Are materialism and logic incompatible?

Great Debates
61

Once again, due to the sheer ratio of posts, I need to consolidate the questions wherever possible. But I’ll make an effort to address those of you who feel you have expressed unique concerns and sentiments.

Beginning with the Scylla post following mine:

So the argument is sound as well as valid?

Obviously. Scylla (and even Jab) were gracious enough to admit that the premises are true and the inferences are valid; therefore, the argument holds. It is sound. God, as defined, exists.

I believe there was one holdout (Preguntas) who was concerned about the definition. Basically, I think his concern amounted to a protest over whether the definition actually describes God or merely assigns to Him an attribute. But that concern seems to coincide with another that is prevalent here, so I’ll address it as one:

What’s the big deal about existence existing?

The gist of most people’s indignance seems to be this: “Okay, so you’ve proved that God, as you define Him, exists. So what? All you’re saying is that existence exists, and that is decidedly unremarkable.”

And I agree that that would be about as interesting as a one account balance sheet. However, it isn’t that simple. The argument’s first inference does NOT establish the existence of God. It is an implication that holds as true only if both of its conditions hold true. The implication does not say that God exists necessarily; it says that if — IF — God exists, then He exists necessarily. G -> G is insufficient to prove the existence of G. God’s existence is not established until the conclusion.

What kind of God are you talking about?

Many are protesting that the God of the argument sounds nothing like the God of the Bible or of traditional gods generally. “Where are the thunderbolts from the sky? The miracles? The mighty Being who claims to be the Alpha and the Omega? How does ‘necessary existence’ square with traditional views of God’s nature? How have you done anything more than prove the existence of the greatest Pet Rock?”

Although I’ve already addressed that, I’ll address it in more detail. Ontology concerns itself with the nature of existence. It does not (and cannot) assign any broader metaphysical significance, though we are free to draw metaphysical implications post priori. However, those broader interpretations are constrained by the nature of the existence described.

The argument can be (and has been) interpreted to prove the existence of a greatest possible material being, and would essentially be a material god. In fact, two of the earliest proponents of the modal argument held just that: Hartshorne argued for a panentheistic god (“a god whose body is the world”), and Spinoza argued for a pantheistic god (“a god who is identical to the universe”). (See Geisler and Corduan’s Philosophy of Religion, page 149)

In accepting the soundness of the earlier forms, both philsophers understandably sought to reconcile the conclusion that they believed to be inescapable with their already established world views. There has to be a god, they reasoned, and this is the only sort of god that we can in good conscience perceive as extending from the argument. It is likely that Dougherty (previously cited) and other materialists who have the intellectual fortitude to admit to the argument’s soundness interpret its metaphysical significance in similar ways.

But those of us who believe in a theistic (as opposed to a pantheistic or panentheistic) God see a problem (naturally!) with those interpretations. Specifically, there is no evidence that the universe per se has many of the attributes that are known to be shared by one of its own elements — us. The universe doesn’t seem capable of knowledge, power, or moral judgment, for example. And while the intelligence, potency, and morality of some of its elements are suspect (even minimal), there exist or have existed known examples of incredible brilliance, awsome might, and stunning moral goodness.

If the Being that is the subject of the modal proof is to be the greatest possible existence, then His (note: consider pronomial references to be anthropologically neutral — they are a mere rhetorical convenience) existence must be greater than any other, including our own. So the panentheistic interpretation seems arbitrary, and the pantheistic interpretation seems weak.

If we are capable of having knowledge (and we are), then this Being must be capable of having the greatest knowledge (which would be all possible knowledge). If we are capable of having power (and we are), then this Being must be capable of having the greatest power (which would be all possible power). And if we are capable of discerning morality (and we are), then this Being must be capable of the greatest moral discernment (which would be all possible moral discernment).

He must have a will because we do, and His will must be the greatest will (which would be all possible will). The universe does not seem to have a will; rather, it seems to operate in accordance with describable principles. Although it is not known which witch drives which (are the laws of the universe prescribed or proscribed?) it doesn’t matter. There is no evidence that the Sun may, say, commit suicide and suddenly decide to burn out. A man is capable of deciding to end his life, but the Sun must consume its fuel in accordance with physical laws until its fuel is spent.

