Your argument, of course, is classic. The support for it is either:
X isn’t bad, it’s only how people use X, or
X is bad, but it’s too dangerous just to leave in the hands of just one country, or
X might be bad, but someone would have to prove it to me, first.
X is bad, but we’re discussing X not to cause it, but to stop it.
Happily for you, it’s quite easy to justify saying anything you want by selectively choosing from the above. (Whether X is food, Internet security, or atomic weapons.)
Unhappily, terrorists can use the same arguments to obtain information.
Your approach puts the burden of proof on those who are trying to limit sensitive information, not on criminals. Eventually, the government may come along and stop the information from being distributed (as they did with certain things after 9/11). By then, of course, it’s largely too late.
I had an interesting conversation with a local bookseller who I’d been on good terms with for years about why he needed to sell a book detailing how to pick locks. His answer (apart from “I can make a buck”) was that sometimes people had legitimate reasons to pick locks. He was not concerned that it was also very useful to thieves.
This is how security professionals view the matter: not discussing what security measures are is the first line of defense against attack.
I have heard from people I know that you can lock a Stinger onto a lit cigarette in cool weather at close range. I personally have locked onto a remote control model airplane within 300 feet of my position. (Both instances used Tracking Head Trainers, with no rocket or warhead, so no danger involved.) The Stinger seeker head routinely locks onto helicopters and propellor planes at normal engagement ranges, but I cannot tell you what the engine/cowling temperatures would be. A larger, hotter source makes it easier as the distance increases, of course, but it certainly does not have to be a jet.
I can only assume a performance out of the SA-7b at a lower, but reasonably similar temperature threshold.
Two other anecdotes, if anybody cares to bear with me on this particular subject. (I do realize that only a percentage of people with doubts will be swayed.)
When I was researching the space station data system I was given the task of establishing what the load and bandwidth might look like. At the time, they didn’t even know the basic space station configuration. After asking around for some days, and getting nothing I could work with, it suddenly occurred to me that submarines must have a very similar, self-contained communications system. Excited, I went immediately to my friends at the NASA library and asked for books on submarine communications. I was told: I wouldn’t be able to find the detailed information I needed in any library. Apparently there’s a lockdown on this sort of submarine information.
So. I was denied information that very probably could have helped space station development in a small way. But, I realized this also made it much more difficult for people hostile to the US to get the information. It was a price that had to be paid.
Other anecdote/comment. The military is constantly frustrated by military buddies, and friends of military buddies casually disclosing confidential information. When confronted with the indiscretion, they’ll often be heard to say something like “Everybody knows that, how could the enemy use it?” or “I was only telling people I trust.” The point is, that it isn’t up to you to decide what the enemy can use.
Broadly, answering phreesh question: anything that deals with methods of attacking groups of people, or methods of avoiding attack to groups of people should not be discussed in public forums.
The information is marginally interesting to the general public, yet highly useful to terrorists. Balance the gain vs. the loss.
partly_warmer’s arguments, and those debating that point, are reminiscent of an old debate amongst locksmiths: is it irresponsible to publish the details of lock construction and the techniques of lock picking? The one side says, “Of course it’s irresponsible, thieves can read it and learn how to break into houses!” The other side says, “We are required to publish it to disclose to the public the effectiveness of the locks we sell. Thieves already know how to pick locks, we’re not telling them anything new.”
Yes. Probably more than you, judging by your posts.
A “lightweight” weapon that can be fired from a man’s shoulder, desiged to take out aircraft (and before you have a hissy-fit, it was discussed in much more detail over the last couple days in Time, Newsweek, US & World Report, New York Times, Washington Post, USA Today, Chicago Sun-Times, Chicago Tribune, and the BBC on-line service. And those are just the ones I’ve read.
On the black market? Anyone with the money. Since exact number would distress you, Partly_Warmer I’ll just say that about a 1/4 of what I spend on flying in a year will buy one.
But, if you HAD been reading the news, you’d know it wasn’t a Stinger that was fired, but a Russian-made (or copied from the design) SA-7. Even so, of the many many Stingers supplied to the Afghans when they were fighting the Russians, at least 400 are unaccounted for. Caches of SA-7’s were discovered in Afghanistan over the past year or so. A training video produced by Al-Quaeda was discovered, a training video that detailed how to use, maintain, and fire these missles. So, not only do these folks already have these weapons, they know how to use them and apparently have even had some practice at it.
What I can’t figure out is how they missed. Which is why I suspect the Isrealis might already have anti-missle technology on board their airplanes.
Anything with an engine.
As a rule of thumb (I am told) the guy firing the missile needs to be within 3-5 miles of the target. Thus, such an exclusion zone would prevent a terrorist from firing on a departing or arriving airplane.
It would also, as a side effect, bring aviation to a screeching halt.
