. . .
Hillary Clinton may be one of the most disciplined figures in national politics, but she has presided over a campaign operation riven by feuding, rival fiefdoms and second-guessing of top staff members.
. . .
Already, some in Clinton’s senior staff are pointing fingers over what went wrong, with some of the blame aimed at Clinton herself. As the race unfolded, neither Clinton nor anyone else resolved the internal power struggles that played out with destructive effect and continue to this day.
Chief strategist and pollster Mark Penn clashed with senior advisor Harold Ickes, former deputy campaign manager Mike Henry and others. Field organizers battled with Clinton’s headquarters in northern Virginia. Campaign themes were rolled out and discarded, reflecting tensions among a staff bitterly divided over what Clinton’s basic message should be.
. . .
Obama, who leads Clinton in delegates, would pose problems for any candidate. But aides to Clinton said the dysfunction within her campaign team made its task that much tougher.
. . .
Last month, after a series of defeats, Hillary Clinton chose a new campaign manager, replacing Patti Solis Doyle. But she left in place many senior people, including Penn and Ickes, who have been involved in incessant turf wars.
As the campaign faces a make-or-break moment, some high-level officials are trying to play down their role in the campaign. Penn said in an e-mail over the weekend that he had “no direct authority in the campaign,” describing himself as merely “an outside message advisor with no campaign staff reporting to me.”
“I have had no say or involvement in four key areas – the financial budget and resource allocation, political or organizational sides. Those were the responsibility of Patti Solis Doyle, Harold Ickes and Mike Henry, and they met separately on all matters relating to those areas.”
Howard Wolfson, the campaign’s communications chief, answered that it was Penn who had top responsibility for both its strategy and message. Another aide said Penn spoke to Clinton routinely about the campaign’s message and ran daily meetings on the topic.
. . .
That problem may go back to well before the lead-off contest, in Iowa. In June, Clinton’s Iowa staff requested 150 organizers; headquarters approved a budget for 90.
By September, Iowa staff were sending out warnings about Obama’s strength. “We are being outnumbered on the ground on a daily basis by his campaign, and it is beginning to show results,” said a memo to top campaign officials on Sept. 26, about three months before the state’s caucuses.
Clinton’s “call time into Iowa is routinely cut. . . . Not only does Obama spend more time in Iowa . . . but he spends more time making political phone calls into Iowa as well,” the memo said. “His persistence and one-on-one approach has earned Obama the support of several key activists who are decision-makers in their counties.”
The memo asked for 100 more field organizers “immediately.”
Later, Clinton did bring more organizers to Iowa.
. . .
Another unresolved question went to the core of Clinton’s identity. Penn wanted to emphasize her “strength and experience” and her command of issues – an approach the campaign adopted.
But others worried that in emphasizing her steely resolve, the campaign was ignoring the reality that many voters disliked Clinton. They wanted to humanize her.
. . .
The dispute flared anew after Clinton’s defeat in South Carolina. At a meeting in the Arlington, Va., headquarters, Penn and others gave a PowerPoint presentation on what was billed as a new message: Clinton would be championing “Solutions for America.”
Henry, then the deputy campaign manager, objected, according to people at the meeting. He said it sounded like a repackaging of the old message that Clinton was a strong leader rather than a warm person. Indeed, a top item in the PowerPoint was “strength and experience” – a theme Clinton had been stressing for months.
Henry asked: “Is this what we’re doing, or is it up for discussion?”
Penn said Clinton had already approved the new message.
At that point, Henry asked if the campaign had learned anything from its defeats. It should be clear, he said, that voters want to see a more human side of her.
“This is not bringing out the humanity in her,” Henry said, according to people present.
Penn countered that the reason for many of her defeats, particularly in smaller states, had been a lack of organization, not the message – a swipe at Henry and others in field work.
In the end, Clinton backed Penn. Henry left the campaign.
. . .