Thus, only by the application of arbitrary entities of restriction can the God of “necessary existence” be construed as anything less than metaphysically complete. If we have wisdom, then God is capable of all possible wisdom. If we have compassion, then God is capable of all possible compassion. And so on.

At this point, many will note, “Ah, but we are also capable of great evil and cruelty. Is God also capable of these?” Yes, certainly. If God is good, then He, like us, has made the willfull decision to be good. If He is merciful, then it is because He has decided to be merciful. If He loves us with the greatest possible love, it is because He has made that moral choice rather than the choice to hate us with the greatest possible hate.

An ability is not a compulsion. Thus, the statement “[c]onsider that if [God] is all powerful [He] may change any state, including [His] own” is true. But there is no evidence that God has done so. Even atheists, hard atheists in fact who assertively deny God’s existence, maintain that goodness and a right morality are that toward which men ought to strive. And they give compelling reasons for their position based on nothing more than their own subjective sociological and psychological analysis. It is reasonable to assume, then, that God has at least as profound an understanding of why goodness is preferable over evil, love is preferable over hate, and retaining His absoluteness and objectivity is preferable over abdicating them.

How is it reasonable to apply modal logic to the ontological argument?

Anselm defined God as “that for which no greater can be conceived,” and proceeded to argue in favor of His existence. Modal logic, in recognizing existence as modal states, is keenly adaptable to modeling the ontological argument.

Are you just being unreasonable, and are unwilling to hear the arguments against you?

Honestly, no. Although I have believed in God for many years now, I am among the nearly unanimous majority who discounts the ontological argument in every form, including Anselm’s. But presentation of the argument in a modal tableau represented a substantial change.

I have always held that the conclusion of a sound argument must be considered true. When I see such an argument, whatever I might have believed before becomes immediately irrelevant, and I change my mind. I didn’t find any of the modal arguments sound (though I knew they were valid) until I ran across Tisthammer’s rework of Hartshorne. It was then that I decided that Becker’s postulate did apply reasonably to Tisthammer’s inference. When he moved the inference to his axiom list, I was dissapointed and felt that it damaged his proof.

The newest argument, however, contains practically zero controversy. And obstinance lies in denying its soundness, not in refusing to hear protests. There is nothing to protest. And denying the conclusion of a sound argument is intellectually dishonest.

But can the argument convince anyone?

Obviously, it can. It convinced me, and it has convinced many others. It will convince whoever accepts soundness as the criterion for proof.

What does all of this mean to me in real life?

As Phil Fernandes wrote in his brilliant doctoral thesis:

"All other arguments for God’s existence argue from something in existence to the existence of God. The teleological argument argues from the design in the universe to the existence of an intelligent Designer. The moral argument argues from the existence of moral values to the existence of the absolute moral Lawgiver. The cosmological argument reasons from the existence of dependent beings to the existence of a totally independent Being. Only the ontological argument argues from the concept of God to His existence. The ontological argument alone does not begin with the facts of experience.

[…]

“Plantinga argued that the greatest possible Being would have to be a being that exists as the greatest possible Being in every possible world. Plantinga concludes that since the actual world is a possible world (it is not an impossible world), then the greatest possible being must exist in the actual world.”

In my next post, I’ll address questions and comments that did not consolidate easily.

62

OK, Lib, I’m glad I stayed up so late/early so I could at least see you check back in. I suspected that at some point you’d try to make this god more like the ones we’re familiar with, and you did just that. I know you may be elaborating on some points later, but I want to again stress a concern I have about using “greatest” in other contexts, as you now have done.

Obviously yes, the argument can convince people of something, but I doubt it convinces them of what you think it does. That’s the point I was making, it isn’t particularly suited towards convincing someone of the existence of their particular monotheistic 3-O God.

