What are you saying? That since we don’t have a collective intelligence, there’s no way to ascertain how intelligent an individual is?
The way I see it, if we ever find evidence of alien life, we’ll be able to determine how intelligent it is by seeing what it does. We don’t believe that dolphins are as intelligent as humans, for example, but we know dolphins are self-aware because they understand that when they see themselves in a mirror, they know it’s merely a reflection and not another dolphin. Mark a dolphin’s body with waterproof paint in a place the dolphin cannot normally see, and then put a mirror in the tank. The dolphin will use the mirror to examine the paint spot. It knows it’s looking at itself in the mirror. But a dog, for example, thinks the dog it sees in the mirror is another dog.
Now tell me how we can test the intelligence of God.
Parts of your argument are solid/valid, but the argument as a whole falls short, mostly because several of your conditions are defined without any reason to support that definition. I go over that a bit more in the rest of my post, though.
I havn’t seen any of those arguments, so I can’t comment on their validity. But I can comment on the validity of this argument, and, as I mentioned before, it seems to fall short. If it is valid, it shouldn’t be too hard to counter the specific criticisms of its working.
You seem to assume your conclusion by assuming god must exist in “one world.” What evidence is there to support that? And what “other world” is this? You assume that there is a god existing in one world, and you assume that there is more than one “world” in this logic-system. If you do not presume that god must exist (Even if only necessarily in one world), then your argument doesn’t work. You also presume to define what god is before you have any evidence for a god’s existance, and therefor your description is flawed. The description you use is flawed, because it describes god only as god would be if he exists. If he doesn’t exist, the definition would be different. If it’s unknown if he exists, then it would again be different. But the definition that you use for god basically enters a “he must exist” value into your logic, which effectively assumes the answer. If you’ve already described him as existing, why even bother with modal logic and everything else? To use an earlier example, it seems like a lot of smoke-and-mirrors (Again, I go into this in my post, but I felt it would be good to emphasize this).
Well, I do have to agree with the earlier statement that you’re playing with a loaded deck. I did go into my reasonings for such in my post, at least, so please let me know what you think of the points I brought up…
No problem, I’ll be glad to see what you come up with
Libertarian, I agree completely that the argument you have presented using modal logic is valid. I do not believe it is sound because I don’t think you have sufficiently justified the assumption <>G, but I’m putting that aside for the moment. Even if your argument is indeed sound, which could very well be the case, I think you haven’t proved as much as you believe you’ve proved. Many others have said this, but I’ll try and present my case a bit differently.
In an earlier post in this thread, you stated
You’ve said essentially the same thing many other times, in a variety of different ways. However, I believe that this reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the modal-logical proof that you have presented.
Based on what you have stated, I understand that “God has the greatest possible existence” is defined to mean that G -> G, where G is the proposition “God exists.” However, when discussing the proof I believe that you are interpreting the words “greatest” and “possible” as ordinary English. From “greatest,” you get the inference that God is as loving, powerful, etc. as could be — that he has the maximum possible amount of every positive attribute. From “possible”, you get the inference that God is possible, and then convert this “possible” back into the modal-logic sense to conclude <>G. You have not provided a logical justification for either of these inferences.
Let me try and rephrase this in symbolic terms:
G = God exists.
M[sub]E[/sub] = God possesses the maximum possible existence. = G -> G
M[sub]X[/sub] = [English]God possess the maximum possible amount of X.[/English]
Note the [English] tags indicating that the second statement is intended to be interpreted in the context of standard English usage rather than specialized modal-logical terminology.
What you have proven is exactly that { M[sub]E[/sub] , <>G } -> G.
You have independently asserted that M[sub]E[/sub] -> M[sub]X[/sub]. where X represents power, love, and every other godly attribute. However, you have not presented a logical argument that proves this.
I think the problem is that you believe:
[list=1][li]God possesses the maximum possible existence -> [English]God possesses the maximum possible existence.[/English][/li][li][English]God possesses the maximum possible existence.[/English] -> [English]God possesses the maximum possible X.[/English][/list=1][/li]You have not proved either of these implications, and I personally find both of them difficult to believe. They may be self-evident to you, but I assure you that they are not obvious to all people.
I believe that perhaps this is why various people have accused you of playing “fast and loose” with the terminology, or similar things. I certainly don’t think you have been intentionally dishonest, but you have repeatedly taken statements that have a specialized meaning in the context of modal logic and interpreted them as though they had the conventional English meanings, and also interpreted words in ordinary English discussion as though they had the specialized meanings ascribed to them by modal logic.
