Question inspired by the A.C. Grayling book Among the Dead Cities, which I have not read yet but discusses the Allied bombing campaign of WWII in moral terms.
Ignoring the ‘should’, let’s turn it to ‘could’ or even ‘did’ - if there are cases of it happening.
Say you were a member of one of the bomber crews in either the RAF or USAAF. You get told that the mission is to drop bombs on Hamburg, Dresden, Berlin - or Tokyo, Yokohama etc. if you were in the Pacific. A strike on a city, area bombing in other words. What happens if you say ‘No’, refuse to fly?
Are you looking at a charge for desertion? Insubordination? Dishonourably discharged? Transferred?
Asking about the RAF and USAAF in particular, since I can guess what the results of saying ‘No’ to an order in the USSR would be.
To do that you’d still have to fly into the hornet’s nest, maybe getting yourself and your crew killed for nothing. The danger wasn’t the bombing, it was getting in and getting out.
You’d probably face a charge of dereliction of duty, punishable in wartime by death. You’d be better off flying and taking your chances than facing the certainty at the end of a rope or the business end of a firing squad.
Whatever else he is A C Grayling is no Nazi apologist. He is a very eminent philosopher - a secularist and a humanist. He makes a strong argument that the Anglo-American bombing of German and Japanese cities in WW2 was morally wrong - that it was not consistent with accepted western standards of a “just war” - but he is not saying the war against Germany or Japan was anything but necessary. I happen to disagree with his view and think it would have been absurd to expect individual British and American flyers to have refused orders on moral grounds but it is an arguable case.
ETA An arguable case if you are a philosopher sitting in a comfortable college in 2006 - not so arguable on a bomber airfield in Norfolk in 1943!
Note that he does seem to be making a distinction between the daylight bombing done by the Americans that at least purported to be targeting specific military and industrial targets and the British nighttime bombing campaigns that targeted entire cities.
I’m not sure if this is specifically part of his argument, but a large part of what made the strategic bombing campaigns so morally questionable after the fact was that post-war records showed that they ultimately had little effect on German industrial production. It’s debatable the extent to which the Allied high command knew this at the time, but it’s certainly unreasonable to think that the average airman had the ability to evaluate the military necessity of the campaigns with the information he would have had at the time.
Don’t worry, he’s no David Irving and is as glad as you or I that Nazism was consigned to the dustbin of history where it belongs. Just wondering about the practicality rather than morality of what he argues.
As President of the Curtis Lemay Fan Club (not a real thing) I don’t see why any of the airmen of that time would have objected. America is pampered by the fact that we have been fighting limited wars for the past sixty years. WWII was a total war… the continued existence of the states and their civilization was at risk. I don’t think what they did was morally wrong, just as I don’t think Sherman’s march to the sea was wrong, nor the airstrikes against Taliban targets in Pakistan are wrong. The purpose of war is to destroy the enemy’s capacity to resist (however that is defined) at the strategic level and that’s what strategic bombing was intended to do.
Put yourself in the shoes of a young man in 1930 watching 50 million people die in the most terrible war the world has ever known. If someone told me that bombing the crap out of Germany would help end the war, I’d jump in a plane and bomb them all day long. Same thing goes for Japan.
Agreed. There is a sensible discussion to be had about how effective the strategic bombing campaigns were in bringing an end to the war and there is certainly an argument about Harris’ obsession with area bombing in late 44 and 45 but expecting a young airman to make the decision that it was wrong in the heat of war, when their duly appointed superiors - and most of the people they know - are telling them it is good thing and will shorten the war, is living in cloud-cuckoo land.
Incidentally, the moral distinction made between the RAF Bomber Command and the USAAF attacks is dubious to say the least. Nominally the USAAF was undertaking precision raids on specific targets in daylight but a lot of the raids used “blind bombing” techniques through cloud and during the February 1945 combined raids on Dresden the USAAF was using the same proportion (40%) of incendiaries - an intrinsically indiscriminate weapon - as the RAF. It was a lesson in destruction that Curtis LeMay implemented in the firebombing of Japanese cities - the ultimate expression of area bombing before the A-bomb.
If only Grayling had been in charge at the time! What a kinder, gentler war we would have had. The fact that we might be speaking about it now in German is surely of secondary importance.
If that’s the logic (I don’t want to get shot at and killed) then the charge is cowardice, not moral objections to bombing.
the logic of total war in the industrial age is simple - the people who produce ball bearings, or make steel, or make petrol, or make cloth for uniforms and leather for boots - they are all part of the war effort. So too are the people who supply rations, who make repair and drive the locomotives, etc.