What are the TRUE aims of these people? (We can talk about that, right?):
Kill “Americans”, especially, but pretty much anyone who isn’t them.
Disrupt the economies of the “Americans” and their allies (which they have specifically named at times) to soften us up.
To that end - yeah, taking out a jetliner full of people accomplishes #1. But - here’s the important point - they don’t have to kill ANYONE to accomplish #2. They’ve already done it.
If people think it’s open season passenger jets - who’s going to fly? And what’s that going to do to the already shakey airlines? And what would that do to the economy of not just the US, but all the countries that use air travel extenstively?
And what about cargo? You want fresh fruits and vegees in the depths of winter? You need medical supplies quick? You need that Fed Ex package delivered?
What happens if air commerce, as a whole, becomes unreliable?
Yeah, it’s a big pain in the backside. Back to railroads and trucks and boats for everything.
And then they can shoot the missles at those (because they’ll work on anything with an engine…)
And, before you jump on my case, partly_warmer, terrorists have already fired on ocean frieghters in the last couple months. So I’m not giving anyone ideas here (except, perhaps, for you).
How old do you think that particular SA-7 was? That might explain its inability to track correctly.
So, we (pick one or more):
Develop and deploy, on every transport airplane, some kind of gee-whizz technology to shoot down a shoulder-fired missle within the 5-10 second window.
Place IR and/or IR/UV flares around a perimeter (neighbors are gonna love that) and hope we don’t miss a spot from which a shot could be taken.
Tell everybody to park their cars 20 miles from the runway, strip naked and get on a bus (which would have to be searched on every cycle), shut down air transport of anything large enough to conceal a weapon.
Issue uzis to everybody with instructions to shoot suspicious-looking people.
I like #4 - solves the immediate problem (which is making people FEEL secure) and, long-term, reduces degradation of the environment by eliminating people. What’s not to like?
By the way, folks - the military DOES have anti-missile counter measures developed for aircraft other than just fighters, and are currently installing it on things like cargo planes (after all, you have to get ammo to the front somehow…)
Cost estimates range from $2-5 million per jet. Possible? Certainly! But the cost of tickets will definitely go up, if such systems are required.
The above mentioned system is, I am told, automatic - no action required by the pilot. The system scans continually for signs of missle when activated, and deploys countermeasures automatically. Then thoughtfully informs the pilot(s) what it has done. Neat-o, huh?
Um… what do you mean by “conventional radar”?
Air traffic control uses two systems - one picks up everything, including flocks of birds, large buildings, and certain types of weather. Another system focuses on the transponder signals. Even in smaller airports, the radar feed allows the controller to switch modes, zoom in and out to a certain degree, and otherwise combine, manipulate, and filter signals to increase the usefulness of the information (I’ve been in airport control towers, but not the big TRACONS, which handle routing between airports and have even more stuff in them).
SOME, but by no means all, airplanes have systems that pick up other transponders. A lot of airplanes also have weather radar. I don’t think it would be that difficult to adapt the on-board radar systems used by the military to commercial aviation. (It’s not unusual for military aviation to filter down to civilian use - I could give numerous examples all the way back to WWII if anyone cares to listen).
But - probably not necessary, given the above systems already developed.
I suspect this would be no more or less a hazard than fuel dumping, chunks of porta-potty “blue ice”, and the occassional stray wheel or engine cowling that already drop in on airport neighbors from time to time. Flares, after all, are not Saturn V rockets. Cripes, considering what pops off in my neighborhood on the Fourth of July it’s a wonder we have set ourselves on fire already.
For darn sure, having a flare drop onto your yard is MUCH LESS a problem than significant chunks of a 757 that just blew up overhead.
Given that a certain minimum level of intelligence and dilligence is required to be an aircraft mechanic, I think those folks are up to the task of learning the job. They’re already maintaining some of the most complex and sophisticated machines ever built. As for the supply chain - you know those little masks that drop down and deliver emergency oxygen? The canisters supply those masks are already little potential bombs - remember the ValueJet crash in the Everglades. The airlines are already experienced at handling potential explosives beyond just the vast quantities of fuel they use.
Nope. We’ve already got automatics systems developed.
Anyhow, that’s like arguing the pilots have to remember to put the landing gear down at the end of the flight. And everything else on the checklist they have to take care of. Given that pilots, with the amount of time they spend in the air, are more likely to be on board a targeted flight than the average citizen, they most certainly DO have incentive to make sure the system operates properly.
So are the systems. They’ve been designed. They function without human intervention. They’ve been tested under combat conditions. Yes, the expense is considerable - but these systems HAVE been available to civilians for some time, usually the high-end business jets, heads of state, etc. Certification would not be a show-stopper, given incentive. The FAA can push things through quickly when there’s need.
