hmm… i understand, but just because you can predict what will happen, how does that zap you inside my brain and give you control over my decisions? an example? if the coach can see that the quarterback is about to throw an interception, but, the quarterback doesn’t see it, has he last his “free will” to throw the ball instead of run of hand off?
a dog and a human are the only ones on the list with a brain. a human has higher thought functions than a dog.
That’s a pretty good summary of what I used to believe. However, if determinism exists even at the quantum level – and there is at least some persuasive evidence that it does – then everything at larger scales must be deterministic, too, and there is no room for randomness in the universe. The quantum uncertainty that prevents us from knowing quantum states with arbitrary precision isn’t an argument against those states being intrinsically deterministic.
The other aspect of this argument is that causal determinism is not necessary to prove that free will is an illusion, it’s just one of a number of hypotheses that totally demolish it. But there are others, including randomness. True randomness – if there were such a thing – doesn’t support the concept of free will either. It would only support the notion of non-predictability.
To make an analogy: I endorse the notion that the human brain is a deterministic mechanism like a computer, albeit currently more complex, and that it’s decision-making processes are no less deterministic that those of a computer. As computers have become more sophisticated we have long ago passed the point of being able to claim that “computers can only do what they’re programmed to do” – the outcome of a complex computer decision-making process or simulation is impossible to predict in any practical way without actually running the simulation. A human has no more real free will than the computer. If one introduces the random element, that would be somewhat like a computer with random memory errors or input from an external random number generator like a cosmic ray counter. Its decision or result might not be predictable, but that has nothing to do with “free will”.
It seems to me that the only way to really endorse objective free will is to pretend that the human brain (and we’d have to include those of other higher creatures, too) somehow transcends physical laws and operates by magic or some kind of endowed spirituality. Or, we could drop the whole thing and consider “free will” to be a comfortable subjective concept – a comfortable illusion.
ah but i actually do have a choice
i am going to exercise it now
Which is irrelevant. They all make decisions. Many humans make decisions that are not choices as choice requires free will and not all decisions are made using free will- we know that over 90% of actions are never decided consciously, but decisions are made without consciousness or awareness or Free Will if it exists.
Yes, not my best choice(heh) of words.
But thats the main problem with Robert’s argument. Its semantics and circular.
Decision is conflated with choice, Hey, if I have choice I have free will!
Or even worse, just the existent of more than one end state somehow magically confers free will.
Whether it’s possible or not depends on what it means to not have free will. 
Though seriously, it does bring up the point that this question probably has different answers depending on whether one is religious or not…
At Robert 163
Please demonstrate how Free Will causes Human Behaviour.
Witnessing is inadequate.
How do thoughts cause action?
Descartes and his followers had a problem with this and came up with three possibilities so maybe you can start from there:
Option 1: Interactionism- the spirit works on the body using the pineal gland and the venticles in the brain (disproved by empirical research)
Option 2: Pre-established Harmony- GOD set up the universe so that when humans cam into existence their Minds would control their bodies because choices in their minds would be in eternal harmony with the timing of parallel actions by the body.
Option 3: Occasionalism- GOD intervenes on a second to second basis to cause choices made in the mind to mirror physical changes in the body.
Do any of these appeal to you. Or do you have a better idea.
That you think such a facile examples refutes all the body of work that has been done on this says a lot about the superficiality of your understanding.
Let’s say you choose the cheerios over the raisin bran. If you don’t know with 100% certainty why you made this choice, then you can’t say anything about how free you were to make it. And before you say it–NO, it is not possible to be 100% certain, because your vantage point doesn’t allow for an objective evaluation. For you to know “why”, you’d need to know what’s going on in your subconscious processes. Which, by definition, is not accessible to you.
For all you know, you went for the Cheerios because your subconscious mind associates the bright yellow box with your mother, who used to wear a lot of yellow when she nursed you as an infant. But listen to you tell it, you chose the Cheerios because they taste better or because you think they’re healthier. Ask a neuropsychologist what a “just so” story is, and they will entertain you all night long with the antics of their patients. “They taste better!” is an example of a “just so” story.
If our brains are really the ones that are pulling the strings but not “us”, then how can we say that we make choices. We can say this only if we define our brains as “us”. But the Free Willers don’t like this because they like to imagine there’s a side to “us” that isn’t just bunch of neurons and hormones and and membrane receptors–that we have souls that are actually pulling the switches. But the “Free Will is an Illusion” folks have no problem accepting that the biology is fundamentally what we are. You can lose sleep over this if you want. But it personally doesn’t bother me none.
I have a feeling that if we start quoting some research from the past three decades (such a Libet) it will just be rubbished rather than be debated. Question to Robert 163- are you willing to debate. If so I will spend some time trying to place some disturbing facts about human conasciousness before you. If you are merely witnessing, then my time is too valuable to waste trying to help you understand. As noted above, this board has a wide variety of expertise from leaders in their fields to complete arseholes. I can be either.
I have spent many decades considering this problem and have still not reached a conclusion much better than “I don’t really know”. I can help you to understand some of the flaws in Free Will if you are willing to debate rather than witness.
Remember, Pjen, that there are lurkers here. I used to be one of them. The OP may not be interested in the evidence, but others may be more open-minded.
Good point. I have some very interesting work on the Psychology of belief in free Will where people can be convinced that they have made choices by Free Will, but can be shown to have decided using non-conscious (and so by definition non-free-will) methods.
