And my response is that this is a claim that, scientifically, you cannot make. You are perfectly justified in saying that your experiments do not support the existence of B. You are perfectly justified in saying that there isn’t a shred of evidence that B exists. You are perfectly justified in saying that all available information leads you to believe that B does not exist. Grand, and I agree to this point.
What you’re not justified in saying, I would argue, is that B does not exist, period. Because there’s always the chance you missed something. There’s always another experiment. We may quite happily believe that B does not exist; we do not know that B does not exist, and we hence cannot make the claim that it does not.
Deductive reasoning/mathematical proof. Intuition. Divine revelation. I’ve more faith in the first than in the second, and I don’t believe in the last at all, but so what?
Because you see, whether I can name another way or not isn’t relevant to the question of whether science is or is not the only way; it may be the only way that person X can think of, but that’s a limitation of person X. It’s really getting back to what JThunder was going on (and on, and on… :p) about earlier: a scientist fundamentally cannot make the claim that no other means of gaining knowledge exist. He can make the claim that he can think of no other means of gaining knowledge, he can make the claim that none of the other means he’s tested seem to have worked, he can make the claim that he does not think that there are other ways of gaining knowledge.
And the minute he steps beyond this and moves from the realm of scientific explanation to a claim of having reached proof and truth (which would be what he’d have to do when he says that there are definitely no other ways of gaining knowledge), he’s overstepped the bounds of what his science has told him and stated an opinion as fact.
It has, I admit, wandered rather far afield, so if you’d prefer, I won’t insist on discussing it further.
Logic, like mathematics, is a tool science uses, but neither are a subcategory of science[sup]1[/sup]. Science is, at heart, inductive.
Moving along to TVAA now… I’ll buy that we can verify the consequences of certain logical principles, which is a form of science. I’m not sure I buy that this makes logic a subset of science, but rather something which science can examine, to a point. Does that make sense?
So let me put down some definitions, and see where we get with those. Anyone is welcome to point out where I’ve said something fundamentally stupid (and I think I probably have, in fact).
Truth: The first clause of TVAA’s first definition is pretty close, as far as I’m concerned, except that we ought to substitute “perfectly” for accurately. I’m leary of extending it further than that. I actually like the word “correct,” but TVAA, at least, finds a distinction[sup]2[/sup].
Knowledge: We say that we know a thing to be true when we have ruled out all possibility of it being false, and we have done so without the possibility of having been mistaken.
Belief: Weaker than knowledge, we believe something to be true when we have little or no reason to do otherwise. That is, if something is definitely true, we have knowledge. If it is probably true, then we have belief.
Given this set of definitions, I actually reach the conclusion that science never delivers knowledge; I’ve managed to conflate knowledge and proof, which was not the intent. I feel that they’re akin, and that my definition of belief is okay, but I’m not entirely happy here.
[sup]1[/sup]With a nod to TVAA, who may end up convincing me otherwise.
[sup]2[/sup]Out of sheer curiousity, what distinction do you see? I don’t want to have a debate on this, because it’s rather farther afield than I’m prepared to go, but I am curious.