Sorry to rain on your parade, Mort Furd, but you can’t install stuff at an airport without FAA approval. My local airport just took two years to put through the paperwork to install new pavement and a better lighting system - and that’s for stuff already certified.
Also, I think you’re underestimating the number of airports. Or are you planning to protect just the big passenger airports? If you protect just the hubs, that’s what, 30-40? But if you include all the significant cargo hubs, feeders, and business airports - anything that can handle a Lear jet or bigger - you’re talking thousands of airports in just the lower 48 of the US.
If you “retro-fit” the airplanes, you do have the advantage that the protection follows you wherever you go - including internationally, to areas where the airports might not be anti-missle equipped.
You know, I can think of simple and effective means of defeating 1, 2, and 4 with easily obtainable technology that, aside from a Stinger or SA-7 or the like, is 50 and more years old. Very reliable, available world-wide, costs less than the missle itself.
{Relax, partly_warmer, that one I am NOT going to detail any further).
There ARE proposed counter-measures in place for that, but they’re largely untested.
Don’t you love vagueness? It stays that vague. As a pilot, it is not in my self-interest to give further details.
No, you have to mount the anti-missle technology on the airplanes themselves. I can’t see any alternative that will be truly effective long-term.
I picked the “Stinger” intentionally because the book I cited from 1991 suggested indirectly it was not far from obsolete.
Talk about the aims of terrorists? Absolutely. Would they change their goals to make them more effective because we thought they were misguided?
I agree with your points 1 and 2. I’d add something from a RAND report, which suggested that one reason terrorists kill is to create a group identity: “We kill, therefore we are.”
However, I dispute the idea that you can know the effect your comments have on other people. There are surely less intelligent and less knowledgable people on the Internet than you. Some small few are also terrorists.
To be honest to the thread, I don’t quite see why a conversation of the following sort doesn’t suggest helping the terrorists:
Person A: Why can’t we protect airplanes with X?
Person B: They tried that in Israel, and it didn’t work.
Person A: Why not, won’t X protect all planes within 10 miles?
Person B: The effective range of countermeasure X is more like 7 miles, in practice.
Person A: So X actually does not work between 7-10 miles, when the airlines think it does? Thanks!
ANY information about destroying or protecting airplanes can potentially used by terrorists.
Any information found in this thread can also be used by non-terrorists to make a threat assessment that does not depend on the politicians, spy agencies, and media moguls. Remember, those are the folks who screwed up so badly by burying the information about early terrorist attempts to ram jetliners into buildings. Had that particular threat been more a part of the public consciousness, we might have been able to forge the political will required to take a few precautions before being confronted with the unthinkable. The secrecy proponents on your side of this “debate” have cost more than a few hundred innocent people their lives as well. Perhaps they died easier not ever knowing that the gun was loaded ?
**
“So are the systems. They’ve been designed. They function without human intervention. They’ve been tested under combat conditions. Yes, the expense is considerable - but these systems HAVE been available to civilians for some time, usually the high-end business jets, heads of state, etc. Certification would not be a show-stopper, given incentive. The FAA can push things through quickly when there’s need.”
**
then
**
“You know, I can think of simple and effective means of defeating 1, 2, and 4 with easily obtainable technology that, aside from a Stinger or SA-7 or the like, is 50 and more years old. Very reliable, available world-wide, costs less than the missle itself.”
**
So, do these whizz-bang systems work, or are they easily defeated? We are still talking about modern shoulder-fired anti-aircraft IR-seekers, right?
And - the military technology we aren’t identifying (souped-up flares, as recently shown on a C-130 gunship?) - at what range are they effective? At 1 mile pointed at the tail of a transport going 80 mph on takeoff roll? Hell, a WWII recoiless rifle on a jeep should be able to get that shot - flares, jamming, and (whatever) not withstanding.
I’ll have to buzz by SFO and see if they’ve evacuated all the houses, hotels, businesses, commercial and industrial buildings under the primary and cross-wind approaches and departures. I’m sure they’re working on it…
p.s. - don’t forget about mortars - how hardened are the fuel dumps?
Terrorists have better ways of getting information than by reading the SDMB. The discussion here may continue without fear of telling them something they are going to use against us. If you disagree with my assessment, then you may complain about it in the BBQ Pit, but not in GQ.
This thread (indeed this whole forum) is reserved for discussion of the facts, not discussion of the suitability of discussing the facts.
Sorry, HappyHeathen, in the excitement of an “A-HA!” experience I miss typed. It should be 2, 3 and 4 are easily defeated.
The point is… no ground-based system can provide adequate protection for a reason that, once it occurred to me, was blindingly obvious. But apparently is not obvious to most other folks. I suspect it’s because non-pilots have certain unconcious assumptions about the aviation environment that just aren’t so.
It also, finally, makes sense about some things the TSA have been asking pilots to be on the look out for since September of 2001.
