Another possibility was Jeffery Amherst. He was around in 1775 and he was one of the foremost military leaders Britain had. But he said that the Americans actually had some legitimate grievances and also said that Britain would have to mobilize a much larger army to conquer America - neither of which was something Parliament wanted to hear. So while he was essentially “kicked upstairs”.
If the war had happened and Britain (and the American Loyalists) had won it, I wonder how long it would have taken everyone to get past the Late Unpleasantness . . .
According to Tuchman’s The March of Folly, the best British generals bowed out of the war. They said they fought besides the Americans in the French and Indian Wars, and didn’t want to turn on their comrades in arms. Which was code for “I don’t think we can beat them.” Some generals were explicit - and public on that second point. If the British governments had listened to their best generals, history would be very different.
I’ve read that there was also a lot of political sympathy for the Americans among the Enlightment-age British elite, including the officers. Since the Americans were fighting for liberty and republican government and rationality, all the fine Masonic ideals. That’s another thing, there were cases during the war of American and British officers attending Lodge meetings together. (I’m getting that last from a book I read years ago, can’t remember the title, that purports to prove the Scottish Knights Templar (one Sinclair, in particular) discovered America pre-Columbus and told nobody and hid treasure here, so take it FWIW. Said book not being the basis for any Nicolas Cage or Tom Hanks film AFAIK.)
That’s true, but I was responding to a previous poster’s erroneous understanding of colonial government.
William Howe was one of these doubters. But when he was offered the command, he let personal ambition overcome his previously stated misgivings. The consensus now is that he was a poor choice for these reasons.
It was also a bad idea to appoint him both as military commander, charged with defeated the rebellion, and political commissioner, charged with negotiating an end to the rebellion if possible. Howe ended up jumping back and forth between his two contradictory roles rather than focusing on either. He was essentially supposed to be both the good cop and the bad cop.
Then I’m more confused. If you were responding to a different poster, why did you quote my post?
Little Nemo, the Brits really let Teh Stoopid piss away the Colonies didn’t they?
You’ve already mentioned Tuchman’s book, where she points out that while Britain wanted to keep the American colonies, they did one thing after another that caused America to slip away.
Burn the crops.
Seize as much food as possible, store it inside forts, burn the crops, & button up.
Starve them.
They will crawl back like whipped curs.
<I’M GOING TO HELL FOR THIS ONE>Just like Ireland. </I’M GOING TO HELL FOR THIS ONE>
Wouldn’t the scorched earth tactics have just driven the colonists further inland? Britain wanted to prevent settlement west of the Appalachians - it was one of the points of contention that sparked off the war, wasn’t it? Scorched earth would have cost Britain a lot, and led directly to an outcome opposite what they desired. And may not have prevented independence.
You make a good point. Bad as the mistakes the British made in America were, they were capable of making worse ones.
It could result in a second nation setting up just to the West of the 13 colonies, with those who are loyal remaining.
Of course, then the British might have been able to work with the Native Americans to attack them from the West while they attack from the East.
American Voortrekkers?
I haven’t heard this theory before. Did you pick it up from somewhere in particular? From what I’ve read the novel American theory of representation wasn’t given much consideration at all in London. It was denounced as propaganda. In any case the colonies weren’t asking to elect representatives. They wanted to control their own taxation (among other things) locally. Being granted a small voice in these important decisions still being made across the ocean wasn’t much concession so no one pursued it.
This is not correct. Parliament appointed no governors. In crown colonies the Crown appointed the governors. In proprietary colonies the proprietors appointed the governors. In the charter colonies the governor was elected. In none of these colonies could the governor unilaterally enact laws. Laws had to be passed by the colonial legislature although governors had absolute vetos. Laws also (in theory at least) had to be approved by the Board of Trade but since transatlantic voyages took so long, and the Lords of Trade were so notoriously lackadaisical about doing so, in practice laws went into effect when approved by the governor and only later (sometimes years later) might be negated by decree from London.
