[QUOTE=Darwin’s Finch]
To which, I can only say “meh”. I feel Gould & Eldredge were right about PuncEq (it should be noted that though Gould was the mouthpiece for PE, Eldredge did most of the legwork in formulating the theory; Gould has admitted as much), as well as multi-level selection (except for group selection…) and Dawkins and Co. about 95% wrong regarding genic selection (I believe it does occur, but is not, by a long shot, the “preferred” focus of selection. And, again, Dawkins is largely the primary mouthpiece, but not the original formulator). Personally, I’m a Darwinian in philosophy: individual organisms are the primary focus of selection, and selection only “sees” phenotypes for the most part (again, I am of the opinion that there are instances wherein individual genes can be selected directly, and there are cases in which populations, or in extreme cases entire species, can be the object of selection).
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I don’t have handy my copies of The Selfish Gene and The Extended Phenotype to cite from, but I’m pretty confident that even Dawkins doesn’t argue that the focus of selection are genes (except in very special instances where the physical form of the genome is directly acted upon by some enzyme or phage), but rather that the gene is inarguably the physical unit of inheritance. Selection, in his view (and the view of most gene centric theorists) acts upon the phenotypical expression of genes, singly or in combination, and that a sufficiently broad definition of phenotype can encompass all higher order categories, from individual functional units of a cell, organ, organism, kin, or group, and by adopting this approach it is, at least in theory, possible to reduce selection upon phenotypical attributes at all levels to their effect on the genome. From the bottom up view, this means that the individual gene “competes” with other genes to be successfully expressed in some form that benefits the carrier and leads to propagation of the gene. Thus, there’s nothing non-Darwinian about it; it just applies an underlying mechanic to the traditional Darwinian approach of viewing competition between organisms or higher groups.
Now, I have to admit a strong personal preference for the gene-centric view as the fundamental level on which the mechanics of competition occur or can be applied. My background is in engineering and physics, and while it is acceptable in those disciplines to model a behavior by approximate methods, the desire is to understand the fundamental mechanic. Even though we can’t analytically model turbulent flows in closed form and model them as being approximately fluid continuums with the Navier-Stokes equations or other methods of statistical mechanics, we know that the underlying mechanic occurs at the molecular and atomic level, and at least in theory you could develop a quantum electrodynamic description of the model (albeit one that strictly speaking would only give you answers in terms of probability), although in practice this would be incalculably complex for any real world event. I’d like to think the same about evolutionary biology and the mechanics of natural selection; that rather than occuring as distinct processes on different and somewhat arbitrary levels, that there is a single set of underlying principles at the root level of inheritance upon which selection fundamentally acts.
Talking about kin selection, group selection, organism selection, and so forth as if they are distinct processes that are disconnected (which is, perhaps incorrectly, the impression I get from many texts) strikes me as handwaving, a denial that there is a more fundamental and quantifiable process which dictates how these observable processes occur. Mayr was famous for decrying mathematical approaches, and although I can’t cite it offhand I recall once reading of him railing against molecular biology as being useless in terms of making any headway in understanding natural selection, which struck me as being nothing but pig-headed. This was, I believe, in the early days of molecular biology, when the field started to become populated by scientists from other, more mathematically-oriented disciplines like physics, and I suspect this came out of a sense of propriety and provincialism, but that kind of thinking leaves me somewhat suspect of the basis behind arguing for higher order selection as fundamental or discrete levels.
Punctuated equilibrium strikes me less as a well-defined hypothesis than a series of interpretations. Even from the writings of Eldredge and Gould I’m not entirely clear on what they believe to be the fundamental cause; at least in the case of Gould, he suggested a number of different causes that were at least somewhat at odds with one another. Note that Dawkins (and presumably some other) gene centricists don’t argue that PE did not happen (though they may object to the label and the connotations that come along with it), but rather than the theories advanced for PE are either insufficiently composed, overly complex, or implicitly teleological in nature. Certainly there were “explosions” of the variety of species in certain phylums in the fossil record (and that these are not just artifacts of incompleteness of the record) but the reasons for thus are not entirely clear, though arguments for accelerated or high-level mutation and saltation divorced from the ordinary and accepted mechanism of natural selection strike me as being arbitrary and without basis. I think that there have been and remain a wide range of misstatements and misinterpretations of PE which has contributed to the overall confusion about the concept. Certainly many pop-lit critics, like Daniel Dennett, have almost completely misunderstood the term and concepts behind it, and their critiques are more obtuse than even the most extended advocates.
Regarding gene centric theory, Dawkins was not the first to develop it in current form (I’d say that George Williams deserves that credit), and his work is clearly derived from Haldane, Fisher, and Wright, he’s functioned as more than just a mouthpiece for the concept, including a significant contribution into the notion of the effect of genes and resultant impact upon selection beyond the physical boundaries of the carrier, the so-called extended phenotype. This generalization of the concept of phenotypical expression allows gene seleciton to be applied beyond the number of fingers and toes one has and directly into why a certain gene is preferred and why it propagates. However, I think Crick’s central principle of molecular biology–that all information flows from the nucleic acid to protein–is what persuades me that the fundamental level upon which selection should be concerned with is the gene, even though selective pressures act upon the carrier.
[QUOTE=Darwin’s Finch]
Though I agree 100% with your assessment of “memes”.
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Yeah, this one is total doo-doo on Dawkins part, and I’m not certain why he has and does continue to promote it. The popular concept of a meme–an idea which has some implicitly preferred cognitive pathway–is just barely plausible; one can speak, for instance, of rhymes or musical cues as being catchy regardless of background, although the fact that physical brain development and resultant cognitative processes are significantly modified in development and by environment tends to weaken even that claim. But Dawkins’ more concrete notion that these supposed memes create an identifiable, unique, and reproducible physical structure within the brains of those exposed to it is beyond all belief, and totally unsupported by any evidence in neurology and cognitive science. It’s not just speculative; it is, IMHO, totally unfounded and as wacky as Fred Hoyle and his claim that are noses turn down so we don’t absorb space-borne viruses. Everybody has a blind spot or a few in rationality, I guess, and this is clearly one of Dawkins’.
[QUOTE=Darwin’s Finch]
None of which is relevant to this thread, of course, but I haven’t posted much lately, and I’m bored 
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Eh, the o.p.'s question as been asked and answered, and answered again, and plus it’s an interesting topic with no clear-cut or universally accepted answer, so like Jack Burton always says, what the hell. Besides, I keep meaning to read up on Crick’s work in neuroscience and the neurophysical basis for consciousness and this reminded me. Now I just have to figure out how to get access to the Milliken Library again since the company cut off our corporate subscription.
Stranger
), but I have to wonder.