To me and to others, G -> G does not imply anything at all about the attributes of God, so we think the “God” of the proof could actually represent one of any number of things. This is one reason that I, at least, don’t find the existence of this valid “proof of God’s existence” to have any major metaphysical consequences.
I have long since given up expecting that anyone will be able to persuade Lib that there is a fallacy involved in
(a) Defining a god in such a way that it has to exist and
(b) Using that definition to prove that it exists.
So I’ll try another tack, without much hope of getting through.
(Lib, I believe, is Armoured In His Faith, not unlike a pachycephalosaurus.) Supposing, and please notice I said supposing and don’t accuse me of Ad Populuming, that the two billion or so Xians that have existed during the past two millenia are correct in their beliefs, and that there is a god that controls this world, and that god is the YHWH of the Bible. Supposing, in other words, that somewhere up there sitting on a cloud is the meanspirited, eviltempered (Nah 1 -2), jealous (Dt.5,9), fiercely angry mass murderer that we read about in Exodus and Numbers and so on; the gloating bully that had Job’s children murdered and Job tortured on a bet, that poisoned twentyfive thousand of its beloved children because they complained about having to eat the same food every day for forty years; that boasts about inflicting leprosy (2 Kg 15 - 15), burning fevers, plagues of all sorts (Dt.28, 20-28), birth defects, (Ex.4,11), who will “not pity, not spare, nor have mercy…” (Is. 13 - 13, 14) that kills and kills and orders more killing when it doesn’t feel like killing itself…
Supposing this god isn’t omnicient (Gen 18 -20), not omnipotent, (Jg 1-19) not omnipresent (Gen 11 - 5) and certainly not omnibenevolent (Most of the Bible.)
Then Lib’s proof has led to a false conclusion, which I had always thought meant that there was probably something wrong with the proof.
I ignored your first post, and now you’ve ignored my request that you allow me the until the morning to complete my response. I now must respond to two posts, so I reckon we’re even.
I’ll start with the second one first since it is the freshest:
I look forward to seeing it. There is no need for the “solid/”. The argument and its parts are either valid or invalid and either sound or unsound. Also, the argument contains one and only one definition. There are no “conditions” that are defined by the argument.
It’s trivially easy, in fact. I counter the (extremely rare) specific criticisms by citing the rules of logic. But just as you say that it ought to be easy to counter criticisms, it ought to be just as easy to offer them.
For example, you might offer something like this: “No! You have made improper substitutions for the terms in Bouer’s Theorem!” That would be a specific criticism that addresses the argument or one of its parts. But offering an analogy of faeries playing chess with birds watching over all, while possibly assuaging your discomfort with the argument or its metaphysical implications, is not by the wildest stretch any sort of “specific criticism”.
In other words, show me a logical fallacy. Show me where I’ve said something like “p -> q: ~p :: ~q” (denial of the antecedant) or “p -> q :: q -> p” (conversion of a conditional). Those are logical fallacies. That is exactly what you and I would demand were we making an argument about evolution. We would not allow the Creationist to fabricate analogies and then declare, “So you see, evolution is false!” We would demand that the Creationist show a specific flaw in our reasoning. Why is this argument, given as a formal logic proof, entitled to anything less than that?
Where? How? Please be specific.
There is one definition. There is one axiom. There are five inferences. The assumption of a conclusion that you speak of must be found in the penumbras and interstices since it isn’t found in the argument. I think that maybe I can avoid violating the cross-posting rule (both in letter and in spirit) by giving the argument in a step-by-step format with plain English commentary.
Definition: G = G
This states that what we mean by God is a Supreme Being. This can be paraphrased as Greatest Possible (Supreme) Existence (Being). No conclusion is assumed here. In fact, it is nothing other than the ordinary dictionary definition of God.
If you wish to protest the definition, then you must do so by offering that Supreme Being is an improper definition of God.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. The definition does not say “G”. It says “G = G”.
Axiom: <>G
This states that it is possible that God exists. You are free to disagree with this assertion, but your disagreement must be with the fact of the assertion, and not with any conclusion because no conclusion is made.
If you wish to disagree with the axiom, then you must agree with its opposite, ~<>G, “it is not possible that God exists”. Note that <>~G (“it is possible that God does not exist”) is NOT the axiom’s opposite. In logic, either A or Not A is true.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. The axiom does not say “G”. It says “<>G”.
