Airline Safety Measures--Is Anything Real Being Done?

Great Debates
21

Sam, I draw your attention to my actual statement regarding ideologically as opposed to economically informed knee-jerk free-marketeering. I’m quite the free-marketeer myself, but I don’t erect it as a holy grail.

Well, there we get to the * economic * question. What is the real economic worth of short-hop business airline travel versus other forms (e.g. rail, teleconferencing, etc.) once one properly prices in security.

The fact it was narrowly economic when higher levels of security were not priced in is not an argument for continuing to use what may in the final analysis be an uneconomic use of resources.

Well, then one may have to reexamine the economics of the industry then, rather than simply taking pre-11 September as a given.

I do not disagree that many restrictions do not actually add much to security and their cost exceeds a probably illusionary benefit.

Hard to say. Obviously one has to experiment with different levels of security.

However, the drop off in all forms of flight, not just business flight implies fear is a non-trivial aspect.

Yes, I know you’re a betting man. I’d rather get some emperical sense of it all before leaping to conclusions.

Leaps? Snort.

First, it is rather clear that the cost structure of the airlines will absolutely lead them to work to minimize cost at the long term expense of security. The free rider effects are really quite strong here.

Second, to refuse to reject, a priori a governmental policing role in baggage screening as a function of air travel hardly means postulating the knee-jerk bugaboo, “large federal bureacracy.” See below.

Meaning transfering the problem without addressing the economic incentives to free ride off of others security and ignoring the similar incentives for airports, above all small and medium market airporst, not to spend up to snuff. Sorry Sam, this is terribly poorly thought through.

My, Sam, this looks, in part, rather like my own statement, if I may quote myself, “An emperical [sic] question, and perhaps one best addressed by a law which allows for some regulated sub-contracting for some functions, is to what degree private service and state policing functions can profitably be mixed here.” Of course “federalized baggage service” seems rather like a red-meat ditto-head term for federalized security services for airports.

The difference in the statements is that I am not excluding, a priori, a state (meaning here governmental) policing presence in the baggage screening process. I rather suspect this is necessary.

Oddly enough, European, MENA region and Israeli security measures (which indeed in the case of most European service I am led to understand are private-public mixes, but with clear public security component), focused on preventive screening have been fairly effective over the past few decades.

It strikes me your fatalism, so to speak, is driven more by a blind dislike of federal government than a logical response to the question.

I absolutely agree.

22

Collounsbury, you’ve gotta stop trying to pigeonhole me as a ditto-headed redneck. Nothing in any of my comments suggests this, other than my belief that the answer does not lie in making security personnel federal employees. I have seen ZERO evidence that federal employees perform any better. After all, the terrorists apparently managed to get into the country past the federal customs agents, and managed to stay in the country on expired passports, despite the fact that the INS is a federal agency. And they managed to plan and carry out an attack under the nose of various federal agencies, all of whom dropped the ball on this. And the CDC, another federal agency, screwed the postal workers pretty badly. There’s plenty of blame to go around, and most of it falls squarely on the federal government and its employees.

And don’t forget that many countries in Europe have gone away from government security forces and towards private airline security. There were plenty of hijackings in Europe when the security there was run by government.

But I do believe there is a federal role in setting security standards, perhaps background checks, and even funding. I just happen to think that the whole issue is overblown. I don’t think passenger screening on aircraft today is a serious issue for anti-terrorist security. The attack that came on Sept 11 took years to plan - They had to have a high degree of certainty that it would work before going to that kind of effort. That certainty is no longer there. So let’s close some of the more obvious loopholes, add some cost-effective security measures like random Sky Marshalls, and stop wasting our time on airlines and start looking at other weak spots.

23

Pigeon-hole, not at all. Or rather, wrong category. I’m pigeon holing you as a knee-jerk libertarian who refuses to equitably consider governmental roles in anything. Given the available evidence.

Well, that all depends on how one weights the evidence and what evidence one considers.

Yup, the INS is a big mess. No arguments there. It is of course partly hamstrung by private sector objections and abiding incoherence in American policy on immigration as well as the highly decentralized and fragmented nature of American jurisdictions.

On the other hand, Customs Agents, to my understanding, simply did not have information to flag most, although not all, of the 19 hijackers. It would, I think, be grossly unfair to shit on them for this.

Quite true. However, that in now way is evidence that the government character of any of the agencies is the defining factor in how and why they dropped the ball.

It strikes me the explanatory causes are to be found in a general sense of invulerability, domestic political wrangling and lack of good intelligence on a sophisticated network.