Somewhere around the Crimean War (the old one) or the US Civil War, warfare became as much about the industrial capacity and logistics and supply as about the Army themselves. In medieval times, the rabble of men set out for the next country and for the vast majority of the country left behind, their only relevance was in news and loot sent home. In total warfare, the whole society is involved.
With that logic, anything that supports local indistry is fair game. the more directly relevant to the war effor, the more legitimate the target. (Dresden, IIRC, was a major rail center). any moral effects on the taget population were a bonus.
This was demonstrated with Sherman’s march to the sea. Every mile of railroad destroyed, every horse or field of food that could not be sent to supply the troops - this was as effective as defeating an army.
Sherman showed a bit of leniency:
Of course, in the context of hindsight and the aftermath of total victory, it’s easy for apologists to say the war was appalling. At the time, things were desperate and the outcome not at all obvious. Toward the end, the actions did not have the desired result, thus “more!” was the obvious response.
OP, for the RAF at least, you’re going to want to look at the term, “LMF” or “Lack of Moral Fibre,” which is what the RAF labeled fliers who refused to fly without a valid medical or other excuse. IIRC, it was also applied to aircrew that were perceived to be not trying their hardest to fulfill their mission, whether by intentionally dropping their bombs short, aborting missions too frequently, or via other means.
LMF status wasn’t something that you wanted to achieve. It was seen as a stigma, and as a moral failing, not a medical condition. Per this article in The Telegraph, discussing a child’s memories of his father’s job, flying (and eventually dying) with Bomber Command:
There’s what appears to be a decent article on LMF implementation and effects, “LMF: The Use of Psychiatric Stigma in the Royal Air Force during the Second World War,” in the April 2006 issue of The Journal of Military History. If you’ve JSTOR access, I’d go read it. As to what would happen to the pilot in the OP’s hypothetical, my guess based on the above is that he’d be immediately removed from his unit, have his duties and privileges stripped, and reassigned to a punitive work detail.
Edit: Though the quote indicates that few aircrew were officially designated LMF, the behaviors characterizing that label were prevalent enough in many Bomber Command wings, and dropping bombloads short was so common, that Pathfinder units would intentionally drop their markers several thousand yds. beyond the target’s actual position.
It’s not as much of a distinction as you might imagine it to be, though I note of course your use of the word purported. As for the actual accuracy of precision bombing in daylight:
This is why the USAAF shifted to nighttime low level firebombing of Japanese cities which were particularly vulnerable with their mostly wood and paper housing.
Regarding just dropping the load short of the target, this would be very detectable in a daylight box formation, and given the vicious irony of war you’d probably have hit a house in the countryside trying to not drop bombs at random over a city.
Here’s a 1992 dissertation for King’s College, London, comparing crew experiences between Eighth Air Force and Bomber Command, AVIATORS AND AIR COMBAT: A STUDY OF THE U.S. EIGHTH AIR FORCE AND R.A.F. BOMBER COMMAND. It’s quite long—which looks like an artifact of the typeface and margin settings—but goes into morale issues like LMF, for both organizations. Seems like something the OP would find helpful in answering his question.
They had it just as bad as those held by the Germans (Switzerland was about as neutral as Ireland). You might check this memoir. Or search “Wauwilermoos”.
The questions in this thread mostly have excellent answers in Donald Miller’s *Masters of the Air: America’s Bomber Boys Who Fought the Air War Against Nazi Germany*, a much more gripping and realistic-seeming account of the experiences of Eighth Air Force people, at all levels, than you might think from the typical-propaganda title. That includes a chapter on the harsh treatment by the Swiss of their internees, partly because of their pro-German orientation and partly because a couple of Swiss cities had been inadvertently bombed by USAAF crews.
Miller is also quite open about the OP question - most crews didn’t care that much about people or places on the ground, they were the enemy and they wanted to kill you and to hell with them. Problems with crews turning back, or refusing to fly, were almost always just fear, built up after enough survived missions to think one’s time was up. But the USAAF was short of trained crews and couldn’t quickly replace anyone it grounded, so it was best to try to “fix” the young man rather than slap a formal label of cowardice, like LMF, on him.
It was dealt with on an individual basis, on a range from a simple pass to London to blow off steam, to time at a resort used for R&R, to whatever else was needed, until the man could regain his composure and go back for more. Only rarely was someone not salvageable.
Great anecdote - and it supports the idea that the aircrew were not going to refuse to obey orders on moral grounds. Notice the objection is not to killing German civilians - it is to destroying Beethoven’s birthplace…