Inference Number 1: G -> G
As I’ve explained before, you cannot assume God’s existence from the definition. Definitions don’t prove things. You can define a unicorn. You can define Santa Claus. You can define anything under the sun, but your definition might be of a conceptual fantasy.
The first inference states that, because of the definition of God as Supreme Being, if He exists, then He is a Supreme Being (exists necessarily). Lest a couple of extremely important words become lost in a forest of words, let me highlight them: IF God exists, THEN He exists necessarily.
If, if, if, if, if.
There is no assumption of any conclusion. There is merely an implication that may be paraphrased two other ways: (1) “God’s existence would imply His necessary existence” and (2) “God exists necessarily if He exists at all.”
All this inference does is establish that, in accordance with the definition given, if God does indeed exist (and we don’t know yet whether He does), then He exists as the Supreme Being (because He was defined that way). No conclusion of any kind is drawn. The inference simply follows from the definition.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. This inference does not say “G”. It says “G -> G”.
Inference Number 2: (p -> p) -> (<>p -> p)
This inference is a statement of Bouer’s Theorem, and you can find proof of it in any sufficiently advanced text on K logics. It says simply that if an entity is implied to exist necessarily, then the entity’s existence is implied by virtue of its possibility. It is our axiom that allows us to invoke this theorem.
This makes perfect sense on a common-sense level, and is what is, in this thread, being popularly and wrongly attributed to either the definition or the opening axiom. Here (and not until here) is where you’ll find the notion that necessary existence implies existence. Can we stop? Certainly not. We have not yet reached our conclusion.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. This inference does not say “G”. It says “(p -> p) -> (<>p -> p)”.
Inference Number 3: (G -> G) -> (<>G -> G)
What we have done here is to substitute the variable on the left-hand side of our definition with the variable in Bouer’s Theorem. The theorem applies for any p, and our p is God. But no conclusion is drawn here. We have a couple of steps to go.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. This inference does not say “G”. It says “(G -> G) -> (<>G -> G)”.
Inference Number 4: <>G -> G
Here, we have a modus ponens. A modus ponens is an inference of the form:
A -> B
A
B
Paraphrased: A implies B. A is true; therefore, B is true.
(G -> G) -> (<>G -> G) (Inference Number 3)
G -> G (Inference Number 1)
<>G -> G (This inference)
Paraphrased: God’s existence implying His necessary existence implies that His possible existence implies His existence. His existence implies His necessary existence; therefore, His possible existence implies His existence.
Have we drawn our conclusion? No, not yet. We have an implication only. We must isolate one or the other term in the implication such that it states our conclusion. But this inference does not state it.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. This inference does not say “G”. It says “<>G -> G”.
Inference Number 5: G
Another modus ponens:
<>G -> G (Inference number 4)
<>G (Our axiom)
G (This inference)
Have we drawn our conclusion? Yes! At last, we have.
The argument’s conclusion is “G”. This inference says “G”.
God exists.
Now, if you care to make specific criticisms of the argument, then by all means do so. Please don’t make analogies. Please don’t appeal to your metaphysical discomfort. Please don’t talk about things out of left-field like scalar values. And please don’t call me huffy.
Point to a step in the argument and show why that step is wrong.
I promise you that I will. Today is Phoenix Dragon day. I appreciate any and all reasonable discourse.
Good. Now, I will go ahead and post this because it is rather lengthy, and then I will address your post from yesterday afternoon. I ask only that you allow me to finish that address before you launch a response. I will ignore other postings until I have satisfied yours. Fair enough?
I hope that you’ve had sufficient opportunity to review my first response to you. I’ll be making reference to it considerably during these responses. You’ll note that this thread, as you can see from its title, is an intellectual search for discourse with materialists who will address points of logic, in particular with respect to this form of the ontological tableau. I see that your posts attempt to do this, and for that I am greatful.
As best I can boil that down, it amounts to a declaration of equivocation, that is, the use of a term to mean more than one thing. And I can understand how that might be suspected what with all the back and forth between plain English and formal symbology. For my money, in that regard, the most suspect term in this whole discussion is “world”. (See Preguntas’ take on worlds in the Ontology thread.) Some people are using it to mean the physical universe versus imaginary universes, when in reality it means simply a set of statements. A world consisting of no true statements is impossible. A world consisting of at least one true statement is possible. And a world consisting of only true statements is necessary.