I find it difficult to assign scalar values to attributes like “love” and “compassion” and “discerning morality.” It seems odd to take a definition of a “being of which there can be no greater”, use it in a proof about greatest possible existence, and then decide to extend “greater” into highly subjective attributes. What love is “greater” than other loves, how do you quantify it, how do you decide which is the high end and low end?

Finally, I think you misunderstood my query about what this all means to me in the real world. Even if all you said were true, and your argument sound and valid, how is my life altered by the existence of your “God”? Even if we give it all the rather suspect (to my way of thinking), “greatest” attributes you want to give it, I still fail to see how this would affect my life in the slightest, since God appears to be epistemically irrelevant. You even seem to admit as much in describing a causal universe.

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Sorry, but I really found only one. If anyone feels that his question or comment has not been addressed, then please say so.

What I have stated before, actually, is that admission that God might exist is implicit in the assertion that He might not. Note that “it is possible that God does not exist” (<>~G) is not the same assertion as “it is not possible that God exists” (~<>G). The latter assertion is a substantive denial of a positive ontological proposition, but the former assertion is merely redundant. Stating the axiom as <>G V <>~G simply means that step 4 becomes <>G -> (G V ~G), and ~G falls out by modus tolens.

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Rex

Actually, until now, I have scrupulously avoided any and all discussions about broader metaphysical interpretations of God from the proof simply because any such interpretations are outside the scope of ontology. But this thread is much less narrow than the prior one, and lends itself to such a discussion. Still, it is important to understand that they have nothing to do with the modal argument per se. As you might notice, I was not the one itching to talk about these things, and I did NOT talk about them until they were brought up specifically.

Yes, I have my own ideas about Who God is, mostly based upon my own experience with Him. And I am willing to share what little I know about that. But I don’t hold that someone else’s experience might not be different. Even vastly different in ways that I can’t comprehend. God, as I see it, is a Being so pertinent and so intimately of concern to everyone that it is eminently conceivable that He might manifest Himself in different ways to different people.

No, you misunderstand me if you think I have maintained that the argument itself is convincing of anything other than that there is a greatest possible existence that exists in all possible worlds (including this one). In fact, I don’t know how I could have been more insistent (and continue to be even now) that broader metaphysical interpretations of the argument are outside its scope.

I don’t know. And in fact, I would wager that it might be different for every person.

As you might or might not know, I hold that, for each of us, our moral journey (our life on earth) is intensely private and personal. We each represent a closed frame of reference, a consciousness that can be invaded by no one else. I don’t know what it’s like to be you, and you don’t know what it’s like to be me. Our experiences are unbridgably unique.

For me, it is merely more testament to God’s greatness that He can manifest Himself to each of us in a personal way, such that each of our lives is a substantive existence, and such that the universe serves as a mis-en-scene for each of our moral plays.

I hope that, by now, I can leave it as understood that such interpretations of mine have nothing to do with the modal argument, but are interpretations that I make post priori.

It has to do with the fact that I believe, based on my own research, knowledge, and experience, that there is nothing substantively real about the universe. The atoms are temporal; God is eternal. Your life might not be altered at all by the existence of my God. But mine has been. Most profoundly.

It is the universe, in its manifest march toward entropy, that is epistemically irrelevant. Only the Love Everlasting has relevance to me.

65

I didn’t originally catch the implication of this statement nested inside the larger quote I gave:

If you will not concede that the existence of the greatest possible existence is possible, I’d like to hear why.

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Lib, perhaps we’re all taking the title of this thread for granted as your thesis. Did you ask the question rhetorically, with tongue in cheek? Or do you hold that this symbological exercise indeed shows some incompatibility of materialism with logic?

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That’s a fair question, Xeno.

I won’t ever forget the remarkable thread where Tris and I were astounded at the apparent mysticism that is endemic to materialism. That’s when I first wondered about the thesis of this thread, and subsequent encounters made me wonder more and more.

So I’ve thought of it many times, but the straw that broke the camel’s back was when a materialist demanded a mathematical proof for the existence of God, and then cried foul when one was given. And as you can see from the quotation in the Opening Post, I was told that logic is so much hocus pocus, useful maybe for snake oil salesmen. I was startled because it is the opposite that is true. Logic is what exposes the PT Barnums.

