The specific scenario I have in mind is if Mussolini had not invaded Greece like some modern Darius of the West but instead had been an asset to the Axis, not delaying Barbarossa such that either Moscow fell, Hitler didn’t get bogged down in Stalingrad, or in any case they managed to control the oil fields of Baku, which they famously failed to achieve in WWII, see here:
I’ll accept any scenario in which the Axis controls the Baku oil long enough to extract some significant quantity- how many poods that is I leave to you. I figure they could have extracted some oil more or less immediately. They would’ve used a bucket-brigade of slaves if they had to, they were friggin’ Nazis after all. The cite shows production never dropped to zero in any case. I can’t claim to know for sure, hence I’m asking you
In July 1945, the United States gets nuclear weapons. No matter what other hypothetical you throw up, in July or August 1945 if Germany is still a threat, they get nuked. All the what-ifs related to conventional warfare are trumped by that fact.
Anyway, Germany had logistical problems besides oil. A better fuel situation would have prolonged the German war effort but not won it.
One could posit that if the Balkan delay did not happen, Barbarossa was kicked off in early May as planned, Moscow was taken during 1941 on this timeline and Baku came under German control in 1942 that the Germans might very well have achieved a peace treaty with the Soviets - maybe establishing the borders along the Ural mountains. If so, the German Wehrmach might have attacked south thorugh Persia and Iraq, securing the oil of the middle East.
This might have forced Britain and the Commonwealth to accept a peace trety in turn, thus making an American nuclear attack on Germany both more difficult (no convinient bases) and perhaps even superflous. (If America too decided Europe was a lost cause without British backing).
I know to little about how much ready oil supplies the Allies could command if the middle East oil was lost - but I doubt it would be sufficient to conduct world -wide war.
Of course, this is all very hypothetical as such what-if scenarios often are
I suppose you’re right. To make a decisive difference it would have to change the timeline of the development of nukes. Unless the US could not develop enough to nuke both Japan and Germany enough to get them to surrender. A successful Germany might not yield to 1 nuke every 3 months?
I don’t think it would have made a strategic difference. Look at Japan - they did capture their oil source (the Dutch East Indies). Germany capturing the Caucasus region would have been the equivalent.
The Allies had a huge logistic lead over the Axis and there was no realistic way the Axis would ever overcome that during the war. The only hope the Axis had for victory was that the war would be decided on non-logistic factors. The Axis would never win a war of attrition.
Assuming they don’t capture Moscow, they surround Stalingrad and secure the river crossings but otherwise don’t bog themselves down in the city, and they secure Baku, I think Germany’s manpower shortages would have caught up with them.
Holding a line from Leningrad to Kharkov (the vicinity from which they launched Case Blue) was hard enough. A line from Leningrad to Baku? I’m confident the Soviets would have found a weak point eventually.
To really be equivalent Japan would have to capture the US oil supply, or at least a big chunk of it.
The consensus looks like it would not have been enough to stop Russia, or change the final outcome in any case. I wonder how Russia would have fared after the loss of Baku.
Thanks, I’ve been looking for my volume of J. Keegan’s The Second World War, which I believe is the text in which he makes the same point – the spring rasputitsa (muddy season) came late in 1941 and a major offensive (and this was the most major offensive of all time!) wasn’t really possible until mid-June. As it was, the Germans attacked on June 22. Since the Germans initially did better than they could have hoped, they made good time at the start, which was possible only because the roads had finally dried out, it could be argued that an earlier start would have hurt the German chances, by bogging them down before they could surround the huge pockets of prisoners they took.
I don’t know where the myth came from that Greek and Yugoslavian resistance saved Russia, but it’s not true. Yugoslavia collapsed almost instantly despite its fantastically defensible terrain, and while intervention in Greece was romantic for the British, it was militarily humiliating and had no effect on the weather in Russia.
An similar alternate scenario was written by John Keegan in “How Hitler Could have Won the War: The Drive for the Middle East, 1941” for “What If? The World’s Foremost Military Historians Imagine What Might Have Been” It’s been years since I’ve read it, so I can’t remember what the possible outcome was.
Judging from the commentary I found here, it looks like Keegan was talking about German forces diverting into the Middle East proper instead of attacking the Soviets, and securing the Arabian oil (and a southern flank from which to hit Russia) first.
That’s interesting. I’ll have to look for that book… after I finish the Washington biography I picked up on sale. I always believed the delay of Barbarossa had everything to do with Greece, and also hampered the mission.
I don’t want to change the question into ‘what if they controlled the oil AND didn’t make these other blunders’- but in retrospect it appears different choices would have led to the capture of Baku and less quagmires*. For instance-
if Italy hadn’t bothered in the first place, but instead assisted with other missions. Say, a Black Sea strategy instead of one aimed at Moscow.
Anyway, its not like I’d prefer for the Axis to have won. I just get curious about these questions since so many of our assumptions (culturally in the US) seem to come from those days. And I suppose this is a good art to practice if you want to guess what this or that policy will do to the current situation.
Maybe quagmires were unavoidable against the Soviets in any scenario.
The Germans deserve a lot of blame for misusing their allies in the east, mostly due to arrogance (it’s hard to look good when you’re fighting alongside the Wehrmacht). With the Italians, the German high command wasted fine Italian mountain divisions holding the line along the Don River instead of unleashing them in the Caucasus. When Soviet armor came screaming through Ukraine in early 43, they never stood a chance.
At any rate, with few exceptions, most of Germany’s allies weren’t really suited for operations deep inside Russia.
The Germans had already lost the war in 1941 by failing to knock out Russia, so whether they capture Baku for a few months in late 1942 or not makes no difference to the outcome.
On top of that they had trouble supplying their forces in the Caucasus as it was, how they were going to get a significant quantity of oil back to Germany I can’t see.
If we didn’t use oil we would have used natural gas or products from natural gas. Ships would have used coal. Aircraft fuel would have been the hardest thing to synthesize and that was doable.
Allied oil mostly came from the United States. The Middle East was not a factor in WW2 as it only was producing 5% of the worlds supply of petroleum in 1944, compared to 60% of the worlds supply for the US.
The only way for the Axis to “control the oil” was for them to invade Texas, Oklahoma, and California.
Well, they certainly couldn’t have denied oil to the US, but they could have accessed the Middle Eastern oilfields described above and had enough fuel to operate effectively. The bigger victory would have been to cut the Soviets off from Baku’s oil (which, if I understand it correctly, would be “phase 2” of Keegan’s fantasy scenario).
I thought the oilfields in the Middle East already were quite important, as I’ve read historians discussing the what-if scenario of the giant pincer - Rommel through Egypt and into ME, Army Group South down through Baku and Persia. Doubtless this would secure German oil needs (except for the logistical nightmare of getting the oil back to Germany of course), but if US oil production could supply the Allied war effort on its own, this would not really impact the war as such.
Also, the fact that Barbarossa would have been more or less impossible due to weather was also something I didn’t know. Did Hitler know this when he commited himself in the Balkans, or was this just a coincidence that actually meant the Balkan campaign did not delay Barbarossa?