The proof uses “possible” in the strictest sense of modal logic. It first appears in our axiom, “<>G”. In plain English, it means that it is possible that God exists. In modal logic, it means that God exists in at least one world, or more precisely, “God exists” is a true statement in at least one world.
It is said in my commentary on the proof that the axiom follows from the definition. There is some protest (by you and others) that His very existence is assumed in the definition. I’ve already shown why that is not the case, but to reiterate, definitions don’t prove anything. Definitions are tautologies. In logic, contradictions and tautologies are special case statements. Contradictions prove anything, while tautolgies are proved by anything. A = Not A (a contradiction) implies that anything under the sun is true. A = A (a tautology) implies that underlying all truths is the presumption of identity.
The definition describes God as that entity which, while not proven to exist, is conceptualized as the Supreme Being. If we were to stop there, then our “proof” would be a tautology, declaring that any and every statement you could possible make proves the existence of God. “I ate cereal this morning” proves that God exists. For you, for me, for anyone with a love of reason, that is not sufficient.
Thus, we search the definition for some statement that can carry us forward. We do that by parsing the definition. G means the same thing as ~<>~G. (“It is necessary that God exists” is equivalent to “it is not possible that God does not exist”). I can understand how, on the face of it, you might cry out at this point, “But hey! If it is not possible that God does not exist, then you have already shown that He must exist!” But consider that we have made no declaration at this point; we are in the middle of parsing the definition.
Notice that there is a difference between these two statements (see Godel’s famous treatment of this):
Statement 1: “It is not possible that God does not exist.”
Statement 2: “God exists necessarily means that it is not possible that God does not exist.”
Do you see the difference? Statement 1 is a positive ontological proposition. It makes a statement about God. Statement 2 is not a statement about God — it is a statement about a statement.
It is Statement 2, and not Statement 1, that leads us to our axiom, which presents itself as the right-hand side of this implication: If it is not possible that God does not exist, then it is possible that God exists. We scrupulously avoid making an assertion that is a restatement of the definition. We do not declare God’s existence; rather, we step out of the tautology.
Therefore, we are not saying that God has a chance to exist merely because He must exist. Rather, we are saying that He has a chance to exist because the possibility of his nonexistence would lead to a contradiction: specifically <>~ contradicts ~<>~.
Study these statements:
Statement 1: <>G (it is possible that God exists)
Statement 2: ~<>G (it is not possible that God exists)
Statement 3: <>~G (it is possible that God does not exist)
Statement 4: ~~<>G (it is not impossible that God exists)
Statement 5: ~<>~G (it is not possible that God does not exist)
Only Statement 5 conveys modal necessity, so that is the statement that we must avoid contradicting, and Statement 1 is the only means to that end. Surely, it goes without saying that if we contradict our definition with our very first proposition, then our “proof” would prove anything, and therefore be summarily useless. A negation of a tautology is always a contradiction.
NB: Your paragraphs are quite long, and so I’ll respond to each of them in separate posts.
Lbertarian, I think you should have thrown in the towel right here. You have admitted that your argument for the existence of God actually doesn’t prove anything. Definition:
“Little green kumquats and grilled cheese sandwiches=necessary existence.”
Libertarian’s argument together lots of hand waving and mumbo-jumbo
AND Poof, Presto we come to the astonishing conclusion that little green kumquats and grilled cheese sandwiches exist!
Well, we actually knew that to start with, since we admitted as much in the definition - and besides I’ve actually seen little green kumquats and grilled cheese sandwiches and I have never seen God.
Whoo hoo. Go peddle your “logic” to retarded chimps and microcephalic mice. They might actually buy it.
Yes, this is a much delayed response to an earlier post, but it had to be said.
One thing I appreciate about your post is that your points reduce fairly easily to manageable units. What the above paragraph seems to boil down to is a protest about ambiguity and amphiboly. In other words, you find the definition in the proof to be vague and possibly allowing of multiple interpretations.
To the extent that that is true of any and every definition, I will gladly concede the point. When a biologist speaks of a living organism, I might press him for a definition of “life”. And in fact, if you search the Web, you will find that defining “life” is notoriously difficult and that various definitions exist, none of which satsify anyone thoroughly. In the end, I could insist that the biologist is assuming the existence of the thing he is studying by defining it as “that which I study”. But I would feel disingenuous in the process because, though I cannot define life precisely, I think I know intuitively what it is or at least what it must be.
