States likes having a significant air capacity in the region. In fact, much of US foreign policy in teh region has been directed at gaining/preserving/obtaining access to military bases in the area.[/li][/quote]
**
That’s true.
[quote]
**[li]I do not know the actual cost of maintaining teh no fly zones, but I think it is a safe supposition that they pale before the monetary costs associated with the invasion and reconstruction of Iraq, which will certainly top $100 billion.[/ul][/li][/quote]
**
Of course.
Yes I do. And, you make a strong argument that continued restraint is a viable alternative to war.
It is certainly not an argument that can be dismissed but it is one that I hope you will grant has some serious problems. Some of these are the same problems that exist if we go to war, some are unique to the solution.
Destabilization. Such an imposing of “no fly zones” prevails upon the continuing good will of those who are allowing us to use their bases and air space. Our long-term semi-permanent meddling in the region in such an overt fashion may actually cause more destabilization, resentment and all that than a short-term action that provides a solution, followed by our noninvolvement.
One problem with such restraint is that requires a constant presence and vigilance. Holding a man down is not easy to do.
With the imposition of “no fly zones” and sanctions, we are stopping genocidal attempts against kurds, but the repression of the entire nation under the regime is not being alleviated. I would hope you would agree that the sanctions imposed against Iraq hurt the Iraqis more than the regime, and the oil for food program was a disaster in terms of providing humanitarian releif.
While unrelated to the humanitarian perspective which has been the focus of this thread, such an effort puts Hussein in a pretty good position politically. We look like long-term meddlers in affairs that our none of our business, while Husseing stays in power and continues to vie for political support from other countries, and pursue WMDs and anything else he can think of.
It seems to me that maintaining a restrain sort of solution holds most of the same dangers and risks as outright war, only they are perpetual, while the war’s dangers while potentially greater, are more short term. The main gain is financial as you point out.
That’s a tough philosophy Dan. A real tough one. It seems an impossible one to live up to, IMO.
It’s one that a lot of governments have wrestled with in terms of terrorist acts.
The biggest problem with it is that you are accepting the proposition on the terms that the guy who is asking for a dollar is making it to you. He is the one giving you the either or proposition, not you.
If yoo think we have a responsibility not to create terorrists consider the following:
The reason the guy is giving you this either or proposition and threatening a child is because he thinks you will have the moral stance that you do, and that you will accept both the either/or proposition and the moral responsibility to save the child by tendering a dollar to him. He is doing this to gain a dollar, right?
If you allow that person to gain a dollar you are proving to him that he is correct in his assumptions. More importantly, you are proving to everybody else who is witness or party to it that this proposition works.
One can make this threat and gain a dollar.
Now, built into the proposition this man has made you is the assumption that you are going to try to stop him. That goes without saying. He expects you to go after him. He was aware that he was creating an enemy who would try to stop him when he made the proposition to you. He expects it. He is prepared. More importantly this is a risk he has already weighed, and he thinks it’s worth the risk to gain the dollar, else he would not have made the proposition to you.
Giving him the dollar, and then trying to stop him from doing it again is exactly the behavior he is expecting from you.
Whether or not you succeed in stopping him, you have proven that his logic works.
This is the inherent problem in capitulating with terorrists. If you accept their proposition, you play their game and you perpetuate and even encourage (albeit not deliberately,) their behavior.
Think about: Any scenario that allows that man to gain a dollar from threatening a kid is playing into his hands and perpetuating his behavior. You are acceding to his logic, and by doing so, by showing it works you are encouraging it.
Given such a proposition, the one way you can do the most to assure that such things never happen again is not to accept the proposition, don’t follow the logic.
It seems to me that the most important thing you could do in such a situation is to make sure that there was absolutely no way that the guy threatening the kid was ever going to get that dollar from you, or anybody.
The only reason such things happen is because they work, because we go along with them.
If they didn’t work, if there was no gain, people would stop attempting them.
Now it’s a tough, tough question. On the one hand if you refuse that child may very well die. However, he may also die if you accept. These people that do such things aren’t really known for their good faith.
Do you risk jeopardizing the child and having his blood on your hands by refusing, or do you risk future children by proving that the logic of terror works?
It seems to me that chosing to save this one kid is a selfish act. I don’t mean that in a bad way. It’s a humane act, but it’s also somewhat selfish. You are risking children in the future and proving the logic of terorrism works to keep blood off your hands personally. You’re essentially passing the buck, are you not?
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Countries like Israel no longer negotiate with terorrists. Logic and experience proves it doesn’t work. If you hijack a plane in Israel you are guarranteed to have that plane stormed immediately.
Now nobody tries to hijack planes in Israel any more.
We do something a little less extreme, but fairly similar. We negotiate. We talk. But, from the beginning we know that we are not doing so in good faith. We’ll talk till we’re blue in the face, and negotiate as long as we gain something from it, but we don’t capitulate or give in. The problem with your stance is complex, but do you see that it actually encourages terorrism if you accept the equation they are handing you?
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I think being a real nice guy to people that hate us encourages terorrism. I think we need to be real nice to people that will be nice back to us. The only way I see to make terorrism unappealing is to prove that it doesn’t work.
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I think if we impose our rule anywhere we are asking for big trouble. I agree with you 110% If we follow through on our promise, liberate the Iraqi people and let them govern ourselves, I think we will have sent quite a positive message. Anything else is suicidal and incredibly stupid.
But Dan, that’s exactly what they are thinking. That’s why they do what they do. Terrorist attacks don’t gain anything in and of themselves. They do it because it focuses on attention on their cause and gets us to do stuff. They don’t do it for fun.
So terrorists don’t hijack airplanes, but they blow up buses and discotheques. This is an improvement in what regard?
And as to the question of democracy for Iraq: if it looks like the first election will elect an administration with an anti-American agenda, do we permit it to go forward?