Also colonial legislatures had a powerful tool in their disputes with their governors. They were the ones who paid said governors. If the governor wouldn’t play ball with them they would refuse to pay his salary or expenses. As time went on legislatures took to approving salaries only on a year to year basis. In this fashion more and more political power accrued to colonial legislatures over the decades of “salutary neglect”. What London did to reign in the colonies in the early Revolutionary Era was to ensure funding of salaries, issue strict instructions on what kinds of bills were unacceptable, and provide for judicial proceedings without American juries.
As for the OP, I think people are seeing the Revolution as being more inevitable than was the case. I think Mr. Miskatonic is pointing in the right direction. If they had been able to corner the Continental Army it’s hard to see how the colonies could have reconstituted a new one. Capture and hang Washington along with his senior officers and imprison the rest and the rebellion would have wilted at least. The cream of the colonial war leaders and war materiel would be gone and there would be little foreign assistance to replace it. That’s a far cry from actually conquering the colonies but it should at least have brought them to terms… assuming the terms weren’t completely unreasonable. Let them keep their governments but give up their resistance to parliamentary supremacy.
Whoops, after rereading upthread I realize that Little Nemo said what I did about the ideal British strategy both before and better than I. Yes. Take advantage when colonial politics foolishly dictated a defense of NYC. Attack relentlessly until the Continentals were put down and the rebels would likely be singing a different tune.
NotSureIfSerious
The British could spare and support a few dozen thousand soldiers to pacify a territory with millions of people.
If the British played ‘hard ball’, to use an Americanism, then they’d be opposed and shot at by millions.
Any successful operation needs either to persuade the vast majority of colonials to either support them or at worst, not support the secessionists.
You are correct that there was more of a balance of power between the King and Parliament than exists today. The King still had some real power like appointing officials. I don’t recall offhand specifically how control over colonial administration was divided up.
But my main point was that the governors were chosen in London not in America. And due to the fact that the governor had a veto over legislative actions and there was no equivalent lever the legislature had over the governor, that gave the governor full control if he chose to exercise it.
You are also correct that one important lever had existed - the legislatures controlled pay. But London realized this and one of the points in their program of asserting more direct control over the colonies was a policy of taking over the payment of governors and other officials. This was couched in positive terms - “See how nice we are? We’re taking over an expense from you.” - but both sides recognized it was a power play.
Capture and control a vital area of the colonies such as the NY area only - let the rest go for now, set up a British state inside the new US nation, much like we have Gitmo in Cuba. From there, with support from the motherland, build it up while being a major thorn in the side of the new US. When it is strong enough, start really tightening the screws like claiming the entire eastern ocean coast for the crown and change a Hefty fee for US ships or insisting with force that all world trade goes though this british state. Keep the new US under economic hardship though forced tribute payments or destructive raids at the choice of the US. When this british state gains enough wealth simply buy the US out or if needed use force.
I don’t think that plan would have much chance of success. The British did try to seize key cities, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Newport, Savannah. But they found that none of these captures had a significant effect of the war - the Americans just kept fighting somewhere else. The fact was that the United States didn’t have a key city that was the equivalent of London or Paris.
I also think that any delayed strategy like the one you outlined or a naval blockade would have been a bad idea (from the British point of view). Time was on the American side - the longer the United States was in existence as an independent country, the more legitimate it would come to be seen by people. People would start thinking of themselves as Americans rather than Britons who lived in America. And if the general population came to feel they were a separate people, Britain’s chances of winning the war would virtually disappear. Britain had to win the war quickly while it was still possible to reconcile the Americans back into the Empire.
As an example, look at the aftermath of the Civil War - it ended soon enough that most of the former Confederates were willing to return to their pre-war status as Americans. If the war had lasted ten or fifteen years, the people of the South would have lost this residual loyalty to the United States. The Southerners would have come to think of the United States as a foreign country.