I also can badger the biologist a different way, using a technique called “drilling down”. To do this, I will allow him any arbitrary definition of life, and then when he gives it to me, I will insist that he define each of the words that he used in defining life. And when he defines each of those words, I will insist on and quibble about definitions of each of the words in those definitions, and so on, until the poor biologist finds himself juggling a manifold of loose ends where the number of words he must define have increased by orders of magnitude. But I would feel like a cheat and a fraud if I did that. After all, the biologist could turn the same trick around to me and begin by insisting that I define “definition”.
In the end, there must be a place at which reasonable people agree to meet. If I define God as a Supreme Being, you can question whether I mean that God is a black woman who sings, or whether I mean that Justice Clarence Thomas is God, or whether I mean that God is a critter that can jump higher than any other. Or you can do as every credible logician has done who examines the ontological argument and understand it to mean a Being Who is capable of all possible capability.
Greatness in modality is not called greatness because of its cardinality, but because of its ordinality. Thus, we needn’t say that God is God because He can know four billion and one things whereas Cecil Adams can know only four billion things. We say that God is God because He can know all that can be known. This is a conceptualizaton of an ideal. We accord it an arbitrary maximum. Necessity does not mean existence in X number of worlds, but merely existence in every world.
Finally, you say that I have not proved that necessary existence (the greatest possible existence) exists. I can prove it. Certainly, I hesitate to do so since that might open a whole slew of worm cans and unleash yet another barage of analogies and left-field protests. But because you impress me as sincere, I will give you the proof here. (I’d like to take credit for it, but I can’t. It is a routine proof that is so common that its attribution is lost.)
(!= means “not equal to”)
Hypothesis:
[symbol]"[/symbol]x[symbol]$[/symbol]y(y = x) (Necessary existence exists)
Inference 1: (x = x) -> ~[symbol]"[/symbol]y(y != x) (Law of the Excluded Middle by contraposition)
Inference 2: (x = x) -> [symbol][/symbol]y(y = x) (follows from Inference 1 and the definition of [symbol][/symbol]
Inference 3: [symbol]$[/symbol]y(y = x) (from Axiom 1 and Inference 2 by modus ponens)
Inference 4: [symbol]$[/symbol]y(y = x) (from Inference 3 by the Derived Rule of Necessitation)
Inference 5: [symbol]"[/symbol]x[symbol]$[/symbol]y(y = x) (from Inference 4 by The Rule of Generalization)
QED
I don’t expect that proof to satisfy people who already are convinced that logic is smoke and mirrors, but I certainly expect it to satisfy people like you. I therefore respectfully request that you allow the formation of a tableau that speaks of necessary existence or Supreme Being.
You may call it any term you like. “God” seems the most appropriate to me. If you decide to call it “cucumber”, then that’s fine, so long as by “cucumber” you agree always to mean “necessary existence” and not a vegetable. After all, you don’t want to equivocate.
God is shown to be a “true value” (I’m assuming that by true value, you mean actual as opposed to merely possible or necessary) only at the conclusion of the argument. And unless you can show how the modus ponens was misapplied in the final inference, then you are compelled by all that is reasonable to accept the conclusion. Modal logic deals with possibility and necessity as well as actuality.
<>G means that it is possible that God exists
G means that it is necessary that God exists
G means that God actually exists
The conclusion of the argument is unambiguous. It means that God actually exists. In this world.
Do not confuse physical existence with the existence of truth, and whatever you do, please don’t be so naive as to consider the former somehow superior to the latter. I mean, talk about tautologies and contradictions! Note that when you assert that the moon exists, you are making a statement. :eek: In fact, if you say anything at all about anything, then you merely are making a declaration that there is truth.
The moon is not true. Only statements about the moon are true (or false). The moon is the moon. It isn’t a part of any world. Note that if you say, “The moon is part of this world”, then you have not affected the moon in any way, but merely have made an observation about it. And if you say, “The moon exists”, then it is your statment (not the moon) that is either true or false.
The purpose of logic is not to be the universe, but simply to make observations about it. You can prove (and disprove) the existence of more things that you cannot see than things that you can. The distance between the earth and the moon is no less real than either the earth or the moon, and yet that distance is ultimately defined with something that you cannot see, but that Peano has proved to be true: 1 + 1 = 2.