Only perhaps domestic political wrangling is perhaps a governmentally related factor to the failure, that is government qua government, rather something external to the process.

I think that I would take exception to that. It strikes me that the CDC did the best it could given the then extent science. As it happened, the extent science was inadequate. Again, here I feel safe in saying that the governmental character had nothing to do with this failing per se.

Precisely the kind of thinking I attributed to you. Insofar as most of the failings have little to do with government per se, that is government as government, but in poorly informed choices due to lack of knowledge (and I see no reason to presume that most of the lack of knowledge depended on the governmental character of anything), it strikes me as fundamentally illogical to blame “guvmint” as such.

(Perhaps this is unclear: the issue returns to industry (intelligence gathering and border security) structure and the degree to which it can be affected by changing the method of provision. I am stating that the failings are structural to the industry and not a function, in large part, of the method of provision. On the other hand, screening of baggage failures do appear to be clearly related to lowest bidder problems, that is method of provision.)

Did I forget that? I rather recall specifically noting the private-public mix in Europe, which nonetheless contains in my experience in Germany, Belgium, France etc a clear state police presence.

I would not necessarily disagree with you on this final estimation.

24

May I post my recent experience with “increased airport security?”

  1. Enter LAX and check bags. Didn’t even get the usual questions about whether or not they had been in my possession since being packed, or whether anyone unknown to me had asked me to carry anything for them. Great start, guys.

  2. Go through security checkpoint and run carry-on bags through x-ray machine. Attendant wasn’t looking at the screen at the time my bags went through.

  3. An airport employee politely asks if he can please open my diaper bag. I say sure, and we joke about how diaper bags are the best ones to search because there are always snacks in them. A National Guardsman is standing about 15 feet behind this man, leaning against a wall and looking bored. He is the first and last one I will see.

  4. I show my ID a total of three times- once when I check my bags, once when I receive my boarding pass, and once more as I board the aircraft. This is the only effective measure so far.

  5. Aboard the aircraft during flight, I am walking a screaming toddler around the galley area. I am told that due to new FAA regs, “congregating” around the galley is not allowed. Also, if anyone from the cockpit wants to come out and use the head, the “fasten seatbelt” light comes on and all passengers must stay seated until the cockpit door is relocked after the nature call.

  6. When we land in Nashville, we encounter not National Guardsmen, but actual Army reservists in their cute new black berets (where’d you earn that beret, bitch? Oh wait, that’s another rant). Not only are they uninterested in the passengers, no-one even compares my tags to my bags when I leave baggage claim. I leave the airport having never encountered airport staff.

Needless to say, I am not impressed. This was last week.

25

I doubt I’m the first to post this news, but here goes- American Airlines Airbus crashes into Queens this morning shortly after takeoff. Witnesses say it broke up in the air. Yes, it’s way too soon to know the source, but I’m going to guess it was done in by a bomb onboard.

well Sam, I’ll be the first to ask. Are you really sure that the US’s enemies have moved on from airplanes?

26

I didn’t say they have moved on from airplanes, I said they wouldn’t try to use them as missiles by hijacking them. For the specific reason that passengers would fight back and prevent it. But that says nothing about whether or not they’d try to get a bomb on a plane, or hit a plane with a missile or heavy gunfire.

This latest crash does look like an accident, but if it is it’s a shocking coincidence. Planes just don’t blow up in mid-air that often, and to have one go down inside New York City at a time when terrorists are attacking us is mighty suspicious.

Even if it turns out to be mechanical failure you still can’t rule out terrorism - a fake mechanic (or a mole hired years ago, waiting to do something) can do lots of things to make an airplane come down.

27

While I agree planes as missiles is unlikely now, bringing planes down over major population areas is clearly an option. Passenger reaction might even help. Airline security is and remains a problem.

Unfortunately as Sam pointed out, sabotage is yet another option. Kennedey is none-too-impressive in that area based on the degree to which organized crime is reported to be able to operate there.

28

I had the same thought. Terrorist with a fake mechanic ID loosens a few bolts…

29

Guys, guys…

More than likely, it WAS an accident. The fact that it happened two months & one day after the WTC tragedy is probably a sad coincidence.

It doesn’t seem that odd that NY/JFK would be the site of an airline accident, as they have a staggering number of flights in and out each day. And this event occured at rotation (take-off), which is the most dangerous time in the flight and the time that most accidents will happen. Not only are the engines at full power (which they will not be again for the duration of a normal flight), but the aircraft is going very slowly, trying to gain altitude. Also, this was to be a flight over water, and the FAA requires that they carry well over the standard amount of fuel in case of emergency, so this was a large fire waiting to happen.