The problem is that a little conscious bubble seems so convincing becasue it gets things right enough most of the time, but it is totally blind usually to its massive limitations. If we had to make all decisions (r even many) by the use of something like Free Will, we would never act at all.
I’m not sure you do understand. This has nothing to do with me having control over your decisions. It has to do with the supposition that your decisions are made, not through an act of volition but in a mechanistic manner based solely on your current brain state. With your quarterback example, it is irrelevant that the coach sees anything. The determinism lies in that given the current state of the physical being of the quarterback he will always choose to throw. Given the same inputs you will get the same outputs.
The problem is, I have no idea what you have in mind.
If you say to me, Kryptonians don’t really exist, and I say Wait; how exactly would a Kryptonian differ from a human? – well, you’d maybe reply If you shoot me with ordinary bullets I’d start bleeding and maybe die; but they’d bounce right off a Kryptonian’s face, and even his eyeballs – and I’d say, Oh, okay, got it.
And if you then added Plus, guys like me walk around, stubbing their toes and tripping over stuff; Kryptonians can fly – well, I’d say Yes, fine, you can stop. And if you then went on and on about heat vision and freeze breath and throwing cars around, I’d tap my foot and check my watch and patiently wait for you to finish describing all the myriad ways a man would be different if he were a Kryptonian.
But in this case?
Tell me there’s no such thing as someone with free will, and I’ll ask you to describe two guys: a real-life one without free will, and a fictional one with free will. And near as I can tell, you’d say Well, one of them would make decisions for reasons he can explain to you, talking at length about what he finds important and why he didn’t instead choose the alternative he seriously considered, and et cetera; and then I’d ask you to describe the other guy, and you’d say…
…well, all the same stuff, right?
No. Free will is supposedly neither random nor deterministic - but what does that even mean? How can something be neither of those things?
If I ask the OP with free will and the OP without free will to explain why they have chosen Cheerios over the other cereals, they will both say the same thing. They will both say Cheerios have the superior taste. Because both are seeing the same reality. Only one is seeing “true” reality and the other is seeing an illusion of it.
The OP with free will will know exactly why he chose the Cheerios. He will know with 100% confidence that he chose the Cheerios because their taste and smell pushes more dopamine receptor buttons than the raisin brain or corn flakes. Moreover, he will have “willed” this reaction to occur in his brain, for reasons that he is also fully aware of and in control of. He will be fully aware and in control of all the choices and compulsions…all the way down.
Meanwhile, OP without free will will never know that he actually prefers Cheerios because his brain has associated the cereal with the comfort and security of infancy. He will continue to assert that he selected Cheerios because of their taste and smell. This seems like the right answer to him. It doesn’t seem at all convenient or “just so”. It seems logical and reasonable.
We can’t test whether free will exists or not by quizzing the subjects. If they have been suckered by the illusion, they will not know it. They will sound just as confident as the person who actually does have free will. We have to perform experiments and look at their brain scans to figure out just how accurate they are in determining their motivations and degree of self-control. For instance, I would expect a person with free will to be able to activate parts of his brain at will. If I tell him not to think about elephants, and yet I see a part of his brain lighting up that I’d previously linked to thoughts about elephants, then he fails the test.
I am in full agreement with monstro (who has done a great and clear job of explaining) et al; if I may give my own attempt at an answer.
Robert163, in this cereal example, there is no fundamental difference between your choice about which of the three cereals to eat, and the choices that lead to the option of those specific three cereals to be available to choose from. Why are Cheerios in my pantry? I don’t know, I decided to buy them. Why? Because I like them? In the moment in the store I was compelled to select them over other options, based on my mood, ‘conscious’ desires, subconscious response to advertising, environment, and other stimuli. Just as my choice at the breakfast table is an amalgamation of responses to stimuli; looking at the Cheerios box makes me feel a certain way; I cannot help it. I pick it or not because of all the feels that are happening, and part of the way we process those feelings is by having active thoughts about them. This doesn’t mean we have some amazing, extra-biological, ration-based ability to make choices, but rather that our thoughts are byproducts of environmental and internal stimuli.
I’d write more, but my chemical impetus to continue seems to have decided that that’s about all I can manage at the moment. I could say I’m stopping because I choose, but really, it’s just that I don’t want to go on. The ‘choice’ comes second to the desire.
I found the rest of what you wrote interesting, but I found those parts there fascinating. To repeat my earlier analogy, having the powers of a Kryptonian would mean I could do a multitude of things I can’t do now; that’s how I can tell I lack those powers. But having free will would mean I’d – say the same things I do now, sounding just as confident when offering the same explanations because I’d be making the same choices for the same reasons?
Talk about a distinction without a difference.
To a limited degree, you can. Self-hypnosis techniques actually can work. A little.
This is also the exception to “You can’t choose what you believe.” In fact, you can have some influence there, too. It isn’t easy, and there is usually very little point to it.
(People who are stuck in loveless marriages have a long history of “making themselves believe they are happy” – and some are even successful in it.)
Free will has some definite limitations; this is why they put candy near checkout aisles in supermarkets.
Ask anyone with an addiction or compulsion that falls outside of “normal” invisible behavior about how free their will is. The concept pretty quickly falls apart.
But that’s the whole point, isn’t it? Show me an addict; tell me to picture him with free will; I promptly imagine the contrast, it’s stark and obvious. Show me someone without that addiction; tell me to picture him with free will; I promptly imagine – a guy who happens to be indistinguishable from the one standing in front of me.