I think it is safe to say that survival itself fails a rational analysis from almost any perspective I can think of. For the theist, death offers the promise of a better existence. For the atheist, death promises nothing. Apart from someone with a strong view of karmic reincarnation, survival has no rational motivation.
As such, the drive to survive must be largely, if not completely, instinctual. I will call such instinctive, genetic, or otherwise physiological bases evolutionary for this argument.
First premise: in general, all forms of life actively attempt to survive as a consequence of evolution. Creatures which have no means of survival become extinct.
We all seem in agreement, in some form or another, that each species has its own methods of survival. They may or may not be compatible with other species. That is, it is necessary for humans to kill to survive; this is incompatible with the survival of what we kill. Thus, there is a struggle between any two species with incompatible survival methods. Other forms of compatibility could be competing for the same resources, shelter, etc.
Second premise: Given the first premise, that all forms of life actively attempt to survive, the evolutionary (remember: physiological) means of survival between species with incompatible survival methods involves death.
There is a secondary survival method that some species implement: that of cohabitation. This could be a symbiotic parasite, or it could be pack groups where the size of the group aids the survival of each of the members. Though this cohabitation may not be strictly necessary for survival, in general a species’ evolutionary actions promote this behavior as well to better reinforce the action outlined in the first premise.
Third premise: humans implement the secondary survival method.
Note that up to this point there has boon no mention of how any particular species should behave, only how they must behave (generally—there could be complex physiological reasons for any particular individual of a species to act against its survival method; chances are such a deviation will result in unsuccessful survival). We describe how things should behave through a process of abstraction called a theory. Many mammals and other “higher” (more complex) animals exhibit this process of abstraction. Normally, such a lofty process is grouped under “learning.” Birds return to their nests, cats and dogs can learn techniques to get their “captors” to feed them, and so on. For humans I trust the learning process is clear enough.
In each case of learning, the member of the species has, in some way, formed an abstraction that supercedes evolutionary action; no longer is it merely a stimulus response relationship, the creature actually predicts events. This is a very low-level example of a creature understanding “how things should be.” This is not inherent in the physiology of the species’ member, it is a product of the member’s interaction with its environment. IIRC, there are creatures without brains that can learn. Flatworms, for example, seem to indicate some learning processes.
Fourth premise: only creatures of significant complexity can learn.
Higher levels of complexity result in elementary communication, complex communication, memory, and so on. This is found to be most relevant in discussing creatures with brains. While I am not prepared to go into detail about levels of brain composition and abilities, I can—upon request—refer you to a few books and papers which deal with it. Sufficient to say:
Fifth premise: once the presence of a brain is determined, the ability of the species’ member is bounded by the abilities of the brain.
Important in this fifth premise is a recognition of the step we’ve made. Previously, the physical structure of the member was crucial to survival, where as after a certain level the structure lost importance and was replaced by the structure’s controller: the brain.
After a sufficient level of complexity, a new type of learning process—which I will call the secondary learning premise—acts in addition to the one discussed in the fourth premise. This involves preferential action toward the environment, which could and probably mostly does include interaction with other species. Here, finally, we come to moral evaluations: how a creature should act. As far as I can tell, no other species other than humans exhibits this secondary learning form, though I suppose one could make the case for certain house pets and maybe the higher sea mammals. I don’t think it is particularly relevant.
First moral premise: moral valuations are not universal.
I don’t see how that can be disputed. Any moral valuation I make is not necessarily valid for a dolphin, and most likely none of them but the most vague are (and then I would argue that these very vague ones are actually conscious interpretation of primary learning).
Second moral premise: any moral premise which acts against the five previous premises is wrong.
I find this to be an effective translation: any moral code which demands action contrary to survival, physiology, and other non-moral developments is an incorrect moral code.
Thus, so long as killing dolphins does not interfere with the survival process of the one forming the moral code, killing dolphins should not be wrong. IOW:
Third moral premise: any moral code which does not interfere with, or have a high probability of interfering with, any of the first five premises of the member which forms the moral code cannot be wrong.
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This is about as far as I am willing to take it at once shot. One comment I would like to add in closing is that the three moral premises listed above are not meant to be moral evaluations, but simply be about moral evaluations. The distinction blurs, however.