While engines falling off of planes is fairly rare (once a decade or so, IIRC), engines catching fire or exploding is not. Anything from scrap metal to a flock of birds could have been ingested by the engine, thus causing an explosion which could rip the engine away from the plane.

Not as much fun as a conspiracy, but perhaps more realistic at this point.

30

EJsGirl,

I am really surprised that you think all of this extra ID checking is doing anything. When I traveled after 9-11 both immediately after and a few weeks after they would check my ID at the various places you had yours checked. Nobody consulted a data base to see if my ID was valid. It is not that difficult to create a fake drivers license and a printout of your e-ticket itinerary.

31

“The reason that these measures have been taken, is because there are a lot of stupid out there, who will be reassured to some degree by the fact that it will now take an hour longer to board a plane.”

Ah, yes, the “inconvenience = security” canard, related to the belief that if it tastes bad, it must be good for you.

I’ve seen editorials in various newspapers where people were shocked and angry that they didn’t have to go through a metal detector to get on an Amtrak or commuter train. Eh? :eek:

  1. A train can’t be hijacked and crashed into a building in a “flying bomb” fashion like an airliner.

  2. If someone wants to sabotage a train, the easiest way is to cut the rails or throw a switch that’s not supposed to be thrown, derailing the train. But derailments almost never result in triple-digit death tolls, and rarely even double-digit death tolls. Indeed, the typical passenger train derailment has no deaths at all.

  3. Most train stations, other than the big urban terminals, aren’t at all like airports. Many train stations, even on some busy commuter systems, are unmanned. Some are just a couple of platforms with a few lamp-posts and a wind shelter. You’re going to put a metal detector at each and every one of these stops?!?! :rolleyes:

But these people were still convinced that because they were able to get onto a train without being poked, prodded, scanned, and x-rayed, they were in mortal danger of attack. :rolleyes: :rolleyes:

32

In a related vein, am I the only person who questions the effectiveness of placing lots of National Guardsmen (and women) at the airports? Aside from standing around and giving suspected terrorists the hairy eyeball, are they actually doing anything effective, security-wise? It would probably be more effective to train them as Air Marshalls and put them on the flights, n’est pas?

33

Perhaps I should have used a different phrase than “effective measure” when referring to ID checks. What I meant was, at least they’re checking. Of course, the inconvenience level was rather high the third time, when I am trying to board while juggling a toddler, a diaper bag, a boarding pass and a ticket, then I have to find my friggin’ ID again. You could have told me I’d need it again at the jetway, but nooooo. At least they don’t require ID for the under 5 crowd. Actually, it may be the under 12 crowd, I can’t remember.

Aside from the aforementioned hairy eyeball, no Guardsman or reservist I’ve seen was doing shine-ola. Nor will they, unless some idiot causes a fuss at the x-ray machine.

34

That’s a very good idea. And actually, they should not need a great deal in the way of additional training. They’ve already had Nat’l Guard training.

Unfortunately, the people making the decisions are thinking in terms of appearences, not substance. The have the Guard. What do they do with it? Use it to create the appearence that “something is being done”. The idea of using it to do something useful seems not to have occured to anyone.

35

I had a very interesting discussion recently with a pilot who does international flights.

He said there is new security on his airline. On long jaunts they have a crew of 4. On short jaunts they have a crew of 2.

There is a new system of going to the toilet. The pilot whistles up a flight attendant. He eyeballs her through the cabin door’s peephole, and lets her in. She then waits for him to do his thing, and then he knocks on the locked door and she eyeballs him, and lets him in.

This causes passenger complaints on short international flights with large numbers of first and business class passengers because it means they are one attendant short for a period of time.

So the pilots sometimes don’t wait for the attendant, and duck out. Trouble is, if they leave the door locked, that means that there is only one pilot on the flight deck. What if he has a heart attack? Suddenly, you have one pilot comatose or dead, one pilot locked out of the flight deck, and no one steering the plane. Despite having newly installed locks and new security procedures, pilots have started leaving the doors unlocked when they leave the flight deck, and not telling their bosses.

My friend says El Al have two security doors, with a toilet in between the doors. Both doors cannot be open at the sme time. He think this is the best idea of all. A pilot can take a pee and not be locked out of the flight deck. (El Al also of course have Israeli commandos on board in plain clothes.)