On a more personal level, I’m tired of two things: (1) materialists accusing theists of being irrational, unthinking faith-zombies who can’t reason their way out of a paper bag; and (2) materialists who want it both ways, calling upon reason when they perceive that it supports their world view and rejecting it when they perceive that it doesn’t.

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Lib: I, too, would be tired of your (1) and (2) if I were to constantly encounter them, and I’ll take you at your word that you do. It’s just that I don’t think you’ve shown that your “greatest possible” line of reasoning fails to support a materialistic world view.

In addition, I’m not sure that you were told that logic is hocus pocus, merely that using symbology to “prove” actuality is a bit of flim-flam. You’ve certainly proven the validity of a concept, but any conclusion that the proof implies a particular reality cannot be supported.

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Lib:

What part of your proof says that the attribute being described must necessarily be embodied in a being?

What part of your proof says that “necessary existence” in all its forms must be an attribute of a single being or object.

Crazy Jim’s used cars may have the best possible rates, and the Acura may be the best possible car, and the Chevy the best possible truck.

The best possible car is not the best possible truck and vice versa. You seem to be suggesting that the best possible of all different criteria finds a single home. I don’t recall seeing that as an axiom. What part of your proof shows this?

I didn’t say that. I said that you were using it like so much hocus pocus, or a snake oil salesman.

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As for the 1 and 2. I have done neither.

I am simply saying that your proof does not prove what you are saying it does, because your definitions and axioms are false.

This makes the proof itself moot regardless of its complexity. GIGO.

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Xeno

I’m not sure what to say about that, Xeno, except that somehow, you missed what I already said. There are philosophers who do interpret the proof materialistically (as in pantheism and panentheism), and I’ve included them in the discussion from the get-go.

They are reacting as materialists ought to react to the proof — they accept that it is sound, and interpret its broader metaphysical implications in accordance with their own world view. Notice that what they do is opposed to the materialist (or theist for that matter) who rejects the argument’s conclusion. That cannot be done without the exercise of intellectual dishonesty.

Ontology speaks to the nature of existence. The greatest possible existence is proven conclusively to be real. As I’ve said repeatedly (and apparently will be saying many more times), broader metaphysical interpretations are outside the scope of the proof.

Scylla

It seems to me that you’ve reneged. In reference to this

you responded this way

and now you say

So what gives? Can you answer the questions or not?

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I directly answered.

If only that courtesy were returned.

73

Indeed you did. Twice.

Yes. No.

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Question: if one asserts that this proof only demonstrates that existence exists, doesn’t that imply actualism (since it is wholly necessary)?

—Specifically, there is no evidence that the universe per se has many of the attributes that are known to be shared by one of its own elements — us. The universe doesn’t seem capable of knowledge, power, or moral judgment, for example.—

It strikes me that you are giving pantheists short shrift here, particularlly Tolland variety. Actual existence, all-that-is, DOES encompass these things: it most certainly seems capable of supporting beings who are capable of these qualities. I’m not sure why the ontolgy here would require existence as a whole being a system that is thinking. Thinking is something that certain beings do, just like venting stellar gas is something that other sorts of beings do.

—God, as I see it, is a Being so pertinent and so intimately of concern to everyone that it is eminently conceivable that He might manifest Himself in different ways to different people.—

It strikes me that this is entirely consistent with everything but the ultimately skeptic sophilistic nihilist. All-that-exists is most certainly is very pertinent to just about everyone who cares about their existence (and often even unavoidably to those who don’t), whether they call it god or not.

—But there is no evidence that God has done so.—

At least from the ontology alone, wouldn’t there also be no evidence that God has ever been consistent either? Indeed, it seems to me that the greatest possible being would not simply have the ability to do anything (within logic), but also does everything.

