I apologize for breaking off abruptly yesterday, but our daughter came to visit us!
It is always a treat when we see her. We watched three movies: Sling Blade, Overboard, and The Exorcist. The first two were thoroughly enjoyable. I love the great moral question that Sling Blade leaves with its viewers — can an evil action come out of a good heart? And Overboard is a wonderful light comedy, with Goldie Hawn conducting an acting tour de force, convincingly playing three very different roles: the hated and dreaded rich bitch, the sweet and nurturing poor woman, and the reformed wealthy matron. On the other hand, the producers of the DVD have ruined a classic and important movie, The Exorcist, with gratuitous overuse of subliminal images that are unnecessary and hokey. There is, however, a very cool new scene not to be found in the original that, to avoid spoiling, I’ll just say involves Regan MacNeil coming down the stairs in a most unique and startling way.
With respect to the topic at hand, there is considerable overlap in some of the objections of materialists, so I think I’ll consolidate those and respond to them:
What does “possible” mean?
In modal logic, possible means truth in at least one world. Thus, the statement “parallel lines do not intersect” is possible because it is true in worlds with flat planes. But it is not true in all worlds, say, worlds without flat planes. Lines on spheres and lines on saddles, for example, may be both parallel and intersecting.
What does “necessary” mean?
Necessary means truth in every world. The statement “A is A” is true in every world. Why? Because of what “world” means.
What is a “world”?
A world is a set of statements. Thus, a world consisting of no true statements is not possible. A world consisting of at least one true statement is possible. A world consisting of only true statements is necessary.
Is modal logic some kind of smoke and mirror thing?
I suppose that’s up to each person to decide for himself. Maybe a bit of history can put it in perspective. If nothing else, this should make for an interesting read if you like learning about the history of things.
Curiously, modal logic was the invention of a materialist, C. I. Lewis (not to be confused with atheist turned theist apologist, C. S. Lewis) in the early 20th century. He developed it to advance his Conceptual Pragmatism philosophy, which required dispensing with a seeming paradox in the first order logic truth table. Those of you familiar with elementary logic know that a false proposition implies any proposition (If A is false, and B is true, then A implies B is true.)
Materialists were its greatest champions for decades. Wittgenstein protege, Georg Henrik von Wright, for example, used it to become the founder of deontic logic. Similar branches of logic were spawned throughout the 1900s as philosophical activity, stuck in a rut for almost a century, suddenly began to flourish once again.
Perhaps the most famous and directly influential application of modal logic, however, has been in the field of computer science. As you can see here, modal logics have made it possible to model and address such concepts as “the train might be late” or “Tom thinks he’s smart”.
Specifically, propositional modal logics have found critical applications in artificial intelligence, reasoning systems, database systems, software engineering, and program behavior theories (algorithms, processes, etc). Modal logic dealing with temporal necessity is indispensible in modeling “the specification, derivation, and verification of programs as programs may be viewed as progressing through a sequence of states, a new state after each event in the system.”
Modal logic was moving along quite rapidly throughout the latter part of the 20th century. Materialists were delighted that they had figured out how to model reality. Who needs God now that truth has been determined to be either contingent on possiblity or else born of necessity?
But the shit hit the fan when, in the late 20th century, Charles Hartshorne, one of the most influential philosophers then alive (he died in 2000), suddenly resurrected one of Anselm’s nearly thousand-year-old ontological arguments (his second one) for the existence of God, and framed it as a modal tableau. His original argument was this:
- g -> N(g)
- N(g) v ~N(g)
- ~N(g) -> N(~N(g))
- N(g) v N(~N(g))
- N(~N(g)) -> N(~g)
- N(g) v N(~g)
- ~N(~g)
- N(g)
- N(g) -> g
- g
QED
Horrors! What was once summarily dismissed as an argument that was invalid on so many levels (even today, many otherwise intelligent people, ignorant of these advances in modal logic use the old arguments against ontological proofs) was suddenly clearly valid. You will find that each inference in Hartshorne’s proof follows perfectly from the previous inference. Even the staunchest critics, like Stuber and Stoebenau, were forced to acknowledge the argument’s validity, even as they desperately worked to show its unsoundness.
Soon, Plantinga and others began developing new tableaux, some more controversial than others. Eventually, as the new millenium dawned, this became one of the most active and fertile areas of philosophy as big names battle very publicly, no longer over validity, but now over soundness.
On a highly subjective note, I find it amusing and ironic that the very tool that was developed primarily to render God irrelevant is now the tool that holds the most promise of rendering Him as not only relevant but necessary.
What I seem to be seeing is that materialists who understand philosophy (and in particular the branch of philosophy called logic) are finding it more and more difficult to defend their position as the modal argument continues to simplify, but they certainly are not resorting to declaring modal logic to be smoke and mirrors. It’s simply too essential to modern technology and science.
Only people who are quite unfamiliar with the discipline are rejecting modal logic out of hand. And it appears to me that they are doing so, not because they have found some hidden flaw that has escaped the world’s greatest minds for nearly a hundred years, but because they don’t like the implication of the ontological proof. In other words, they seem to be saying, “It was a good thing when it worked for me, but now that it works for you, it is nonsense.” Thus, the question in the title of this thread.
What’s the difference between “valid” and “sound”?
An argument is valid if its propositions follow from one another by strict rules of inference. There is not one philosopher who says that Hartshorne’s proof is invalid. No one can say that because he would lose all credibility. If you will not allow a modus ponens to fall through to the next inference, then you simply dismiss the whole of logic altogether. A materialist who does that has “bought the farm”, so to speak, and now has nothing other than mystical fuzziness with which to model his material world.
An argument is sound if it is both valid and it’s axioms (or base premises) are true. An honest person is forced, when confronted with a sound argument, to accept its conclusion. Rejection of a sound argument is the very hallmark of intellectual dishonesty.
Therefore, many materialists, while unable to attack the argument’s validity, have attacked its soundness. This or that premise that serves as the basis of the argument is not true, they say. In its earliest forms, there were certainly eminently attackable premises, like Becker’s postulate, for example. No one was forced to accept the proposition that modal status, except for actuality, is always necessary.
But now, arguments have been developed that use far less controversial premises and even do away with the excluded middle approach altogether (like the one under discussion here). So it is becoming increasingly difficult to hold a straight face while attacking the soundness of modern arguments.
What is truth?
There are many theories of truth, some of which were discussed in great detail in the other ontology thread. Someone here mentioned one of them (actually a variant). But this argument holds without respect to any particular theory of truth. The interpretation of God’s nature is left wide open by ontology; thus, holders of the Correspondence Theory of Truth may rightfully interpret God from the argument pantheistically.
But what they may not do is make the sweeping assertion that “Modal logic is absolutely worthless, as it represents nothing.” Certainly, that assertion represents desperate ignorance. A computerized society without modal logic is like an industrial society without mechanical theory.
The questions remain unanswered
No one has yet satisfactorily addressed the questions from the Opening Post.
- What existence can possibly be greater than the greatest possible existence?
and
- How can the greatest possible existence be impossible?
The hedging and protests are not, in my opinion, earning you any points. If you attack the argument’s validity you merely look silly. But if you intend to attack the argument’s soundness, you must address its only two axioms and show why they are false. Flail all you like; it won’t matter. Tease and cajole a la Scylla as much as you want; it means nothing. Evade, and you lose. Misdirect, and you raise suspicion. Hedge, and you waste everybody’s time.
Stop being like Creationists attacking evolution, and answer the damn questions. 