The anti-missle defense systems have to be mounted on the airplanes themselves. Otherwise, you might as well not spend the money at all.
That’s like saying “Well, if we’re likely to face 20,000 enemy troops, there’s no need to have our soldiers carry more than 20,000 rounds of ammunition.” or something.
It’s not as if 1 missile = 1 dead plane, and you just throw both resources into a pile and take them out of play. Soldiers need an umbrella of protection against attack aircraft, and doing that requires the deployment of missiles to lots of troops that will never fire them in anger. The idea that we can keep 600 missiles, and that somehow, the right 600 people will get them and take out 600 planes, while the rest never get attacked, is silly.
And if you advocate securing the stockpiles, then why do they need to be reduced?
Besides, in modern terms, ramping up production takes a LONG time relative to the speed of war. If we don’t have weapons stockpiled, and have to rebuild a manufacturing base, you can rest assured that they’re not going to be available for fighting any time soon.
This seems reasonable, in the sense that questioning the validity of the question itself is something of a hijack. So, your concern is understood, acknowledged, and appreciated.
I don’t imagine most people are receptive to the notion that anything at all they say should be restricted. Since it’s a wildly unpopular thesis, so I doubt I’ll ever start a thread on the subject. If I did, I’d hope it wouldn’t immediately be seen as material for The Pit.
Yes, but I doubt you want to leave the system active at all times. I expect you still have to arm it before take off and landing and disarm once you are at altitude and again after landing. I have no doubt that the pilots can deal with it - as you say they deal with much more difficult things. It is simply another point on the check list. No sweat.
The concern I have is just the logistics of getting it into the check list in the first place - and of course, the training on what to do when the system tells you it is fending off an attack. Do you continue on course, do you abort the takeoff. Do you go ahead and complete your landing or pull up and wait for an all clear from ATC before trying again? That is the kind of thing I’m thinking of.
The type that shows everything, not just the stuff with transponders.
I was talking about onboard the planes.
OK, so most planes don’t have transponder based radar, not all have what I was calling “conventional” radar. Even on the ones that have it, I doubt that a radar system designed to pick up weather and birds would be up to tracking a missile.
Again, probably a moot point anyway if you use the flare ejector system you mentioned above.
We’re talking magnesium flares here - they are just a tad different from your Fourth of July fireworks. I will grant you, though, that I’d rather have flares falling than pieces of a shot down 747.
My concern is not with side effects when the system kicks in and saves lives. My concern was with false triggers that get flares dumped to no advantage. Once again, though, a moot point if the system is mature enough not to have glitches. Of course, the terrorists could then take to firing missiles at air liners just to get them to dump flares and fuck up air and ground traffic around the airport.
Right-o. I’m not concerned with them being capable of it, just about the additional training that will take time and cost money - that and getting maintenance schedules modified to include maintenance of the ejector system and replacement of flares. Pyrotechnics generally have a limited life, so they will need replacing even if none have been used. Which brings up to the next point:
Right you are. The airlines have procedures in place to deal with this kind of thing. They also have safe storage for the oxygen cylinders and the explosive stuff used to blow the doors off and whatever it is that they have in place to inflate the life rafts. If you add flares to the mix, then you’ve got to have a new storage facility. You’ve got to add personnel to manage the facility and equipment for the handling and transport of the flares. I mean, do you really want magnesium flares stored together with oxygen bottles or transported together?
How thoroughly have they be tested in non-combat conditions?
I know you have to get FAA approval to put things on the ground at an airport. I am assuming, though, that the approval process for a piece of ground equipment is not as stringent as the process for equipment that actually gets taken onboard.
I wasn’t thinking of the smaller planes. It would be tragic if a small plane gets shot down, of course, but it won’t cause the kind of damage and loss of life that potting a 747 on take off from O’Hare would.
That is an advantage, although it is my under standing that individual aircraft generally stay more or less on one route. Still, though, you can’t force foreign aircraft to have flare ejectors installed. It doesn’t matter whose airplane it is. If it gets shot down it still kills people and makes a mess.
Your latest post has gotten me curious, so now I’m trying to figure out what, other than the narrow field of view of the missiles, would make a ground based system completely useless. Granted, popping up flares from the ground won’t be terribly useful. I just don’t understand why a ground based IR jammer like a modified Nemesis wouldn’t work.
It should be noted that all of the stingers we gave the Afghanis in the 80s, even if they still have them, will be useless. I won’t say any more than that they require very specialized maintenance at certain intervals, and the system will quickly fail without them.
If I say any more, I’m sure I’ll be reported to the CIA.
Shit. Got it. Fuck. Fuck. Fuck.
OK. Nemesis on the plane it is. That, and catching each and every one of the fucktards before they get around to doing something nasty.
Damn.