—Even atheists, hard atheists in fact who assertively deny God’s existence, maintain that goodness and a right morality are that toward which men ought to strive. And they give compelling reasons for their position based on nothing more than their own subjective sociological and psychological analysis. It is reasonable to assume, then, that God has at least as profound an understanding of why goodness is preferable over evil, love is preferable over hate, and retaining His absoluteness and objectivity is preferable over abdicating them.—

No. There is no reason to suppose that God shares the values of mankind that these sorts of moral appeals rely upon. Moral value is a particular idea held by particular sorts of beings (those, for instance, that care about certain states of the world over others). Maybe god is that sort of being. Maybe not. Is it necessary that god be such a being?

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No. Parallel lines do not intersect. Parallel lines do not exist in curved spaces.

  1. Something either exists or it does not exist. Something is either possible or it is not possible. What does greater mean when qualifying an either/or proposition?

  2. How can the greatest possible integer’s existence be impossible? Your argument can easily be used to prove that the greatest possible integer exists.

Libertarian,

What you are doing in your “proof” is assuming your conclusion. Hiding the conclusion in your definition and waving modal logic are not sufficient distractions to prevent notice of this flaw. Once the flaw of defining God as that which must exist is taken away, all you have done is demonstrate that something which must exists, does exist. I’ll grant that, but that’s not very remarkable. Most logic systems do not allow you to assume your conclusion and your “proof” clearly illustrates why this restriction exists.

Yes and you certainly have!

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The symbolic proof is clearly valid from the symbolic premises. If anyone denies that I think they need to reread the proof. All that can be in question is whether what meaning we have put in those symbols corresponds to a valid means of thinking about the proof.

I don’t think <> means “possible” in the same way we use the word “possible” though it is indeed a specific case of the use of the word. Most people use the word “possible” to mean “not forbidden, though no claim for existence”. Modal logic has no conception of “not forbidden but no claim on existence”. It only has: exists, exists everywhere, doesn’t exist. At least one choice is missing that would complete the translation of the word “possible” to symbolic logic. One caveat to this: a perfectly deterministic world also has no concept of “not forbidden” that doesn’t also imply “exists”.

I don’t think “god” can be defined in that symbol set as anything other than “necessary existence”. I do feel that any reasonable definition of a monotheistic god does have as part of its description G->G. Thankfully Eris isn’t reasonable, so I don’t feel compelled to prove her necessary existence :wink:

77

OK. So logic and materialism are indeed compatible, and broad metaphysical interpretations are outside the scope of the proof. Thanks.

So, taking your proof as not only valid but sound, we can still quite easily find support for at least three opposing articles of faith:
a.) faith in the nonreality of the atoms (on your part),
b.) faith in the nonreality of anything but atoms (for the strict materialist), and
c.) faith that material and nonmaterial things alike are dependent on the atoms (“mystical” materialism)

And we haven’t even touched on the nature of God or God’s relationship to lesser possible existences.

78

“An ability is not a compulsion. Thus, the statement “[c]onsider that if [God] is all powerful [He] may change any state, including [His] own” is true. But there is no evidence that God has done so.”
Oh my, you presume that god would leave fingerprints? Maybe he did it for our own good, kicking us out of the nest sort of thing. If you accept the idea of an all powerful god then rationally you must accept that he could dissappear whenever he wanted without letting us know. By the way that quote modification is improper, changing my statement from describing a generic god to describing your God changes the meaning. Quite rude, imho.

"A man is capable of deciding to end his life, but the Sun must consume its fuel in accordance with physical laws until its fuel is spent. "
Well, in a true materialist world a man does not decide to take his life. A sequence of chemical reaction cause body motion which results in termination of life. :slight_smile:

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“It does not (and cannot) assign any broader metaphysical significance, though we are free to draw metaphysical implications post priori.”

The problem is we can draw just as strong metaphysical implications from observing an anthill. The greatest possible existence existing does not really give me a lot of spiritual fodder.

80

Lib, how do you know that human beings don’t represent the greatest possible existence? Maybe there is nothing more intelligent than we in all the universe? (And I think intelligence is the greatest attribute a living thing may possess.)