By defining as real only that which your senses (themselves tautological elements of what you perceive) can tell you about is to rip away from reality any and all legitimacy. You rob yourself of even saying that there IS a moon. You can be blind, dumb, and deaf and still be a viable, thinking, and significant entity. You aren’t significant just because the rest of us can see, taste, and smell you. You are significant because you exist — quite independently of our senses.
Existence is not itself intrinsic to the universe. The moon exists merely and solely because you say it does and can prove it. Without your logic, the moon’s existence is moot.
Much of what you’ve said, I’ve already commented on (as you can see), so I’ll move on to your next paragraph.
The final inference in the argument, G, is not some idealized concept like our definition is. It is demonstrable, unambiguous, and final proof that God exists in actuality.
Please understand that the materialist logician, Dr. Dougherty, who heaved a heavy and said that it was with great regret that he conceded that God exists, understood fully what it was that he was conceding — not some vague, mysterious, Platonic notion of godness, but rather, a real, actual, honest-to-goodness entity that is capable of every possible capability and that exists in reality.
That’s why I find it to be so humorous when assertions are made that the proof implies nothing of significance. From where I sit, the existence of a Being Who can do anything that can be done, Who can know anything that can be known, and Who generally is capable of anything possible — I can’t think of anything more significant. Particularly so when I have unequivocal personal evidence (though I didn’t for many years) that said Being takes a personal interest in my life. Of course, that has nothing to do with the modal tableau, but the discussion long ago jumped over that fence.
Make no mistake. If you thought that the implication of the proof was that there is some nebulous notion that is describable but not actualizable, then you find yourself in the position of facing something much more wonderful (or terrible) than you had imagined.
I see that your last paragraph is basically a summary of those before it. And I cannot think of a point that I have not addressed. If you believe that I still have been slack in responding to you, please let me know, and please specify in what way. Otherwise, I hope that, even if we still disagree for whatever reason, you will be satisfied that I have made amends.
Lib, mate: Can I repost a portion of something I posted on page one, which you may not have seen as a request for clarification (which is fair enough, it doesn’t now look like one to me)
What I want to know is whether you assert that the proof means that it is a being with these properties (which make for supremacy in some world) that is necessary in all worlds or whether it is necessary that a being supreme to each world is necessary. I rather suppose you mean the second, but I’m not sure I get why. Why is it that the description of the Being rather than the attributes of It that is necessary in all worlds?
I appreciate your carefully measured response. I hope that, if you read my posts to Phoenix, you will see that I have sufficiently addressed most of the concerns that you expressed with respect to equivocation, with respect to how <>G is derived from G = G, and with respect to what I think the proof proves.
You’re entitled to think that I’ve equivocated, but I hope you won’t. Although I’ll be the first to admit that I do make errors, I assure you that I do make a meticulous effort to separate formal discourse from informal. Owing to the nature of the beast, I am encountering much more informal input than formal.
I do understand that there’s a difference between saying that (1) God’s existence must be possible because he is defined as the greatest possible being (that’s English) and (2) God’s existence is possible because other statements about God’s existence would lead to a contradiction (that’s Logic). If I cross one with the other, it certainly isn’t intentional (as you were gracious enough to acknowledge).
You’re certainly entitled to reject <>G, but it seems to me that, in so doing, you must also reject the definition of God. And if you do, I would appreciate hearing what you might believe to be a more appropriate definition than Supreme (necessary) Being (existence).
Frankly, it is the implication of the proof — G — that I would imagine a materialist would find most unsettling. And I can sympathize with what might be his ensuing struggle to find a hole somewhere, anywhere, in order to avoid that conclusion. But at the end of the day, the materialist who accepts the conclusion (or else shows a logical fallacy by the rules of logic) is the materialist who will merit my respect.
He may reject altogether my own idea of God as I understand Him. He may say that the God of the Bible is nothing like the God presented here. And he may say that his concession that God exists — whether as the universe itself, or as some entity in the universe that can jump higher than all others, or some other interpretation — is a trifling thing without significance to his personal life. He can say all these things, and I will still respect him.
But if he says that the proof is invalid or unsound simply because he doesn’t want to believe its conclusion, then he leaves me no choice but to pity him and wish that he weren’t ignorant.
I resent that. I think you’re doing the same thing “creation scientists” do. You use a little bit of complicated sounding science or math to throw a patch in the gaping whole of your argument.
I can see no other choice than your full awareness of your fallacious reasoning. You would have to be aware of it to dodge it so effectively.
