how "close" was the US Rev. War?

Given a few changes of events to favor the British, would the US have still eventually won the Revolutionary War? Or was it touch and go?

As noted in a couple of other threads, I’ve been reading Ray Raphael’s Founding Myths, in which he notes that, aslthough we treat Cornwallis’ defeat at Yorktown as the definitive end of the w3ar in our histories, it certainly waasn’t seen so at the time, either by the Americans or the British. The Americans were spread pretty thin, and the British-controlled troops still held a lot of important points. It was the fact that the British were trying to hold onto a far-flung empire (and had strong challenges in India and elsewhere at the same time) that induced them to stage a strategic withdrawal from the American colonies. Even after Yorktown, the war could’ve gone otherwise.

There were many points at which the war could have been decisively lost. Washington and the bulk of the Continental ASrmy came perilously close to being captured in Brooklyn. They were also suffering a prettyy significant morale loss just before the battle of Trenton. The “hammer and anvil” strategy by which Burgoyne was supposed to cut the colonies in two by coming down New York from the north would have been devastating, if it succeeded. That the colonists prevailed in the war was a combination of luck, good generalship, and determination. There were many pointsd at which it could easily have been lost.

Absolutely. Roughly 66% of the colonists wanted to remain part of the empire. If the British could have pinned down and destroyed the continental army, they probably could have held onto America.

Actually, I think the numbers given are usually that 1/3 wanted to secede, 1/3 wanted to remain in the empire, and 1/3 didn’t care (rather like today on many issues). Still, only 33% actively supported the revolution.

I think that if the Battle of Long Island had gone as it should have, the British would have held on a *lot * longer, but the genie of nationalism/anti-colonialism was out of the bottle, and the Americans would have kept some type of rebellion up for quite some time until they were a separate nation.
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This was John Adams’ estimate, explicitly set down in his writings (see McCulloouch’s bio of him), and he’s probably right. Rapahel disputes the numbers, saying that it’s only Adams’ estimate, and it’s true there wasn’t anyone like Gallup doing polls back then, so it’s reasonable to take the estimate with a grain of salt. But adams was there, and could judge the feelings of the crowd.

The is many battles mentioned, but wasn’t the key to the war getting and keeping the French Support? That has been my readings on it.

CalMeacham: I just finished the Adams book, I really though it was excellent.

Jim

If Benedict Arnold hadn’t built a small fleet on Lake Champlain in upstate New York, which slowed down the British army just arriving (for the “hammer and anvil” mission Cal Meacham mentioned) enough so that they couldn’t start down the Hudson River until the next spring, the lower and upper colonies would have certainly been split, pretty much dooming American chances. And he built it quickly, and lost the battle, and burned all the ships.

That bought the Americans enough time to get together troops to face down the British at Oriskany and Saratoga, and capture that army.

I would think one measure of “support” would be the relative readership of the various broadsheets.

Not all that close - I took the British receiving 4 1/2 and still lost.

Pretty impressive given your location. Wasn’t the war over for a couple of years before the British settled Australia?

Washington was a brilliant Strategist (although perhaps not that great as a Tactitian). He saw that as long as the Americans had an Army in the field, the British must eventually lose- in other words, we’d wait them out. Exactly what happened.

Ditto. There was a recent biography of Ben Franklin’s years in France, and hoo boy could it have gone the other way. Very easily.

Washington didn’t want to wait them out. He wanted to fight and constantly had to be dissuaded from staging a large pitched battle by his officers. Washington was neither a brilliant strategist nor a brilliant tactician. He was, however, very aware of this and made sure he surrounded himself with the best people. And he was often very good at picking the best people and inspiring them, which was his true strength.

I recall reading somewhere that the British and French considered the Caribbean isles FAR more valuable than the 13 colonies, and concentrated more effort in keeping (or gaining) those. And that France didn’t help a whole lot militarily until Yorktown because they went straight for the Caribbean after Saratoga.

Straight dope?

I have read the same, including the Fact that John Adams spent a lot time in France trying to convince them to move the fleet North to the Colonies.

Jim

Everybody beat me to the right answers already! Yes, it was a very near-run thing. Arnold’s flotilla on Lake Champlain, the Battle of Long Island, Saratoga, the French entry on the colonials’ side, and the perfect timing of the French fleet and the Franco-American army converging at Yorktown, were all very important - if any of those had gone the other way (or gone worse for the colonials), the Brits might very well have won.

I’m more of a Washington admirer than Neurotik, but it’s true that Washington was (particularly early in the war) eager for a direct, head-to-head confrontation with His Majesty’s army. I think we also have to recognize how vitally important he was in maintaining the Continental Army’s morale; had he been captured or killed (as he almost was several times, most notably at the Battle of Princeton), I highly doubt that any other American military leader could have kept the army in the field and led it to victory.

Yes. The first British settlers arrived in Australia in 1788.

If it wasn’t for the French you’d all still be speaking British :smiley:

I’ll defend Washington as understanding that the British definition of winning a battle wasn’t the way to win this war. He understood that the goal was to keep American spirits up and dishearten the British career soldiers every bit as much as it was to capture a city or fort.

Inflicting damage and letting the British “win the field” so the Americans could fight another day made for a very tiring, depressing war for the Brits. Besides, it was America - if there’s one thing they could afford to give up, it was a little land. There’s plenty more!