You’re witnessing. You’re knowingly presenting a flawed product that does not live up to the claims you make for it. In short, you’re selling snake oil.
If seeing that makes me a chimp, than “ooga-ooga.” It’s not really me that’s in question. I’ll be the chimp. That’s fine.
You ain’t fooling us chimps and mice though. Maybe the fact that so many people are pointing to the same fallacy oughtta give you pause.
I hope that I understand your question, but I’m not sure that I do. I’ll attempt to answer based on my understanding. Let me know if I leave you high and dry. Perhaps, at the very least, my response will lead you, by your own demonstrated good sense, to your answer.
Possibility is contingent; necessity is not.
For example, the statement “A = A” is a necessary statement. It is true in every possible world. A world without identity is impossible, since truth in that world would have no meaning. It would be a world of contradiction, where even false statements are provably “true”. Syllogisms like this would hold:
Tom is a rat’s ass.
Nabisco eats wax.
Therefore, the number seven hates Russians.
On the other hand, the statement “the ratio of the circumference to the radius of a circle is 2(Pi)” is merely possible. Its truth is contingent upon a world with flat planes. A circle drawn on a saddle could have a ratio much greater than 2(Pi), while a circle drawn on a sphere could have a ratio much less.
Thus, because God’s existence is necessary, there exists every possible world that manifests His capabilities. In a world with one and only one true statement, God knows the truth of that statement. And in a world with infinitely many true statements, God (with equal effortlessness) knows the truth of them all. His existence is not contingent on the worlds (that would contradict His definition); rather, the existence of the worlds are contingent on His existence.
You might think that we could get around this by defining God some other way, some way besides G. But we can’t, because then we cannot even derive our first axiom. Let’s cardinalize the concept just for the sake of discussion.
If World A has 3 things that can be known and 2 things that can be done, then God knows all 3 things and can do all 2 things. If, meanwhile, World B has the reverse, 2 things that can be known and 3 things that can be done, then God knows all 2 things and can do all 3 things.
Modality also deals with accessibility among worlds, so that the question arises, “Can God do all 3 of the things in World A that He can do in World B?” And the answer is no. There are only 2 things in world A that can be done, so God cannot do 3 things there.
“Ah ha!” someone might say, “then isn’t His capability contingent upon what the worlds will allow?” And the answer is no. God can still do both 3 things and 2 things.
So, you see that cardinality is irrelevant. God can do whatever can be done. Did this come close to answering your question?
With all due respect, jumping out from behind bushes and making faces at me does not constitute rebuttal. The argument is simple. It has one definition, one axiom, and five inferences. It is time for you to point out specifically what you perceive as a logical fallacy, or else do everyone here the courtesy of shutting up.
Libertarian, would you please find the guts to stand up and admit to the world that you have proved nothing?
You set up the conditions, you made the definitions, and then you make an argument that agrees with the definitions you laid out. It is a circular argument.
You have found a most complicated way of saying “God exists, I told you so, so there.”
BTW:
I really hope you weren’t likening me or Scylla (or any of the other disenters) to retarded chimps and microcephalic mice. That would really be below the standards of GD.
Interesting. I’m clearer on where you’re coming from, but I’m still uneasy (although your second-last para in post #2323624 makes me happier about what you think this thread can be). Now, you’re going to laugh, because it’s a terribly materialist thing to say, but
makes my head spin. How many true statements are there? Isn’t that at least two? I’m still hung up on what qualifies as a possible world.
—You’re certainly entitled to reject <>G, but it seems to me that, in so doing, you must also reject the definition of God. And if you do, I would appreciate hearing what you might believe to be a more appropriate definition than Supreme (necessary) Being (existence).—
The problem is, when most people say “God is possible,” they don’t mean “God, the necessarily existing being, is possible.” Not even most theists think this.
And personally, it’s not the concept of God that’s troubling me (and, I would think, others, despite what you keep initimating about their characters) but rather the concept of something simply possessing a necessary existence (why? how?). While I can see modal logics validity in demonstrating that something is necessarily true in all possible worlds, I don’t see how this can work with existence. I guess I don’t agree that we can say for sure that anything can have a necessary existence.
If you meld the premises here, you get the plain english “It is possible that [necessary existence] exists.” But I don’t think “possible” in that sentance can be using the modal sense of “possible” (exists/is true in some possible world), because we are already talking about one set of all possible worlds vs. another set.
